Hawkins v. Piazza et al

Filing 40

RULING denying 36 Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patrick J Hanna on 07/25/11. (crt,Yocum, M)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
JOSEPH HAWKINS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:10-cv-0152

VERSUS

JUDGE DOHERTY

RICK COLEMAN, ET AL.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HANNA

RULING ON MOTION

Pending before this Court is the defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees and
costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Rec. Doc. 36), which was referred to the
undersigned for ruling (Rec. Doc. 37). For the reasons set forth below, the motion
is DENIED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On June 17, 2009, Joseph Hawkins was arrested by officers of the Abbeville
Police Department. During the arrest, Mr. Hawkins, who has a history of mental
illness, was physically restrained and tased. After he was taken into custody, Mr.
Hawkins gave a medical and mental health history, which included past and current
suicidal ideation as well as his just having been tased. Mr. Hawkins received no
medical evaluation or treatment.

He brought this lawsuit, asserting various

constitutional violations, and alleging that the arresting officers used excessive force

during the arrest and were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Following
discovery, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. (Rec. Doc. 18). In
the motion, the defendants sought an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, alleging that they should be reimbursed the sums expended in
defending this allegedly frivolous lawsuit. (Rec. Doc. 18 at 2).
This court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in part,
denied it in part, and deferred it in part. (Rec. Docs. 32, 33). The court dismissed the
plaintiff’s federal-law claims; declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
plaintiff’s state-law claims and dismissed them without prejudice; and deferred ruling
on the defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees and costs, ordering the defendants to
submit the instant motion in support of their alleged entitlement to fees and costs.

ANALYSIS
Mr. Hawkins asserted claims against the defendants under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1985, and 1986. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 allows a district court, “in its discretion,” to award
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to the prevailing party in actions brought under
those statutes and others. Although prevailing plaintiffs are usually entitled to

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recover such fees, prevailing defendants are subject to a more rigorous standard.1
“[P]revailing defendants cannot recover § 1988 fees without demonstrating that the
plaintiff's underlying claim was frivolous, unreasonable or groundless.”2 Indeed,
such awards “for prevailing defendants are presumptively unavailable unless a
showing is made that the underlying civil rights suit was vexatious, frivolous, or
otherwise without merit.”3 To be meritless, the action must be groundless or without
foundation.4
Since there is no evidence that this lawsuit was brought in bad faith or litigated
in a vexatious manner, the undersigned must determine whether Mr. Hawkins’s
lawsuit was sufficiently frivolous to justify an award of attorneys' fees and costs to
the defendants. A suit is frivolous if it is “so lacking in arguable merit as to be
groundless or without foundation....”5 In determining whether a suit is frivolous, the

1

Dean v. Riser, 240 F.3d 505, 508 (5th Cir. 2001). See, also, White v. South Park
Independent School Dist., 693 F.2d 1163, 1169 (5th Cir. 1982) (“the standard for awarding attorneys'
fees differs if a defendant rather than a plaintiff prevails.”)
2

Merced v. Kasson, 577 F.3d 578, 595 (5th Cir. 2009), quoting Hidden Oaks Ltd. v.
City of Austin, 138 F.3d 1036, 1053 (5th Cir. 1998). See, also, United States v. Mississippi, 921 F.2d
604, 609 (5th Cir. 1991), citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978).
3

Dean v. Riser, 240 F.3d at 508.

4

Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980). See, also, United States v. Mississippi, 921
F.2d 604, 609 (5th Cir.1991).
5

Walker v. City of Bogalusa, 168 F.3d 237, 240 (5th Cir. 1999), citing Plemer v.
Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1140 (5th Cir. 1983).

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district court should consider factors such as whether the plaintiff established a prima
facie case, whether the defendant offered to settle, and whether the court dismissed
the case or held a full trial.6 Since this court has discretion to award fees and costs
under Section 1988, these factors are merely illustrative and are neither exclusive nor
controlling.
Two of the three factors specifically identified as worthy of consideration are
of little value. It is well-settled that the dismissal of a plaintiff’s claims is not a
sufficient justification for an allocation of fees to the defendants.7 Therefore,
although the plaintiff’s claims in this case were dismissed on the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment, that does not automatically mean that the claims were
frivolous nor does it mean that the defendants are automatically entitled to an award
of attorneys’ fees. However, as the Fifth Circuit has noted, “the careful consideration
given to the case by the district court is some indication that the suit was not
frivolous.”8 Here, the district court’s decision, which is seventeen pages long, gave
careful consideration to the arguments presented by the parties both for and against

6

Myers v. City of West Monroe, 211 F.3d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 2000); Walker v. City of
Bogalusa, 168 F.3d at 240; United States v. Mississippi, 921 F.2d at 609.
7

Dean v. Riser, 240 F.3d at 512; Hidden Oaks Ltd. v. City of Austin, 138 F.3d at 1053;
Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. at 15-16 (“The fact that the Court dismissed Plaintiffs' suit is not in itself
a sufficient justification for the fee award.”)
8

Jones v. Texas Tech University, 656 F.2d 1137, 1146 (5th Cir. 1981).

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the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, indicating that the lawsuit was taken
seriously, and there is no finding in that ruling that the plaintiff’s claims were
frivolous. Therefore, neither the fact that Mr. Hawkins’s claims were dismissed on
summary judgment nor the summary judgment ruling itself offers much guidance in
determining whether Mr. Hawkins’s claims were frivolous.
Similarly, “whether a defendant offers to settle a case is of questionable value
in determining whether the plaintiff's claims are frivolous.”9 Here, the defendants
state that they made no offer to settle this case.10 But this factor is totally under the
control of the defendant and is contrary to the principle that the amicable settlement
of lawsuits should be encouraged.11 “Settlement agreements have always been a
favored means of resolving disputes.”12 However, any defendant aware that whether
it has made a settlement offer is a factor to be considered by the court in determining
if it is awarded attorneys’ fees can simply decline to make an offer, regardless of the
relative merit or frivolity of the plaintiff’s claims. If this factor were given great
weight, the pragmatic result would be that no defendant in a civil rights lawsuit would

9

Myers v. City of West Monroe, 211 F.3d at 292.

10

Rec. Doc. 36-2 at 13.

11

See, also, Bell v. Schexnayder, 36 F.3d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 1994) (“a district court has
inherent power to... encourage... settlement agreements.”)
12

Thomas v. State, 534 F.2d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 1976).

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ever make a settlement offer out of fear that doing so would preclude its attorneys’
fees claim. Consequently, whether the defendants did or did not make a settlement
offer in this case sheds no light on the merit of the plaintiff’s claims.
Despite the defendants’ argument that Mr. Hawkins failed to establish a prima
facie case under the various federal-law theories he alleged, the claims asserted by
Mr. Hawkins in this case were not totally groundless. It is undisputed that he was
tased by Abbeville city police officers, he was arrested by those officers, he was taken
into custody, he advised his jailers that he had an extensive medical history including
mental health issues and suicidal ideation, and he was not provided with any medical
assistance. Although the District Court ultimately determined that his allegations did
not rise to the level of constitutional violations, his allegations had an arguably valid
factual basis.
In deciding whether defendants may be reimbursed for their fees and costs, this
court should focus on whether the plaintiff's claim is colorable and of arguable
merit.13 “When a plaintiff presents some credible evidence to prove his claim, he has
shown that his case has colorable merit; consequently, the prevailing defendant is not

13

Vaughner v. Pulito, 804 F.2d 873, 878 (5th Cir. 1986) (“To avoid discouraging all but
‘airtight claims,’ courts focus on whether a plaintiff's claim is colorable and of arguable merit.”)
See, also, Jones v. Texas Tech University, 656 F.2d 1137, 1147 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Because Jones' case,
although not ultimately successful, had some arguable merit, the district court's finding that the suit
was frivolous cannot stand.”)

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entitled to attorney's fees.”14 The undersigned finds that this is the case here. Mr.
Hawkins’s claims had an arguable basis in undisputed fact. Although the facts
underlying his claims were ultimately determined to fall short of establishing that his
constitutional rights were violated, there is no evidence that his claims were so
lacking in factual foundation as to be deemed frivolous. Therefore, the defendants
have not established that they are entitled to a reimbursement of the attorneys’ fees
they incurred in defending against those claims.

CONCLUSION
The undersigned finds that the claims asserted by the plaintiff, Joseph
Hawkins, in this lawsuit were not frivolous. Therefore, the defendants’ motion for
reimbursement of attorneys’ fees and costs (Rec. Doc. 36) is DENIED.
Signed at Lafayette, Louisiana, this 25th day of July 2011.

14

Hahn v. City of Kenner, 1 F.Supp.2d 614, 617 (E.D. La. 1998), aff’d, 207 F.3d 658
(5 Cir. 2000), quoting Broussard v. Board of Trustees for State Colleges and Universities, No. Civ.
A 96-2425, 1995 WL 683858 *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 13, 1995), citing Vaughner v. Pulito, 804 F.2d 873,
878 (5th Cir. 1986).
th

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