Bruno v. Cetco Oilfield Services Co et al

Filing 35

MEMORANDUM RULING granting 27 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patrick J Hanna on 1/12/2012. (crt,Kennedy, T)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
LINDA F. BRUNO

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:11-cv-0837

VERSUS

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HANNA

CETCO OILFIELD SERVICES
COMPANY AND ACE AMERICAN
INSURANCE COMPANY

BY CONSENT OF THE PARTIES

MEMORANDUM RULING

This case comes before the Court by consent of the parties, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636. Pending is the plaintiff’s motion (Rec. Doc. 27) for partial summary
judgment on two issues: (1) that defendant Cetco Oilfield Services Company’s
employee Stanford D. Broussard was solely at fault in causing the incident from
which this lawsuit arises, and (2) that Mr. Broussard was in the course and scope of
his employment with Cetco when the incident occurred, making Cetco vicariously
liable for its employee’s fault. The motion is unopposed. Considering the evidence
submitted and the applicable law, and for the reasons that follow, the motion for
summary judgment is GRANTED.

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Linda F. Bruno, and Cetco’s employee, Stanford D. Broussard,

were involved in a motor vehicle accident on July 29, 2010. Both were traveling in
an easterly direction on Cameron Street toward its intersection with Ambassador
Caffery Parkway in Lafayette, Louisiana, with Mr. Broussard’s vehicle directly
behind Ms. Bruno’s. Ms. Bruno stopped at a yield sign, and Mr. Broussard’s truck
hit her Honda from behind. In his deposition testimony, Mr. Broussard admitted that
he was inattentive just before the collision occurred and that he was at fault in causing
the collision. The defendants do not contend – and submitted no evidence – that Ms.
Bruno or any other person caused or contributed to the cause of the rear-end collision.
Mr. Broussard also testified at his deposition that he was in the course and scope of
his employment with defendant Cetco when the accident occurred, and Cetco has
admitted that Mr. Broussard is its employee.

II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment

is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A fact is material if proof of
its existence or nonexistence might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the
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applicable governing law.1 A genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable jury
could render a verdict for the nonmoving party.2
The party seeking summary judgment has the initial responsibility of informing
the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those parts of the record that
demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material fact.3 If the moving party
carries its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the
existence of a genuine issue of a material fact.4 All facts and inferences are construed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.5
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the
burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by pointing out that
there is insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's

1

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Sossamon v. Lone Star
State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 326 (5th Cir. 2009); Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477
(5th Cir. 2000).
2

Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008), citing Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 252; Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc., 232 F.3d at 477.
3

Washburn v. Harvey, 504 F.3d 505, 508 (5th Cir. 2007), citing Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
4

Id.

5

Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008), citing Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
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claim.6

The motion should be granted if the nonmoving party cannot produce

evidence to support an essential element of its claim.7

III.

APPLICABLE LAW
A.

AND

ANALYSIS

MR. BROUSSARD CAUSED

THE

COLLISION

Louisiana substantive law must be applied in this diversity case, including the
analysis used in imposing liability for negligence.8 Louisiana utilizes a duty-risk
analysis to determine whether liability exists under the particular facts presented. The
plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, (2) that
the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the defendant’s substandard conduct was
a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injuries, (4) that the defendant’s substandard conduct
was the legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, and (5) that the plaintiff sustained actual
damages.9

6

Norwegian Bulk Transport A/S v. International Marine Terminals Partnership, 520
F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 2008), citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 325.
7

Condrey v. Suntrust Bank of Ga., 431 F.3d 191, 197 (5th Cir. 2005).

8

Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Haspel-Kansas Inv. Partnership, 342 F.3d 416, 419 (5th

Cir. 2003).
9

Westchester Fire v. Haspel-Kansas, 342 F.3d at 419, citing Pinsonneault v.
Merchants & Farmers Bank & Trust Co., 2001-2217 (La. 04/03/02), 816 So.2d 270, 275-76.
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Under Louisiana law, the determination of whether an action is the
cause-in-fact of injury is a question of fact.10 A defendant’s conduct is considered to
be a cause-in-fact of a plaintiff’s injuries if the injury would not have occurred but for
the conduct or if the conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.11
In this case, the cause-in-fact inquiry centers on Mr. Broussard’s allegedly
substandard conduct and whether it was a substantial factor in bringing about the
subject collision.
In support of her motion for partial summary judgment, Ms. Bruno produced
Mr. Broussard’s deposition testimony, in which he admitted that the front of his
vehicle impacted the rear of her vehicle as he was accelerating and that the collision
was caused by his inattention.12 He also explained that “I was at fault.”13 At the
scene of the accident, Mr. Broussard told Ms. Bruno that he was at fault and
apologized to her for causing the collision.14 The defendants presented no contrary
evidence. It is undisputed that Mr. Broussard caused the collision.
10

Westchester Fire v. Haspel-Kansas, 342 F.3d at 419, citing Lasyone v. Kansas City
Southern Railroad, 2000-C-2628 (La. 04/03/01), 786 So.2d 682, 691.
11

Westchester Fire v. Haspel-Kansas, 342 F.3d at 419, citing Lasyone v. Kansas City
Southern, 786 So.2d at 691 and Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So.2d 1032, 1042 (La. 1991).
12

Rec. Doc. 27-3 at 9, 16-17.

13

Rec. Doc. 27-3 at 11.

14

Rec. Doc. 27-4 at 2.
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B.

CETCO IS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE

Under Louisiana law, an employer is answerable for the damage occasioned by
its employees in the exercise of the functions in which the employee is employed.15
An employer is liable for its employee's torts if the employee was acting within the
course and scope of his employment when the tort was committed.16 An employee
is acting within the course and scope of his employment when the employee's action
is of the kind that he is employed to perform, occurs substantially within the
authorized limits of time and space, and is activated at least in part by a purpose to
serve the employer.17 Whether an employee is within the course and scope of
employment is a factual question.18
In support of her motion for partial summary judgment, Ms. Bruno produced
Mr. Broussard’s deposition testimony, in which he affirmed that he was “on the
clock” at the time of the accident.19 He stated that he was engaged in his duties for
his employer, Cetco, and was both “at work” and “being paid” when the accident
15

La. Civ.Code art. 2320.

16

Timmons v. Silman, 1999-3264 (La. 05/16/00), 761 So.2d 507, 510; Baumeister v.
Plunkett, 95-2270 (La. 5/21/96), 673 So.2d 994, 996.
17

Timmons v. Silman, 761 So.2d at 510; Orgeron v. McDonald, 93-1353 (La. 070/5/94),
639 So.2d 224, 226-27.
18

Baumeister v. Plunkett, 673 So.2d at 998.

19

Rec. Doc. 27-3 at 19.
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occurred.20 She also pointed out that Cetco admitted in its answer that Mr. Broussard
is its employee.21 The defendants offered no contrary evidence. Because Mr.
Broussard was within the course and scope of his employment when the collision
occurred, Cetco is liable for his tortious conduct.

CONCLUSION
The evidence presented by the plaintiff, which was not refuted by the
defendants, establishes two undisputed facts: (1) Mr. Broussard caused the collision;
and (2) Mr. Broussard was in the course and scope of his employment at the time of
the collision, making Cetco vicariously liable for Mr. Broussard’s conduct. The
undersigned finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the
plaintiff is entitled to partial summary judgment in her favor, as requested in her
motion. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment
(Rec. Doc. 27) is GRANTED; and

20

Rec. Doc. 27-3 at 19.

21

Rec. Doc. 9 at ¶ 11.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the oral argument previously scheduled for
January 25, 2012 is CANCELLED.
Signed at Lafayette, Louisiana on this 12th day January 2012.

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