U S Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Minden Seafood L L C et al

Filing 10

ORDER AND REASONS granting #5 Motion to Transfer; Case transferred to Western District of Louisiana. Signed by Judge Barry W Ashe on 03/11/2025.(go) [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 3/11/2025.]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CIVIL ACTION

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

NO. 24-2360
VERSUS
SECTION M (4)
MINDEN SEAFOOD, LLC, et al.
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss for improper venue, or alternatively, to transfer this
case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Shreveport Division,
filed by defendants Minden Seafood, LLC and Dorcheat Seafood, LLC (together, “Defendants”).1
Plaintiff United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”) responds in
opposition,2 and Defendants reply in further support of their motion.3 Having considered the
parties’ memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court grants the motion to transfer the
case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Shreveport Division.
I.

BACKGROUND
This case concerns sex discrimination claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 by the EEOC on behalf of
Tiffany Frankel.4 In 2011, Frankel began working as a waitress at Defendants’ Dorcheat Seafood
restaurant.5 She became a cashier at Defendants’ Minden Seafood location in 2018.6 In February
2021, Ledderick “Bubba” Edwards started working with Frankel at Minden Seafood.7 Soon after,
1

R. Doc. 5.
R. Doc. 8.
3
R. Doc. 9.
4
R. Doc. 1 at 1.
5
Id. at 3.
6
Id.
7
Id.
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Edwards began sexually harassing Frankel by making unwanted and inappropriate comments
about her body.8 Edwards escalated the harassment and began sexually propositioning Frankel by
insinuating that he would pay her bills if she would have sex with him.9 Prior to November 2021,
Frankel told one or more co-workers about Edwards’s behavior, which co-workers in turn told
Defendants’ sole proprietor and general manager, Jeremy Wesson.10 In November 2021, Edwards
followed Frankel into a bathroom where he exposed himself to her and made a lude, inappropriate
comment, which caused Frankel to fear that Edwards would rape her.11 Frankel contacted the
police and Edwards was arrested.12 The next day, Frankel complained to Wesson about Edwards’s
conduct and requested that he not be permitted to work at the same time that she was scheduled.13
Wesson did not heed Frankel’s request or take any other appropriate steps to remedy the situation.14
Frankel worked at Minden Seafood with Edwards for three more days during which time Edwards
continued to harass Frankel, including showing her cash and asking her to sleep with him, which
Frankel interpreted as an offer of payment for sex.15 On November 15, 2021, Frankel resigned her
position with Defendants because she feared for her safety due to Edwards’s behavior.16 Two days
later Frankel told Wesson that she was pressing charges against Edwards and asked to return to
work at Dorcheat Seafood, where Edwards did not work.17 Wesson declined her request.18

8

Id. at 3-4. Edwards also allegedly harassed other female co-workers during the same period. Id. at 4.
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 5.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
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Frankel then filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC alleging that Minden Seafood
violated Title VII.19 On August 30, 2023, the EEOC issued to Defendants a letter of determination
finding reasonable cause to believe that they violated Title VII and inviting them to join with the
EEOC in informal methods of conciliation to try to eliminate the unlawful employment practices
and provide relief to Frankel.20 The EEOC communicated with Defendants to provide the
opportunity to remedy the discriminatory practices described in the determination letter.21 On
October 13, 2023, the EEOC issued to Defendants a notice of conciliation failure.22 Then, on
September 27, 2024, the EEOC filed the instant action against Defendants, alleging that they
violated Title VII by subjecting Frankel to a hostile work environment because of her sex,
terminating her because of her sex, and retaliating against her by not rehiring her because she
engaged in an activity protected by Title VII.23 Although the events giving rise to this lawsuit
occurred in the Western District of Louisiana, the EEOC alleged that venue is proper in the Eastern
District of Louisiana pursuant to Title VII’s special venue provision, which states that –
[e]ach United States district court and each United States court of a place subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought
under this subchapter. Such an action may be brought in any judicial district in the
State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been
committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such
practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the
aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment
practice, but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action
may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal
office. For purposes of sections 1404 and 1406 of Title 28, the judicial district in
which the respondent has his principal office shall in all cases be considered a
district in which the action might have been brought.

19

Id. at 3.
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 1-9.
20

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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). The EEOC contends that this statute allows a Title VII case to be
brought in any judicial district in the state where the unlawful employment practice is alleged to
have been committed, which here, is Louisiana.24
II.

PENDING MOTION
Defendants move to dismiss, or alternatively, to transfer this matter due to improper

venue.25 They argue that, pursuant to certain rules of statutory interpretation, § 2000e-5(f)(3)
should be read narrowly to permit filing only in a judicial district where (1) the unlawful
employment practice is alleged to have been committed, (2) the employment records are
maintained and administered, or (3) the charging party worked.26 Alternatively, Defendants argue
that this case should be transferred because the factors outlined in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501 (1947), weigh in favor of transfer to the Western District of Louisiana.27 Defendants
argue that all four private interest factors – (1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof, (2)
the availability of compulsory process, (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses, and (4) all
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive – favor
transfer to the Western District of Louisiana where the underlying events occurred and the
documents, if any, and firsthand witnesses (including the complainant, alleged harasser, and
business owner) all reside.28 They also argue that three of the public interest factors – (1)
administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion, (2) familiarity of the forum with the law
that will govern the case, and (3) avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of law or in the
application of foreign law – are neutral, and that the fourth public interest factor – local interest in

24

Id. at 1; R. Doc. 8 at 2, 4-7.
R. Doc. 5.
26
R. Doc. 5-1 at 1, 5-12.
27
Id. at 13-18.
28
Id. at 14-17.
25

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having localized interests decided at home – favors transfer to the location where the underlying
events occurred.29
In opposition, the EEOC argues that the plain meaning of § 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title
VII action to be filed in any judicial district in the state where the unlawful employment practice
is alleged to have been committed (here, Louisiana).30 It also argues that Defendants have not met
their burden of proving that transfer is appropriate under the Gilbert factors.31 The EEOC argues
that the private interest factors weigh against transfer because (1) it has the relevant documents at
its office in New Orleans; (2) most unwilling witnesses would be subject to compulsory process
anywhere in Louisiana and any other unwilling witness can testify via Zoom; (3) the EEOC will
pay the cost of attendance for Frankel and the travel, lodging, and meals of any other witness it
commands to testify at trial; and (4) receiving testimony via Zoom can be used to make the trial
more cost effective and efficient.32 The EEOC argues that the public interest factors also weigh
against transfer because (1) on average, cases get to trial eight months faster in the Eastern District
than in the Western District; (2) the relevant interests of a Title VII claim are national, not regional
or more localized; (3) both forums are equally familiar with the law; and (4) there is no issue of
conflict of laws or application of foreign law.33
Defendants reply reasserting their position that venue in this case is only proper in the
Western District under the special venue provision.34

29

Id. at 14, 17-18.
R. Doc. 8 at 2, 4-7.
31
Id. at 11-26.
32
Id. at 13-23.
33
Id. at 23-27.
34
R. Doc. 9.
30

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III.

LAW & ANALYSIS
Defendants move for either dismissal or transfer due to improper venue. Because the Court

finds that transfer to the Western District of Louisiana is appropriate, it assumes, without deciding,
that venue is proper in the Eastern District of Louisiana pursuant to § 2000e-5(f)(3).
A. Legal Standard
Section 1404(a) provides that “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest
of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought.”35 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). A defendant seeking transfer must show “good
cause,” meaning the defendant “must satisfy the statutory requirements and clearly demonstrate
that a transfer is ‘for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.’” In re
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 2008). “Thus, when the transferee venue is
not clearly more convenient than the venue chosen by the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s choice should be
respected.” Id.
Courts apply the private and public interest factors originally set out in Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), when evaluating whether another district could be clearly more
convenient. In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315. As the Fifth Circuit has explained:
The private interest factors are: (1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof;
(2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3)
the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems
that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. The public interest
factors are: (1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the
local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of
the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of
unnecessary problems of conflict of laws or in the application of foreign law.

35

The parties do not dispute that this case could have been brought in the Western District of Louisiana. See
R. Doc. 8 at 11 n.7.

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Id. (quotations, internal citation, and alteration omitted). These factors are not necessarily
exhaustive or exclusive, and none has dispositive weight. Id.
B. Analysis
1. Private Interest Factors
a. Access to sources of proof
The first of the four private factors is access to sources of proof. The Fifth Circuit has
clarified:
The first factor focuses on the location of documents and physical evidence relating
to the case. The question is relative ease of access, not absolute ease of access.
That means this factor weighs in favor of transfer where the current district lacks
any evidence relating to the case. But when the vast majority of the evidence
is electronic, and therefore equally accessible in either forum, this factor bears less
strongly on the transfer analysis.
In re TikTok, 85 F.4th 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2023) (emphasis in original; quotations and alterations
omitted). Here, this factor appears to be neutral. Defendants say that any relevant documents,
including Frankel’s and Edwards’s employment records, would be housed at their office in
Minden.36 The EEOC claims, on the other hand, that Defendants have no documents because one
of the restaurants burned down, but the EEOC has its case file in New Orleans.37 What neither
party explains is the volume of the records and whether the vast majority are electronic, which
would make them equally accessible in either forum. Without such information, this Court will
deem the ease of access to sources of proof neutral.
b. Availability of compulsory process
The second private interest factor pertains to the availability of compulsory process to
procure the attendance of unwilling witnesses. A district court has subpoena power over a person

36
37

R. Doc. 5-1 at
R. Doc. 8 at 14.

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who “resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person” within 100 miles of the
location of the court or within the state in which the court sits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1)(A). It also
has subpoena power over a person who “resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in
person [within the state], if the person (i) is a party or a party’s officer; or (ii) is commanded to
attend a trial and would not incur substantial expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1)(B). As explained
by Defendants, all the witnesses with firsthand knowledge of the events giving rise to this lawsuit
reside in or near Minden, including Frankel, Wesson, Edwards, and Frankel’s co-workers and
healthcare providers.38 Minden is 387 miles from New Orleans. While this Court would have
subpoena power over Wesson and any of Frankel’s former co-workers who are still employed by
Defendants, its power to subpoena other witnesses from the Minden area depends on the expense
they would incur. See EEOC v. Am. Screening, LLC, 2022 WL 2177483, at *3 (E.D. La. June 14,
2022) (explaining that a corporate party’s employees can be compelled to testify at a trial anywhere
in the state, but that other witnesses who live near Shreveport may incur substantial expense and
thus not be subject to compulsory process). The Court finds that these other witnesses would incur
substantial expense if they were required to attend a trial in New Orleans, because the drive from
Minden to New Orlans is around five hours and gas is expensive, as are plane tickets. See id.
(reasoning likewise in case involving events that occurred in Shreveport, which is only 30 miles
from Minden). Thus, unwilling witnesses not employed by Defendants would be beyond this
Court’s subpoena power. See id. As noted in American Screening, “[w]hile it may be possible
for witnesses to testify by videoconference technology, there are benefits to in-person testimony,
including the ability to consider a witness’s body language and demeanor on the stand.” Id.
Moreover, although some witnesses (viz., the corporate parties’ employees) may be subject to

38

R. Doc. 5-1 at 15-16.

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compulsory process in this district, even they should not be unnecessarily subjected to substantial
travel expense and the parties should have the benefit of in-person testimony. Id. By contrast,
compulsory process is available for all currently identified witnesses if the case were transferred
to the Shreveport Division of the Western District. Accordingly, this factor favors transfer.
c. Cost of attendance for willing witnesses
The third private interest factor concerns the cost of attendance for willing witnesses. The
Fifth Circuit uses distance as an analogue for convenience. “When the distance between an
existing venue for trial of a matter and a proposed venue under § 1404(a) is more than 100 miles,
the factor of inconvenience to witnesses increases in direct relationship to the additional distance
to be traveled.” In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 204-05 (5th Cir. 2004). The Fifth Circuit
further explained:
Additional distance means additional travel time; additional travel time increases
the probability for meal and lodging expenses; and additional travel time with
overnight stays increases the time which these fact witnesses must be away from
their regular employment. Furthermore, the task of scheduling fact witnesses so as
to minimize the time when they are removed from their regular work or home
responsibilities gets increasingly difficult and complicated when the travel time
from their home or work site to the court facility is five or six hours one-way as
opposed to 30 minutes or an hour.
Id. at 205.
This factor favors transfer. As explained above, travel from Minden to New Orleans would
be expensive and virtual testimony is not always effective. Am. Screening, LLC, 2022 WL
2177483, at *4. Further, although the EEOC says that it would pay the travel expenses of Frankel
and any other witness it compels,39 this does not make up for the time those witnesses would be
removed from their regular work or home responsibilities, which would be more protracted and
complicated given that New Orleans is about a five-hour drive from Minden. The cost of
39

R. Doc. 8 at 20.

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attendance for willing witnesses is significantly mitigated by transfer to the federal court in
Shreveport.
d. Other practical problems
The fourth private interest factor, which encompasses “all other practical problems that
make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive,” In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315, weighs
in favor of transfer. As in American Screening, “[c]onsidering that a number of witnesses likely
live near Shreveport, holding the trial in Shreveport would promote efficiency by allowing
flexibility in the order of those witnesses’ testimony and by preventing delays due to technical
difficulties that might accompany virtual testimony in a trial elsewhere.” Am. Screening, LLC,
2022 WL 2177483, at *4.
2. Public Interest Factors
a. Court congestion
The first public interest factor, which concerns court congestion, is said to be the most
“speculative” of the Gilbert factors. See In re Clarke, 94 F.4th 502, 515-16 (5th Cir. 2024). Thus,
while the statistics cited by the EEOC show that cases get to trial a bit faster in this district than in
the Western District of Louisiana,40 this factor is neutral, or only weighs slightly against transfer,
because an estimate of court congestion, “at its core, is an uninformed guess.” Id..
b. Local interest
The second public interest factor is “the local interest in having localized interests decided
at home,” In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315, and has been explained by the Fifth Circuit this way:
[Courts] do not consider the parties’ connections to the venue because the local
interest analysis is a public interest factor. Accordingly, the local-interest inquiry
is concerned with the interest of non-party citizens in adjudicating the case.
Considerations such as the location of the injury, witnesses, and the plaintiff’s
40

R. Doc. 8 at 23-24.

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residence, are useful proxies for determining what local interests exist in each
venue.
In re Clarke, 94 F.4th at 511 (emphasis in original; footnote, quotation, internal citation, and
alteration omitted). Here, this factor strongly favors transfer because it is undisputed that the
alleged discrimination and harassment occurred in the Shreveport (Minden) area and involved
people who lived there at the time and a business that still operates there. Am. Screening, LLC,
2022 WL 2177483, at *4. Further, non-party citizens of the Western District certainly have a stake
in the adjudication of a case involving wrongs committed against their fellow citizen by businesses
in their district.
c. Familiarity with governing law
The third public interest factor evaluates the relative familiarity of the transferor and
transferee courts with the law that will govern the case. In this case, both parties agree that this
factor is neutral because both proposed venues are equally familiar with the federal law that
governs.41
d. Avoidance of conflicts of law or application of foreign law
The final public interest factor considers whether transfer would “avoid[] … unnecessary
problems of conflict of laws or in the application of foreign law.” In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at
315. In this case, both parties agree that this factor is neutral because there are no conflicts of law
or foreign law issues.42
*

41
42

*

*

See R. Docs. 5-1 at 18; 8 at 25.
See R. Docs. 5-1 at 18; 8 at 25.

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*

On balance, then, when the Gilbert factors are considered as a whole, Defendants have
demonstrated that the Western District of Louisiana is a “clearly more convenient” forum. In re
Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to transfer (R. Doc. 5) is GRANTED, and this

matter is TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana, Shreveport Division.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 11th day of March, 2025.

________________________________
BARRY W. ASHE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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