Cormier et al vs. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government et al

Filing 102

RULING ON MOTION re 73 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Nolvey Stelly, Heather Martin, Chase Guidry, Shane M Mouton, Gary J Haynes, Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government IS GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patrick J Hanna on 11/08/11. (crt,Guidry, C)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
JOSEPH BOWMAN CORMIER, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:09-cv-0703

VERSUS

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HANNA

LAFAYETTE CITY PARISH
CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT,
ET AL.

BY CONSENT OF THE PARTIES

RULING ON MOTION
Currently pending is the motion for summary judgment filed by defendants
Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government (“the City”), Gary J. Haynes, Shane
M. Mouton, Heather Martin, Chase Guidry, and Nolvey Stelly, seeking dismissal of
the plaintiffs’ claims against them based on the Heck doctrine, qualified immunity,
and punitive damages. (Rec. Doc. 73). The moving defendants argue that the Heck
doctrine or, alternatively, the doctrine of qualified immunity, bars the plaintiffs’
claims. The moving defendants also seek dismissal of the plaintiffs’ punitive
damages claim. The motion is opposed. (Rec. Doc. 85). For the following reasons,
the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Two very different stories are told by the persons on each side of the
controversy presented in this lawsuit. According to the moving defendants, Lafayette

city police officers Heather Martin and Chase Guidry responded to an incident at a
vacant lot at the corner of South Pierce and West Simcoe Streets in Lafayette,
Louisiana, on April 29, 2008. Plaintiff Joseph Bowman Cormier, who has an
ownership interest in the lot, had called in a complaint concerning vagrants who were
trespassing, and the police were responding to the call. When they arrived, a female
witness, Melanie Green, stopped them and allegedly told them that a man she thought
was a police officer (Cormier) brandished a firearm, chased a man and pushed him
to the ground, and was cursing in a loud voice even after the man had fled on foot.1
When the officers approached Cormier and began to question him, he once again
began using profanities in a loud voice.2 When questioned, Cormier allegedly
admitted to striking a homeless man from behind, causing him to fall.3 Cormier was
not arrested at the time.
Greg Greer, who was the individual allegedly involved in the incident but was
not at the scene when the officers arrived, called 911 later that day to complain about
the incident.4 Officer Martin was dispatched to Greer’s location where Greer claimed

1

Rec. Doc. 73-5, at p.15.

2

Id.

3

Id., at p. 16.

4

Rec. Doc. 73-7.
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that Cormier had removed a handgun from the trunk of his car, and when he, Greer,
tried to flee, Cormier struck him from behind causing him to fall.5 According to the
defendants, Greer indicated that he wished to press charges.6
Later that same day, Cormier was at the police department and at that time,
allegedly based on Greer’s complaint, a misdemeanor summons for simple battery
was issued to Cormier by Officer Martin.7
Cormier’s version of these events is substantially different. In his verified
complaint, Cormier attests that he called the police on April 29 to report the
trespassers on his property. According to Cormier, Officer Martin saw the homeless
people when she arrived on scene but did nothing.8 Cormier left the location to go
to the police department to get a “no trespass” letter, and when he arrived he was
approached by Martin who asked him to come with her.9 According to the complaint:
Defendant Martin falsely arrested Petitioner Joseph Bowman Cormier
without probable cause, and by means of a false affidavit, falsely
accusing Petitioner Joseph Bowman Cormier of committing the crime
of simple battery against a homeless man named Greg Greer. At the
time, Defendant Martin informed Petitioner Joseph Bowman Cormier
5

Rec. Doc. 73-5, at p. 17.

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Rec. Doc. 1, at p. 6.

9

Rec. Doc. 1, at p. 7.
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that he was being arrested because he had admittedly pushed Greg
Greer. The illegal arrest occurred in the presence of Defendant Guidry
and defendant Lafayette Supervising Police Lt. Nolvey Stelly. . . .10
Cormier further contends that he was fingerprinted and booked on the hood of
Martin’s police cruiser and arrested on the public sidewalk outside the police
headquarters, causing him to be publicly humiliated.11
On or about May 5, 2008, Lafayette City Marshall Earl “Nickey” Picard
received, allegedly from an unknown source, a copy of Martin’s statement regarding
the events of April 29, together with copies of two witness statements and the
misdemeanor summons that was issued to Cormier on that day.12 Picard gave
Martin’s statement to a deputy city marshal, with instructions to deliver it to a local
television news anchor.13
On July 11, 2008, Cormier qualified to run against Nickey Picard for the post
of Lafayette City Marshal.14 The complaint alleges that, on July 21 or 22, the local
news anchor aired a story allegedly reporting that, based on an internal and
confidential police report, Cormier was charged with the misdemeanor criminal
10

Id.

11

Rec. Doc. 1, at pp. 7-8.

12

Rec. Doc. 59-3, at pp. 22-24.

13

Id.

14

Rec. Doc. 1, at 8.
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offense of simple battery but should have been charged with a felony count of
aggravated battery.15 According to the complaint, “[t]he news report falsely stated
that . . .Cormier had pulled a gun while jumping onto a man on his property, striking
the man in the back of the head.”16 At about the same time that the news story aired,
on July 22, 2008, the city prosecutor added an additional charge by bill of
information, charging Cormier with aggravated assault in connection with the April
2008 incident.17 No contemporaneous affidavit supporting the bill of information has
been located in the suit record.
When Cormier wrote to the police to complain of the news report, the Chief of
Police responded that Officer Martin and Lt. Stelly had released the information to
defendant Timothy Picard, Chief Deputy Marshal for the City and the son of Nickey
Picard.18 According to the complaint, Lt. Stelly and Timothy Picard are friends, and
Stelly arranged a meeting with Martin and Timothy Picard to discuss Cormier’s
arrest, which resulted in the disclosure of Martin’s illegally released and confidential
police report.19 During the course of this litigation, Nickey Picard admitted that he
15

Rec. Doc. 1, at pp. 8-11.

16

Rec. Doc. 1, at p. 9.

17

Rec. Doc. 73-5, at p. 31.

18

Rec. Doc. 1, at p. 10.

19

Rec. Doc. 1, at p. 10.
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gave Martin’s report to a deputy city marshal with instructions to deliver it to the
news media.20 On the eve of the election, the same news anchor again aired a report
concerning Cormier, allegedly reported that Cormier had been charged with
aggravated assault, and if elected and subsequently found guilty, would have to be
removed from office.21 Cormier was not successful in his bid for election, and Nickey
Picard was re-elected.
After the election, when the matter was called for trial in November 2008,
neither Mr. Greer nor the witness, Melanie Green, were able to be located to appear
for trial, and the battery and aggravated assault charges were dismissed.22 At the
same time, Cormier was charged by bill of information with one count of disturbing
the peace. Based on the affidavits of Martin and Stelly, however, the single charge
arose out of allegedly separate incidents on April 29 – Cormier’s actions at the vacant
lot and his actions at the police station later that day.23

20

Rec. Doc. 59-3, at pp. 22-24.

21

Rec. Doc. 1, at pp. 9-10.

22

Rec. Doc. 73-6, at p. 3.

23

Rec. Doc. 73-6, at pp. 2-3; Rec. Doc. 73-5, at pp. 32-34. The affidavits in support
of the arrest warrants, and therefore, presumably in support of the bill of information, were executed
by Officer Martin and Lt. Stelly on December 17, 2008, a month after the assault and battery charges
were dismissed and the new charge was set forth by bill of information.
-6-

On December 17, 2008, nine months after the incidents occurred, Stelly and
Martin executed affidavits for warrants of arrest with regard to Cormier and the
events of April 29, 2008. Stelly’s affidavit indicates that Cormier was arrested on
April 29, 2008 and that the charge was disturbing the peace under La. R.S. 14:103.24
Martin’s affidavit indicates that Cormier was arrested on April 29, 2008, and that the
charges were disturbing the peace, simple battery, and aggravated assault.25 On April
29, 2008, however, Cormier was merely issued a summons charging him with simple
battery. In April 2009, Cormier was convicted in Lafayette City Court on the charge
of disturbing the peace with regard to the incident at the vacant lot.26
In this lawsuit, which asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana
state law, Cormier alleges that, in connection with the April 2008 incident and the
news broadcast, his constitutionally-protected rights were violated by the
defendants.27 He seeks to recover damages he allegedly sustained as a result of his
having been falsely arrested, falsely prosecuted, and defamed. He claims that police

24

Rec. Doc. 73-5, at p. 34.

25

Rec. Doc. 73-5, at p. 33.

26

Rec. Doc. 73-4.

27

The defendants contend that the plaintiffs waived their claims under state law based
on the plaintiffs’ outline of claims (Rec. Doc. 58) submitted in response to the order of the district
court. (Rec. Doc. 55). The undersigned does not agree, based on the citation to Louisiana Civil
Code Article 2315 in Article III of the plaintiffs’ outline of claims.
-7-

officers Guidry, Martin, and Stelly, along with the city prosecutors, “engaged in a
conspiracy to violate his civil rights through his illegal arrest and malicious
prosecution for political gain” by assuring “Cormier’s defeat in the race against
Defendant Nickey Picard for City Marshal.”28 In his complaint, Cormier sued the
City, two city prosecutors, and three city police officers, as well as other individuals.
The City, the prosecutors, and the police officers now argue that the claims against
them are barred by the Heck doctrine. They alternatively argue that they are entitled
to summary judgment in their favor under the doctrine of qualified immunity.
Finally, they argue that the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover punitive damages.

ANALYSIS
A.

THE SCOPE OF THIS RULING

Although styled “Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Based on the
Heck Doctrine,” the instant motion (Rec. Doc. 73) actually seeks summary judgment
on three separate bases. First, the City, the prosecutors, and the police officers
contend that all claims against them are barred by the Heck doctrine. Second, or
alternatively, the City, the prosecutors, and the police officers contend that they are
entitled to qualified immunity with regard to all claims asserted against them in this
28

Rec. Doc. 1, at p. 14.
-8-

lawsuit. Third, the City, the prosecutors, and the police officers contend that the
plaintiffs’ punitive damages claims should be dismissed. This ruling will address all
three of those subjects.
A separate motion (Rec. Doc. 75) sought dismissal of the claims against the
prosecutors under the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. That motion was
granted in a separate ruling, and the plaintiffs’ claims against the prosecutors have
been dismissed.29 (Rec. Doc. 99, 100). Accordingly, the issues raised in the instant
motion (Rec. Doc. 73) will be analyzed only with regard to the plaintiffs’ claims
against the police officers and the City.

B.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment
is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A fact is material if proof of its
existence or nonexistence might affect the outcome of the lawsuit.30 A genuine issue

29

Rec. Doc. 98.

30

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Minter v. Great American
Insurance Co. of New York, 423 F.3d 460, 465 (5th Cir. 2005).
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of material fact exists if a reasonable jury could render a verdict for the nonmoving
party.31
The party seeking summary judgment has the initial responsibility of informing
the court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those parts of the record that it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.32 If the moving
party carries its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to
demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of a material fact.33 The evidence is
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,34 and all facts and
inferences are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.35 The
allegations in a verified complaint are competent summary judgment evidence.36
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the
burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by pointing out that

31

Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008), citing Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 252.
32

Washburn v. Harvey, 504 F.3d 505, 508 (5th Cir. 2007), citing Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
33

Id.

34

Gillis v. Louisiana, 294 F.3d 755, 758 (5th Cir. 2002).

35

Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008), citing Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
36

Hart v. Hairston, 343 F.3d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 2003).
-10-

there is insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's
claim.37 The motion should be granted if the non-moving party cannot produce
evidence to support an essential element of its claim.38

C.

THE HECK DOCTRINE

The City and the police officers contend that Cormier’s conviction on the
disturbing the peace charge precludes him from asserting a § 1983 claim with regard
to the simple battery and aggravated assault charges under the Heck doctrine. In Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the United States Supreme Court determined that:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional . . . imprisonment or for other harm caused
by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction
or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called
into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
The purpose of this doctrine is to avoid collateral attacks on valid convictions. If a
§ 1983 action would imply the invalidation of the plaintiff’s conviction, the complaint
should be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction has
37

Norwegian Bulk Transport A/S v. International Marine Terminals Partnership, 520
F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 2008), citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 325.
38

Condrey v. Suntrust Bank of Ga., 431 F.3d 191, 197 (5th Cir. 2005).
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already been expunged or reversed.39 On the other hand, however, when the
plaintiff’s § 1983 action, if successful, “will not inherently imply the nullification of
the criminal judgment against the Plaintiff, the action should be allowed to
proceed.”40
The City and the police officers contend that, since Cormier was convicted on
the disturbing the peace charge, Heck precludes him from challenging his prosecution
on the simple battery and aggravated assault charges that arose out of the same
incident despite the fact that the simple battery, aggravated assault, and disorderly
conduct charges were initiated at a different times and even though the battery and
assault charges were dismissed prior to trial.
To support that contention, the City and the police officers rely in large part on
the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1995). A close
reading of Wells reveals, however, that it is inapposite. Wells was arrested and
charged with resisting a search and disorderly conduct. The disorderly conduct
charge was dropped, and he was convicted of resisting the search. He then filed a §
1983 action, alleging false arrest, excessive force, and malicious prosecution. In

39

Arnold v. Town of Slaughter, No. 01-902-D, 2003 WL 25729166, at *1 (M.D. La.
Sept. 5, 2003), aff’d 100 Fed. App’x 321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 966 (2004), citing Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 477.
40

Id.
-12-

support of his § 1983 claims, Wells argued that the police lacked probable cause for
the arrest on either charge. Thus, he was contesting his conviction on the resisting
a search charge, and his § 1983 claims were clearly barred by Heck. As the court
said: “Wells’s § 1983 claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution are not
cognizable under Heck because each of these claims imply the invalidity of his
conviction.”41
In the instant case, the City and the police officers argue that even if there was
no probable cause to arrest Cormier for each of the crimes charged, proof of probable
cause to arrest him for a related offense triggers the Heck bar. In support of that
proposition, they cite Pfannstiel v. City of Marion42 and Arnold v. Town of
Slaughter.43

But that argument confuses two separate and distinct concepts.

Pfannstiel and Arnold stand for the proposition that a showing of probable cause for
an arrest is a substantive defense to a § 1983 claim for false arrest. But Heck bars the
assertion of a § 1983 claim of any sort when the claimant is attacking his criminal
conviction. Therefore, Pfannstiel and Arnold are inapplicable with regard to the
pending motion.

41

Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 96 (5th Cir. 1995).

42

Pfannstiel v. City of Marion, 918 F.2d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir. 1990)

43

Cited supra.
-13-

In the instant case, the plaintiffs are not attacking Cormier’s conviction on the
disturbing the peace claim of which he was convicted. They are arguing, instead, that
Cormier was falsely arrested, maliciously prosecuted, and defamed with regard to the
simple battery and aggravated assault claims that were dismissed. Once a claim has
been dismissed, the person charged may have a valid § 1983 claim.44

The

undersigned has found no authority for the proposition that any conviction
automatically triggers Heck and bars any potential § 1983 claim that might arise out
of the same underlying facts. Instead, the critical inquiry is whether the claimant’s
§ 1983 claims constitute a collateral attack on his conviction.
Cases in which it was determined that Heck bars § 1983 claims help to clarify
the issue. In Muller v. St. Tammany Parish, Muller was convicted on a charge of
false impersonation of a peace officer. He then brought a § 1983 action, alleging that
law enforcement officers falsified police reports and affidavits and illegally searched
his home and vehicle to obtain evidence used to prosecute him. His claims were
barred under Heck because “[a] claim of illegal search and seizure implicates the
validity of a criminal conviction where the conviction is based on evidence
discovered during that search or the resultant arrest.”45
44

Webb v. Parole Division, 234 F.3d 29 (5th Cir. 2000).

45

Muller v. St. Tammany Parish, No. 09-3362, 2010 WL 2464802, at * 11 (E.D. La.
Apr. 28, 2010).
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Similarly, in Connors v. Graves, the plaintiff pleaded guilty to discharging a
firearm from a motor vehicle, attempted simple burglary, and negligent injury. He
then filed a § 1983 action, alleging excessive force, unlawful seizure, and conspiracy
claims against the law enforcement officers. The court held that the Heck doctrine
barred those claims, “because success on those claims would necessarily impugn
Connors’s state criminal convictions . . . .”46
In the instant case, however, it is conceivable that Cormier’s conviction on the
disorderly conduct charge would not be challenged if he is ultimately successful on
his § 1983 claims. The disorderly conduct charge47 does not require evidence of “the
intentional use of force or violence”48 as the battery charge does nor does the
disorderly conduct charge require evidence of the involvement of a firearm or other
weapon as the aggravated assault charge does.49 Furthermore, the battery and assault

46

Connors v. Graves, 538 F.3d 373, 375 (5th Cir. 2008).

47

Cormier was charged with disturbing the peace and disorderly conduct under
Ordinance No. 62-38(a)(2) of the Code of Ordinances of the Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated
Government, which is defined as using unnecessarily loud, offensive, or insulting language in a
manner as would foreseeably disturb or alarm the public.
48

La. R.S. 14:33 (definition of battery under Louisiana state law); Ordinance No. 62-67
of Code of Ordinances of the Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government (definition of battery
under the City’s Code of Ordinances).
49

La. R.S. 14:37 (definition of aggravated assault); Ordinance No. 62-78(b) of Code
of Ordinances of the Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government (definition of aggravated
assault under the City’s Code of Ordinances).
-15-

claims were dismissed, and Cormier was not convicted on those charges. Therefore,
Cormier’s contention that he was falsely arrested, maliciously prosecuted, and
defamed with regard to the simple battery and aggravated assault charges does not
necessarily impugn his conviction on the disorderly conduct charge. Consequently,
the Heck doctrine does not bar the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims with regard to the battery
and assault claims. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on the Heck
doctrine is denied.

D.

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

The City and the police officers seek dismissal of the § 1983 claims against
them on the basis of qualified immunity.
[A] court applies a two-step analysis to determine whether
a defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the basis
of qualified immunity. First, we determine whether,
viewing the summary judgment evidence in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, the defendant violated the
plaintiffs constitutional rights. If not, [the] analysis ends.
If so, we next consider whether the defendant's actions
were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly
established law at the time of the conduct in question. To
make this determination, the court applies an objective
standard based on the viewpoint of a reasonable official in
light of the information then available to the defendant and

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the law that was clearly established at the time of the
defendant's actions.50
Applying this analysis, the Court finds that Officer Guidry is entitled to qualified
immunity but Officer Martin and Lt. Stelly are not.

A.

OFFICER GUIDRY
The first inquiry in the requisite analysis is whether the defendant violated the

plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The only allegations against Officer Guidry are that
he was a trainee at the scene of the April 2008 incident but played virtually no role
in deciding whether charges should be brought against Cormier or what those charges
should be. He was also allegedly present at the time of the arrest at the police station
in April 2008, but there is no allegation that he actually did anything beyond
observing the other police officers’ interaction with Cormier. While there are
allegations that Guidry testified falsely at the trial, that conduct would be protected
by the absolute immunity from civil liability afforded to witnesses in a criminal trial.51
Finally, there is no evidence linking Guidry to the release of information to the news
media. In summary, there is no evidence that anything he did violated the plaintiffs’

50

Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 410–11 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

51

Enlow v. Tishomingo County, 962 F.2d 501, 511 (5th Cir. 1992), citing Briscoe v.
LaHue, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 1121 (1983).
-17-

constitutional rights. Accordingly, Officer Guidry is entitled to qualified immunity,
and the claims against him will be dismissed with prejudice.

B.

OFFICER MARTIN

AND

LT. STELLY

With regard to Officer Martin and Lt. Stelly, however, a genuine dispute
concerning material facts precludes a finding that they are entitled to qualified
immunity. Officer Martin responded to the scene of the January 2008 incident, she
interviewed and obtained statements from the alleged victim Greg Greer and witness
Melanie Green, neither of whom showed up at the trial to confirm what they allegedly
stated to her, and she issued the battery summons to Cormier, after she obtained
information from Greer and Green. The parties concede that Cormier was “arrested”
when Martin issued the simple battery summons to him. If the arrest for simple
battery was made by Officer Martin without probable cause, then she violated
Cormier’s constitutional rights.
The defendants contend that there was probable cause for the issuance of a
simple battery summons to Cormier, arguing that the existence of probable cause
mandates a finding that Officer Martin is entitled to qualified immunity. Probable
cause exists “when the totality of the facts and circumstances within a police officer's
knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude
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that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.”52 Louisiana law
defines battery as “the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of
another,”53 and defines simple battery as “a battery committed without the consent of
the victim.”54 The City defines simple battery as “the intentional use of force or
violence upon the person of another, without the consent of the victim, committed
without a dangerous weapon.”55 Cormier contends in his verified complaint that he
was falsely accused of having battered Greer. When this is accepted as true, as it
must be at this time, there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether
Martin had probable cause to arrest Cormier on April 29. This is sufficient to
preclude summary judgment in Martin’s favor with regard to qualified immunity.
But there is more. Cormier also alleges that the police officers conspired to
violate his civil rights and to defame him in order to assure Nickey Picard’s reelection as City Marshal. According to Cormier’s complaint, he was told by the
City’s Chief of Police that Martin and Stelly released the information that was aired

52

Vance v. Nunnery, 137 F.3d 270, 276 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Levine, 80 F.3d
129, 132 (5th Cir. 1996).
53

La. R.S. 14:33.

54

La. R.S. 14:35.

55

Ordinance No. 62-67, Code of Ordinances of the Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated

Government.
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on television to the news anchorman.56 If there was, as alleged, a conspiracy to
interfere with Cormier’s candidacy and aid Picard’s campaign, then the release of
Martin’s statement to the media was an act in furtherance of that conspiracy. Cormier
alleged in his verified complaint that the information set forth in the statement, and
reported on TV, was false. In the television news reports, Cormier was first accused
of having committed aggravated battery and later accused of having committed
aggravated assault. The second news story allegedly suggested that if Cormier was
elected and subsequently found guilty on the aggravated assault charge, he would be
found guilty of committing a felony, and would have to be removed from office.57
Louisiana law does not recognize an independent cause of action for civil
conspiracy. Instead, Article 2324 of the Louisiana Civil Code states: “He who
conspires with another person to commit an intentional or wilful act is answerable,
in solido, with that person, for the damage cased by such act.”

Louisiana

jurisprudence is clear the actionable element of a civil conspiracy claim is not the
conspiracy itself but the underlying tort that the conspirators agree to perpetrate and

56

Rec. Doc. 1, at 10.

57

Rec. Doc. 1, at 9-10. It should be noted that although the December 2008 affidavits
for Cormier’s arrest reference state charges, Cormier was actually charged with violating City
ordinances, not with violating state laws. (Rec. Doc. 73-5, at 20, 31, 32). According to Ordinance
No. 62-2 of the City Code of Ordinances, any act or omission constituting a crime or offense that is
prohibited by a City ordinance is a misdemeanor.
-20-

actually commit in whole or in part.58 In this case, Cormier alleges that the police
officers conspired to defame him in order to assist with Nickey Picard’s political
campaign and derail his own. Under Louisiana law, a statement that imputes the
commission of a crime to another is defamatory per se; as a result, falsity and malice
are presumed.59
It is well settled that an injury to a person’s reputation, even if defamatory, is
not cognizable, standing alone, under § 1983. However, “damage to an individual’s
reputation as a result of defamatory statements made by a state actor, accompanied
by an infringement of some other interest, is actionable under § 1983.”60
The stigma prong of the “stigma-plus” test is satisfied when the plaintiff shows
that the stigma was cause by concrete, false assertions by a state actor.61 In this case,

58

Thomas v. North 40 Land Development, Inc., 2004-CA-0610 (La. App. 4th Cir.
01/26/2005), 894 So.2d 1160, 1174, citing Ross v. Conoco, Inc., 2002-0299 (La. 10/15/2002), 828
So.2d 546, 552.
59

See, e.g., Cluse v. H & E Equipment Services, Inc., 2009-574 (La. App. 3 Cir.
03/31/10), 34 So.3d 959, 969, writ denied, 2010-0994 (La. 09/17/2010), 45 So.3d 1043; Anders v.
Andrus, 2000-00332 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/06/2000), 773 So.2d 289, 293, writ denied, 2001-C-0066
(La. 03/23/2001), 788 So.2d 427; Redmond v. McCool, 582 So.2d 262, 265 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1991);
Trahan v. Ritterman, 368 So.2d 181 (La. App. 1 Cir.1979); Makofsky v. Cunningham, 576 F.2d
1223, 1236 n. 23 (5th Cir. 1978).
60

Texas v. Thompson, 70 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 1995), citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693, 710-712 (1976).
61

Texas v. Thompson, 70 F.3d at 392; San Jacinto Sav. & Loan v. Kacal, 928 F.2d 697,
701 (5 Cir. 1991).
th

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Cormier alleged in his verified complaint that he was accused in a false affidavit of
committing the crime of simple battery and that this false accusation was leaked to
the media, where the false accusation was repeated. These allegations must be taken
as true. Therefore, the stigma prong of the test is satisfied.
To satisfy the infringement prong of the test, there must be a showing that the
government sought to remove or significantly alter a life, liberty, or property interest
recognized and protected by state law or incorporated in the Bill of Rights.62
Although defamation, in itself, is not a constitutional tort, a false accusation of
wrongdoing, can be a link in a chain showing a deprivation of liberty or property.63
Such a link has been established in this case. Because of the defamation
(Martin’s statement which must be accepted as false), Cormier was arrested and
detained while being fingerprinted, booked, and served with a summons for simple
battery outside the Lafayette police department headquarters in April 2008. He was
again arrested when charged with aggravated assault in July or August 2008.
Assuming, as is required, that Cormier’s arrests on those charges were premised on

62

Texas v. Thompson, 70 F.3d at 392; San Jacinto Sav. & Loan v. Kacal, 928 F.2d at

701-02.
63

Doe v. Louisiana, 2 F.3d 1412, 1421 (5th Cir. 1993) (King, J., concurring), quoting
Mahoney v. Kesert, 976 F.2d 1054, 1060 (7th Cir. 1992).
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false statements by the police officers, then he was falsely deprived of a liberty
interest under the Fourth Amendment both times that he was arrested.
Additionally, although there is conflicting jurisprudence, it has been suggested
by at least one court that “[c]andidacy for public office is one form of political
activity within the protection of the first amendment.”64 If that is the case, then the
leak by Martin and Stelly of false information to the news media was a violation of
Cormier’s First Amendment right to seek political office and promote his own
candidacy.
Furthermore, both the public arrest outside the police headquarters and the
airing of false information via the media might be construed as violations of
Cormier’s right to privacy. Although there is no express right to privacy in the
United States Constitution, the Louisiana Constitution does contain such a provision.
It states: “Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of
privacy.”65 The Louisiana Supreme Court has described this right as the right to be

64

Hickman v. City of Dallas, 475 F.Supp. 137, 140 (N.D. Tex. 1979), citing Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
65

Article 1, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution.
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let alone and to be free from unnecessary public scrutiny.66 Thus, to the extent that
Cormier claims that he was stigmatized or, in his word, humiliated by being arrested
outside the police headquarters, as well as to the extent that he claims he was
stigmatized by the public scrutiny that resulted from having false statements about
him communicated by the police officers to the media and by the media to the public,
he has satisfied the infringement prong of the requisite analysis. Succinctly, Cormier
has established that he has a valid “stigma-plus” claim against the defendant police
officers, Martin and Stelly. With regard to both Martin and Stelly, then, viewing the
summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it appears that
the defendants violated Cormier’s constitutional rights. The first part of the qualified
immunity analysis weighs against affording immunity to these officers.
The second part of that analysis is whether the defendant's actions were
objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the conduct
in question. It is objectively unreasonable for any law enforcement officer to support
an arrest with a false statement or affidavit.67 Consequently, the second part of the

66

Capital City Press v. East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council, 96-C-1979 (La.
07/01/1997), 696 So.2d 562, 566.
67

Byers v. City of Eunice, 157 Fed. App’x 680, 683, 2005 WL 3228114, 3 (5th Cir.
2005); citing Blackwell v. Barton, 34 F.3d 298, 302-03 (5th Cir. 1994), and United States v. Cavazos,
288 F.3d 706, 709-10 (5th Cir. 2002).
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qualified immunity analysis also militates against affording immunity to these
officers.
The facts alleged by Cormier in his verified complaint must be accepted as true.
Those facts cannot be reconciled with the facts related by the defendant police
officers in their briefing. Therefore, there are disputed factual issues material to the
issues of probable cause and qualified immunity. Furthermore, when the allegations
of the complaint are accepted as true, Cormier has stated a valid stigma-plus claim
under § 1983, which precludes summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity
with regard to Martin and Stelly. The motion will be denied with regard to both of
them.

C.

THE CITY
The police officers were sued in their individual capacities and also in their

official capacities. A suit against a governmental official in his or her official
capacity is really a suit against the office or the government.68 Official capacity suits
generally represent another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an

68

See, e.g., Goodman v. Harris County, 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009), citing Monell
v. Dept. of Soc. Serv.'s of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978).
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officer is an agent.69 Therefore, the plaintiffs’ claims against the police officers in
their official capacities are actually claims against the City.
Municipal entities and local governing bodies do not enjoy immunity from suit,
either absolute or qualified, under § 1983.70 But the § 1983 claims against the City
are premised on the fact that the City employed the defendant police officers. Under
§ 1983, however, a municipality cannot be held vicariously liable for the conduct of
its employees, such as Officers Martin, Guidry, and Stelly.71 Municipal liability
under § 1983 requires “a policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of
constitutional rights whose moving force is the policy or custom”72 or, in other words,
action by the government itself. Therefore, in order to hold the City liable for the acts
of its employee police officers, the plaintiffs would have to show that the officers
were policymakers for the City.
The plaintiffs do not argue that the police officers were responsible for any
municipal policy, and no evidence has been presented in support of such a
proposition. Therefore, the undersigned finds that there is no basis for holding the
69

Monell v. New York, 436 U.S. at 691 n. 55.

70

Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 1999), citing Leatherman
v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993).
71

Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001); Bd. Of Comm'rs of
Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997).
72

Piotrowski v. Houston, 237 F.3d at 578, quoting Monell v. New York, 436 U.S. at 694.
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City liable for any actions of the defendant police officers that might have violated
§ 1983. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against the City, in its capacity as
the employer of the police officers, are dismissed.

E.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES CLAIMS
In their complaint, the plaintiffs indicated that they are seeking to recover

punitive damages. They did not claim punitive damages in their outline of claims that
was ordered by the district court, and they did not oppose the motion seeking to
dismiss the punitive damage claim. Therefore, the motion will be granted with regard
to punitive damages.
The United States Supreme Court has unequivocally held that a municipality
is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.73 Thus, to the extent that
the plaintiffs are seeking to recover punitive damages from the City, no such recovery
is permitted as a matter of law, and the motion will be granted on that basis as well.
To the extent that the plaintiffs seek an award of punitive damages on their
claims asserted under Louisiana state law, the motion for summary judgment will be
granted. It is well-settled Louisiana law that punitive damages are not allowed in

73

City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). See, also, Webster
v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 1220, 1230 (5th Cir. 1982); Hughes v. Gueydan Police Dept., No. 6:101570, 2010 WL 5625661, at *2 (W.D. La. Dec. 30, 2010).
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civil cases unless specifically provided for by statute. In the absence of such a
specific statutory provision, only compensatory damages may be recovered.74
Nowhere in the pleadings do the plaintiffs identify a statutory provision that allows
the recovery of punitive damages for the state-law claims that the plaintiffs assert
against any of the defendants. Accordingly, the moving defendants’ motion for
summary judgment will be granted with regard to the plaintiffs’ claims for punitive
damages with regard to the state-law claims.
Finally, to the extent that the defendants suggest in brief that the plaintiffs are
claiming punitive damages by seeking to recover attorneys’ fees and costs under §
1988 which may be awarded in the court’s discretion to a prevailing party,75 this
Court disagrees that the statutory remedy is for punitive damages, and the claim for
fees and costs is premature at this stage of the litigation and the motion will be
denied.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment
based on the Heck doctrine is denied. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment

74

See International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Seale, 518 So.2d 1039, 1041 (La.1988).

75

42 U.S.C. § 1988.
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on the basis of qualified immunity under § 1983 is granted with regard to Officer
Guidry, in his individual and official capacities, and the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims
against him are dismissed with prejudice. The defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on the basis of qualified immunity under § 1983 is denied with regard to
Officer Martin and Lt. Stelly, in their individual capacities. The defendants’ motion
for summary judgment with regard to the § 1983 claims asserted against the police
officers in their official capacities and against the City as the employer of the police
officers is granted, and those claims are dismissed with prejudice. Finally, the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment with regard to the plaintiffs’ punitive
damages claims is granted.
Signed at Lafayette, Louisiana, this 8th day of November 2011.

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