Jacob et al v. Ackal

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM RULING granting 17 Motion to Stay. This action is stayed in its entirety until the criminal proceedings against Jacob are completed. Signed by Magistrate Judge C Michael Hill on 1/14/13. (crt,Kennedy, T)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
EMMETTE J. JACOB, JR., ET AL.

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CIVIL NO. 6:12-1338

VERSUS

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JUDGE DOHERTY

LOUIS M. ACKAL, ET AL.

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE HILL

MEMORANDUM RULING
Pending before the Court is the defendants Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending
Disposition of Plaintiff's Criminal Proceedings. [rec. doc. 17]. By this Motion, the defendants
seek to stay this action until the pending state criminal prosecution against plaintiff Emmette J.
Jacob, Jr. has been completed. The plaintiffs have filed Opposition. [rec. doc. 21]. The Motion
was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for ruling. [rec. doc. 20].
For the following reasons, the Motion to Stay [rec. doc. 17] is GRANTED, and
accordingly, this action is stayed in its entirety until the criminal proceedings against plaintiff
Emmette J. Jacob, Jr. are completed, subject to the following conditions:
a. Within thirty (30) days of the date the state court criminal proceedings have
concluded, plaintiffs must file a motion asking this Court to lift the stay. The
action will proceed at that time, absent some other bar to suit. See Wallace v.
Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007).
b. If the criminal proceedings are not concluded within six (6) months of the date
that this case is stayed, plaintiffs shall file a status report indicating the expected
completion date of the proceeding. Additional status reports shall be filed every
three (3) months thereafter until the stay is lifted.

STATEMENT OF CLAIM
Before the court is a civil rights action filed by plaintiffs Emmette J. Jacob, Jr. ("Jacob"),
Cupid's Closet of New Iberia, LLC ("Cupid") and Emmette Enterprises, LLC ("Emmette").
Jacob is the owner of both Cupid and Emmette. In their Original, Amended and Second
Amended Complaints, plaintiffs name Iberia Parish Sheriff Louis M. Ackal ("Ackal"),
Deputies Jason Comeaux ("Comeaux") and Cody Vaughn ("Vaughn"), and JP Morgan Chase
Bank, N.A. ("Chase").
Plaintiffs allege that their civil rights were violated when on May 22, 2012, Comeaux
and Vaughn unlawfully "raided" Cupid, a retail business, and with the benefit of a warrant,
unlawfully seized allegedly legal property (goods described as "a botanical sachet", bearing the
brand name "Bayou Blaster Redoux") which was being sold in the store as well as currency
from the store. Plaintiffs further allege that Comeaux and Vaughn thereafter also unlawfully
seized business and personal bank accounts at Chase owned by Jacob, Cupid and Emmette,
without a warrant, by Notice of Forfeiture served on Chase. These actions are alleged to have
been in violation of plaintiff's Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights which prohibit
illegal search and seizures and deprivations of property without due process of law. Plaintiffs
additionally allege that because Chase "colluded, assisted, and conspired" with Ackal,
Comeaux and Vaughn, Chase has likewise violated plaintiff's constitutional rights. Plaintiffs'
constitutional claims are filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs pray for an award of
compensatory, special and punitive damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.

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As a result of the alleged illegal seizures, Jacob was arrested on June 30, 2012, and was
subsequently charged Bill of Information with to following criminal charges: (1) unlawful
production, manufacturing, distribution or possession of a prohibited plant, (2) possession with
intent to distribute a schedule I controlled dangerous substance, to wit, synthetic cannabinoids,
(3) transactions involving proceeds from drug offenses, and (4) racketeering. Jacob has been
formally arraigned and trial on these criminal charges is set for March 11, 2013.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
In light of the above, by this action, plaintiffs contest the legality of the search and
seizure of alleged synthetic cannabinoids, which were being sold at Cupids, and the alleged
proceeds of these sales held in the plaintiffs' business and personal Chase bank accounts.
Further, it is clear that plaintiffs seek monetary damages based on alleged violations of their
Constitutional rights stemming from these challenged search and seizures. It is undisputed that
criminal narcotics and racketeering charges remain pending against Jacob in the Sixteenth
Judicial District Court for Iberia Parish.
If Jacob is ultimately convicted of the pending narcotics and racketeering charges,
plaintiffs may not be entitled to seek damages for the search and seizure of the tangible goods
from Cupid's or funds in their Chase bank accounts, until such time as the convictions in
question have been declared invalid. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364
(1994). The Fifth Circuit explained the Heck analysis as follows:
When a plaintiff alleges tort claims against his arresting officers, the district court
must first consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily
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imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. If so, the claim is barred unless
the plaintiff demonstrates that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal
court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 2007).
Thus, unless Jacob proves that his convictions or sentences have been reversed,
expunged or otherwise declared invalid, he could not recover damages for an alleged violation
of his constitutional rights because a plaintiff who has been convicted of a crime cannot
recover damages for an alleged violation of his constitutional rights if that violation arose from
the same facts attendant to the charge for which he was convicted. Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d
492, 497 (5th Cir. 2008); See also Wilbon v. Louisiana, Civil Action No. 10-4281, 2010 WL
5598336 at *4 (E.D. La. 2010) (“Heck likewise bars a related illegal search and seizure claim.)
citing Johnson v. Bradford, 72 Fed. App’x 98, 99 (5th Cir. 2003) and Hall v. Lorenz, No.
02-50312, 2002 WL 31049457 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that Heck barred the plaintiff's illegal
arrest and illegal search and seizure claims because, if successful, they would undermine the
validity of the plaintiff's conviction).
However, because Jacob’s criminal prosecution remains pending and no conviction has
therefore been obtained, Heck does not apply.1 See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-394,

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Relying on cases which predate the United States Supreme Court's decision in Wallace v Kato,
both parties argue extensively why the Heck principle should or should not be applied to this case.
Wallace forecloses these arguments. Wallace made clear that the Heck rule "is called into play only
when there exists 'a conviction or sentence that has not been . . . invalidated,' that is to say, an
'outstanding criminal judgment'"; Heck does not bar "an action which would impugn an anticipated

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127 S.Ct. 1091 (2007). However, federal courts are authorized to stay civil rights claims
attacking the legality of a plaintiff’s arrest, prosecution, and detention until such time as the
allegedly improper state prosecution has been concluded. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393-394.
The Wallace Court stated as follows:
If a plaintiff files a false-arrest claim before he has been convicted (or files any
other claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated
criminal trial), it is within the power of the district court, and in accord with
common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood
of a criminal case is ended. See id., at 487-488, n. 8, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (noting that
“abstention may be an appropriate response to the parallel state-court
proceedings”); Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 730, 116 S.Ct.
1712, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996). If the plaintiff is ultimately convicted, and if the
stayed civil suit would impugn that conviction, Heck will require dismissal;
otherwise, the civil action will proceed, absent some other bar to suit. Edwards v.
Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 649, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997); Heck, 512
U.S., at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364.
Id. (emphasis added).
In accordance with that authorization, district courts within the Fifth Circuit, as well as
this federal district court, have routinely stayed civil rights actions when criminal charges
remain pending. Pellerin v. Neustrom, 2011 WL 6749019 (W.D. La. 2011); Hughes v.
Gueydan Police Dept., 6:10-1570, doc. 49 (W.D. La. 2010); Alexander v. City Police of
Lafayette, 6:11-1749, doc. 11 (W.D. La. 2011); Hood v. Smith, 2011 WL378786, *3-4 (E.D.
La. 2011) (staying claims for illegal arrest and illegal seizure of evidence on which pending
criminal charges are based under the Wallace reasoning); Quinn v. Guerrero, 2010 WL

criminal trial . . . ." Id. at 393-394.

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412901, *2 (E.D. Tex. 2010); Fox v. Campbell, 2009 WL 10786809 (E.D. Tex. 2009); Holt v.
Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office, 2007 WL 4114357, *5-6 (E.D. La. 2007) (relying on Wallace
to stay a claim for fabrication of evidence); Profit v. Ouachita Parish, 2010 WL 1643800, 2010
WL 1643798, 3:09-cv-1838, docs. 25 and 37 (W.D. La. 2010); Anderson v. Madison Parish
Sheriff’s Dept., 3:09-cv-0223, doc. 17 (W.D. La. 2010); Caldwell v. Lambert, 2010 WL
3036488, 3:10-cv-0526, docs. 7 and 9 (W.D. La. 2010); Brown v. Hill, 2010 WL 1734721,
3:09-2170, docs. 10 and 11 (W.D. La. 2010).
Indeed, this Court has stayed at least three actions, on facts substantially similar to the
present action, seeking to challenge the constitutionality of a search and seizure relating to
pending criminal charges. See Pellerin v. Neustrom, 2011 WL 6749019 (W.D. La. 2011);
Hughes v. Gueydan Police Dept., 6:10-1570, doc. 49 (W.D. La. 2010); Alexander v. City
Police of Lafayette, 6:11-1749, doc. 11 (W.D. La. 2011).
Although Jacob's criminal prosecution can move forward toward conviction regardless
of this pending civil rights action, the question faced by this Court is whether plaintiffs' damage
claims asserted in this action may move forward before the criminal proceeding has been
concluded. In this case, they may not.
While the plaintiffs argue that a stay is not warranted in this case because they seek to
challenge only the search and seizure of their property and bank accounts and do not seek to
challenge the arrest of Jacob and present no claim for malicious prosecution, that argument
misses the mark. The question is whether plaintiff's damage claims are "relate[d] to rulings
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that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial." Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393394. If so, the civil action should be stayed until the criminal case is ended. Id. Clearly, the
legality of the search and seizure of evidence which forms the basis of Jacob's criminal
prosecution will be determined in the pending prosecution.
Moreover, even if this were not the case, when it is premature to determine whether a
plaintiff's civil damages claims may be barred under Heck because of the pendency of criminal
charges, under Fifth Circuit precedent, courts should stay the proceedings. Quin, 2010 WL
412901 at *2 citing Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995) (in such cases, the
court “may – indeed should – stay proceedings in the section 1983 case until the pending
criminal case has run its course, as until that time it may be difficult to determine the relation, if
any, between the two.”), Busick v. City of Madison Mississippi, 90 Fed. Appx. 713, 713-714
(5th Cir. 2004) (where it is impossible to determine whether a plaintiff's civil claims relating to
his arrest and criminal prosecution necessarily implicate the validity of any conviction or
sentence that plaintiff has received or might receive because of ongoing criminal proceedings,
the district court should have stayed the civil proceedings pending the resolution of the criminal
charges against plaintiff); Davis v. Zain, 79 F.3d 18, 19 (5th Cir. 1996) (“if some presently
unforeseen or unarticulated conflict arises between the criminal retrial and the pending § 1983
case, the district court may consider the propriety of a stay or, perhaps, abstention”).
For the above reasons;

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IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Stay [rec. doc. 17] is GRANTED, and accordingly, this
action is stayed in its entirety until the criminal proceedings against Jacob are completed,
subject to the following conditions:
a. Within thirty (30) days of the date the state court criminal proceedings have
concluded, plaintiffs must file a motion asking this Court to lift the stay. The
action will proceed at that time, absent some other bar to suit. See Wallace v.
Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007).
b. If the criminal proceedings are not concluded within six (6) months of the date
that this case is stayed, plaintiffs shall file a status report indicating the expected
completion date of the proceeding. Additional status reports shall be filed every
three (3) months thereafter until the stay is lifted.
Signed this 14th day of January, 2013, at Lafayette, Louisiana.

Copy Sent: RFD, CG
On: 01-13-2013
By: MBD

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