Guilbeau v. Wyeth Inc, et al

Filing 56

MEMORANDUM RULING re 33 MOTION to Sever filed by Pliva Inc, 43 MOTION to Sever filed by Teva Pharmaceuticals U S A Inc, 47 MOTION to Sever filed by Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. (crt,Alexander, E)

U N IT E D STATES DISTRICT COURT W E S T E R N DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA L A F A Y E T T E -O P E L O U S A S DIVISION Guilbeau, et al versus Wyeth, Inc., et al Civil Action No. 09-1652 Judge Tucker L. Melançon Magistrate Judge C. Michael Hill M E M O R A N D U M RULING B e fo re the Court is an unopposed 1 Motion to Sever filed by defendants Pliva, Inc. ("P liv a" ) [Rec. Doc. 33] and Motion(s) to Sever adopting the reasons stated in Pliva's M o tio n , filed by Teva Pharmaceutical USA, Inc. ("Teva") [Rec. Doc. 43] and Mutual P h a rm a c eu tic a l Co. Inc. ("Mutual") [Rec. Doc. 47]. For the reasons that follow, the motions w ill be granted. F A C T U A L ANALYSIS Plaintiffs Suzanne Guilbeau, Roberta Phillips, Brenda Richardson, Roy Steve, Sr., Brenda Steve, Jane Etta Stevens, and Eddy Sue Williams on behalf of Dolly Sue Williams ("plaintiffs") filed this action against defendants Wyeth, Inc., Schwarz Pharma, Inc., Barr Pharmeceuticals, Inc., Actavis, Inc. and Actavis Elizabeth LLC, Pliva, Inc., Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Watson Laboratories, Inc. and Duramed Pharmaceuticals, Inc.2 for alleged personal injuries they suffered as a result of being

The deadline to file any opposition to Pliva's motion to sever was May 5, 2010. See Local Rule 7.5 W. No opposition was filed. Thereafter, Teva and Mutual filed motions adopting the legal arguments contained in Pliva's motion. All defendants have filed answers to plaintiffs' complaints except Watson Laboratories, Inc. The record indicates that summons were issued to all defendants on February 19, 2010. R. 22. 1
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prescribed and ingesting Reglan, whose generic name is metoclopramid (hereinafter "Reglan/metoclopramid")3. Plaintiffs assert claims under the Louisiana Products Liability Act and state law negligence, alleging that defendants tested, developed, manufactured, labeled, marketed, distributed, promoted and/or sold either directly or indirectly Reglan/metoclopramid and are therefore liable for failure to adequately test and/or warn about the side effects of longterm use, failure to exercise reasonable care in the design and/or marketing of the drug, breach of express and implied warranties and intentional and negligent dissemination of misleading information. R. 1. O n April 14, 2010, Pliva filed this Motion to Sever plaintiffs' claims in order for P liv a to proceed separately, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20(a) and 21, on th e basis that: (1) plaintiffs' claims do not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence a n d do not involve common questions of law or fact; and (2) defendant will be prejudiced if the plaintiffs are allowed to proceed jointly in this case. R. 33. On May 3 and May 5, 2 0 1 0 , respectively, Teva and Mutual also filed motions to sever, adopting Pliva's legal a rg u m e n ts in its motion and memorandum in support. R. 43, 47. L A W AND ANALYSIS U n d e r Rule 21, a district court has "broad discretion" to sever improperly joined p a rtie s . Brunet v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 15 F.3d 500, 505 (5th Cir.1994); see also A n d e r s o n v. Red River Waterway Comm'n, 231 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir.2000). To

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved Reglan in 1980. In 1985, the FDA required that Reglan's label be updated to include a warning regarding the risk of developing tardive dyskinesia. In February 2009, the FDA issued a labeling revision for metoclopramide meant to warn of the risk of prolonged use, defined as use for more than 12 weeks. Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428, 430 (5th Cir. 2010). 2

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d e t e rm in e whether parties were properly joined under Rule 20(a), a district court must c o n sid e r (1) whether the right to relief arises "out of the same transaction, occurrence, or s e rie s of transactions or occurrences," and (2) whether there is a question of law or fact c o m m o n to all of the plaintiffs that will arise in the action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a). "Both re q u ire m e n ts must be met for the parties to be properly joined. See Porter v. Milliken & M ic h a e ls , Inc., 2000 WL 1059849, at * 1 (E.D.La. Aug. 1, 2000); see also Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: 7 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1653 (3d ed.). Furthermore, courts may consider whether settlement or judicial economy would be p ro m o te d , whether prejudice would be averted by severance, and whether different w itn e ss e s and documentary proof are required for separate claims." Adams v. Big Lots S to r e s, Inc., 2009 WL 2160430, 2 (E.D.La.,2009) (J. Vance). T h e Court finds that plaintiffs' claims do not arise out of the same transaction or o c c u rre n c e and have no common question of fact or law under Rule 20(a). The operative fa c ts under plaintiffs' claims are significantly different in that each plaintiff's claim in v o lv e s different medical histories, different courses of treatment and/or underlying c o n d itio n s , different prescribing physicians, different alleged periods of ingestion, d iffe re n t alleged injuries and different treatment options and risks. Consequently, each c a s e will require separate factual analysis as to medical causation and damages. See Gill v . Ethicon, Inc., (W.D. La. 2001) (J. Tremble). Further, plaintiffs' claims involve allegations against seven defendants, each of w h o m only manufactured the product ingested by one or two plaintiffs. Under the present

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p o s tu re of the case, defendants would be forced to participate in expensive, timec o n su m in g and unnecessary discovery related to claims that do not concern them, in a d d itio n to engaging in similarly expensive and time-consuming discovery coordination w ith the other defendants. Because each plaintiff's witnesses would necessarily include th e individual plaintiff and all of his or her prescribing physicians, healthcare facility re p re se n tativ e s and fact witnesses, undue prejudice and unnecessary jury confusion would lik e w is e occur. Therefore, in the interest of fairness, judicial economy and potential p re ju d ic e to both plaintiffs and defendants, plaintiffs' claims should be severed. C O N C L U S IO N T h e Court finds that each plaintiff has an individualized claim, requiring largely d iffe re n t witnesses and evidence. Given the separate and distinct factual basis for the c la im s and the individualized proof necessary to support each claim, the Court finds that jo in in g the plaintiffs is more likely to confuse the jury and that severance would avoid u n d u e prejudice. Although severing the claims will result in a greater number of trials, s e v e r a n c e will allow the Court to better manage and resolve the individual claims of plaintiffs. In order to manage these cases in an effective and economical manner, the Court fin d s that the claims of the individual plaintiffs, Suzanne Guilbeau, Roberta Phillips, Brenda Richardson, Roy Steve, Sr., Brenda Steve, Jane Etta Stevens, and Eddy Sue Williams on behalf of Dolly Sue Williams, should be severed into separate causes of action. The Court will d ire c t the Clerk of this Court to assign a separate case number for each plaintiff, with p lain tiff Suzanne Guilbeau retaining the civil action number originally assigned to this

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a c ti o n .

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