Price v. Rayne et al

Filing 55

RULING re 40 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Joseph Cormier, City of Rayne, Joseph Credeur, Carroll Stelly. Signed by Judge Robert G James on 3/3/16. (crt,DickersonSld, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
WENDELL DWAYNE PRICE

CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-0790

VERSUS

JUDGE ROBERT G. JAMES

CITY OF RAYNE, ET AL.

MAG. JUDGE PATRICK J. HANNA
RULING

Pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 40] filed by the
City of Rayne (“the City”), Rayne Police Officers Joseph Cormier (“Cormier”) and Joseph Credeur
(“Credeur”), and Rayne Chief of Police Carroll Stelly (“Chief Stelly”) (collectively, Defendants”).
Plaintiff Wendell Dwayne Price (“Price”) has filed an opposition memorandum, to which Defendants
have filed a reply. [Doc. Nos. 46 and 49].
Price filed this civil rights action in state court on March 28, 2013, and it was subsequently
removed to this Court on April 17, 2013. In his Complaint, Price alleges that his civil rights were
violated when he was unlawfully arrested with the use of excessive force on April 2, 2012. Price’s
claims are asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana state law.
In this motion Defendants argue that Price’s false arrest and excessive force claims are barred
under the principles set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477 (1994). Officers Cormier and Credeur alternatively contend that they are entitled to qualified
immunity, and that, therefore, Price’s federal claims against them in their individual capacities
should be dismissed. Chief Stelly contends that Price cannot establish a claim against him in his
individual capacity. The City of Rayne and Officers Cormier and Credeur and Chief Stelly in their

official capacities seek summary judgment based on Price’s failure to demonstrate that his alleged
constitutional deprivations were caused by an official policy, custom or procedure of the City.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 2, 2012, Officer Cormier was working a traffic detail in the City of Rayne when he

was approached by a vehicle driven by a female with a male passenger suffering from facial injuries.
The driver reported to Cormier that her passenger had been assaulted by three black men on a nearby
street, Live Oak Street. She described the assailants, stating one was wearing a red shirt, another a
white shirt, and all were accompanied by a tan dog.
After reporting the incident to dispatch, Officer Cormier went in search of the suspects. He
spotted a man on Live Oak Street wearing a red shirt and conducted a field interview. During the
interview, he noticed a tan dog wandering on the road near a residence on Live Oak Street. He
proceeded to the residence and observed two other dogs in the yard with no fence. Also present was
a black man wearing a white shirt, later identified as Price.
When Officer Cormier asked Price to put his dogs away, Price refused. By then, Officer
Credeur had arrived at the scene, but he remained inside his vehicle. An altercation ensued in which
Officer Cormier hit Price in the head with his baton. Ultimately, Officer Credeur ended the
altercation by using his Taser on Price, who was then arrested.
On October 23, 2013, months after this lawsuit was filed, Price was convicted of resisting
an officer, following a jury trial in the Louisiana Fifteenth Judicial District Court for Acadia Parish.
He was sentenced to six months imprisonment, which was suspended, and was placed on six months
probation with special conditions requiring payment of a $250.00 fine, court costs and the
completion of an anger management program at his expense. Price’s conviction was affirmed on
2

direct appeal by the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal on June 4, 2014, and Price’s request
for discretionary review was denied by the Louisiana Supreme Court on February 6, 2015.1
II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
A.

Summary Judgment Standard

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate
when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. A fact is material if proof of its existence or nonexistence might affect the
outcome of the lawsuit under the applicable governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 326 (5th Cir. 2009);
Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000). A genuine issue of material fact
exists if a reasonable jury could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Brumfield v. Hollins, 551
F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; Hamilton, 232 F.3d at 477.
The party seeking summary judgment has the initial responsibility of informing the court of
the basis for its motion and identifying those parts of the record that demonstrate the absence of
genuine issues of material fact. Washburn v. Harvey, 504 F.3d 505, 508 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). If the moving party carries its initial burden,
the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of a
material fact. Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323).
All facts and inferences are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Brumfield, 551 F.3d at 326 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475

State v. Price, 139 So.3d 1259 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 6/4/2014), writ denied, 158 So.3d 815
(La. 2/6/2015).
1

3

U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). However, the nonmoving party may not rely on mere allegations in the
pleading; rather, the nonmovant must respond to the motion for summary judgment by setting forth
particular facts indicating that there is a genuine issue for trial. International Ass’n of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A., 199 F.3d 796, 798 (5th
Cir. 2000) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–49). After the nonmovant has been given an
opportunity to raise a genuine factual issue, if no reasonable juror could find for the nonmovant,
summary judgment will be granted. Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof
at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by pointing out that there is insufficient proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim. Norwegian Bulk Transport A/S v.
International Marine Terminals Partnership, 520 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Celotex, 477
U.S. at 325). The motion should be granted if the nonmoving party cannot produce evidence to
support an essential element of its claim. Condrey v. Suntrust Bank of Ga., 431 F.3d 191, 197 (5th
Cir. 2005).
B.

Federal Excessive Force and False Arrest Claims/ Heck v. Humphrey

It is an undisputed fact that, after this lawsuit was filed, on October 23, 2013, Price was
convicted of resisting an officer.

It is equally undisputed that Price’s conviction has not been

invalidated, but rather has been affirmed on direct appeal. The conviction is therefore final.
In Heck v. Humphrey, the United States Supreme Court determined that:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional . . .
imprisonment or for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed
on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a
state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
4

question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28
U.S.C. § 2254.
512 U.S. at 477.
The purpose of this doctrine is to avoid collateral attacks on valid convictions. If a § 1983
action would imply the invalidation of the plaintiff’s conviction, the complaint should be dismissed
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction has already been expunged, reversed, or
invalidated. Arnold v. Town of Slaughter, 2003 WL 25739166, at *1 (M.D. La. Sept. 5, 2003), aff’d
100 Fed. App’x 321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 966 (2004) (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 477).
However, when the plaintiff’s
§ 1983 action, if successful, “will not inherently imply the nullification of the criminal judgment
against the Plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed.” Id.
In the context of an excessive force claim, such as that presented here, the Fifth Circuit has
provided clear guidance:
It is well settled under Heck that a plaintiff who has been convicted of a crime cannot
recover damages for an alleged violation of his constitutional rights if that “violation
arose from the same facts attendant to the charge for which he was convicted, unless
he proves ‘that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make
such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus.’ ” Although the Heck principle applies to § 1983 excessive force
claims, the determination of whether such claims are barred is analytical and
fact-intensive, requiring us to focus on whether success on the excessive force claim
requires negation of an element of the criminal offense or proof of a fact that is
inherently inconsistent with one underlying the criminal conviction.
*
*
*
. . . a § 1983 claim would not necessarily imply the invalidity of a resisting
arrest conviction, and therefore would not be barred by Heck, if the factual basis for
the conviction is temporally and conceptually distinct from the excessive force claim.
Accordingly, a claim that excessive force occurred after the arrestee has ceased his
or her resistance would not necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction for the
earlier resistance. . .
5

Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir. 2008).
Thus, “a plaintiff’s claim is Heck-barred despite its theoretical compatibility with his
underlying conviction if specific factual allegations in the complaint are necessarily inconsistent with
the validity of the conviction.” Id. at 498 n. 14. This is because “factual assertions in pleadings are
. . . judicial admissions conclusively binding on the party that made them.” Daigre v. City of
Waveland, Miss., 549 Fed. App’x 283, 286 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Davis v. A.G. Edwards & Sons,
Inc., 823 F.2d 105, 108 (5th Cir. 1987) (alterations and citation omitted)). Accordingly, when a
plaintiff contends that he did not resist arrest, that is, that he committed no offense and was instead
unjustly victimized, the Fifth Circuit has uniformly concluded that his excessive force claim is Heckbarred because the excessive force claim necessarily attacks the validity of the conviction for
resisting arrest. See DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 656–57 (5th Cir. 2007); Daigre,
549 Fed. App’x at 287; Walker v. Munsell, 281 Fed. App’x 388, 390 (5th Cir. 2008); Arnold v. Town
of Slaughter, 100 Fed. App’x at 324. Moreover, when there is no temporal and conceptual
distinction between the factual basis for the conviction and the excessive force claim, that is, when
the complained of use of force is applied during or simultaneously with the arrest, Heck applies.
Walter v. Horseshoe Entertainment, 483 Fed. App’x 884, 887 (5th Cir. 2012); Bush, 513 F.3d at 495,
498 (use of force after arrest and handcuffing when resistance by the arrestee had ceased was
temporally and conceptually distinct from the criminal conviction); DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 656-657
(finding that the complaint did not allege that the claims of excessive force were separable from the
plaintiff’s aggravated assault on the officer); Pratt v. Giroir, 2008 WL 975052, at *5 (E.D. La. Apr.
8, 2008) (“Fifth Circuit precedent is clear that whether the plaintiff alleges excessive force during
or simultaneous with an arrest versus after an arrest results in distinct consequences under Heck.”).
6

In such cases, the “[p]laintiff’s claims are dismissed with prejudice to their being asserted again
until the Heck conditions are met.” DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 657 (quoting Johnson v. McElveen, 101
F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996)).
In Arnold v. Town of Slaughter, the Fifth Circuit examined an excessive force claim of a §
1983 plaintiff who had been convicted of resisting an officer in a Louisiana state court. Like Price,
the Arnold plaintiff maintained that he did nothing to provoke the officer’s action; he had done
nothing wrong; and he had been viciously attacked for no reason. The Fifth Circuit concluded that
the plaintiff’s “suit squarely challenge[d] the factual determination that underlie[d] his conviction
for resisting an officer.” Arnold, 100 Fed. App’x at 324.

If he prevailed, the plaintiff would

establish that his conviction lacked a factual basis. As such, the court held the claim was barred by
Heck.
Similarly, in Daigre v. City of Waveland, Mississippi, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint of innocence, non-resistance and compliance were not
separable from, and inconsistent with, the facts underlying her conviction for resisting arrest. Her
excessive force claim was therefore barred by Heck. 549 F.3d at 286-287.
In Walker v. Munsell, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s claim was “not that the officers
used excessive force after he stopped resisting or to stop his resistance; his claim [was] based solely
on his assertions that he did not resist arrest, did nothing wrong, and was attacked by the . . . officers
for no reason.” 281 Fed. App’x at 390. Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s
excessive force claim “squarely challenge[d] the factual determination that underlie[d] his
conviction for resisting an officer,” and if the plaintiff prevailed, “he [would] establish[] that his

7

criminal conviction lack[ed] any basis.” Id. The plaintiff’s excessive force claim was therefore
barred by Heck.
Finally, in Walter v. Horseshoe Entertainment, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Heck applied
to bar the plaintiffs’ claims of excessive force because the claims were “not derived from distinct
incidents.” 483 Fed. App’x at 887. Rather, the plaintiffs’ “convictions for resisting arrest and their
claim of use of excessive force stem[med] from a single interaction [and they] argue[d] that they did
not resist arrest . . . and that the force used against them was therefore excessive.” Id. The court read
that claim as an attack on the validity of their conviction for resisting arrest.
In this case, Price was found guilty of resisting an officer, a violation of LA. REV. STAT.
14:108. That statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
A. Resisting an officer is the intentional interference with, opposition
or resistance to, or obstruction of an individual acting in his official
capacity and authorized by law to make a lawful arrest, lawful
detention . . . .
B. (1) The phrase “obstruction of” as used herein shall, in addition to
its common meaning, signification, and connotation mean the
following:
*
*
*
*
(b) Any violence toward or any resistance or opposition to the
arresting officer after the arrested party is actually placed under arrest
and before he is incarcerated in jail.
Guilt under that statute requires evidence of intentional interference with the arresting officer or
violence toward or resistance to the officer during a lawful arrest or lawful detention. Although
Price was found guilty of resisting an officer, he made the following allegations in his complaint:
“Mr. Price was not breaking any laws at any time and was located on his own private
property at all times during the entire course of the incident.” [Doc. No. 1-1, ¶ ¶ 4 and 18(B)].
8

Officer Cormier “suddenly and without provocation” approached him using profane language
and ordered him to put his dogs in the cage. [Id. at ¶ ¶ 5 and 18(A)].
“When Mr. Price questioned his command, Officer Cormier threatened to arrest Mr. Price
and pulled out his Billy club striking Mr. Price repeatedly on the head.” [Id. at ¶ 5].
Officer Credeur “arrived on the scene and without question joined in on the assault and began
tasering” Price. [Id. at ¶ 6].
Price expressly alleges that “there were no threats of violence or violent acts, no battery of
any police officer, and/or no resistance of arrest committed by Wendell Dwayne Price.”[Id. at ¶ 16
(emphasis added)].
Price further alleges that he was “not breaking any laws at any time,” was “not threatening
the safety of anyone on the scene,” and that Defendants acted “unlawfully [by] detaining, seizing,
and arresting [him] without probable cause and despite his compliance.” [Id. at ¶ ¶ 18(B)(C) and (E)
(emphasis added)].
After Price “fell to the ground and was no longer able to move,” he was handcuffed and
transported to the police station for booking. [Id. at ¶ ¶ 6 and 7].
These allegations are mirrored in Price’s state court criminal trial testimony wherein Price
testified that on the day of the incident he was on his phone outside his residence when Officer
Cormier pulled into his driveway, told him to put up his dogs or he would be arrested, and then,
without provocation, pulled out his baton and began hitting him on the head and choking him. He
was thereafter tased. Contrary to the testimony of the police officers, Price expressly denied being
the aggressor, denied swinging at Cormier or placing him in a choke hold and expressly denied doing
anything wrong prior to being attacked. [Doc. No. 40-7, pp. 357-358, 359, 372, 381-382].
9

Several other witnesses testified to a version of the incident similar to that testified to by
Price. After discussing the conflicting version of events, on direct appeal, the Louisiana Third
Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed Price’s conviction noting that “[b]ased on the guilty verdict, the
jury apparently accepted the officers’ testimony and rejected the testimony of the conflicting
witnesses.”2
The effect of Price’s allegations and trial testimony is clear. Price continues to maintain that
he is innocent of the charge of which he was convicted, that he did nothing wrong, and that he had
been viciously attacked without justification. These allegations relate to the entire encounter and not
a distinct temporal or conceptual portion of it; that is, Price’s claim is directed to the singular event,
the use of force during and simultaneously with his arrest, which admittedly stopped immediately
after Price stopped resisting. These allegations and trial testimony therefore distinguish Price’s
excessive force claim from those which survive Heck’s bar. Price’s excessive force claim falls
squarely within the confines of the Fifth Circuit’s rulings in Arnold, Daigre, Walker, Walter, and
their progeny, and as such is subject to dismissal under Heck.3
Price’s false arrest claim is likewise subject to dismissal under Heck. To obtain Price’s
conviction for resisting an officer, the prosecution had to prove that the officers were making a

2

State v. Price, 139 So.3d at 1268.

3

Price attempts to avoid the above cited Fifth Circuit jurisprudence citing cases from the
Third and Ninth Circuits, Nelson v. Jashurek, 109 F.3d 142, 145–46 (3rd Cir. 1997); Smithart v.
Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996). The Fifth Circuit in Arnold cited these cases, and
implicitly disagreed with their holdings stating “[b]oth the Ninth and Third Circuits have
indicated that an excessive force claim would not necessarily challenge a plaintiff’s conviction
for assault during a stop. While recognizing this distinction, this circuit has recognized that
certain convictions will prevent a plaintiff from bringing an excessive force claim.” Arnold, 100
Fed. App'x at 323 (internal citations to Nelson v. Jashurek, 109 F.3d 142, 145–46 (3rd Cir. 1997)
and Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996) omitted).
10

lawful arrest or lawful detention. LA. REV. STAT. 14:108; see also Arnold, 100 Fed. App’x at 325.
For this reason, the Heck Court observed that § 1983 unlawful-arrest claims cannot lie in cases in
which “[a] state defendant is convicted of and sentenced for the crime of resisting arrest . . .
[because] he would have to negate an element of the offense of which he has been convicted.”
Daigre, 549 Fed. App’x at 287 (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 486 n. 6). Allowing Price to proceed
with his false arrest claim would necessarily attack one of the elements of the offense of which he
was ultimately found guilty. See id.; Walter, 483 Fed. App’x at 887.4 Accordingly, Price’s
false-arrest claim is barred under Heck.
For these reasons, Price’s federal excessive force and false arrest claims against Officers
Cormier and Credeur in their individual capacities will be dismissed with prejudice to their being
asserted again until the Heck conditions are met. DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 657 (quoting Johnson v.
McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996)).
The Heck analysis does not make an inquiry into the validity of the plaintiff’s claims, but
rather, considers whether they are inconsistent with a prior criminal conviction. Accordingly, the
Court will address Price’s remaining claims.
C.

Official Capacity/ Monell Claims

Price has also sued Officers Cormier and Credeur and Chief Stelly in their official capacities.
An official capacity suit is the equivalent of a suit against the entity of which the officer is an agent.

See also Thomas v. La. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 406 Fed. Appx. 890, 898 (5th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam) (unpublished) (false-arrest claim “would necessarily require the district court to
re-evaluate the lawfulness of her arrest and criminal conviction because proof of” false arrest
would require proving that the arrest was unlawful); Cano v. Bexar Cnty., Tex., 280 Fed.Appx.
404, 408 (5th Cir. 2008) (false-arrest claim Heck-barred where conduct that provided probable
cause to arrest also formed the basis of conviction).
4

11

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-166 (1985); Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-472
(1985); Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358, 361 (1991); McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., Ala., 520 U.S. 781,
784-85, (1997)5 ; Burge v. St. Tammany Parish, 187 F.3d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 1999). In this case, Price
has sued the City of Rayne; therefore, the Court treats the claims against Cormier, Credeur, and
Chief Stelly as claims against the governmental entity for which they served, the City of Rayne.
It is well established that governmental liability under § 1983 must be premised on a
government policy or custom that causes the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs ., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Board of Cnty. Comm’nrs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397, 403 (1997); Turner v. Houma Mun. Fire & Police Civ. Serv. Bd., 229 F.3d 478, 483 n. 10 (5th
Cir. 2000). A policy may be a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially
adopted and promulgated by the government’s lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the
lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority. Burge, 336 F.3d at 369.
It is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable
to the municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate
conduct, the municipality was the “moving force” behind the injury alleged. That is,
a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree
of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action
and the deprivation of federal rights.
Board of Cnty. Comm’nrs of Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 404.

5

As the Supreme Court explained,

a suit against a governmental officer “in his official capacity” is the same as a suit
“‘against [the] entity of which [the] officer is an agent,’” Kentucky. . . , 473 U.S. . . [at]
165 . . . (quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, n.
55 . . .(1978) and that victory in such an “official-capacity” suit “imposes liability on the
entity that [the officer] represents,” Brandon . . . , 469 U.S. . . [at] 471 . . . .
McMillian, 520 U.S. at 785 n. 2.

12

Price has submitted no evidence that the City of Rayne adopted or promulgated any official
policy which encouraged police officers to unlawfully arrest persons or to use excessive force against
persons arrested. Instead, Price argues that the City had an “ongoing custom and policy” of failing
to follow procedures mandated by the Lawrason Act, LA. REV. STAT. 33:321, et seq., in hiring and
disciplining officers.6 In support of these allegations, Price points to an alleged failure of the City
to obtain City Council approval of the hiring of Officer Cormier, and the alleged failure of the City
to bring recommended disciplinary action before the City Council against Cormier for the use of
inappropriate language during this incident and against Officer Credeur for failure to report a January
15, 2012 accident in which Credeur hit a bicyclist, and the failure of the City to investigate the April
15, 2012 arrest of Officer Cormier for domestic abuse battery.
With respect to the hiring of Officer Cormier, Defendants have submitted documentation
which establishes that Chief Stelly obtained the approval of then-Mayor Jim Petitjean and the
Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board, as required under applicable civil service statutes.7
[Doc. No. 49-1, p. 1]. Further, under the Lawrason Act, the appointment by Chief Stelly, approved
by the Mayor, remains in effect unless rejected by the governing authority.8 Price has presented no
evidence demonstrating any such rejection by the City.
Furthermore, even if the hiring of Officer Cormier was not in compliance with the Lawrason
Act, Price has presented no evidence of deliberate conduct on the part of the City and no evidence
of a direct causal link between the City’s alleged inaction and the deprivation of Price’s

6

LA. REV. STAT. 33:423(A), (C)(1)(a) and (C)(2)(a).

7

LA. REV. STAT. 33:2531; LA. REV. STAT. 33:2533(2).

8

LA. REV. STAT. 33:423(C)(2)(a).
13

Constitutional rights. Simply stated, there has been no showing that the complained of municipal
action was taken with “deliberate indifference as to its known or obvious consequences” or that the
alleged unlawful arrest and use of excessive force was the “plainly obvious consequence” of the
allegedly improper hiring of Officer Cormier. Board of Cnty. Comm’nrs of Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S.
407-409.
The same is true with respect to Price’s allegations of alleged failure of the City to bring
recommended disciplinary action before the City Council as required under the Lawrason Act.
There has been no showing that the complained of municipal inaction was taken with “deliberate
indifference as to its known or obvious consequences” or that the alleged unlawful arrest and use of
excessive force was the “plainly obvious consequence” of the cited failures. Cormier’s arrest for
domestic abuse battery occurred after Price’s arrest and his disciplinary action concerned the use of
inappropriate language which occurred during Price’s arrest. As such, these complained of
disciplinary failures cannot be shown to have the requisite direct causal connection to Price’s
complained of Constitutional violations. Likewise, the failure of the City to bring before the City
Council the recommended disciplinary action against Officer Credeur regarding an unreported
bicycle accident has no causal connectivity whatsoever to the alleged Constitutional deprivations
asserted herein.
For these reasons, summary judgment on Price’s official capacity claims against Officers
Cormier and Credeur and Chief Stelly, as well as the City of Rayne, will be granted.
D.

Individual Capacity Claim against Chief Stelly

“Under section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for the actions of subordinates on
any theory of vicarious liability.” Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001)
14

(quoting Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987)). In a § 1983 action, a supervisory
official may be held liable only if: (i) he affirmatively participated in the acts that resulted in a
constitutional deprivation; or (ii) he implemented unconstitutional policies that resulted in the
plaintiff’s injury. See Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2011); Gates v. Texas Depot of
Prot. & Reg. Serve., 537 F.3d 404, 435 (5th Cir. 2008). To establish supervisor liability for
constitutional violations committed by subordinate employees, the plaintiff must show that the
supervisor acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference to the violation of others’ constitutional
rights committed by their subordinates. Porter, 659 F.3d at 446. Deliberate indifference requires
“proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Id. at 44647; see also Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011).
In this case, there is no allegation that Chief Stelly was present at Price’s residence on the
day in question or that he personally participated in Price’s arrest or the alleged use of excessive
force. The summary judgment evidence belies any such allegations. [See Doc. No. 40-10].
Furthermore, in accordance with the above analysis, Price has failed to show an unconstitutional
policy with respect to the Lawrason Act which caused the alleged false arrest and use of excessive
force by Officers Cormier and Credeur complained of by Price, and there is no evidence that Chief
Stelly acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference to the constitutional violations allegedly
committed by these two officers.
To the extent that Price suggests that Chief Stelly may be held personally liable for
inadequate supervision or a failure to train his subordinates, that claim likewise is properly
dismissed. A supervisory official may be held personally liable for inadequate supervision or a
failure to train his subordinates only where the failure to train or supervise amounts to deliberate
15

indifference and is a proximate cause of a constitutional violation. See Porter, 659 F.3d at 446;
Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 254 n. 1 (5th Cir.2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2932 (2011).
“‘[D]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor
disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Porter, 659 F.3d at 446-47 (quoting
Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1360 (internal quotation marks omitted) (other citations omitted)). To
establish that a state actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his actions, there must
be “actual or constructive notice” “that a particular omission in their training program causes . . .
employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights” and the actor nevertheless “choose[s] to retain
that program.” Id. at 447 (citing Board of Cnty. Comm’rs, 520 U.S. at 409). Thus, “[a] pattern of
similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate
deliberate indifference,” because “[w]ithout notice that a course of training is deficient in a particular
respect, decision makers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program that will
cause violations of constitutional rights .” Id.
Defendants have submitted proof that both Officer Cormier and Officer Credeur were POSTcertified, and that both officers were trained in the proper and safe use of the Taser. [Doc. Nos. 4011, 40-12, 49-2]. There is no evidence for this Court to find that the Chief’s training program was
in any way deficient. Furthermore, Price has failed to submit any evidence to establish a pattern by
these or any other officers of the Rayne Police Department of falsely arresting or using excessive
force on members of the community. Therefore, Price has failed to demonstrate deliberate
indifference on the part of Chief Stelly. “A complete failure of proof concerning an essential
element of the nonmoving party’s case is fatal and entitles the moving party to judgment as a matter

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of law.” Ledesma v. Swartz, 1998 WL 355480, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 26, 1998) (citing Celotex, 477
U.S. at 322–23).
For these reasons, there is no basis for Price’s federal individual capacity claims against Chief
Stelly, and all of these claims will be dismissed.
E.

State Law Claims

In light of the above, all federal claims asserted by Price against the City, Officers Cormier
and Credeur, and Chief Stelly are dismissed. Accordingly, no federal question remains before this
court.
A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if the court has dismissed
all claims over which it had original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Nowell v. Acadian
Ambulance Service, 147 F.Supp.2d 495, 510 (W.D. La. 2001). Indeed, when a court dismisses all
federal claims before trial, the general rule is to dismiss any pendent claims. Bass v. Parkwood
Hospital, 180 F.3d 234, 246 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir.
1989). However, the dismissal should be without prejudice. Id. Accordingly, the Court declines
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims asserted by Price. Those claims will
be dismissed without prejudice.
III.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 40] is

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. To the extent that Defendants move for
summary judgment on Price’s § 1983 claims against the City of Rayne, Cormier, Credeur, and Chief
Stelly, the motion is GRANTED, and Price’s claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. To
the extent that Defendants move for summary judgment based on a substantive analysis of Price’s
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state law claims, the motion is DENIED. However, having dismissed Price’s federal claims, the
Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims, and those claims are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 3rd day of March, 2016.

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