Boudreaux v. Global Offshore Resources L L C
Filing
15
MEMORANDUM RULING ON MOTION TO REMAND: For the foregoing reasons, the 5 Motion to Remand is GRANTED. Signed by Magistrate Judge C Michael Hill on 1/30/2015. (crt,GregorySld, C)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
MARK BOUDREAUX, ET AL
*
CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-2507
VS.
*
JUDGE DOHERTY
GLOBAL OFFSHORE RESOURCES, LLC *
MAGISTRATE JUDGE HILL
MEMORANDUM RULING ON MOTION TO REMAND
Pending before the undersigned is the Motion to Remand filed by plaintiffs, Mark
Boudreaux (“Boudreaux”) and John Guidry (“Guidry”), on September 5, 2014. [rec. doc. 5].
Defendant, Global Offshore Resources, LLC (“Global”), filed opposition on September 26,
2014. [rec. doc. 11]. Following oral argument I took the motion under advisement. [rec. doc.
14].
For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.
Background
Plaintiffs, Boudreaux and Guidry, were employed by Global. On November 4, 2013,
Boudreaux was assigned to the Hornbeck Offshore Services (“Hornbeck”) vessels Voyager
and Sweetwater, while Guidry was assigned to the Hornbeck vessel Stormridge. On that date,
plaintiffs were en route to a safety meeting hosted by Global, when a third-party automobile
caused an accident resulting in plaintiffs’ alleged injuries.
On July 15, 2014, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Global in the 15th Judicial District
Court for the Parish of Lafayette, State of Louisiana, asserting claims under the general
maritime law and the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30104-30105 (formerly 46 U.S.C. App. § 688),
as well as for maintenance and cure.1 Plaintiffs invoked the “savings to suitors” clause under
28 U.S.C. § 1333 and requested a jury trial. (Petition, ¶¶ VII, XI).
On August 18, 2014, Global removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 13312 and 1441(a). Global asserted that this case was removable on the basis of federal
question jurisdiction because plaintiffs had asserted general maritime claims, specifically for
maintenance and cure benefits.
On September 5, 2014, plaintiffs filed the instant Motion to Remand on the grounds that
actions brought in state court under the general maritime law are not removable. [rec. doc. 5].
Global argues that this case is removable under the holding in Ryan v. Hercules Offshore, 945
F.Supp.2d 772 (S.D. Tex. 2013), and its progeny.
Analysis
This motion presents the Court with a hotly contested issue – whether general maritime
claims are removable after the 2011 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Butler v. RLB
Contracting, Inc., 2014 WL 1653078, *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2014). To date, the Fifth Circuit
has not directly addressed this question, and the trial courts are sharply divided.
Global removed this case on the grounds of federal question jurisdiction under §§ 1331
and 1441(a). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), any state court civil action over which the federal
courts would have original jurisdiction may be removed. Jurisdiction over a claim for
1
At the hearing, plaintiff counsel withdrew his claims under the Jones Act.
2
Section 1331 provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
2
maintenance and cure is based upon the general maritime law, over which the federal courts
have jurisdiction. Billiot v. Cenac Towing Co., 2009 WL 1458265, *1 (E.D. La. May 22,
2009) (citing Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 17 (1963)).
When considering a motion to remand, the removing party bears the burden of showing
that federal jurisdiction exists and that removal was proper. Manguno v. Prudential Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002); Scarlott v. Nissan North America, Inc., —
F.3d — , 2014 WL 4920255 (5th Cir. Sept. 30, 2014) (citing Mumfrey v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.,
719 F.3d 392, 397 (5th Cir. 2013)). Because removal raises significant federalism concerns,
the removal statutes are strictly and narrowly construed, with any doubt resolved against
removal and in favor of remand. Gutierrez v. Flores, 543 F.3d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 2008). In
short, any doubts regarding whether removal jurisdiction is proper should be resolved against
federal jurisdiction. Vantage Drilling Co. v. Hsin-Chi Su, 741 F.3d 535, 537 (5th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Acuna v. Brown & Root Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 530 U.S.
1229, 120 S.Ct. 2658, 147 L.Ed.2d 273 (2000)).
In this case, plaintiffs filed suit in state court invoking the “saving to suitors clause” as
well as asserting a claim for maintenance and cure. Defendants removed this case on the
grounds that after the 2011 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, general maritime claims are
removable.
3
Prior to the amendment in December, 2011, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 provided:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the
place where such action is pending. For purposes of removal under this chapter,
the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded
on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United
States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the
parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in
interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which
such action is brought.
(emphasis added).
Before the amendment, the general rule in the Fifth Circuit was that maritime claims
were not removable absent a basis of jurisdiction outside of admiralty. Tennessee Gas Pipeline
v. Houston Cas. Ins. Co., 87 F.3d 150, 153 (5th Cir. 1996) (maritime claim is not removable
under the first sentence of § 1441(b) by falling within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal
courts, but is removable when original jurisdiction is based on something other than
admiralty); In re Dutile, 935 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir. 1991) (admiralty and maritime claims may
be removed to federal court only by non-forum defendants and only where there is complete
diversity of citizenship). Dutile reasoned that because admiralty and general maritime claims
are not “founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States,” such claims were subject to the in-state-defendant bar to removal found in
section 1441(b). Thus, admiralty and maritime claims could be removed to federal court “only
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by non-forum defendants and only where there [wa]s complete diversity of citizenship.”
Dutile, 935 at 63.
However, the 2011 amendment to § 1441 created a split among the trial courts as to
whether admiralty and maritime claims are now removable. The Federal Courts Jurisdiction
and Venue Clarification Act of 2011 revised § 1441 as follows:
(a) Generally. – Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any
civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division
embracing the place where such action is pending.
(b) Removal based on diversity of citizenship.--(1) In determining whether a
civil action is removable on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of
this title, the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be
disregarded.
(2) A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the jurisdiction
under section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties in
interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which
such action is brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1441. Although § 1441(a) remained basically the same, Congress removed the
“original jurisdiction” and “other such action” language from § 1441(b).
Global argues that the 2011 amendment to the statute now permit removal of general
maritime claims, regardless of the citizenship of the parties, citing Ryan and its progeny. [rec.
doc. 11, pp. 3-4]. The court in Ryan reasoned that when Congress amended § 1441, it deleted
the text upon which courts in the Fifth Circuit had previously interpreted as precluding removal
of admiralty cases. Id. at 777. Thus, Ryan concluded, because Section 1333 (saving to suitors
clause) also grants jurisdiction to the federal courts over admiralty and maritime matters,
5
general maritime law claims have become removable. Id.; see Gregoire v. Enterprise Marine
Services., LLC, — F.Supp.2d — , 2014 WL 3866589, *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 6, 2014) (Duval, J)
(analyzing Ryan).
This issue has sharply divided the district courts within the Fifth Circuit and courts
outside of this Circuit. See Cassidy v. Murray, — F.Supp.2d — , 2014 WL 3723877, *5 (D.
Md. July 24, 2014) (“The Court is not inclined to reject decades of well-established law to
adopt an unsettled attempt to alter the course of removal procedures without clear, binding,
precedent”); In re Foss Maritime Co., — F.Supp.2d — , 2014 WL 2930860, *4 (W.D. Ky.
June 27, 2014) (rejecting Ryan's conclusion that the December 2011 amendment altered the
removability of maritime claims); Pierce v. Parker Towing Co., 2014 WL 2569132, *7 (S.D.
Ala. June 9, 2014) (remanding maritime claim on grounds that “not only would Plaintiffs be
deprived of their forum of choice, but importantly, they would be deprived of their right to
pursue non-maritime remedies, a right the savings clause ‘protects’”); Coronel v. AK Victory, 1
F.Supp.3d 1175, 1188 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (recognizing that removal would “deprive the
plaintiff of his long-recognized choice of remedies, including, potentially, his right to a jury
trial”).
Courts in the Eastern and Western Districts of Louisiana and in the Southern and
Eastern Districts of Texas have held that the 2011 amendments did not change the Fifth
Circuit’s longstanding rule that maritime claims are not removable absent a basis of
jurisdiction outside of admiralty. See Parker v. US Environmental Services, LLC, 2014 WL
7338850, *5 (S.D. Texas Dec. 22, 2014) (Ellison, J); Serigny v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 2014
6
WL 6982213, *3 (W.D. La. Dec. 9, 2014) (Drell, J); Harbor Docking & Towing, LLC v. Rolls
Royce Marine North America, Inc., 2014 WL 6608354, *3 (W.D. La. Nov. 19, 2014) (Kay, J);
Rutherford v. Breathwite Marine Contractors, Ltd., — F.Supp.3d —, 2014 WL6388786, *3
(S.D. Texas Nov. 12, 2014) (Gilmore, J); Yavorsky v. Felice Navigation, Inc., 2014 WL
5811699, *5 (E.D. La. Nov. 7, 2014) (Lemmon, J); Henry J. Ellender Heirs, LLC v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., — F.Supp.2d — , 2014 WL 4231186, *6 (E.D. La. Aug. 26, 2014) (Fallon, J);
Bisso Marine Co., Inc. v. Techcrane Intern., LLC, 2014 WL 4489618, *4 (E.D. La. Sep. 10,
2014) (Feldman, J); Riley v. Llog Exploration Co. LLC, 2014 WL 4345002, *3 (E.D. La. Aug.
28, 2014) (Milazzo, J); Gregoire, supra (Duval, J); Grasshopper Oysters, Inc. v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock, LLC, 2014 WL 3796150, *2 (E.D. La. July 29, 2014) (Berrigan, J); Porter v.
Great Am. Ins. Co., 2014 WL 3385148, *1 (W.D. La. July 9, 2014) (Walter, J); Gabriles v.
Chevron USA., Inc., 2014 WL 2567101, *4 (W.D. La. June 5, 2014) (Haik, J); Perrier v. Shell
Oil Co., 2014 WL 2155258, *3 (E.D. La. May 22, 2014) (Zainey, J); see also Figueroa v.
Marine Inspection Services, — F.Supp.2d — , 2014 WL 2958597, *4 (S.D. Texas July 1,
2014) (Ramos, J) (disagreeing with Ryan); Alexander v. Seago Consulting, LLC, 2014 WL
2960419, *1 (S.D. Texas June 23, 2014) (Hoyt, J) (disagreeing with Ryan); Hamerly v.
Tubal-Cain Marine Servs., Inc., — F.Supp.2d —, 2014 WL 5149752, *5 (E.D. Tex. June 12,
2014) (Crone, J); Rogers v. BBC Chartering America, LLC, 2014 WL 819400 at *1 (S.D. Tex.
March 3, 2014) (Hoyt, J) (“maritime cases filed in state court cannot be removed to federal
court unless an independent basis for federal jurisdiction exists.”).
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However, the Middle District of Louisiana and other courts in the same Texas district in
which Ryan was decided have followed Ryan, holding that the 2011 amendment makes these
cases removable. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Starr Indem. & Liab. Co., 2014 WL 2739309, *2 (S.D.
Tex. June 17, 2014) (Atlas, J), remanded on other grounds on reconsideration, 2014 WL
4167807 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2014); Provost v. Offshore Service Vessels, LLC, 2014 WL
2515412, *3 (M.D. La. June 4, 2014) (Dick, J); Garza v. Phillips 66 Company, 2014 WL
1330547, *4 (M.D. La. April 1, 2014) (Dick, J); Carrigan v. M/V AMC AMBASSADOR, 2014
WL 358353, *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2014) (Werlein, J); Bridges v. Phillips 66 Co., 2013 WL
6092803, *5 (M. D. La. Nov. 19, 2013) (Brady, J); Wells v. Abe's Boat Rentals Inc., 2013 WL
3110322, *3 (S.D. Tex. June 18, 2013) (Rosenthal, J); but see Perise v. Eni Petroleum, 2014
WL 4929239, *5 (M.D. La. Oct. 1, 2014) (Dick, J) (noting that the district judge had not
considered the argument that the “saving to suitors” clause bars removal of general maritime
actions, in the absence of an independent ground for the court's original jurisdiction, where the
plaintiff requested a jury trial in state court).3
Recently, Judge DeGravelles of the Middle District followed the majority view holding
that general maritime claims are not removable, despite the changes to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
Harrold v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, 2014 WL 5801673, *3 (M.D. La. Nov. 7, 2014).
Additionally, Judge Brady adopted Magistrate Judge Bourgeois’ recommendation to remand a
case where plaintiff had alleged Jones Act and general maritime law claims. Bartel v. Alcoa
3
Judge Dick adopted the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Bourgeois,
who indicated, in dicta, that plaintiff’s maritime claims would warrant remand under the savings
to suitors clause because of his jury demand. Perise at *5.
8
Steamship Co., Inc., 2014 WL 6879012, *5 (M.D. La. Dec. 4, 2014); Bartel v. American
Export Isbrandtsen, 2014 WL 6879027, *5 (M.D. La. Dec. 4, 2014).
The Fifth Circuit has yet to directly address whether the current version of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441 permits the removal of general maritime claims. In Barker v. Hercules Offshore, Inc.,
713 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2013), the Court interpreted the updated version of § 1441(b) as a
“clarification,” rather than an amendment. Id. at 223 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 112-10 “explaining
that the updated version is a clarification, as opposed to an amendment, of the original
statute”). Thus, the Court found, the citizenship requirement in § 1441(b) only applies when a
case is removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The Court, relying on Dutile, further
noted that “cases invoking admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333 may require complete
diversity prior to removal.” (emphasis added). Id. at 223.
In Gregoire, supra, Judge Duval observed that Barker, which was decided under the
pre-2011 version of Section 1441, “may be interpreted as simply reiterating Dutile's holding
and recognizing no substantive change in removal jurisdiction as it pertains to maritime cases.”
2014 WL 3866589, *8 (citing Perrier, supra; 14A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, &
Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure note 2, § 3674 (4th ed. 2014)). Other
courts, including Ryan, have regarded Barker's discussion of the 2011 amendments as mere
dictum, noting that Barker did not directly address the issue. See Maturin v. Commerce &
Indus. Ins. Co., 2014 WL 2567150, *2 (W.D. La. June 6, 2014) (Haik, J) (noting Barker, in
dicta, reasoned that the amendments in 1441(b) showed “Congress only meant the diversity
requirement to apply to cases removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction”).
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Until the Fifth Circuit definitively decides this issue, I am disinclined to hold that
Congress intended to make such a major substantive change to § 1441, which would, in effect,
upset centuries of well-established precedent by denying plaintiffs their right to a jury trial.
Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution vests federal courts with
jurisdiction over “all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” Coronel, 1 F.Supp.3d at
1181 (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 2). Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 originally
codified this jurisdictional grant as follows:
That the district courts shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several States
. . . exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction . . . within their respective districts as well as upon the high seas;
saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the
common law is competent to give it.
(emphasis added). Id. (citing Ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73).
The last passage, known as the saving to suitors clause, now states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the
States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to
suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.
(emphasis added). 28 U.S.C. § 1333.
The saving to suitors clause reserves to admiralty claimants all remedies that would be
available at common law. Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 454, 121 S.Ct.
993, 1004 (2001) (citing The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555, 18 L.Ed. 451 (1866)). In short, the
clause reserves to plaintiffs all remedies traditionally available at common law via in personam
proceedings. Id. (citing Lewis, 531 U.S. at 455, 121 S.Ct. 993). Thus, the federal courts’
admiralty jurisdiction “is ‘exclusive’ only as to those maritime causes of action begun and
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carried on as proceedings in rem, that is, where a vessel or thing is itself treated as the offender
and made the defendant by name or description in order to enforce a lien.” Coronel at 1181
(citing Madruga v. Superior Court of State of Cal. in and for San Diego County, 346 U.S. 556,
560, 74 S.Ct. 298, 301, 98 L.Ed. 290 (1954)). State courts are “‘competent’ to adjudicate
maritime causes of action in proceedings ‘in personam,’ that is, where the defendant is a
person, not a ship or some other instrument of navigation.” Id. (quoting Madruga at 560-61).
The saving to suitors clause has always been understood to preserve the remedy, not the
forum. Bisso at *4. Thus, admiralty cases filed in state court that fall within the federal court's
jurisdiction under an independent, non-admiralty doctrine, such as diversity, have always been
removable. Id. For centuries, the savings clause has provided a maritime plaintiff with three
options: (1) sue in admiralty in federal court under admiralty jurisdiction, (2) sue at law in state
court, or (3) sue at law in federal court “if he can make proper parties to give that court
jurisdiction of his case.” Id. (quoting The Belfast, 74 U.S. 634, 644 (1868)).
As to procedure, historically, the federal courts maintained separate dockets and
separate rules of procedure for cases under admiralty and law jurisdiction. Coronel, 1
F.Supp.3d at 1183 (citing Wilmington Trust v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Hawaii, 934 F.2d
1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 1991); Erastus C. Benedict, Benedict on Admiralty § 133 (2013)). In
1966, the separate dockets were merged and the Federal Rules of Procedure were made
applicable to admiralty claims. Id. (citing Benedict, supra, § 133; Wilmington Trust, 934 F.2d
at 1029; Fed.R.Civ.P. 1). Thus, a plaintiff can bring a maritime suit in federal court either in
admiralty or at law. Bisso at *5.
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The differences between claims brought in admiralty and at law are procedural. Bisso at
*5 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(c) (third party practice), 38(e) (no jury trial), and 82 (lack of venue
restriction)); Coronel at 1183. Probably the most salient distinction is the right to a jury trial.
Coronel at 1183 (citing Lewis, 531 U.S. at 455, 121 S.Ct. 993). The Seventh Amendment right
to a jury trial does not apply to cases brought in admiralty. Id. (citing Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines
Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963)); see also Bisso at *5.
Here, plaintiffs filed their petition in state court invoking the saving to suitors clause
and requested a trial by jury. Allowing removal to this Court would “require the Court to
disregard hundreds of years of admiralty tradition” by stripping plaintiffs of their right to a jury
trial. Riley 2014 WL 4345002 at *4. For this reason, the undersigned rejects the holding of the
court in Ryan, and adopts Judge Milazzo’s very sound reasoning in Riley.
In Riley, plaintiff, a commercial fisherman filed a maritime negligence action in state
court, alleging that he was injured when his shrimp net struck an unmarked underwater pipe in
the open waters of Plaquemines Parish, causing his boat to unexpectedly stop and throw him
backwards. Defendants, the owners of the pipe and the lessor of the land on which the pipe
was placed, removed the case to federal court on the grounds that the amended removal statute
permitted removal of admiralty claims. Plaintiff opposed, arguing that removal of admiralty
cases in state court offends the saving to suitors clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333.
Judge Milazzo assumed, without deciding, that defendants’ analysis of the removal
statute was correct. Id. at 3. Then, she proceeded to plaintiffs’ argument: that the saving to
suitors clause was an Act of Congress operating to prevent removal of the case. Relying
12
“largely by the manner in which federal courts have historically treated admiralty claims,” she
concluded that plaintiff was correct.
In her analysis, Judge Milazzo cited Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,
358 U.S. 354, 79 S.Ct. 468, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959), in which the Supreme Court held that
admiralty claims could not be brought on the law side of federal courts unless the claims also
fell within a statutory grant of jurisdiction such as §§1331 or 1332.4 In light of Romero, she
noted that three things were clear: (1) plaintiff’s case must proceed either at law or in
admiralty, (2) the case could only proceed at law if there was a jurisdictional basis outside of
section 1333, and (3) the only possible jurisdictional basis for the suit was section 1333. Thus,
the Court could only exercise jurisdiction over the case if it could do so in admiralty.
In urging the court to uphold removal, defendants argued that the court had the power to
grant plaintiff a jury trial even if the case proceeded in admiralty, citing Fitzgerald and Luera
v. M/V Alberta, 635 F.3d 181 (5th Cir. 2011). After distinguishing these cases, Judge Milazzo
rejected defendant’s argument, reasoning as follows:
Defendants have cited no case where a federal court presented only with claims
arising under the general maritime law has granted the parties a jury trial.
Indeed, to do so would require the Court to disregard hundreds of years of
admiralty tradition, something this Court is not prepared to do.
Considering the foregoing, the Court is left with the firm conviction that the
savings clause of section 1333 prohibits this case from proceeding in admiralty.
To be sure, courts have long held that the saving-to-suitors clause is not an
independent bar to removal. The savings clause preserves a plaintiff's right to
pursue common law remedies but not a right to a non-federal forum. The clause
4
This holding has been consistently followed by the Fifth Circuit. Barker, 713 F.3d at
219; In re Dutile, 935 F.2d at 63; Tennessee Gas Pipeline, 87 F.3d at 153.
13
does, however, require that a plaintiff's choice between proceeding at law or in
admiralty be honored. It is similarly well settled that, because federal courts
possess exclusive admiralty jurisdiction, state court suits are necessarily brought
at law. Thus, when a plaintiff files suit in state court he has affirmatively elected
to proceed at law and his suit may only be removed to the law side of federal
court. As explained supra, there is no ground on which this Court can exercise
jurisdiction over this case at law. Accordingly, the only at-law forum available
to the parties is state court and that is where this suit must be litigated.
Id. at *4-5.
Here, the plaintiffs specifically invoked the saving to suitors clause and requested a jury
trial in state court. By affirmatively electing to proceed at law, their suit can only be removed
based on an independent ground for this Court’s original jurisdiction, such as diversity. Unless
and until the Fifth Circuit addresses this issue, this Court will join the reasoning set forth by
the judges of this District (see Porter and Gabriles, supra) and Judge Milazzo in finding that
plaintiffs’ claims remain unremovable.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Remand is GRANTED.
January 30, 2015, at Lafayette, Louisiana.
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