Caffey et al v. Domingue et al

Filing 70

MEMORANDUM RULING re 57 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment on the Issues of Liability for Unlawful Seizure/False Arrest/Battery and Excessive Force filed by Cynthia C Caffey, Carl L Caffey. The motion is opposed, and oral argument was held on March 22, 2018. Considering the evidence, the law, and the arguments of the parties, and for the reasons fully explained below, the motion is DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patrick J Hanna on 4/23/2018. (crt,Alexander, E)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
CARL L. CAFFEY, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:10-cv-001545

VERSUS

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HANNA

LONIS D. DOMINGUE, SR., ET AL.

BY CONSENT OF THE PARTIES

MEMORANDUM RULING
Currently pending before the court is the motion for partial summary judgment
filed by the plaintiffs, Carl L. Caffey and Cynthia C. Caffey. (Rec. Doc. 57). The
motion is opposed, and oral argument was held on March 22, 2018. Considering the
evidence, the law, and the arguments of the parties, and for the reasons fully
explained below, the motion is DENIED.
Background
In this lawsuit, Mr. and Mrs. Caffey claim that Mr. Caffey sustained serious
injuries when he was handcuffed by Acadia Parish Sheriff’s Deputy Lonis Domingue
after being arrested on October 16, 2009. The Caffeys own a trailer park, located on
land adjacent to their home. One of their tenants, Caroline Eaglin, was moving her
trailer out of the trailer park, and Mr. Caffey was concerned that moving the trailer
would damage his property. Ms. Eaglin’s daughter called the Acadia Parish Sheriff’s
Office and complained that Mr. Caffey was harassing her mother. Deputy Domingue,
who had responded to a prior call involving Mr. Caffey and Ms. Eaglin, arrived at the
scene, arrested Mr. Caffey for disturbing the peace and public intimidation of a police

officer, handcuffed Mr. Caffey, and took him to the Sheriff’s Office. The plaintiffs
claim that Deputy Domingue lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Caffey for anything,
they claim that he was unlawfully seized, and they claim that excessive force was
used in applying the handcuffs during the arrest. The plaintiffs claim that Deputy
Domingue applied the handcuffs too tightly, that he failed to double-lock them
(which would have prevented them from tightening up while being worn), and that
he failed to loosen the handcuffs when Mr. Caffey complained that they were too
tight. Deputy Domingue, however, does not recall whether he double-locked the
handcuffs nor does he recall Mr. Caffey complaining that the cuffs were too tight. It
is undisputed that the handcuffs injured Mr. Caffey’s right wrist.
ANALYSIS
A.

THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment

is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A fact is material if proof of
its existence or nonexistence might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the

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applicable governing law.1 A genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable jury
could render a verdict for the nonmoving party.2
The party seeking summary judgment has the initial responsibility of informing
the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those parts of the record that
demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material fact.3 If the moving party
carries its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the
existence of a genuine issue of a material fact.4 All facts and inferences are construed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.5
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the
burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by pointing out that
there is insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's

1

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Sossamon v. Lone Star
State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 326 (5th Cir. 2009); Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477
(5th Cir. 2000).
2

Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 252); Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc., 232 F.3d at 477.
3

Washburn v. Harvey, 504 F.3d 505, 508 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).
4

Washburn v. Harvey, 504 F.3d at 508.

5

Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d at 326 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
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claim.6 The motion should be granted if the nonmoving party cannot produce
evidence to support an essential element of its claim.7
B.

THE STANDARD FOR EVALUATING A SECTION 1983 CLAIM
The plaintiffs brought their claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 as well

as under Louisiana law. Section 1983 provides a cause of action against anyone who
“under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State”
violates another person's Constitutional rights. Section 1983 is not itself a source of
substantive rights; it merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights
conferred elsewhere.8 To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must: (1) allege a
violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2)
demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under
color of state law.9 In this case, the defendants do not contest whether Deputy
Domingue acted under color of law at any relevant time, but they do challenge
whether his actions or omissions are Constitutional violations.

6

Norwegian Bulk Transport A/S v. International Marine Terminals Partnership, 520
F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 325).
7

Condrey v. Suntrust Bank of Ga., 431 F.3d 191, 197 (5th Cir. 2005).

8

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,
144, n. 3 (1979); Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 380
F.3d 872, 879 (5th Cir. 2004).
9

Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013); Moore v. Willis Independent
School Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 2000).
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C.

GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
As a pretrial detainee, Mr. Caffey had a Fourteenth Amendment due process

right to be free from excessive force.10 The law is clearly established that a law
enforcement officer's use of excessive force in the course of an arrest, investigatory
stop, or other “seizure” of a free citizen violates that citizen's constitutional rights.11
To succeed on an excessive force claim, a plaintiff bears the burden of showing (1)
an injury (2) that resulted directly and only from the use of force that was excessive
to the need and (3) that the force used was objectively unreasonable.12 Although it
is no longer necessary for a plaintiff to establish that he sustained a significant injury,
a plaintiff is required to establish that he sustained at least some form of injury that
is more than de minimis when evaluated in the context in which the force was
deployed.13 This proposition was very recently clarified by the Fifth Circuit on April
12, 2018:
The district court concluded that Sam’s injuries were de minimis and
therefore could not support an excessive force claim. This was error. In
Alexander v. City of Round Rock, we reversed dismissal of an excessive
force claim. 854 F.3d 298, 310 (5th Cir. 2017). In doing so, we
10

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (“It is clear. . . that the Due
Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to
punishment.”); Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1445 (5th Cir. 1993).
11

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 394-95.

12

Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 314 (5th Cir. 2001); Goodson v City of Corpus
Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 740 (5th Cir. 2000); Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 703 (5th Cir. 1999).
13

Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d at 314.
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explained that even insignificant injuries may support an excessive force
claim, as long as they result from unreasonably excessive force:
Although a de minimis injury is not cognizable, the
extent of injury necessary to satisfy the injury requirement
is directly related to the amount of force that is
constitutionally permissible under the circumstances. Any
force found to be objectively unreasonable necessarily
exceeds the de minimis threshold, and, conversely,
objectively reasonable force will result in de minimis
injuries only. Consequently, only one inquiry is required to
determine whether an officer used excessive force in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. In short, as long as a
plaintiff has suffered some injury, even relatively
insignificant injuries and purely psychological injuries will
prove cognizable when resulting from an officer’s
unreasonably excessive force.
Id. at 309 (quotation marks, citations, and modifications omitted).
Viewing the facts and evidence in the most favorable light, Sam’s
alleged injuries—which include minor bleeding—meet Alexander’s
“some injury” test. See, e.g., Bone v. Dunnaway, 657 Fed.Appx. 258,
262 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Although Bone’s allegation of injury could be
characterized as de minimis—bruising and a swollen cheek—whether
an injury is cognizable depends on the reasonableness of the force, not
just the extent of injury.”); Schmidt v. Gray, 399 Fed.Appx. 925, 928
(5th Cir. 2010) (pain, soreness, and bruising resulting from an officer’s
slamming a car’s trunk lid on a suspect’s finger was a legally cognizable
injury); Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 704 (5th Cir. 1999)
(“dizziness, loss of breath, and coughing” caused by choking was
sufficient injury to assert constitutional violation).
Sam v. Richard, 2018 WL 1751566 *2, –F.3d. – , (5th Cir. 2018).
Therefore, the issue before the Court is not necessarily the degree of injury, as
it is clear Mr. Caffey did sustain “any” injury, the issue is whether the force used was
objectively unreasonable. In the Fifth Circuit, “handcuffing too tightly, without more,
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does not amount to excessive force.”14 However, there are cases in which the way
that an arrestee was handcuffed has been found sufficient to support an excessive
force claim. These include cases when the handcuffs caused deep cuts, permanent
scarring, and nerve injury;15 when the handcuffs were applied so tightly as to cause
long-term nerve damage that was severe enough to require four surgeries,16 or when
a detainee was handcuffed too tightly without justification for a significant period of
time despite complaints, leading to serious and permanent injury.17
While Mr. Caffey’s wrist injury, assuming the medical evidence as true since
it was largely uncontested, can support a claim for excessive force, there are other
genuinely disputed factual issues that preclude summary judgment in the plaintiffs’
favor with regard to the excessive force. There are disputes concerning whether
Deputy Domingue double-locked the handcuffs and whether Mr. Caffey complained
about how tightly the handcuffs were applied. The Fifth Circuit has found that
factual disputes concerning those two specific issues are sufficient to preclude

14

Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d at 314.

15

Dominguez v. Moore, 149 Fed. App’x 281, 283 (5th Cir. 2005).

16

Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 168 (5th Cir. 2009).

17

Heitschmidt v. City of Houston, 161 F.3d 834, 839-40 (5th Cir. 1998).
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summary judgment.18

Accordingly, the plaintiffs are not entitled to summary

judgment with regard to the excessive force claim.19
Having found that the plaintiffs are not entitled to summary judgment on their
excessive force claim, it is not necessary for this Court to decide, whether the
plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their state law claims for false arrest
and excessive force.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that there are genuinely disputed
issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment in the plaintiffs’ favor.
Accordingly, their motion for partial summary judgment (Rec. Doc. 57) is DENIED.
Signed at Lafayette, Louisiana, this 23rd day of April 2018.

____________________________________
PATRICK J. HANNA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

18

See, e.g., Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d at 169 (“While the officers claim that she
did not complain about being cuffed too tightly and [the defendant] claims he used his finger to
‘double lock’ the cuffs, the injuries [the plaintiff] sustained as well as her testimony that [the officer]
did not perform the double-lock procedure create genuine issues as to these material facts.”).
19

The Court is cognizant of the fact that there is a significant issue whether there was
probable cause for the arrest on the charged offenses, however, that necessarily contemplates a
credibility determination from the arresting officer’s testimony, and therefore, is not proper at the
summary judgment stage.
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