Price v. Porter

Filing 15

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 10 MOTION to Dismiss Judge Charles Porter filed by Charles Porter Objections to R&R due by 4/17/2009. Signed by Magistrate Judge C Michael Hill on 3/31/09. (crt,Roaix, G)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT W E S T E R N DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA K E L D A PRICE V ER SU S C H A R L E S PORTER C I V I L ACTION NO. 09-0176 J U D G E DOHERTY M A G I S T R A T E JUDGE HILL R E P O R T AND RECOMMENDATION P e n d in g before the court is the Motion to Dismiss filed by Sixteenth Judicial D is tric t Court Judge Charles Porter ("Judge Porter"). [rec. doc. 10]. By this Motion, J u d g e Porter seeks dismissal of this civil rights action purportedly filed pursuant to 42 U .S .C . § 1883 on grounds that the action is barred by the Rooker-Feldman and Younger a b s te n tio n doctrines, and also because he is judicially immune from suit. Pro se plaintiff, K e ld a Price ("Price"), has filed Opposition. The Motion has been referred to the u n d e rs ig n e d for report and recommendation. [rec. doc. 13]. For the following reasons, it is recommended that the defendant's Motion to D is m is s [rec. doc. 10] be GRANTED, and accordingly, that the instant civil rights action b e DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. S T A T E M E N T OF CLAIM B e f o re the court is a civil rights action filed in forma pauperis by pro se plaintiff, K e ld a Price, on January 16, 2009.1 In her Complaint, plaintiff complains that Judge P o r te r deprived her of her Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal
The action was originally filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, but w a s transferred to this court on February 2, 2009.
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p ro te c tio n when he presided over a case she had pending before him. More specifically, s h e complains that Judge Porter had previously been employed by her opponent and yet co n tin u ed to preside over the proceedings. Accordingly, she requests that this court " re m o v e and discipline Judge [Porter], make null and void his orders, provide any and all e q u ita b le relief, [and] any relief possible." It is not clear whether plaintiff's state court action is currently pending or whether th a t action has been resolved. However, for the reasons set forth below, in either in s ta n c e , plaintiff's action is subject to dismissal. LAW AND ANALYSIS I . Rooker-Feldman Doctrine B y this action, plaintiff seeks an order of this court declaring Judge Porter's Orders in a state court action pending before him null and void. To the extent that these Orders c o n stitu te adverse state court judgments entered against Price, the instant lawsuit c o n stitu tes an impermissible collaterally attack on these judgments in federal court. T h e Rooker-Feldman 2 doctrine holds that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to e n te rta in collateral attacks on state court judgments. A federal complainant cannot circu m v en t this jurisdictional limitation by asserting claims not raised in state court p ro c e e d in g s or claims framed as original claims for relief. United Sates v. Shepherd, 23 F .3 d 923, 924 (5th Cir. 1994). If a state court errs, the judgment is not void, it is to be

See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 150, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); District of C o l u m b i a Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1311 & 1315, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983)

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re v ie w e d and corrected by the appropriate state appellate court. Thereafter, federal re c o u rs e is limited solely to an application for a writ of certiorari to the United States S u p re m e Court. Liedtke v. State Bar of Texas, 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994); See a ls o Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 2 8 1 , 296, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 1748, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970) ("lower federal courts possess no p o w e r whatever to sit in direct review of state court decisions."). The Rooker/Feldman doctrine holds that a party losing in state court is barred from s e e k in g what, in substance, would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United S ta te s District Court; inferior federal courts lack jurisdiction to exercise such review. Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 2654, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994); In re E r le w in e , 349 F.3d 205, 209 (5 th Cir. 2003). The fact that a plaintiff may have forfeited h e r rights to appeal the judgment at issue in state court proceedings does not circumvent th is rule. Shepherd, 23 F.3d at 925. Further, if a federal district court is confronted with issues that are "inextricably in ter tw in e d " with a state court judgment, the court is, in essence, being called upon to re v ie w the state court decision; the originality of the district court's jurisdiction precludes s u c h a review. Shepherd, 23 F.3d at 924. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes not o n ly review of adjudications of the state's highest court, but also the decisions of its lower c o u r ts . Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Virginia, 122 F.3d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 1997) citing

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P o r t. Auth. Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Port Authority of N.Y. and N.J. Police, 973 F.2d 1 6 9 , 177 (3d Cir. 1992). U n d e r the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Fifth Circuit has consistently rejected c h a llen g e s to state court proceedings based on alleged constitutional violations of state c o u r t judges in those proceedings. Chrissy F. by Medley v. Mississippi Dept. of Public W e lfa r e , 995 F.2d 595 (5 th Cir. 1993) (challenge to a state custody rulings by a state C h a n c e ry Court judge and Youth Court referee); Sookma v. Millard, 151 Fed.Appx. 299 (5 th Cir. 2005) (challenge to divorce and custody decree based on alleged conspiracy b e tw e e n litigants and presiding state court judges); Williams v. Liberty Mutual, 2005 WL 7 7 6 1 7 0 (5 th Cir. 2005); Glatzer v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 108 Fed.Appx. 204 (5 th Cir. 2 0 0 4 ); Larrew v. Barnes, 87 Fed.Appx. 407 (5 th Cir. 2004); Bell v. Valdez, 207 Fed.Appx. 6 5 7 (5 th Cir. 200) citing Wijas v. Nelson, 1994 WL 117988, at *1 (7th Cir.1994) (un p u b lish e d ) (suit challenging divorce proceedings against ex-wife and presiding judge), P ilk in g to n v. Pilkington, 389 F.2d 32 (8th Cir.1968), Carlock v. Williams, 1999 WL 4 5 4 8 8 0 (6th Cir.1999) (unpublished) (same holding), Shqeir v. Martin, 1997 WL 587482, a t *2 (N.D.Tex.1997) (§ 1983 claim against judge in state divorce proceeding dismissed u n d er Rooker-Feldman as "seeking a reversal" of the divorce court proceeding "under the g u is e of a civil rights action") and Logan v. Lillie, 965 F.Supp. 695, 699 n. 6 (E .D .P a .1 9 9 7 ) ("The Court's decision is consistent with the clear trend of case authority h o ld in g that actions brought under §§ 1983 and 1985 but which are bottomed on claims 4

o f constitutional violations arising out of state court child custody proceedings are `in e x tric a b ly intertwined' with such custody proceedings and therefore are barred under th e Rooker-Feldman doctrine from the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts."); G ilb e rt v. Gunja, 184 Fed.Appx. 817 (5 th Cir. 1999); Hatter v. Brinkman, 124 F.3d 193 (5 th Cir. 1997); Williams v. Landmark Exploration, 68 F.3d 465 (5 th Cir. 1995). A review of the allegations in Price's complaint reveals that this suit is " in e x tr ic a b l y intertwined" with the state court's judgments which were apparently adverse to Price. See Shepherd, 23 F.3d at 924 and Feldman, 460 U.S. at 1416, S.Ct. at 483. Therefore, this court is clearly without jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's challenge. Price e x p re ss ly seeks a reversal of the rulings made by the state court and new adjudication of th e issues presented in her state court suit. Clearly, plaintiff's request for relief, stripped to essentials, is a collateral attack on the adverse judgments of Judge Porter of the L o u isia n a Sixteenth Judicial District Court. The present civil action is "inextricably in te rtw in e d " with those judgments. Plaintiff's sole federal recourse is with the United S ta te s Supreme Court on application for writ of certiorari; she has no recourse in this f e d e ra l district court. I I . Mandamus Relief T h is court also lacks jurisdiction to issue an order to the Sixteenth Judicial District C o u rt requiring the state court to remove and discipline Judge Porter. Federal courts lack ju ris d ic tio n to issue orders to a state court to act upon a case pending before it. Moye v. 5

C le r k , DeKalb County Superior Court, 474 F.2d 1275, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973) (a federal c o u rt lacks the general power to issue writs of mandamus to direct state courts and their jud icial officers in the performance of their duties) citing Lamar v. 118th Judicial District C o u r t of Texas, 440 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1971) and Haggard v. Tennessee, 421 F.2d 1384 (6 th Cir. 1970). III. Younger Abstention To the extent that Price's state court action is currently pending, it is well settled that federal courts should not interfere in ongoing state court proceedings except in very e x t ra o r d in a r y situations, not established in this case 3 , based upon principles of federalism a n d comity. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971)4 ; S e e also Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 37, 54, 91 S.Ct. 764, 768 (1971) (applying
Courts may disregard the Younger doctrine only if one of the narrowly delineated exceptions to the d o c tr in e applies. These exceptions include cases where it is established that a state court criminal proceeding was b r o u g h t in bad faith or with the purpose of harassing the federal plaintiff, when a state statute is "flagrantly and p a t e n tly violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence, and paragraph, and in whatever m a n n e r and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it," or when application of the doctrine was waived. T e x a s Association of Business v. Earle, 388 F.3d 515, 519 (5 th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U . S . 82, 85, 91 S.Ct. 674, 677 (1971) (requiring that harassment and bad faith be proven for federal intervention into a pending state criminal prosecution); Ballard v. Wilson, 856 F.2d 1568, 1570-1571 (5 th Cir. 1988) (same); W ig h tm a n v. Texas Supreme Court, 84 F.3d 188, 190-191 (5 th Cir. 1996) (requiring more than mere allegations of b a d faith for application of the bad faith/harassment exception); Wilcox v. Miller, 691 F.2d 739, 741 (5 th Cir. 1982). S e e also Granger v. Slade, 90 Fed.Appx. 741 (5 th Cir. 2004). None of these exceptions have been shown to apply in t h i s case. The Supreme Court's decision was grounded on principles of equity and on notions of comity, to which it g a v e the name, "Our Federalism". "Our Federalism" represents a "system in which there is sensitivity to the le g i tim a t e interests of both State and National governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not u n d u ly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States." Id. at 44, and at 750. The notion of comity "includes a p r o p e r respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a union of separate s t a t e governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their i n s t i tu t i o n s are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways." Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U.S. 423, 431-32, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2520-21 (1991).
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Y o u n g e r to claims for declaratory relief). The Younger abstention doctrine "is generally d ee m ed appropriate [when] assumption of jurisdiction by a federal court would interfere w ith pending state proceedings, whether of a criminal, civil, or even administrative c h a r a c te r ." Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church, Inc. v. Morales, 986 F.2d 9 6 2 , 966 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 823, 114 S.Ct. 82, 126 L.Ed.2d 50 (1993). It is well settled that the Younger abstention doctrine is fully applicable even w h e re federal intervention would not bring the proceeding to a halt. "An equally s ig n if ic a n t dimension of the Younger holding is the respect for the integrity and c o m p e te n c e of state judicial officials in adjudicating constitutional issues before them." K r a m e r v. Metro-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Department, 822 F.Supp.1572, 1 5 7 4 (S.D. Fla. 1993) citing Wilson v. De Bruyn, 633 F.Supp. 1222, 1225 (W.D.N.Y. 1 9 8 6 ). The policy of equitable restraint expressed in Younger counsels against any f e d era l intervention in pending legal proceedings that could be interpreted "as reflecting n e g a tiv e ly on the state court's ability to enforce constitutional principles." Id. at 1573 c itin g Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 1208 (1975). In implementing the Younger policy of non-interference, federal courts must focus u p o n the practical impact of any potential ruling. See Ballard v. Wilson, 856 F.2d 1568, 1 5 7 0 (5th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit has stated that " we cannot ignore th e fact that any injunction or declaratory judgment issued by a federal court would affect th e course and outcome of the pending state proceedings ." Id. at 1570. Moreover the 7

F if th Circuit noted that, "a federal court ruling on the practices and procedures of the m u n ic ip a l court system . . . would require supervisory enforcement of the ruling by the f e d era l courts . This type of monitoring of state court procedures . . . offends principles of f e d era lis m and was condemned by the Supreme Court in O'Shea v. Littleton . . . ." Id. In so finding the Fifth Circuit favorably cited a Sixth Circuit decision "holding that where th e complaint alleges failure of some state judges properly to follow the law, a federal c o u rt will not enjoin the alleged unconstitutional practices even in the absence of a p e n d i n g state proceeding, since the relief sought would require monitoring of the judges' c o n d u c t." Id. citing Parker v. Turner, 626 F.2d 1, 9 (6th Cir.1980). With respect to Price's claims herein, this reasoning is compelling. It is simply not th e role of this Court to supervise a state court judge's handling of his judicial caseload. Plaintiff is requesting that this Louisiana federal court make declaratory and injunctive o rd e rs which would affect a potentially ongoing Louisiana state court proceeding. If this c o u rt granted declaratory, equitable or injunctive relief to Price, the court would become in e x tric a b ly intertwined with the daily administration of state judicial proceedings. However, the Younger doctrine prohibits this court from doing so. Accordingly, p la in tif f 's request for declaratory, equitable and injunctive relief with respect to any o n g o in g state court proceedings must be dismissed.

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IV . Judicial Immunity E v e n if plaintiff's claims against Judge Porter were not barred by the RookerF e ld m a n or Younger abstention doctrines, this suit must be dismissed because Judge P o rte r is entitled to absolute judicial immunity for his judicial acts as a Louisiana state c o u rt judge. Thus, plaintiff's claims are not cognizable in this court. State court judges e n jo y absolute judicial immunity from civil liability arising out of performance of their ju d ic ia l duties 5 , even if such judicial duties are taken in bad faith. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U .S . 9, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1 8 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1 9 7 8 ). This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and c o rr u p tly. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554, 87 S.Ct. at 1218. Moreover, disagreement with an a c tio n taken by a judge does not deprive the judge of his immunity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 3 6 3 , 98 S.Ct. at 1108. Additionally, a state court judge is absolutely immune from civil liab ility even if his exercise of authority is flawed by grave procedural errors or his failure to comply with the elementary principles of due process. Brandley v. Keeshan, 64 F.3d

Acts are judicial in nature if they are (1) normal judicial functions, (2) that occurred in the judge's court or c h a m b e r s and were (3) centered around a case pending before a judge. Mireles, supra; Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F . 2 d 387, 396-397 (5th Cir. 1982). Courts unanimously have found that a failure to recuse oneself is a judicial act f o r purposes of absolute judicial immunity. Shepherdson v. Nigro, 179 F.R.D. 150, 152 (E.D.Pa. 1998) citing C a l la h a n v. Rendlen, 806 F.2d 795, 796 (8 th Cir. 1986), Schiff v. Dorsey, 877 F.Supp. 73, 76 (D.Conn. 1994), Sato v . Plunkett, 154 F.R.D. 189, 191 (N.D.Ill. 1994), Font v. Dapena Yordan, 763 F.Supp. 680, 682 (D.P.R. 1991), I s e l e y v. Bucks County, 549 F.Supp. 160, 164-165 (E.D.Pa. 1982), Schafer v. Buhl, 1994 W L 669688, *2 ( W .D .M ic h . 1994) (decisions regarding recusal are "indisputably" judicial acts), and Kenard v. Nussbaum, 1988 W L 2 5 2 4 0 , *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Thus, "a judge is immune from suit on a claim predicated on his refusal or failure to r e c u s e himself in a case which he otherwise has jurisdiction to adjudicate, whatever his motive." Shepherdson, 179 F . R . D . at 152.

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1 9 6 , 200 (5th Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2 0 0 7 )6 ; Stump, 435 U.S. at 355-360 (reversing the appellate court's determination that the judge forfeited his immunity "because of his failure to comply with elementary p rin c ip le s of due process" because the court over which the judge presided was one of g e n e ra l jurisdiction and the judge therefore did not act in "the clear absence of ju risd ictio n " ). Although unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on occasion, "it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act on his own c o n v ic tio n s , without apprehension of personal consequences to himself." Mireles, 502 U .S . at 10, 112 S.Ct. at 287. "A judge will not be deprived of immunity because he was in error, took action maliciously or was in excess of his authority; rather he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction." Brandley, 64 F .3 d at 200; Young v. Biggers, 938 F.2d 565, 569 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1991). With respect to ju ris d ic tio n , the issue "is whether at the time [the judge] took the challenged action he had ju ris d ic tio n over the subject matter before him." Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57, 98 S.Ct. at 1105. Price alleges that Judge Porter acted without jurisdiction because of his alleged " sig n in g [of] Judgments directed to the Appellate Courts". However, as a Louisiana

Wallace holds that the statute of limitations on a § 1983 damage claim for false arrest begins to run at the tim e the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process.

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D istric t Court Judge, Judge Porter had original subject matter jurisdiction to hear all state c rim in a l and civil matters. La. Const. Art. 5 §16. Judge Porter was actively serving on th e state court bench at the time of plaintiff's lawsuit, and was exercising the authority v e ste d in him by the Constitution and statutory law of the State of Louisiana on cases p e n d in g before him in the court of general jurisdiction to which he was elected. Accordingly, it is clear that Judge Porter did not act "in the clear absence of all ju ri s d ic tio n " . Price suggests that Judge Porter is not entitled to immunity because his actions, in f a ilin g to recuse himself from presiding over her state court lawsuit, allegedly violated her rig h ts to due process and equal protection. Petitioner's argument is without merit. Allegations of alleged due process and equal protection violations do not defeat judicial im m u n ity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 355-360 (holding that a state court judge does not lose his a b so lu te immunity from civil liability when his actions are alleged to have deprived a litig a n t of due process); Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 303-304 (5th Cir.1980) (holding th a t judge was entitled to immunity even though delay by the judge in processing the p la in tif f 's criminal case amounted to a denial of due process), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1 9 8 1 ); Collie v. Kendall, 1999 WL 329737, *4-5 (N.D.Tex. 1999) ("the fact that [the ju d g e 's ] actions may have violated [the plaintiff's] procedural due process rights does not d e p riv e [the judge] of jurisdiction or judicial immunity."); Holeman v. Elliott, 732 F .S u p p . 726, 727 (S.D.Tex. 1990) (finding a judge judicially immune despite plaintiff's 11

c la im that the judge's actions in holding ex parte hearings deprived him of his right to due p ro c e ss ); Adams v. McIlhany, 593 F.Supp. 1025, 1029-1031 (N.D.Tex. 1984); Anderson v . City of Dallas, 116 Fed.Appx. 19, *10 (5 th Cir. 2004) (granting quasi-judicial immunity to administrative hearing officers against claims of equal protection violations); Hudson v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 101 Fed.Appx. 947 (5 th Cir. 2004) (noting that "[a]ny eq u al protection claims against the district court are barred by judicial immunity"); K r a u s e v. Leonard, 2009 WL 416284, *14 (S.D.Tex. 2009) (dismissing due process and eq u al protection claims against a judge on grounds of judicial immunity); Champluvier v. E v a n s, 2008 WL 2699796, *6 (N.D.Miss. 2008) (same). Rather, the sole inquiry is w h e th e r the judge acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction. Stump, Brandley, supra. As is discussed above, Judge Porter was acting within the scope of his jurisdiction and hence, h e is absolutely immune from suit notwithstanding plaintiff's allegations of alleged due p ro c e s s and equal protection violations. Because Price's claims against Judge Porter are directed at actions or inactions u n d e rta k e n in the performance of his judicial duties as a state court judge, plaintiff's suit is barred by the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. A c c o rd in g ly, IT IS RECOMMENDED the defendant's Motion to Dismiss [rec. d o c . 10] be GRANTED, and accordingly, that the instant civil rights action be D I S M I S S E D WITH PREJUDICE.

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U n d er the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 72(b), p a rties aggrieved by this recommendation have ten (10) business days from service of this re p o rt and recommendation to file specific, written objections with the clerk of court. A p a rty may respond to another party's objections within ten (10) days after being served w ith a copy thereof. Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the p r o p o s e d legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within ten (1 0 ) days following the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by F e d .R .C iv .P . 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual fin d in g s or the legal conclusions accepted by the District Court, except upon g r o u n d s of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F .3 d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996). T H U S DONE AND SIGNED in chambers at Lafayette, Louisiana, this 31 st day of M a rc h 2009.

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