Boudreaux et al v. Schlumberger Tech Corp

Filing 629

MEMORANDUM RULING re 534 MOTION for Summary Judgment as to the Issues of Good Faith and Willfullness filed by Schlumberger Technology Corp; 540 MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff Hani Anklis filed by Schlumberge r Technology Corp; 541 MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff Michael Ainsworth filed by Schlumberger Technology Corp; 542 MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff Gadi Ogbogu filed by Schlumberger Technology Corp; 543 MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff Thomas Naron filed by Schlumberger Technology Corp; 544 MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff Brian Dankowski filed by Schlumberger Technology Corp; 545 MOTION f or Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff Joshua Eaton filed by Schlumberger Technology Corp 546 MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff James Davis filed by Schlumberger Technology Corp; 552 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgm ent Regarding Schlumberger's Exemption Defenses filed by Brock P Boudreaux; 556 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment as to Schlumberger's Good Faith Affirmative Defense filed by Brock P Boudreaux. Signed by Judge Robert R Summerhays on 3/30/2022. (crt,Taylor, L)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION

BROCK PBOUDREAUXETAL CASE NO. 6:14-CV-02267
VERSUS JUDGE ROBERT R. SUMMERHAYS
SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGY CORP MAGISTRATE JUDGE CAROL B.
WHITEHURST

MEMORANDUM RUUNG
Presently before the Court are (1) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding
Schlumberger's Exemption Defenses [ECF No. 552] filed by Plaintiffs; (2) Motion for Summary
Judgment as to Plaintiff Hani Anklis [ECF No. 540] filed by defendant Schlumberger Technology
Corp. ("Schlumberger" or "Defendant"); (3) Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff

Michael Ainsworth [ECF No. 541] filed by Schlumberger; (4) Motion for Summary Judgment as
to Plaintiff Gadi Ogbogu [ECF No. 542] filed by Schlumberger; (5) Motion for Summary
Judgment as to Plaintiff Thomas Naron [ECF No. 543] filed by Schlumberger; (6) Motion for
Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff Brian Dankowski [ECF No. 544] filed by Schlumberger; (7)
Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff Joshua Baton [ECF No. 545] filed by Schlumberger;
(8) Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff James Davis [ECF No. 546] filed by
Schlumberger; (9) Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Issues of Good Faith and Willfulness
[ECF No. 534] filed by Schlumberger; and (10) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to
Schlumberger's Good Faith Affirmative Defense [ECF No. 556] filed by Plaintiffs. Each of the
motions is opposed.

I.

BACKGROUND
On July 8, 2014, Plaintiffs Brock Boudreaux and Khaled Barake filed the present Fair
Labor Standards ("FLSA") collective action against Schlumberger asserting claims for unpaid

overtime on behalf of Measurement While Drilling Operators ("MWDs") and Directional Drillers
("DD's").1 On December 4,2014, an amended complaint was filed by Boudreaux and Barake, and
Michael Ainsworth was added.2 Schlumberger filed an answer asserting various affirmative
defenses.3 Plaintiffs requested conditional certification of the FLSA claims under 29 U.S.C. §
216(b) and, on February 25, 2015, the Court entered an order granting conditional certification.4
This order established two classes: MWDs and DDs.5 The parties subsequently settled the claims
of the MWD class.6 The litigation has continued as to the DD class.
Schlumberger provides drilling and measurement services to oil and gas exploration
development companies.7 Directional drilling cells are recognized operational units with assigned
responsibilities for its members in Schlumberger's manuals.8 Schlumberger would create cells
with the intent to regularly assign the same employees to work in the same cell for the same
customer.9 The Lead DD manages the cell, which normally consisted of two DDs and two
MWDs.10

'ECFNo.l.
2 ECF No. 27.

3 ECF No. 29.
4 See ECF No. 33 and 52.
5 ECF No. 52.

6 ECF No. 436.
7 ECF No. 540, Ex. 1, Anklis Deposition., at 84.
8 ECF No. 540, Ex. 3, van Vliet Declaration., at ^ 7; Ex. 5, van Vliet Depo., Vol. II, at pp. 42-43.; Ex, 6, van Vliet
Deposition, Vol. I, at 148.
9 Id., at Vol. II, at pp. 42, 128-129, 151-52.
10 Id. at If 8; Ex. 4, Kuwertz Deposition, at p. 297; Ex. 5, van Vliet Deposition, Vol. II, at p. 41.

II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
"A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense-or the part
of each claim or defense-on which summary judgment is sought.9911 "The court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."12 "A genuine issue of material fact exists
when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party."13

As summarized by the Fifth Circuit:
When seeking summary judgment, the movant bears the initial responsibility of
demonstrating the absence of an issue of material fact with respect to those issues
on which the movant bears the burden of proof at trial. However, where the
nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may merely point to an
absence of evidence, thus shifting to the non-movant the burden of demonstrating
by competent summary judgment proof that there is an issue of material fact
warranting trial.1
When reviewing evidence in connection with a motion for summary judgment, "the court must
disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe, and
should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmoving party as well as that evidence
supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached."15 "Credibility
determinations are not part of the summary judgment analysis."16 Rule 56 "mandates the entry of
summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
12 Id.

13 Quality Infusion Care, Inc. v. Health Care Service Corp., 628 F.3d 725, 728 (5th Cir. 2010).
14 Lindsey v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 (5th Cir.1994) (internal citations omitted).
15 Roberts v. Cardinal Servs., 266 F.3d 368, 373 (5th Cir.2001); see also Feist v. Louisiana, Dept. of Justice, Office of
the Atty. Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cu\ 2013) (court must view all facts and evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party).
16 Quorum Health Resources, L.L.C. v. Maverick County Hosp. Dist., 308 F.3d 451, 458 (5th Cir. 2002).

existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof;'17

III.
THE "WfflTE COLLAR" EXEMPTIONS AND
THE "SALARY BASIS" REQUIREMENT
Plaintiffs and Schlumberger have both moved for summary judgment with respect to
Schlumberger's exemption defenses. The FLSA provides that "no employer shall employ any of
his employees ... for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives
compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one
and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed."18 However, the FLSA provides that
employers do not have to pay time and a half to individuals "employed in a bona fide executive,
administrative, or professional capacity."19 The statute does not define the scope of these
exemptions but, instead, delegates authority to the Secretary of Labor to promulgate mles that
define these exemptions.20 The Secretary has issued regulations that exempt "highly
compensated/'21 as well as more modestly paid "executive/9 "administrative/" and "professional"
employees.22 Schlumberger asserts three of these exemption defenses, namely, the (1) highly

compensated employee ("HCE") exemption; (2) the administrative exemption; and (3) the
executive exemption. Collectively, these three exemptions are often referred to as "white collar"
exemptions.23 If an employer claims "that the suing employee is exempt from the overtime

17 Patrick v. Ridge, 394 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir. 2004) (alterations in original) (quoting Celotex v. Catlett, 477 U.S.

317,322(1986)).
18 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(l).
1929U.S.C.§213(a)(l).
2029U.S.C.§213(a)(l).
2129 C.F.R.§ 541.601.

22 Id. at §§ 541.100, 541.200, 541.300.
23 Snivety v. Peak Pressure Control, LLC, 317 F. Supp. 3d 911 (W.D. Tex. 2018).

requirement/9 then the employer "has the burden of proving that the employee falls within the
claimed exempted category."24
The HCE exemption applies to employees who earn over $100,000 in annual
compensation, perform non-manual work, and regularly perform at least one of the exempt duties
of an exempt executive, administrative or professional employee.25 The administrative exemption
applies to employees who earn a weekly salary of at least $45 5 26 perform non-manual work related
to the management or operations of the employer's customers, and exercise "discretion and
independent judgment with respect to matters of significance."27 The executive exemption applies
to employees who manage a department or subdivision of Schlumberger, who regularly direct the
work of at least two other employees, and whose recommendations as to the hiring and firing,
advancement, or promotion of other employees are given weight.28 Each of these three white collar
exemptions requires that the employee be paid on "a salary basis" for the exemption to apply. In
their motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs argue that Schlumberger's pay structure does not
satisfy this "salary basis" requirement and thus none of the exemptions are applicable as a matter
of law.

As explained by the Fifth Circuit:
To fall within any of these exemptions, however, three conditions must be met:
First, the employee must meet certain criteria concerning the performance of
executive, administrative, and professional duties. Second, the employee must meet
certain minimum income thresholds. Finally, the employee must be paid on a
"salary basis." And although the duties criteria and income thresholds vary from
exemption to exemption, the regulations apply the same salary-basis requirement

to all four exemptions. See id. § 541.100(a)(l) (applying the salary-basis test to
executive employees); id. § 541.200(a)(l) (administrative employees); id. §

24 Samson v. Apollo Res., Inc., 242 F.3d 629, 636 (5th Cir.2001).
2529C.F.R.§541.601(a).
26 The amount of $455 per week was applicable for the relevant time periods but has since changed.
2729C.F.R.§541.200(a).
2829C.F.R.§541.100(a).

541.300(a)(l) (professional employees); id. § 541.601(b)(l) (highly compensated
employees).
So earning a certain level of income is necessary, but insufficient on its own, to
avoid the overtime protections of the FLSA. The employee must also be paid on a
salary basis, as well as perform certain duties. And unless those tests are met, the
employee is "not exempt ... no matter how highly paid they might be." Id. §

541.601(d) (emphasis added) (specifying various professions that are subject to
overtime regardless of the amount ofmcome earned).29
In Hewitt, the Fifth Circuit addressed whether an employee who was paid solely on a daily
rate could satisfy the requirements of an HCE without satisfying the salary basis requirement.30
There, the parties conceded that the plaintiff met the job duties requirement and the income
thresholds but disputed whether the salary basis requirements must be met—specifically the
guaranteed minimum component. The FLSA and its regulations define salary as compensation
paid "on a weekly, or less frequent basis," "without regard to the number of days or hours
worked."3 If an employee's wages are computed on a daily rate, certain criteria must be met,
namely:
An exempt employee's earnings may be computed on an hourly, a daily or a shift
basis, without losing the exemption or violating the salary basis requirement, if the
employment arrangement also includes a guarantee of at least the minimum weekly
required amount paid on a salary basis regardless of the number of hours, days or
shifts worked, and a reasonable relationship exists between the guaranteed amount
and the amount actually earned.32
In Hemtt, the Fifth Circuit concluded that, since the plaintiffs compensation was based solely on
a daily rate, this regulation applied.33 Further, since the plaintiff was not guaranteed at least the
minimum weekly requirement, the HCE exemption failed.34 Plaintiffs in the present case argue

29 Hewitt v. Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc., 15 F.4th 289,290-291 (5th Cir. 2021).
30 Id.

31 29 C.F.R § 541.602(a) & (a)(l).
32M§541.604(b).
3315F.4th289.
34 Id.

that Hewitt is dispositive as far as Schlumberger's exemptions. They argue that, even if Plaintiffs
meet the guaranteed minimum requirement,35 they do not satisfy the "reasonable relationship"
requirement found in the same regulation. Schlumberger, however, argues that the "reasonable
relationship" requirement does not apply in the present case. The Court agrees.
In Hewitt, the plaintiffs income was computed solely on the basis of a daily rate.36 The

defendant in that case argued that the day rate paid to the plaintiff exceeded the required weekly
minimum and thus no further analysis was required. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, relying on the
fact that there simply was no guaranteed minimum requirement.37 Here, the Plaintiffs are paid
under a hybrid compensation structure. Specifically, they are each paid an annual salary that is not
subject to reduction regardless of the numbers of hours or days worked. As to the specific

individual Plaintiffs named in the seven motions for summary judgment filed by Schlumberger,
that salary more than satisfies the requisite guaranteed minimum weekly salary requirement. These
employees were also provided additional compensation of a day rate paid for any day they are
present on a customer's rig. This day rate compensation generally accounts for the bulk of each
Plaintiffs9 total compensation.
The distinction between the compensation structure in the current case and that found in
Hemtt is significant. Based on the compensation structure in the present case, the Plaintiffs9 pay
is calculated "on a weekly, or less frequent basis"38 and is not pay "computed on... a

daily... basis."39 The significance of this distinction was addressed by the Fifth Circuit when it

35 While the Court has evidence demonstrating that the guaranteed minimum requirement is met as to the seven
individual Plaintiffs named in Schlumberger's motions, there is no specific evidence regarding the remaining
Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' motion simply seeks a finding that even if the guaranteed minimum requirement is met, the pay
structure cannot meet the "reasonable relationship" test and therefore does not qualify as salary basis compensation.
36 Hewitt, 15 F. 4th at 292.
37 Id., at 298.

3829C.F.R.§541.602(a).

39M§541.604(b).

explained that the Hewitt ruling was not in conflict with First40 and Second41 Circuit rulings on the
issue:

But there is no actual conflict here. That is for one simple reason that should be
apparent from the face of the regulations: Litz ondAnani involve pay calculated "on
a weekly, or less frequent basis" (29 C.F.R. § 541.602(a))—and not pay "computed
on ... a daily ... basis" (§ 541.604(b)). See Litz, 772 F.3d at 2 (employees were

"guaranteed a minimum weekly salary of $1,000 whether they bill [ed] any hours
or not') (emphasis added); Anani, 730 F.3d at 148 (employee's "base weekly salary
was guaranteed, i.e. to be paid regardless of the number of hours ... actually

worked') (emphasis added).
Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has already distinguished Litz and Anani on precisely this
textual ground. As that court explained, "Anani and Litz involved plaintiffs who ...
were undisputedly guaranteed weekly base salaries above the qualifying level."

Hughes, 878 F.3d at 189-90 (emphasis added).42
Moreover, the fact that the Plaintiffs were paid additional compensation by Schlumberger does not
defeat the specific exemptions claimed by Schlumberger. Indeed, the regulations promulgated
under the FLSA address this issue:
An employer may provide an exempt employee with additional compensation
without losing the exemption or violating the salary basis requirement, if the
employment arrangement also includes a guarantee of at least the minimum
weekly-required amount paid on a salary basis. Thus, for example, an exempt
employee guaranteed at least $684 each week paid on a salary basis may also
receive additional compensation of a one percent commission on sales. An exempt
employee also may receive a percentage of the sales or profits of the employer if
the employment arrangement also includes a guarantee of at least $684 each week
paid on a salary basis. Similarly, the exemption is not lost if an exempt employee
who is guaranteed at least $684 each week paid on a salary basis also receives
additional compensation based on hours worked for work beyond the normal
workweek. Such additional compensation may be paid on any basis (e.g., flat sum,
bonus payment, straight-time hourly amount, time and one-halfor any other basis),
and may include paid time off.43

40 Litz v. Saint Consulting Group, Inc., 772 F.3d 1 (1st Cu-. 2014).

41 Anani v. CVS RX Services, Inc., 730 F.3d 146 (2nd Cir. 2013).
42?w^,15F.4that297.
4329C.F.R.§541.604(a).

8

The Court, therefore, concludes that Schlumberger's compensation structure does not require
application of the "reasonable relationship" test. Accordingly, one or more of the white collar

exemptions may apply to Plaintiffs if Schlumberger establishes that the minimum weekly
guaranteed compensation requirement has been met and that the job duties test is satisfied.

IV.

APPLICATION OF THE HCE EXEMPTION TO SEVEN PLAINTIFFS
Schlumberger next argues in its seven motions for summary judgment that the HCE

exemption applies to seven (7) of the individual Plaintiffs—Hani Anklis, Michael Ainsworth, Gadi
Ogbogu, Thomas Naron, Brian Dankowski, Joshua Baton, and James Davis—as a matter of law
based on the summary judgment record. As the Court previously ruled, Schlumberger's pay
structure satisfies the "salary basis" requirement. The HCE exemption thus applies if these seven
Plaintiffs satisfy the "job duties" requirement.
A. HCE Exemption "Job Duties" Requirement.

Under the FLSA, an employee falls into the HCE exemption if that employee (1) is
annually compensated at least $100,000; (2) "customarily and regularly performs any one or more
of the exempt duties or responsibilities of an executive, administrative or professional
employee;"44 and (3) has within his or her primary duties the performing of office or non-manual
work. Plaintiffs do not dispute the compensation requirement of this exemption. However, the
applicable regulation states that the "high level of compensation" that the HCE exemption requires
is itself "a strong indicator of an employee's exempt status, thus eliminating the need for a detailed
analysis of the employee's job duties."46

4429C.F.R.§541.601(a).
4529C.F.R.§541.601(d).
46 29 C.F.R.§ 541.601(0.

The Fifth Circuit has explained the job duties requirement of the HCE exemption:
The breadth of the HCE exemption is shown by the statement that an employee
may be exempt even if "the employee does not meet all of the other requirements"
for the underlying administrative, executive, or professional exemption. §
541.60 l(c). The regulation includes an example of an exempt executive HCE, who
can be an "employee [who] customarily and regularly directs the work of two or
more other employees." Id. Notably, this hypothetical employee meets only one of
the elements in the standalone executive exemption. § 541.100. The standalone
executive exemption mirrors the standalone administrative exemption: they both
have conjunctive elements laying out an employee's duties. Compare id., with §
541.200. While the elements are conjunctive in the standalone exemptions, they are

disjunctive when paired with a high salary. § 541.60 l(c). Analogously, then,
employees may be exempt as administrative HCEs even if they do not meet all the
elements in the standalone administrative exemption. So an employee could be an

administrative HCE if the employee customarily and regularly performed "office
or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business

operations of the employer," § 541.200(a)(2), even if the employee's duties did not
"include[ ] the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to

matters of significance," § 541.200(a)(3).47
In Zannikos v. Oil Inspections (U.S.A.), Inc. ,48 the Fifth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs did

not fall within the administrative exemption because their primary duties did not include the
exercise of "discretion and independent judgment" with respect to matters of significance. But the

court concluded that the HCE exemption did apply because plaintiffs9 primary duties included a
component that met an element of the "administrative exemption."49

Section 541.201 of the FLSA regulations specifically defines the type of job duties which
qualify as administrative:
(a) To qualify for the administrative exemption, an employee's primary duty must
be the performance of work directly related to the management or general business
operations of the employer or the employer's customers. The phrase "directly
related to the management or general business operations" refers to the type of work
performed by the employee. To meet this requirement, an employee must perform
work directly related to assisting with the running or servicing of the business, as
distinguished, for example, from working on a manufacturing production line or
selling a product in a retail or service establishment.
47 Smith v. Ochsner Health System, 956 F.3d 681, 685 (5th Cir. 2020).

48 605 FApp'x 349 (5th Cir. 2015).
49 Id.

10

(b) Work directly related to management or general business operations includes,
but is not limited to, work in functional areas such as tax; finance; accounting;
budgeting; auditing; insurance; quality control; purchasing; procurement;
advertising; marketing; research; safety and health; personnel management; human
resources; employee benefits; labor relations; public relations, government
relations; computer network., internet and database administration; legal and
regulatory compliance; and similar activities. Some of these activities may be
performed by employees who also would qualify for another exemption.

(c) An employee may qualify for the administrative exemption if the employee's
primary duty is the performance of work directly related to the management or
general business operations of the employer's customers. Thus, for example,
employees acting as advisers or consultants to their employer's clients or customers
(as tax experts or financial consultants, for example) may be exempt.50
Schlumberger thus need only establish that an employee customarily and regularly performed one
or more of these exempt duties or responsibilities and that their primary duties were non-manual
in nature.51 Schlumberger contends that the summary judgment record establishes that the job
duties of the seven plaintiffs at issue satisfy these requirements as a matter of law.
D. Hani Anklis.

Schlumberger first argues that Hani Anklis falls within the HCE exemption based on the
summary judgment record. Anklis began his employment with Schlumberger on July 12,2005, as

a MWD and transitioned to a DD in 2008.52 He remained a DD through the end of his employment
on July 12, 2015.53 While working as a DD he received a base salary plus bonuses.54 He received
the same amount every two weeks whether he worked or not.55 In addition, there were no

50 29 C.F.R.g 541.201.
51 Id.

52 ECF No. 540, Ex. 1, Anklis Deposition, at p. 17; Ex. 2, Marroquin Declaration, at ^ 5 & attached exhibit 2- 1.
53 Id.

54 ECF No. 540, Ex. 1, Anklis Deposition, at 37. See also Declaration of M. F. van Vliet attached as Exhibit 3, at ^ 5.
55 Id.

11

deductions to his salary for any reason.56 He also received bonuses including a day bonus or day
rate.57

In 2012, Anklis' total compensation was $280,913.3 6.58 His bi-weekly salary was
$1,980.77, or $990.38 per week. In 2013, Anklis' total compensation was $292,221.02, which
included a bi-weekly salary of $1,980.77, or $990.38 per week.59 In 2014, Anklis' total
compensation was $347,753.70, which included a bi-weekly salary $1,980.77, or $990.38 per
week.60 In 2015, Anklis received $98,791.49 total compensation (or approximately $169,357 pro

rated annually) which included a bi-weekly salary of $1,485.58, or $742.79 weekly through his
July 2015 termination date.61

When he worked as Lead DD, Anklis was ultimately responsible for the directional drilling
work performed at the rig.62 Anklis had very little contact with the DD coordinator in the office
while he was at the well site.63 Even though MWDs had their own manager, Anklis oversaw their
work on the rig.64 As Lead DD, Anklis trained or mentored as needed. This included teaching
trainees on the job.65 Lead DDs had the authority to replace other DDs if their performance lagged,
and Anklis testified that there are many cases when that occurred.66 Schlumberger's business
managers would often ask Anklis his opinion about less experienced DDs.67

56 Id.
57 Id. at p. 37. See also Ex. 3, van Vliet Declaration, at 1[ 5.

58 ECF No. 540, Ex. 1, Anklis Deposition; Ex. 2, Marroquin Declaration & attached exhibits 2-2 and 2-3.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.

62 Id. at 61. 5^ also Ex. 3, van Vliet Declaration, at ^ 16, 27; Ex. 4, Kuwertz Deposition, at p. 190, 272; Deposition
of E. Monckton, attached as Exhibit 7,at pp. 29, 36, 165, 173; Deposition of M. F. van Vliet, Volume I, attached as
Exhibit 6, at pp. 150, 154.
63 ECF No. 540, Ex. 1, Anklis Deposition, at 128.
64 Id. See also Ex. 4, Kuwertz Depo., at pp. 270-272.
65 Id. at 62. 5^? also Ex. 3, van Vliet Declaration, at If 16; Ex. 4, Kuwertz Deposotopm, at p. 270, 281-283; Ex. 7,
Monckton Depo., at pp. 65-66, 81; Ex. 5, van Vliet, Vol. II, at pp. 41-42.
66 Id. at 66.
67 Id. at 68. See also Ex. 3, van Vliet Declaration, at ^ 16; Ex. 4, Kuwertz Deposition, at p. 287; Ex. 5, Monckton
Deposition, at pp. 65-66, 68, 102, 165.

12

As Lead DD on site, Anklis was the lead interface with the company.68 His communication
duties included keeping the company up to date as to the progress of the well plan. The contact
was regular, Anklis would raise any issues and help resolve the issues.69
Part of his job as DD was to provide instruction to the Driller as to how to "steer" the
bottom of the well hole assembly and ensured that they hewed to the well plan; it was very rare
for the Driller to reject Anklis9 instmctions.70 Anklis, as the DD, essentially supervised the

Driller.71 As a DD, Anklis did not physically control the drill string when it was in the hole. For
safety and insurance reasons, he was not allowed to touch the company's rig equipment.72

Anklis9 duties during operation included checking that the tools were functioning properly
down hole and verifying that the drill string was staying on path.73 When Anklis saw that a
correction needed to happen, he intervened and worked with the Driller on a solution to address
the problem.74

Anklis9 responsibilities included ensuring that they did not lose the entire drill string, which
would have been a multi-million-dollar issue.75 Anklis watched the MWDs provide their surveys

and if the smvey data indicated that the drill was veering off path, Anklis shut down the drilling
operation and instructed the Driller on how to return the drill back onto the intended well path.76
Determining the proper corrective action required Anklis to use both mathematical calculations

68 ECF No. 540, Ex. 1, Anklis Deposition, at 80. See also. Ex. 3, van Vliet Declaration, at ^ 16; Ex. 5, van Vliet
Deposition, Vol. II, at p. 41.

69 ECF No. 540, Ex. 1, Anklis Deposition, at 81.
70 Id. at 85-86. See also Ex. 3, van Vliet Declaration, at ^ 13; Ex. 4, Kuwertz Deposition, at 276- 279; Ex. 5, van Vliet

Deposition, Vol II, at pp. 96,98.
71 Id. at 115. See also Ex. 3, van Vliet Declaration, at ^[ 11 - 13; Ex. 4, Kuwertz Deposition., at pp. 276-277.
72 Mat 84.
73 Id. at 91. See also Ex. 3, van Vliet Declaration, at ^ 12 - 13; Ex. 4, Kuwertz Deposition, at 276-279; Ex. 5, van

Vliet Deposition, Vol II, at pp.96,98.
74 Id. at 92.
75 Id. at 96.
76 Id. at 97. See also Ex. 3, van Vliet Declaration, at ^ 13.

13

and his judgment.77 While drilling was occurring, Anklis constantly observed the drilling
operations and the relevant data and provided instructions to the Driller on how to steer the drill
based on the trends Anklis observed in the data.78

Schlumberger argues that Anklis is exempt for the FLSA based upon the HCE exemption
because his duties were non-manual, and he customarily and regularly performed at least one
exempt duty or responsibility under the executive or administrative exemptions. His annual
compensation also exceeded $100,000 per year, of which over $455 per week was paid on a salary
basis. The Court agrees.

The duties of an exempt executive employee include managing a subdivision of the
enterprise or supervising two or more employees. Anklis customarily and regularly performed both
these duties. He was a senior DD serving as lead or cell manager from 2010 until his termination.79
As a Lead DD, Anklis assigned tasks and monitored performance.80 He trained and mentored the
cell members.81 All of these were ongoing responsibilities while Anklis served as Lead DD.82 The
summary judgment record thus establishes that Anklis regularly performed the duties outlined in
29 C.F.R. §§ 541.102 and 104. Plaintiffs have not come forward with evidence sufficient to create
a genuine question of material fact as to these duties.
Anklis also satisfies the requirements of the HCE under the administrative exemption as
he regularly performed "non-manual work directly related to the management or general business
operations of the employer or the employer's customers."83 The phrase "directly related to the

77 Id. at 99-100. See also Ex. 3, van Vliet Declaration, at 113; Ex. 4, Kuwertz Deposition, at pp. 108, 206-208, 210,

214,278-279.
78 Id. at 106.

79 ECF No. 540, Ex. 1; Anklis Deposition, at 18.
80 Id., at 61. See also Ex. 3, van Vliet Declaration, at ^ 16; Ex. 4, Kuwertz Deposition, at pp. 270-272.
81 Id., at 62. See also Ex. 3, van Vliet Declaration, at ^ 16; Ex. 5, van Vliet Deposition, Vol. II, at pp. 79-80; Ex. 7,

Monckton Deposition, at pp. 65-66, 68,102,165; Ex. 4 Kuwertz Deposition, at pp. 281-283.
82 Id., at 61, 62, 66.

8329C.F.R.§541.200(a)(2).

14

management or business operations" refers to the type of work performed by the employee.
Administratively exempt employees are those "whose work affects business operations to a
substantial degree, even though their assignments are tasks related to the operation of a particular
segment of the business."85 The regulations specifically identify quality control and safety as
administrative duties qualifying for the exemption.86 Further, an employee who serves as an
advisor and consultant to an employer's customers will also qualify for the exemption.87 The
summary judgment record shows that Anklis customarily and regularly performed as an advisor
and consultant to Schlumberger's customers.88 Anklis affected the customer's business operations
to a substantial degree. As stated above, he directed and supervised the rig crew through the
directional drilling operation, giving continuous input to the Driller as to the steps necessary to
stay on the drill plan. His guidance was cmcial to the success of the drilling operation. Anklis
also continuously perfomied a significant quality control function. Specifically, Anklis would
inspect the surveys performed by the MWD and, if they appeared off to him, he would direct the
MWDs to "reshoot" the survey.90 If the monitors indicated that the drill was straying from the well

path, Anklis instructed the Driller on what actions to take to adjust the drill.91 Anklis also had
significant safety responsibilities, which are administrative duties.92 While the rig crew was
performing work under Anklis9 supervision, he was ensuring safety.93 Further, Anklis9 supervision

8429C.F.R.§541.201(a).
85 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.201(a), 541.205(a).
8629C.F.R.§541.201(b).
8729C.F.R.§541.201(c).
88 See generally Ex. 3, van Vliet Declaration, at ^ 9, 13; Ex. 5, van Vliet Deposition, Vol. II, at pp. 7-8,25; Ex. 6, van

Vliet Deposition, Vol. I, at p. 150; Ex. 4 Kuwertz Deposition, at pp. 49, 1 11, 128,216,278-279, 306.
89 ECF No. 540, Ex. 5, van Vliet Deposition, Vol. II, at 77-78.

90 ECF No. 540, Ex. 1, Anklis Deposition, at 97.
91 Id.

925'ee29C.F.R§541.201(a).
93 ECF No. 540, Ex. 1 at 109; Ex. 5, van Vliet Deposition, Vol. II, at 121; Ex. 4, Kuwertz Deposition, at 123, 125,
273,275.

15

of the rig crew during the directional drilling operation was another administrative function he
performed as part of his duties.94
In sum, based on the summary judgment record, the Court concludes that Anklis' duties as
a DD were non-manual in nature. To qualify for the HCE exemption, the employee's primary duty
must include performing office or non-manual labor.95 Anklis was not allowed to perform manual
work on the rig for safety and insurance reasons.96 Anklis9 primary duties involved monitoring
data and providing direction and advice. Monitoring data and providing direction or advice is not
manual labor. The limited manual labor that Anklis performed, does not alter this conclusion. The
mere fact that an exempt employee performs some manual work does not convert that employee
to a non-exempt laborer.97 Plaintiffs have not come forward with evidence sufficient to create a
genuine question of material fact as to the application of the HCE exemption. Accordingly, the
HCE exemption applies to Anklis as a matter of law. The Court, therefore, GRANTS
Schlumberger's motion for summary judgment with respect to Anklis.
E. Michael Ainsworth.

Michael Ainsworth began employment as a DD for PathFinder in August 2007 and
PathFinder was acquired by Schlumberger in August of 2010.98 Ainsworth voluntarily ended his

employment with STC with an effective date in January 2014." Throughout his employment with
STC, Ainsworth was paid on a salary basis.100 He received that same salary regardless of the
number of days or hours he worked.101 In addition, he received bonuses, often referred to as day

94 See Zannikos v. Oil Inspections (U.S.A.) Inc., No. 12-2508, 2014 WL 12771511 at *5 (S.D. Tex. Jan 30, 2014)
(finding that the inspector's supervision of the customer's line blending operation was an administrative task).
95 29C.F.R.§541.601.
96 ECF No. 540, Ex. 1, Anklis Deposition, at 84.

97 Smith v. Ochsner Health System, 956 F.3d 681 (5th Cir. 2020).
98 ECF No. 541, Exhibit 1, Ainsworth Deposition, at pp. 17-19.
99 Id.

100 ECF No. 541, Exhibit 2, Marroquin Declaration at ^ 6 & attached exhibit 2-1.
101 ECF No. 541, Exhibit 1, Ainsworth Deposition, at p. 32.

16

rates, which varied based on factors such as crew size or technology used, for each day that he
worked at a well site.102 From 201 1 to 2013, Ainsworth was paid a bi-weekly salary of $1,846.15,

or $923.07 per week.103 His total earnings for 2011, 2012, and 2013 were $215,315.30,
$225,653.41, and $233,330.05, respectively.104
As a DD, Ainsworth's job was to give instructions to the Driller—the member of the rig
crew who operated the controls for the drill string—as to how to drill the well.105 He instructed the

Driller on "sliding", "weighting the bit", and "drilling the curve."106 Schlumberger prohibited DDs
from operating the customer's equipment.107 Further, drilling rig companies often refused to let
Ainsworth or other DDs run their equipment as a matter of policy.108 Ainsworth was not
responsible for any maintenance on the directional drilling equipment.109
As a DD, Ainsworth was provided with "a well plan,"110 which contains the target
trajectory for the path of the well through the formations and to the production zone.111 The well
plan provides a "kick-off point from which it was Ainsworth's responsibility to build the curve
through to the end of that cm-ve or landing point.112 As Ainsworth stated, it was his responsibility

to direct the Driller in the building of the ciu-ve to get the well from point A to point B.113

102 M, at pp. 32-33. See also Exhibit 3, Declaration of M. F. van Vliet, at \ 5.

103 Id., at attached Ex. 7. See also Exhibit 2, Marroquin Declaration, at ^ 6 & attached Exhibit 2-1.
104 Id., at pp. 35-38; Ex. 2, Marroquin Declaration, at ^ 7 - 9 & attached Ex. 2-2 through 2-7.

105 Id., at pp. 60-61. See also Exhibit 4, Kuwertz Deposition, at pp. 40-41,207-209, 214,220,278-279; Exhibit 5, van
Vliet Deposition, Vol. II, at pp. 6-8; 91-92, 95-96; Ex. 2, van Vliet Declaration at ^ 13.
106 M, at pp. 60- 61. 5^? <^o Exhibit 3, Kuwertz Deposition, at pp. 208-209, 275, 278-279; Exhibit 6, van Vliet
Deposition, Vol., at p. 150.
107 Id., at pp. 59-60.
108 Id., at p. 58.
109 Id., at p. 73.
llo/(/,atp.74.

ln Id., at p. 68. See also Exhibit 4, Kuwertz Deposition, at p. 108; Exhibit 5, van Vliet Deposition, Vol. II, at pp.7,
97.
112 Id., at pp. 74-75. See also Exhibit 4, Kuwertz Deposition, at pp. 207-208.
113 Id.

17

Ainsworth also directed the pointing of the "mud motor" within the target zone to keep the
bottom hole assembly ("BHA")—which is the base of the "drill string" where the drill bits, motors,
and sensor packages are located—within that zone.114 If the BHA's trajectory trended outside the
target the zone, Ainsworth instmcted the Driller on how to correct it, such as by changing the
BHA's trajectory up, down, side to side, or whichever direction was required to keep the BHA
within the target zone.115 Ainsworth did not use a checklist or a standard operating procedure that
dictated a solution; he decided what instructions to give the Driller based on his experience.116

When the rig was drilling, Ainsworth was typically located on the floor with the Driller; when he
was not on the rig floor with the Driller, he continued to monitor the drilling parameters and data
from a screen or terminal to monitor the status of drilling operations.117 Ainsworth was constantly
monitoring for potential problems.118
When Ainsworth first arrived at a rig, he took an inventory and made sure all the required
items were there and set up his computer.119 He consulted with the company representative to
ensure that there were no changes to the drilling plan.120 When they were ready, the drilling crew

picked up the tools that make up the BHA.121 Ainsworth gave the driller a diagram or a list of the
components of the BHA that the crew was going to assemble, and instmcted the crew on the
amount oftorque to be applied to join the pieces.122 Ainsworth showed the rig crew what he wanted
them to do, and the rig crew used their methods to move the items onto the rig floor.123 The rig

114 M, at p. 69. See also Exhibit 4, Kuwertz Deposition, at pp. 40-41, 207-209, 214, 220, 278-279; Exhibit. 5, van
Vliet Deposition, Vol. II, at pp. 6-8; 91-92, 95-96.
115 Id., at p. 69.
116 M, at p. 69. See also Exhibit. 4, Kuwertz Deposition, at p. 215.
117 Id., at pp. 71-72.
118 Id., at p. 72.

119 M, at pp. 61-62. See also Exhibit 4, Kuwertz Deposition, at p. 123; Exhibit 3, van Vliet Declaration, at ^ 15.
120 Id.
121 Id., at p. 62.
122 Id.
123 Id., at pp. 64-65.

18

crew operated the derrick and hoist for picking up the tools.124 Ainsworth ensured that the rig crew
picked up the tools correctly.125 Ainsworth did not use his own hands to work with the tools; he
only monitored the work of the roughnecks on the site.126
Ainsworth also inspected the surveys performed by MWDs and, if they appeared incorrect,
he directed the MWDs to "reshoot" the sm-vey.127 Sometimes, when he was "building the cm-ve,"
Ainsworth would receive a survey that showed that he was not attaining the build rates that he was
expecting.128 In those situations, depending on the formation within which the BHA was drilling,
Ainsworth had the rig reduce the flow rate, slow drilling to hold a more accurate tool face, or pull
out of the hole to get a different tool.129 Ainsworth relied on his experience for these decisions,
and most of the time he did not have to get permission from the company representative to make
these changes.130 If there were problems with the directional drilling equipment, the DD would
trouble shoot the problem, consult with the company representative, and provide his opinion as to
what was causing the problem.131
Schlumberger contends that Ainsworth's duties were non-manual and that he customarily
and regularly performed at least one exempt duty or responsibility under the administrative
exemption and that the HCE exemption applies as a matter of law. The Court agrees. Ainsworth's
annual compensation exceeded $100,000 per year of which over $455 per week was paid on a
salary basis. Ainsworth performed many of the same duties as Anklis, and customarily and
regularly acted as an advisor and consultant to Schlumberger's customers. Ainsworth was

124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id., at pp. 84-85.
128 Id., at pp. 79-80.
129 Id.

130 M, at 79-80. 5^ also Exhibit 4, Kuwertz Deposition, at pp. 206-208, 278-279.
131 Id., at 78-79. See also Exhibit 3, van Vliet Declaration, at ^ 14.

19

responsible for instructing Drillers—members of the rig crew who operated the controls for the

drill string—on how to drill the well.132 He instructed the Driller on sliding, weighting the bit, and
drilling the curve.133 Ainsworth spent most of his time directing the Drillers.134 Ainsworth also
continuously performed a significant quality control function. Ainsworth would inspect the

smveys performed by the MWD and, if they appeared off to him, he would direct the MWDs to
"reshoot" the smvey.135 Ainsworth also had significant safety responsibilities, which are
administrative duties.136
In sum, the summary judgment record establishes that Ainsworth customarily and regularly
performed multiple administratively exempt duties. Only one such exempt duty is required to
trigger the HCE exemption. Moreover, like Anklis, the summary judgment record establishes that
Ainsworth's duties as DD were primarily non-manual in nature. Plaintiffs have not come forward
with summary judgment evidence sufficient to create a genuine question of material fact as to the
application of the HCE exemption. Accordingly, the HCE exemption applies to Ainsworth as a
matter of law and Schlumberger's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED with respect to
Ainsworth.
F. Gadi Ogbogu.
Schlumberger next moves for summary judgment with respect to Gadi Ogbogu. Ogbogu

began his employment with STC on July 25, 2006.137 He worked in the field, as a MWD from
2006 through 2009.138 Beginning on July 1, 2009, Ogbogu was assigned to and worked as a

132 M, at 60-61. 5^? also Exhibit 4, Kuwertz Deposition, at pp. 40-41, 207-209, 214, 220, 278-279; Exhibit 5, van
Vliet Depo., Vol. II, at pp. 6-8; 91-92, 95-96; Exhibit 3, van Vliet Declaration., at ^ 9-13.
133 Id., at pp. 60-61. See also Exhibit 4, Kuwertz Deposition, at pp. 208-209, 275, 278-279; Exhibit 6, van Vliet
Deposition, Vol. I, at p. 150.
134 Id.
135 Id., at pp. 84-85.

136 See 29 C.F.R §541.201(a).
137 ECF No. 542, Exhibit 1, Ogbogu Deposition, at pp. 17-18.
138 Id., at pp. 17-18

20

member ofSTC's Operations Support Center (the "OSC").139 While working m the OSC, Ogbogu
provided support to MWDs in the field.140 Ogbogu's time working in the OSC ended on or about

November 3, 2013.141 Ogbogu left the OSC in November 2013 and transitioned to working in the
field providing DD services for the first time.142 He continued to perform these services until
March 2015, when he was laid off as part of a reduction in force.143 Ogbogu was paid on a salary
basis.144 He received that same bi-weekly salary regardless of how much he worked—even if he
did not work an entire week.145
When Ogbogu worked in the OSC, his annual salary was $68,300 per year, or $1,311.58
per week.146 When he returned to field work as a DD, his annual salary remained at the same
level.147 He remained at that salary level until shortly before his termination in March 2015, when
his salary was reducedto $57,096 annually, or $1,115.31 per week.148 In 2012,2013 and 2014, his
total compensation was $216,948.24, 200,853.00, and $202,066.08 respectively.149 His total
compensation through March of 2015 was $55,554.50.150

Ogbogu testified that when he went to work in the field as a DD, he immediately "took the
reins."151 He worked on rigs owned by Schlumberger's clients whose business involved creating
wells that would produce oil and gas.152 As a DD, he was not physically controlling the BHA.153

139 Id.
140 Id., at pp. 49-50.
141 Id., at p. 18.
142 Id., at pp. 18-19.
143 Id.
144 Id., at 35.
145 Id.

146 ECF No. 542, Exhibit 2, Marroquin Declaration, at ^ 5 & attached ex. 2-1.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.

151 ECF No. 542, Exhibit 1, Ogbogu Deposition, at p. 57
152 Id., at 73-78.
153 Id., at 73-74.

21

Controlling the BHA was the job of the Driller.154 Ogbogu's job was to provide instruction to the

Driller on how to orient and steer the BHA to stay in the well plan.155 The Driller followed his
instructions.156 Ogbogu never actually operated the controls.157
Before arriving at the rig, Ogbogu would participate in a meeting between Schlumberger
and the customer.158 Once he arrived at the rig site, he would check in with the company
representative.159 He would then inventory his equipment since part of his job was managing the
inventory and ordering needed items.160 Next, he prepared for the crew to "pick up" the BHA.161
The rig crew physically assembled all the components of the BHA.162 While the rig crew
assembled the BHA, Ogbogu monitored different gauges to make sure the rig crew performed this
job in a safe manner.163 Before the drilling would commence, Ogbogu would the shallow hole test
to ensure the equipment was running properly.164 Once the drilling began, Ogbogu monitored the
drilling parameters, rate of penetration, flow rates, inclination, and azimuth.165 As a DD, Ogbogu
monitored various drilling parameters in real time, and, as drilling conditions changed, he would
instruct the driller to adjust the drilling parameters.166 Ogbogu used his experience, the real time
performance of the BHA, and past results of the well (or trends) to decide how to slide to stay
within the parameters.167

154 Id.

155 Id., at pp. 73-75. See also Exhibit 3, van Vliet Declaration, at ^ 13; Exhibit 4, Kuwertz Deposition, at pp. 207-208.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id., at pp. 78-79.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. at p. 76.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id., at pp. 80-85.
166 Id.
167 Id., at pp. 93-95.

22

As the DD, Ogbogu received surveys from the MWD that pinpointed the BHA9s location
underground, and Ogbogu used those surveys to make steering adjustments and decisions.168 If the

data that the MWD provided differed significantly from the expected data, he would instruct the
MWD to conduct another survey.169 Ogbogu predicted which way the BHA would move by using
information regarding the formation, the zone, the hole, and the motor.170 There is no standard
operating procedure or checklist to follow regarding corrective action to get back on a well path.171
It was his responsibility to make sure that they were attaining the required curve.172
Schlumberger argues that Ogbogu falls under the HCE exemption because his duties were
not manual, and he customarily and regularly performed at least one exempt duty or responsibility
under the administrative exemption. His annual compensation exceeded $100,000 per year of
which over $455 per week was paid on a salary basis.
As with Anklis and Ainsworth, the Court agrees that the summary judgment record

establishes that Ogbogu falls within the HCE exemption. To trigger this exemption, Schlumberger
need only establish that Ogbogu customarily and regularly performed one or more of these exempt
duties or responsibilities. Here, Ogbogu's duties were similar to both Anklis and Ainsworth. His
primary duties involved acting as an advisor and consultant to Schlumberger's customers. He
never operated the equipment but rather directed others how to do so and monitored their actions.

He provided quality control by inspecting surveys taken by MWDs and instructing Drillers on
what adjustments to make. He performed safety responsibilities by ensuring that the rig crew
carried out their tasks safely. Ogbogu's supervision of the rig crew during the drilling operation

168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id., at pp. 80-85.
171 Id., at pp. 93-95.
172 Id.

23

was yet another administrative function. Ogbogu's duties as DD were also primarily non-manual
in nature.

In sum, the summary judgment record establishes that Ogbogu customarily and regularly
performed multiple administratively exempt duties. Plaintiffs have not come forward with
summary judgment evidence sufficient to create a genuine question of material fact as to the
application of the HCE exemption. Accordingly, the HCE exemption applies to Ogbogu as a matter
of law. The Court GRANTS Schlumberger's motion for summary judgment with respect to
Ogbogu.
G. Thomas Naron.

Schlumberger's motion next addresses the claims of Thomas Naron. The summary
judgment record shows that Naron began his employment with Anadrill as a MWD and was later
employed by Schlumberger when Schlumberger acquired Anadrill.173 Naron became one of the
first STC employees designated as a "DDX", meaning that he was cross trained to provide both
DD and MWD services.174 As a DDX, Naron performed DD services more often than MWD
services.175 After injuring his back in 2007 and again in 2011, Naron could no longer climb stairs
and, in 2012, he was transferred to the Operational Support Center ("OSC") where he remained

until his termination in April 2015.176
Throughout the relevant period, Naron was paid a salary on a bi-weekly basis.177 Naron
understood that he was paid on a salary basis, that he would receive the same salary no matter how
many hours he worked, and that there were no deductions other than required or authorized

173 ECF No. 543, Exhibit 1, Naron Deposition, at pp. 17-18.
174 Id.
175 Id., at p. 20.
176/</,atp.27.
177 Id. at pp. 39-40. See also Exhibit 2, van Vliet Declaration, at ^ 5.

24

deductions such as taxes.178 Additionally, Naron received bonuses that were paid the same as a
DD working on a well site.179 In 2012 through August 2014, Naron was paid a bi-weekly salary of
$2,057.69, or $1,028.84 weekly. 180Naron's bi-weekly salary increased to $2,151.92, or $1,075.96
weekly, at that time.181 Naron's total compensation for 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 was
$255,649.74, $265,200.26, $252,593.86, and $126,148.82, respectively.182 Further, Naron recalls
making over $100,000 dollars in each year that he worked, including his last year.183
The OSC supported DDs who were working on Schlumberger's customers9 well sites.184

Naron's job as a DDX working in the OSC was different from the duties ofDDs in the field.185
There was no manual work in the OSC.186 In fact, the reason Naron began working in the OSC
was that, because of his injuries, he could no longer climb stairs.187 His work at the OSC pertained

solely to directional drilling.188
The summary judgment reflects that all of the DDs working in the OSC, including Naron,
were classified at the highest grade held by field employees.189 Naron personally monitored up to

40 ongoing directional drilling operations at a time.190 The role ofDDs in the OSC was to assist
the field services managers by assisting DDs located at a wellsite and having the OSC DDs
monitor, intervene, and provide their expertise to the wellsite DDs to resolve issues.191 While in
the OSC, Naron's duties required consistent monitoring of the actual performance of the 30 to 40

178 Id.
179 Id.
180 ECF No. 543, Exhibit 3, Marroquin Declaration, at ^ 5 - 8 & attached exhibits 3-2, 3-4, 3-6, and 3-7.
181 Id.
182 Id.

183 ECF No. 543, Exhibit 1, Naron Deposition, at pp. 41-42.
184 ECF No. 543, Exhibit 2, van Vliet Declaration, at ^ 18.
185 ECF No. 543, Exhibit 1, Naron Deposition, at p. 75
186 Id.,ai p. 76.
187 Id.
188 Id., at p. 33.
189 Id., at p. 72.
190 Id., at pp. 48, 75-76.
191 Id., at pp. 61-62.

25

wells versus well plan projections.192 Naron's monitoring the well plan was based on his analysis
of surveys provided by the MWDs.193 WhenNaron observed that a DD at a rig was deviating from

the well plan, he contacted the DD at the rig to discuss the issue with him and attempt to help
correct the problem.194
Naron also continuously performed anti-collision monitoring for the wells for which he
was assigned.195 The summary judgment record reflects that Naron could be responsible for as
many as six wells in close proximity at any one time.196 In addition, Naron's responsibilities
included sersdng as a "help desk" for DDs on the rig sites197 —serving as a resource was a key
duty his position in the OSC.198 Naron's duties also included record keeping with respect to
reporting incidents on the well site.199
Schlumberger contends that Naron's duties were non-manual and that he customarily and
regularly performed at least one exempt duty or responsibility under the administrative exemption.
The Court agrees. Naron's annual compensation exceeded $100,000 per year of which over $455
per week was paid on a salary basis. Again, Schlumberger need only show that Naron customarily
and regularly performed one or more of these exempt duties or responsibilities.
Specifically, the record shows that Naron customarily and regularly performed as an
advisor and consultant to Schlumberger's DDs. He provided technical advice and alerted them to
problems;200these job functions affected and implemented his employer's operating practices.201

192 Id., at p. 66.
193 Id., at p. 66.
194 Id., at pp. 49-52.
195 Id., at p. 73.
196/(/,atp.56.
197 Id., at p. 73.

198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id., at p. 77.

201&e29C.F.R.§202(b).

26

Naron also continuously performed quality control functions by monitoring the progress of drilling
operations.202 Naron was also responsible for monitoring for "anti-collision," which is an

important safety responsibility; safety responsibilities qualify as administrative duties.
Considering the summary judgment record, Schlumberger has established that the HCE
exemption applies to Naron. Plaintiffs have not come fonvard with summary judgment evidence
sufficient to create a genuine question of material fact as to the application of the HCE exemption.
The Court therefore GRANTS Schlumberger's motion for summary judgment with respect to
Naron.

H. Brian Dankowski.
Schlumberger next moves for summary judgment with respect to Brian Dankowski. The
summary judgment record reflects that Dankowski began his employment with Schlumberger in
February 2007, as a field engineer trainee in MWD.204 Dankowski transitioned to a DD Engineer
position in November 2011 and performed mostly DD work until January 2015.205 After that,
Dankowski transitioned to a DDX and worked with a remote MWD Specialist located at the
Remote Operations Center ("ROC").206 Dankowski was terminated as part of reduction of force in
February 2016.207
Dankowski was paid on a salary basis as a DD.208 He received the same salary regardless
of the number of hours he worked and even received compensation during weeks when he
performed no work.209 Additionally, Dankowski received bonuses for days spent on the rig or

202 ECF No. 543, Exhibit 1, Naron Deposition, at pp. 52, 73.
203 Id., at p. 55.

204 ECF No. 544, Exhibit 1, Dankowski Deposition, at p. 13.
205 Id., at pp. 16-17.
206 Id., at pp. 48-51.
207 Id., at p. 19.

208 Id., at pp. 31-32. See also Exhibit 3, van Vliet Declaration, at ^ 5; Exhibit 4, van Vliet Deposition, Vol. II, at p.
132.
209 Id., at pp. 31-32.

27

performing other types of work.210 In 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015, Dankowski received total

compensation of $199,012.39, $229,971.32, $186,400.92, and $163,233.47 respectively.211 His
weekly salary for each of those years were $1,426.92, $1,486.76, $1,529.81, and $1,529.81
respectively.212 For the first two months of 2016, prior to his termination, Dankowski's total
compensation was $62,492.39 and his weekly salary remained at $1,529.81.213
When Dankowski worked in the field there were typically two DDs on site.214 One DD and

the MWD would cover the day shift while the others worked the night shift.215 During his last two
years of employment, Dankowski worked as a DDX with a reduced crew and would serve as the

night DD and MWD.216 Usually, he was supported by an MWD located at the ROC.217 If the
communications between the rig and the ROC failed, Dankowski performed both jobs.218

As a DD, Dankowski was responsible for the execution phase of the directional drilling job
at the rig. Dankowski was responsible for "anti-collision" monitoring and "steering" the well
properly.220 He was also responsible for communicating with the office about changes to the well
plan and corrections that may be needed.221 Dankowski participated in calls or meetings prior to
beginning a project; in those meetings, the rig workers and supervisors discussed the "well
plan."222

210 Id., at pp. 32-33.

211 Id., at pp. 33-35; Exhibit 2, Marroquin Declaration, at ^ 7 & attached exhibits 2-3 and 2-4.
212 Id.
213 Id.

214 M, at p. 47. See also Exhibit 3, van Vliet Declaration, at ^ 8; Exhibit 4, van Vliet Depo., Vol. II, at p. at 41.
215 Id., at pp. 46-48.
216 Id., at pp. 49-51.
217 Id., at pp. 49-50.)
2l8/rf.,atp.50.

219 Id., at pp. 53, 55. See also Exhibit 3, van Vliet Declaration, at I 9; Exhibit 5, Kuwertz Deposition, at pp. 207-208;
Exhibit 6, van Vliet Deposition, Vol. I, at p. 150.
220 Id., at pp. 53, 55. See also Exhibit 3, van Vliet Declaration, at \ 13; Exhibit 5, Kuwertz Deposition, at pp. 40-41,
207-209,214,220,278-279; Exhibit 4, van Vliet Deposition, Vol. II, at pp. 6-8; 91-92, 95-96.
221 Id., at p. 56.

222 Id., at pp. 97-98.

28

As a DD, Dankowski did not actually assemble the BHA; rather, the rig crew is responsible
for assembly.223 Dankowski would check the cord and make sure that the threads are properly
lubricated, and he also ensured that the rig crew was handling and assembling the tools properly.22
While DDs are responsible for steering the well, they are not physically in charge of the controls.225
Most of the time DDs are not allowed to touch the controls.226 The DDs advise the Driller on what
to do and how to adjust to stay on plan based on their evaluation of surveys received from the
MWD.227 As a DD, Dankowski detennined where the BHA was in relation to the well plan and
instructed the Driller on issues such as flow rates and drilling direction.228
As a DD, Dankowski assisted clients by providing solutions for drilling issues.229 He

advised the client throughout the drilling process and had discretion to deviate from the well plan,
based on his drilling experience.230 As a DD, Dankowski monitored any deviations from the well
plan and decided when corrective action was needed.231

Schlumberger argues that Dankowski is exempt from the FLSA based upon the HCE
exemption. According to Schlumberger, his duties were non-manual and he customarily and
regularly performed at least one exempt duty or responsibility under the administrative exemption.
The Court agrees. Dankowski's annual compensation exceeded $100,000 per year of which over
$455 per week was paid on a salary basis. The summary judgment record establishes that
Dankowski customarily and regularly perfonned one or more exempt duties or responsibilities.

223 M, at pp. 89-91; See also. Exhibit 5, Kuwertz Deposition, at 123-125, 273, 275.
224 Id., at pp. 89-91.
225 Id., at pp. 55, 99-101.
226 Id.
227 Id., at pp. 101-104, 121-123.
228 Id.
229 Id., at pp. 69, 73,107, 110-111.
230 Id., at pp. 107, 113-115.
231 Id., at p. 112.

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Specifically, Dankowski customarily and regularly performed as an advisor and consultant
to Schlumberger's customers.232 Dankowski instmcted the Driller; the Driller is a member of the
rig crew who operates the controls for the drill string, as well as the process of drilling the well. 3
He instructed them on "sliding," "weighting the bit," and "drilling the cm-ve."234 Dankowski thus

directed and supervised the rig crew throughout the directional drilling operation, and provided
input to the Driller as to the steps necessary to maintain the drilling plan. He also performed

significant quality control functions by guiding the Driller in line with the well plan and continually
reviewing surveys provided by the MWD, determining the BHA location and deciding on remedial
course corrections. Further, Dankowski had safety responsibilities as he was responsible for "anticollision" monitoring. All these duties qualify as administrative duties. DankowskTs supervision
of the rig crew during the directional drilling operation was yet another administrative function.
Considering the summary judgment record, Schlumberger has established that the HCE
exemption applies to Dankowski. Plaintiffs have not come forward with summary judgment
evidence sufficient to create a genuine question of material fact as to the application of the HCE
exemption. The Court therefore GRANTS Schlumberger's motion for summary judgment with
respect to Dankowski.
I. Joshua Eaton.

Schlumberger next moves for summary judgment with respect to the claims of Joshua
Baton and asserts that the HCE exemption applies to Baton. The summary judgment record shows
that Baton was hired by Schlumberger in May 2009.235 He was promoted to a DD on February 26,

232 Id., at pp. 56-57, 69, 73,78-81, 107,110-111.
233 Id., at p. 101.
234 Id., at pp. 114-17.

235 ECF No. 545, Exhibit 1, Eaton Deposition, at p. 11.

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2012, with an annual salary of$62,004.236 On July 27,2014, he was promoted from DD to Drilling
Engineer.237 Baton's employment with Schlumberger ended on or about May 2, 2015.238 Baton's

total compensation for 2012, 2013 and 2014 was $213,713.78, $172,949.02, and $144,268.37
respectively.239 His weekly salary for those years was $ 1,192.3 8.240
Eaton worked as a Lead DD or cell manager except for a short period of time immediately
afiter his promotion.241 The standard cell for the directional drilling team is four members
consisting of two MWD's and two DDs. As the cell manager. Baton was the focal point for
ensuring the quality of the services being provided to Schlumberger's client and was the point of
contact between the client and cell and between the client and Schlumberger's office personnel.242
As the cell manager, Baton was responsible for the execution of the directional drilling
services provided to Schlumberger's client.243 Baton testified that, as cell manager he was
responsible for "ensuring] plans are executed properly at the wellsite."244 The other DD on the
wellsite report to the cell manager.245 The cell manager provides on-the-job training and mentoring
to cell members.246 He also worked with trainees.247 If asked, he provided his opinion on a trainee's
performance.248

Baton described himself "as the manager of a team of [four]."249 He supervised the drilling
team on logistics, equipment, troubleshooting, placement of equipment, quality of measured data

236 ECF No. 545, Exhibit 2, Marroquin Declaration, at ^ 5 & attached ex. 2-1.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id., at 1[ 7 & attached exhibits. 2-3 and 2-4.
240 Id.

241 ECF No. 545, Exhibit 1, Baton Deposition, at pp. 59-62.
242 Id., at pp. 62.
243 Id., at p. 71
244 Id.
245 Id., at pp. 46-47.
246 Id., at pp. 73-76
247M,atp.74
248 Id., at p. 76

249 Id., at attached exhibit 11 (Lmkedln profile of Joshua Baton).

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and mandatory tasks.250 He was responsible for hitting client targets and maintaining well
stability.251 He trained individuals on company policy, quality health safety and the environmental
reporting software, technical assessment, and drilling techniques.252 Baton also managed contracts

with the client, updated billing daily, and delivered signed contracts and bills.253
As both a Lead DD and night DD, Baton was responsible for "steering" the well consistent
with the well plan, and he oversaw that process.254 He also provided technical support to the
client255 and, when problems with drilling operations arose, his duties included consulting with
clients on solutions.256 His primary duty during the "execution phase" of the well is to steer the

BHA to create a well path within limits set by the well plan.257 The DD would use the MWD data
to determine the location of the BHA and then decide if survey data was within acceptable limits.258
Baton, however, did not operate the rig controls, and in fact, he was not permitted to touch the rig
controls.259 Instead, Baton conveyed to the Driller, who was actually drilling the well, the
instructions on how to steer the BHA to keep the wellbore as close to the well plan as possible.260
Baton indicated that his instructions to the Driller were necessary because "[s]ome drillers can't

slide" and the Drillers "don't know the math behind what [he] [did.]"261
Schlumberger contends that Baton's job duties satisfy the "job duties" requirements for the
HCE exemption and that the exemption applies as a matter of law. The Court agrees. The summary

250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id., at p. 46
255 Id., at pp. 45-46.
256 Id., at p. 54.
257 Id., at pp. 89-90.
258 Id., at p. 112.
259 Id., at pp. 102-103.
260 Id.
261 Id.

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judgment record reflects that Baton's annual compensation exceeded $100,000 per year of which
over $455 per week was paid on a salary basis. To satisfy the "job duties" requirement of the HCE
requirement, Schlumberger need only establish that Baton customarily and regularly performed
one or more of these exempt duties or responsibilities. The summary judgment record establishes
that Baton customarily and regularly performed one or more responsibilities of both an executive
and administrative employee. His duties were not manual, and he customarily and regularly
perfomied at least one exempt duty or responsibility under the executive or administrative
exemptions.

The duties of an exempt executive employee include managing a subdivision of the
enterprise or supervising two or more employees. Baton customarily and regularly performed both
duties. He was a senior DD sendng as lead or cell manager from 2012 until his termination.262 The
Lead DD manages the cell and is responsible for the cell.263 He trains and mentors the cell members
and provides feedback with respect to the performance of his cell members that is afforded
significant weight.264 These are ongoing responsibilities while the DD is serving as Lead.
Accordingly, Baton regularly performs the executive duties outlined in 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.102 and
541.104.
Baton also meets the requirements of the HCE under the administrative exemption as he
regularly performed "non-manual work directly related to the management or general business
operations of the employer or the employer's customers."265 Baton's primary duty was to manage
the ... drilling measurement services on the job site.266 While at the wellsite. Baton customarily

262 Id., at pp. 59-62.
263 Id.
264 Id., at pp. 73-74

26529C.F.R.§541.200(a)(2).
266 ECF No. 545, Exhibit 6, van Vliet Deposition Vol. I,at p.150

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and regularly served as an advisor and consultant to Schlumberger's clients with respect to the
directional drilling aspect of its business operations.267 Baton's primary job was to provide

instruction to the Driller on how to steer the BHA to create a well path within the limits set by the
well plan.268 To do so, Baton used survey data, compared it to the well plan, and determined if any
adjustments needed to be made.269 Reviewing the job description for the DD position. Baton stated
that his job involved 6<'us[ing] logic to solve problems with effective solutions."270 Baton would
then communicate these adjustments to the Driller who executed them.271 Baton's actions thus
affected and implemented the customer's operating practices.272
Baton also continuously performed a significant quality control function. Baton would use
the surveys performed by the MWD to determine where the BHA was positioned and whether the
survey data was within acceptable limits. If the data was not within these limits, he would take
remedial steps.273 Further, Baton's supervision of the rig crew during the directional drilling
operation was another administrative function.
Considering the summary judgment record, Schlumberger has established that the HCE
exemption applies to Baton. Plaintiffs have not come forward with summary judgment evidence
sufficient to create a genuine question of material fact as to the application of the HCE exemption.
The Court therefore GRANTS Schlumberger's motion for summary judgment with respect to
Baton.

267 Id.

268 ECF No. 545, Exhibit 1, Baton Deposition, at pp. 89-90, 102-103.
269 Id., at pp. 90, 112.

270 M, at pp. 53-54 and attached exhibit 7.
271 Id., at pp. 102-103.

272 See 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(b).
273 Id., at p. 112.

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J. James Davis.

Finally, Schlumberger contends that plaintiff James Davis falls within the HCE exemption.
The summary judgment record shows that he began employment with Schlumberger as a DD on
December 28,2009.274 Throughout a majority of his employment with Schlumberger and between
January 2011 and his termination in January 2015, Davis was paid on a salary basis in the amount
of $42,000 per year, or $807.69 per week.275 He received the same salary every week and it did
not change based upon the number of hours he worked in a week, and he received the salary even
during weeks when he did not work.276 He also received additional compensation that included
such items as a rig bonus, commonly called a "day rate."277 Davis9 total annual compensation in

2012, 2013, and 2014 was approximately $187,926.60, $192,784.88, and $193,889.88,
respectively.278 During the brief period in 2015 during which Davis was employed by
Schlumberger, his total compensation for the year was $50,566.15.279

As with the other DDs, Davis did not physically control the drill or the drill the well—the
Drillers employed by the client did that.280 Instead, Davis instructed the Driller how to steer the
BHA.281 The rig crew physically assembled the BHA, and Davis oversaw and instructed the rig
crew on the assembly process.282 The Driller physically lowered the BHA into the hole, not
Davis.283

274 ECF No. 546, Exhibit 1, Davis Deposition, at pp. 11-12.
275 Id., at pp. 20 - 22 & attached exhibits 2 through 4.
276 Id., at p. 18.
277 Id.

278 Id., at pp. 20-23; Exhibit 2, Marroquin Declaration at ^ 11 - 13 & attached exhibits 2-5 - 2-8.)
279 Id.
280 Id., at pp. 27,46.
281 Id., at p. 46.
282 Id., at p. 48.
283 Id., at p. 49.

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Davis was also responsible for ensuring that the directional drilling aspect of the client's
drilling operation was done correctly. If corrections or adjustments to the BHA's trajectory were
required, Davis directed the Driller to perform corrective actions that Davis determined were
necessary, such as changing the weight on bit, slowing the rate of penetration, or turning the toolface.284 Davis used his experience to determine what changes were necessary; there was no
checklist or procedural list for Davis to follow.285 According to Davis, neither the company
representative nor the Driller overrode his decisions and instructions to the Driller.286 During
drilling, Davis continuously monitored the progress of the drilling through survey data and used
this data to make his decisions and instructions about what action, if any, was needed to keep the
BRA. within the well plan.287
Schlumberger contends that Davis9 job duties satisfy the "job duties" requirements for the
HCE exemption and that the exemption applies as a matter of law. The Court agrees. Davis9 annual
compensation exceeded $ 100,000 per year of which over $455 per week was paid on a salary basis.
To satisfy the "job duties" requirement of the HCE requirement, Schlumberger need only establish
that Davis customarily and regularly performed one or more of these exempt duties or
responsibilities. The summary judgment record establishes that Davis customarily and regularly
performed one or more responsibilities of both an executive and administrative employee. His
duties were not manual, and he customarily and regularly performed at least one exempt duty or
responsibility under the executive or administrative exemptions.
Davis customarily and regularly performed as an advisor and consultant to Schlumberger's
customers. Davis9 job duties included planning, executing, and managing all phases of the

284 Id., at p. 51.
285 Id., at p. 51.
286 Id., at pp. 51-52.
287/^,atp.53.

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directional drilling job to deliver services that meet client expectations. His job duties included
ensuring that the directional drilling job was performed correctly.288 He instructed the Driller as to
how to "steer" the well.289 He also consulted with clients on the drilling process and developed
solutions for any problems encountered; these duties affected and implemented the customer's
operating practices.290 Further, Davis's supervision of the rig crew during the directional drillmg
operation was an administrative function.

Considering the summary judgment record, Schlumberger has established that the HCE
exemption applies to Davis. Plaintiffs have not come forward with summary judgment evidence
sufficient to create a genuine question of material fact as to the application of the HCE exemption.
The Court therefore GRANTS Schlumberger's motion for summary judgment with respect to
Davis.
V.

GOOD FAITH AND WlLLFULNESS
Plaintiffs and Schlumberger seek a summary judgment ruling on the issue of whether any
violations committed by Schlumberger were willful and whether Schlumberger acted in good faith.
The Court concludes that a ruling on good faith and willfulness is premature at this time unless
and until there has been a finding that a violation has occurred. Accordingly, both motions
addressing these issues are denied as prematoe.

VI.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding

Schlumberger's Exemption Defenses [ECF No. 552] filed by Plaintiffs is DENIED. The Motion

288 Id., at p. 48.

289 Id.

29°5'ee29C.F.R.§202(b).

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for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff Hani Anklis [ECF No. 540], the Motion for Summary
Judgment as to Plaintiff Michael Ainsworth [ECF No. 541], the Motion for Summary Judgment
as to Plaintiff Gadi Ogbogu [ECF No. 542], the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff
Thomas Naron [ECF No. 543], the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff Brian Dankowski
[ECF No. 544], the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff Joshua Eaton [ECF No. 545]
and the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff James Davis [ECF No. 546] filed by
Schlumberger are all GRANTED. The Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Issues of Good

Faith and Willfulness [ECF No. 534] filed by Schlumberger and the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment as to Schlumberger's Good Faith Affirmative Defense [ECF No. 556] filed by Plaintiffs

are both DENIED AS PREMATURE.
THUS DONE in Chambers on this 30th day of March, 2022.

ROBERT R. SUMMERHAVS^
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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