Boutin v. Newfield Exploration Co et al

Filing 451

MEMORANDUM RULING re 429 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, 429 Motion for New Trial. IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and/or New Trial is DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge C Michael Hill on 12/30/2010. (crt,Alexander, E)

B o u t i n v. Newfield Exploration Co et al

D o c . 451

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT W E S T E R N DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA B R A D BOUTIN, ET AL. VERSUS * * C I V I L NO. 07-0567 M A G I S T R A T E JUDGE HILL B Y CONSENT OF THE PARTIES

N E W F IE L D EXPLORATION CO., ET AL. *

M E M O R A N D U M RULING ON MOTION FOR J U D G M E N T AS A MATTER OF LAW AND/OR NEW TRIAL P e n d in g before the Court is the Motion and Order for Judgment as a Matter of Law a n d /o r New Trial on Behalf of Plaintiffs, Brad Boutin, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of the Minor Child, Christian Boutin, filed on October 14, 2010. [rec. doc. 429]. O n December 8, 2010, the Court held a hearing on the motion, after which I took it under a d v is e m e n t . For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED. B a c k gro u n d P la in tif f , Brad Boutin ("Boutin"), an employee of Island Operating, filed suit for in ju rie s sustained on September 20, 2006, while he was working aboard a satellite p r o d u c tio n platform owned by Newfield Exploration Company ("Newfield") in East C a m e r o n Block 286-A, approximately 80 miles south of Vermilion Parish, Louisiana.1 B o u tin was assigned to bring a nearby platform online, as well as to allow an employee of

"In evaluating such a motion, the court must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, drawing all factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and leaving credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts to the jury." U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Com'n v. Dizona, 594 F.3d 408, 413 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d 330, 300 (5th Cir. 1997)).

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E n v iro n m e n ta l and Safety Systems International, Inc. ("ESSI") to replace fog horns and n a v ig a tio n a l lights which had been damaged by Hurricane Katrina and/or Rita. A t the time of the accident, Bouton and an ESSI employee, Brett Ortego ("Ortego"), w e re the only individuals aboard the platform. As lead operator, Boutin was in charge and p rim a rily responsible for safety on the platform. In that capacity, he had stop work authority if he believed any unsafe condition existed. O n the day of the accident, Boutin and Ortego were jointly engaged in replacing a f o g h o rn on the lower deck of the platform. They decided that a portion of the main deck g ra tin g would be removed so that the foghorn could be lowered through the opening in the g ra tin g on the main deck, which was in the middle of the platform. While removing the d e c k grating by hand, the grating fell to the deck below, creating an open hole on the main deck. A metal safety barricade was available on the platform to protect workers from f a llin g into the hole. Boutin initially placed the safety barricade around the hole, but moved it off of the hole by himself on more than one occasion to reach a parts locker on the main p la tf o rm deck where tools and supplies were kept to work on production equipment. During the course of the job, Boutin went to retrieve shackles from the parts locker. When he did so, he accidently fell through the open hole, landing on the deck below. The b a rric a d e was not over the hole at that time. As a result of this accident, Boutin was left a p a ra p le g ic .

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O n February 28, 2007, Boutin filed a suit for his damages and loss of consortium for h i s minor child, Christian Boutin, against various defendants, including Newfield, Grasso P r o d u c tio n Management, Inc. ("Grasso"), ESSI and several insurance companies, in the 15 th Ju d icia l District, Vermilion Parish, State of Louisiana.2 Defendants removed the action to th is Court on March 26, 2007. A jury trial was held in this matter from August 30, 2010, through September 3, 2010. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Westchester Fire Insurance Company, as insurer of G ra ss o , and against plaintiffs, dismissing plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. A judgment c o n sis te n t with this verdict was entered by the Court on September 13, 2010. [rec. doc. 4 1 9 ]. O n October 14, 2010, plaintiffs filed the instant Judgment as a Matter of Law and/or N e w Trial. [rec. doc. 429]. Oral argument was held on December 8, 2010, after which the C o u rt took the matter under advisement. [rec. doc. 450]. S t a n d a r d for Judgment as a Matter of Law and New Trial R u le 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, as f o l lo w s : (a ) Judgment as a Matter of Law. (1 ) In General. If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally s u f f ic ie n t evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may: All defendants except Grasso were dismissed on motions for summary judgment or through voluntary dismissal by plaintiffs. 3
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(A ) resolve the issue against the party; and (B ) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or d e f e a te d only with a favorable finding on that issue. (2) Motion. A motion for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any tim e before the case is submitted to the jury. The motion must specify the ju d g m e n t sought and the law and facts that entitle the movant to the judgment. (emphasis added). J u d g m e n t as a matter of law is appropriate after "a party has been fully heard on an iss u e during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally s u f f ic ie n t evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue." Dizona, 594 F.3d at 413 (q u o tin g Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 50(a)). Although the court "should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to b e lie v e ", that is, the Court "should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as w e ll as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, a t least to the extent that the evidence comes from disinterested witnesses." Id. (quoting R e e ve s v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 1 0 5 (2000)). F o r a post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law, Rule 50 (b) provides as f o l lo w s : (b) Renewing the Motion After Trial; Alternative Motion for a New Trial. If th e court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made under R u le 50(a), the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury s u b je c t to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion. 4

N o later than 28 days after the entry of judgment--or if the motion addresses a ju ry issue not decided by a verdict, no later than 28 days after the jury was d is c h a rg e d --th e movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and may include an alternative or joint request for a new trial under Rule 5 9 . In ruling on the renewed motion, the court may: (1 ) allow judgment on the verdict, if the jury returned a verdict; (2 ) order a new trial; or (3 ) direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law. Rule 59 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (a ) In General. (1) Grounds for New Trial. The court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all o r some of the issues--and to any party--as follows: (A ) after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been g ra n te d in an action at law in federal court; . . . U p o n the conclusion of a jury trial, Fed R. Civ. Proc. 59 empowers the trial court, on m o tio n , to grant a new trial "for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court [.]" Deciding whether to grant a new trial is a matter " c o n fid e d almost entirely to the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court." Allied C h e m ic a l Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36, 101 S.Ct. 188, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980). A trial court "should not grant a new trial on evidentiary grounds unless the verdict is a g a in s t the great weight of the evidence." Carr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 312 F.3d 667, 670 (5 th Cir. 2002) (quoting Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 163 F.3d 265, 269 (5 th C ir.1 9 9 8 )). Even if substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict, the court may find that

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the weight of the evidence is against the verdict; however, the court cannot grant a new trial "simply because [the court] would have come to a different conclusion then the jury did." Peterson v. Wilson, 141 F.3d 573, 577 (5 th Cir.1998) (internal quotations omitted). L ik e w is e , "[t]he fact that there was conflicting testimony regarding causation and d a m a g e s is not grounds for a new trial." Dawson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 978 F.2d 205, 2 0 8 (5 th Cir.1992). "Where the jury could have reached a number of different conclusions, a ll of which would have sufficient support based on the evidence, the jury's findings will be u p h e ld ." Id. The court views the evidence "in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict . . . and [the verdict] must be affirmed unless . . . the court believes that reasonable persons c o u ld not arrive at a contrary decision." Id. (citing Jones v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 870 F.2d 9 8 2 , 986 (5 th Cir.1989). F u rth erm o re, "a trier of facts need not accept the opinion testimony of expert w itn e ss e s, even though uncontradicted." Griffin v. Missouri P.R. Co., 413 F.2d 9, 13 (5 th C ir.1 9 6 9 ) (quoting Boon Enterprises, Inc., v. Carstairs, 312 F.2d 323 (5 th Cir.1963)). In e v a lu a tin g expert testimony, jurors "have a right to use their own common sense and e x p e rie n c e and to draw all reasonable inferences from the physical facts and occurrences." R e m in g to n Arms Co. v. Wilkins, 387 F.2d 48, 54 (5 th Cir.1967). A n a ly sis A t the outset, defendant notes that plaintiff failed to bring a Rule 50 motion at trial b e f o re the verdict was reached. Accordingly, defendant argues, Boutin waived his right to re q u e s t judgment as a matter of law.

T h e record shows that plaintiff did not move for judgment as a matter of law prior to th e time that the case was submitted to the jury. Indeed, the record reflects that defendant m o v e d for judgment as a matter of law both at the close of plaintiff's case and at the close of its own evidence, before the case went to the jury. [rec. doc. 410]. However, plaintiff argues that the Court may excuse "technical compliance" when the p u rp o s e s of Rule 50 are satisfied. Generally, a party who fails to present a Rule 50 (a) m o tio n on an issue at the close of evidence waives both its right to present a Rule 50 (b) m o tio n after judgment and its right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. Navigant Consulting, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 508 F.3d 277, 288 (5 th Cir. 2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P . 50(b); Flowers v. Southern Regional Physician Services, Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 238 (5 th Cir. 2 0 0 1 ). However, Rule 50 (b) is construed liberally, and the court may excuse "technical n o n c o m p lia n c e " when the purposes of the rule are satisfied. Id. (citing Scottish Heritable T r u st, PLC v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 81 F.3d 606, 610 (5 th Cir.1996)). T h e two basic purposes of this rule are "to enable the trial court to re-examine the q u estio n of evidentiary insufficiency as a matter of law if the jury returns a verdict contrary to the movant, and to alert the opposing party to the insufficiency before the case is s u b m itte d to the jury." Id. (quoting MacArthur v. Univ. of Tex. Health Ctr., 45 F.3d 890, 8 9 7 (5 th Cir.1995)). In addition, a "defendant's objection to proposed jury instructions on g ro u n d s pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence issues it seeks to appeal may satisfy th e se purposes." Id. (quoting Scottish Heritable Trust, PLC, 81 F.3d at 610).

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B o u tin argues that both purposes have been satisfied. As to the first ground, plaintiff a ss e rts that the Court had the opportunity to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence when d e f e n d a n ts presented both of their motions for judgment as a matter of law during the trial. He contends that based on the Court's rulings and conduct, the Court "clearly indicated" that it would not grant sufficiency motions and intended to give the case to the jury. [rec. doc. 4 4 9 , p. 2; Tr. 765, 873]. Plaintiff further asserts that any such motion by him would have c o n stitu te d a "vain and useless act" that was not required. B o u tin 's basis for the instant motion is that the jury did not have a legally sufficient e v id e n tiary basis to find that Grasso was not liable for any percentage at fault in causing his d a m a g e s . [rec. doc. 429, p. 12]. Specifically, he asserts that the jury ignored "undisputed e v id e n c e " of Kevin Lafleur's negligence, finding that Boutin was solely at fault. Essentially, Boutin argues that Lafleur, a Grasso field foreman who was Boutin's supervisor o n the morning of the accident, sent Boutin to the production platform without enough m a n p o w e r. Because the platform did not have enough workers, he contends, it was unsafe f o r Boutin to do the job assigned, ultimately leading to his accident. T h e Court finds that defendant had more than adequate notice of the basis of plaintiff's argument in this case. Numerous motions in limine were filed directed to L a f leu r's conduct on or prior to the accident at issue, which motions were extensively b rie f ed and argued by the parties. The Court had two opportunities to re-examine the q u e stio n of evidentiary insufficiency as a matter of law when defendant urged and re-urged

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its motion for judgment as a matter of law. Clearly, defendant was alerted to plaintiff's a rg u m e n t for insufficiency before the case was submitted to the jury. Accordingly, based o n the specific circumstances in this case, the Court excuses plaintiff's technical n o n c o m p lia n c e with Rule 50. A s to the merits of Boutin's motion, the Court finds that the jury had a legally s u f f ic ie n t evidentiary basis to find for defendant in this case. While Boutin presented te stim o n y regarding Lafleur's actions in this case, the jury chose to believe that Boutin was re s p o n s ib le for causing his own injuries. The trial testimony shows that Boutin and Ortego decided to detach an old foghorn f ro m the cellar deck and replace it with a new foghorn which had been placed on the p ro d u c tio n deck. (Tr. 437). In order to do move the new foghorn to the deck below, they re m o v e d a hatch in the deck grating. After they removed the hatch, it fell to the cellar deck b e lo w , creating a hole in the production deck. (Tr. 439). In order to lower the new foghorn to the deck below, Boutin removed the barricade co m p letely off of the hole. (Tr. 440, 509). Boutin helped Ortego lower the new foghorn d o w n with a rope and place it onto the cellar deck, then returned up to the production deck to perform function testing. (Tr. 442, 783). A tool cabinet was located on the production deck. To get to the tool cabinet, Boutin h a d to slide the barricade which had been placed over the hole in the production deck out of th e way. (Tr. 444-45). Boutin testified that he had moved the barricade and slid it back over

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th e hole more than one time. (Tr. 446, 505-06). Boutin and Ortego's job was to install the new foghorn. (Tr. 420, 784). Boutin a d m itte d that he and Ortego were sufficient to install the new foghorn. (Tr. 489). Ortego te stif ie d that ESSI typically left the old foghorn on the platform because it took too much w o rk and time to remove it. However, Boutin wanted to remove the old foghorn from the p la tf o rm . Boutin decided to use the crane to get the old foghorn off of the deck. (Tr. 446, 499, 7 8 5 ). In order to use the crane, Boutin and Ortego had to open the hatch on the heliport. (Tr. 446). While operating the crane, Boutin realized that he needed a new shackle. (Tr. 7 8 8 , 790). Boutin stopped the crane, then came down from the helideck to the production p la tf o rm to get some shackles from the tool cabinet. (Tr. 446, 449, 790). After getting the shackles from the tool cabinet, Boutin fell through the hole on the p ro d u c tio n deck onto the deck below. (Tr. 449). Boutin said that he did not remember a n yth in g from the time that he came down to the toolbox until he was on the floor of the c e lla r deck. (Tr. 449). However, he testified that he had removed the barricade all of the w a y off of the hole in order to lift up the old foghorn. (Tr. 509). Additionally, the eyewitness, Ortego, testified that the barricade was not over the hole a t the time that Boutin fell. (Tr. 792-93). Grasso employee Tracy Richard, who was the first p e rso n to arrive at the platform after Boutin's fall, testified that the barricade was still in its sto ra g e position and not over the hole. (Tr. 866). Based on the evidence presented at trial, it

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w a s reasonable for the jury to have concluded that Boutin had fallen through the u n b a rr ic a d e d hole which he caused. Although Boutin argues that his accident would not have happened absent Lafleur's f a u lt for having sent him to do the job without enough manpower, the jury chose to believe that Boutin was responsible for his own injuries. As previously stated, the fact that there w a s conflicting testimony regarding causation and damages is not grounds for a new trial. D a w s o n , 978 F.2d at 208. Where the jury could have reached a number of different c o n c lu s io n s , all of which would have sufficient support based on the evidence, the jury's f in d in g s will be upheld. Id. Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the d ra w in g of legitimate inferences should be left to the jury. Dizona, 594 F.3d at 413. V ie w in g the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the Court finds that the verdict must be affirmed. The extensive evidence presented in this case was more th a n sufficient to uphold the jury's decision. Thus, the Court finds that the jury had a re a s o n a b le basis for its decision. Dawson, 978 F.2d at 208. N e x t, Boutin argues that the jury verdict was "tainted" by the instruction and closing a rg u m e n t on intervening cause. [rec. doc. 429, p. 17]. However, Boutin did not quote the in s tru c tio n or attach it to his brief. In any event, the Court finds that the instruction was p rop er under Louisiana law. (Tr. 926). F u r th e r, Boutin questions the Court's rulings on the Motion in Limine to Exclude T estim o n y of Robert Borison ("Borison") [rec. doc. 374], as and well as other evidentiary

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rulings. [rec. doc. 429, pp. 19-30]. This Court extensively considered the motion regarding B o ris o n both prior to and at the trial. In fact, the Court held a Daubert hearing in the middle o f trial, and allowed additional argument to clarify the scope of Borison's testimony. (Tr. 5 8 3 - 6 0 6 ; 616-21). As to the other evidentiary rulings, the Court has already addressed these a n d will not revisit them. Finally, Boutin argues that the Court erred in granting the motion for summary ju d g m e n t filed by Roclan Service & Supply, Inc. ("Roclan") [rec. doc. 429, p. 31]. The C o u rt has reviewed Judge Doherty's ruling, and found that it was well-reasoned and s u p p o rte d by established law. [rec. doc. 201]. Additionally, Boutin moved to dismiss Roclan f ro m this case with prejudice, which motion was granted. [rec. doc. 277, 285]. Thus, this c a n n o t be relitigated. C o n c lu s io n F o r the foregoing reasons; I T IS ORDERED that the Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and/or New Trial is DENIED. D e c e m b e r 30, 2010, Lafayette, Louisiana.