Toliver v. Chrysler Group L L C et al

Filing 23

SUA SPONTE BRIEFING ORDER: IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff shall, not later than twenty-one (21) days after the date of the entry of this order, file a memorandum setting forth specific facts that support a finding that the amount-in-controversy e xceeds $50,000 exclusive of interests and costs. These facts should be supported with summary-judgment-type evidence. The defendants will be allowed seven (7) days to respond to the plaintiff's submission. Signed by Magistrate Judge Carol B Whitehurst on 9/22/2015. (crt,Dauterive, C)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
Toliver

Civil Action No. 6:14-cv-03082

versus

Judge Rebecca F. Doherty

Chrysler Group, L.L.C.,et al

Magistrate Judge Carol B. Whitehurst

SUA SPONTE BRIEFING ORDER
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing
federal-court jurisdiction rests on the party invoking the federal forum, in this case
the plaintiff. Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001). The
plaintiff alleges this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action because a
claim was asserted under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”), 15 U.S.C.
§ 2301 et. seq. No other basis of federal-court jurisdiction was alleged.
Section 2310 of the MMWA contains the provisions for remedies in consumer
disputes. Subsection (d) of § 2310 contains the jurisdictional grant and paragraph (3)
of that subsection provides that jurisdiction does not exist “if the amount in
controversy is less than the sum or value of $50,000 (exclusive of interest and costs)
computed on the basis of all claims to be determined in [the] suit.” Thus, the MMWA
supports federal-court jurisdiction only if the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000
exclusive of interests and costs. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B).

The undersigned reviewed the plaintiff’s complaint and finds that it is not
facially apparent that the amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied. Because the
amount-in-controversy requirement is jurisdictional, the court must sua sponte raise
the issue if there is any doubt concerning subject-matter jurisdiction. Marathon Oil
Co. v. Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211, 217 (5th Cir. 1998) (“‘[the court is] obliged to inquire
sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to the existence of federal jurisdiction’ ”)
(quoting Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278
(1977)). “The test is whether it is more likely than not that the amount of the claim
will exceed [the jurisdictional threshold].” St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Greenberg,
134 F.3d 1250, 1263 & N. 13 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Allen v. R&H Oil & Gas Co., 63
F.3d 1326, 1335 (5th Cir. 1995). Additionally, “statutes conferring jurisdiction on
federal courts are to be strictly construed, and doubts resolved against federal
jurisdiction.” Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 748 F.2d 1058, 1067 (5th Cir.1984).
The plaintiff alleges that he purchased a vehicle for $40,982.40, excluding
finance charges. In particular, plaintiff claims “he made a down payment in the
amount of $1,028.78" and “[t]he total cost of the vehicle [] including finance charges
will be over $75,000.00.” The plaintiff, however, does not explain how he reaches
that figure except to say that his damages include “the purchase price [of the vehicle]
including all collateral costs at the time of the sale, any and all finance charges,
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insurance premiums, maintenance costs, repair costs, damages” as well as
“Prejudgment and post-judgment interest [and] Attorney fees....” R.1, ¶ IX.
The plaintiff can only collect economic losses under the MMWA, and
attorneys’ fees are not included in the damages calculation since they are categorized
as costs under the statute. Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 748 F.2d 1058, 1068, 1069
(5th Cir. 1984). Furthermore, in Ward v. Tupelo Auto Sales, Ltd., 1998 WL 930798,
at *2 (E.D. Miss. Nov. 25, 1998), the court held that it had no jurisdiction over a
claim based on the purchase of an allegedly defective Dodge Ram on the basis that
“the alleged consequential costs are unspecified.”
In the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, the party asserting federal jurisdiction under
the MMWA is required to “allege the cost of the replacement vehicle, minus both the
present value of the allegedly defective vehicle and the value that the plaintiff
received from the allegedly defective vehicle.” Golden v. Gorno Bros., 410 F.3d 879,
884 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Voelker v. Porsche Cars North America, Inc., 353 F.3d
516, 521 (7th Cir. 2003)). In those circuits, the amount of finance charges is not
included in the calculation since “the question of whether federal jurisdiction exists
under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act should not be determined by whether a
finance contract was used in purchasing an automobile. This is particularly true since

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the Act provides that the amount in controversy does not include interest.” Golden
v. Gorno Bros., 410 F.3d at 883.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff shall, not later than twenty-one (21) days
after the date of the entry of this order, file a memorandum setting forth specific facts
that support a finding that the amount-in-controversy exceeds $50,000 exclusive of
interests and costs. These facts should be supported with summary-judgment-type
evidence. The defendants will be allowed seven (7) days to respond to the plaintiff’s
submission.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED at Lafayette, Louisiana, this 22nd day of
September, 2015.

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