Bradley v. St Landry Parish et al

Filing 42

MEMORANDUM RULING. This Court recently examined its subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte. For reason herein, plaintiff's claim is prescribed and this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patrick J Hanna on 4/24/2018. (crt,Alexander, E)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
HURLE BRADLEY

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:14-cv-03105

VERSUS

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HANNA

ST. LANDRY PARISH
SHERIFF’S DEP’T, ET AL.

BY CONSENT OF THE PARTIES

MEMORANDUM RULING
This Court recently examined its subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte. On
May 19, 2018, the parties filed their proposed pretrial order, which restated the
defendants’ prescription defense, causing the Court to consider whether it has
subject-matter jurisdiction over this action.
Federal courts have a continuing obligation to examine the basis for their
jurisdiction.1 The issue may be raised by the parties, or it may be raised by the court
sua sponte, at any time.2 In an ordinary civil case, the affirmative defense of
prescription or the applicability of a statute of limitations may not be raised by the
court sua sponte.3 But when a limitations bar destroys federal-court jurisdiction, a

1

MCG, Inc. v. Great Western Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1990).

2

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); MCG, Inc. v. Great Western Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170,
173 (5 Cir. 1990); Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191, 192 (5th Cir.1980); Baker Oil Tools, Inc.
v. Delta S.S. Lines, Inc., 562 F.2d 938, 940 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1977).
th

3

Lebouef v. Island Operating Co., 342 Fed. App’x 983, 984 (5th Cir. 2009).

court is authorized to examine its subject-matter jurisdiction and, if it finds such
jurisdiction lacking, to dismiss the suit sua sponte.4 This is so because the parties
cannot waive a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.5
The plaintiff’s sole basis for invoking federal-court jurisdiction in this case is
the existence of a federal question. He brought his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
asserting that he was wrongfully arrested, detained, and prosecuted and therefore
deprived of rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. There is no
constitutional right to be free from malicious prosecution.6 Therefore, the plaintiff
has no such federal claim. For this Court to have subject-matter jurisdiction, the
plaintiff’s claims for wrongful arrest and detention must be timely. If the plaintiff’s
false arrest and false detention claims are time-barred, then this Court lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction, and the case must be dismissed.

4

See Lebouef v. Island Operating Co., 342 Fed. App’x at 984. See, also, Gandy
Nursery, Inc. v. United States, 318 F.3d 631, 637 (5th Cir. 2003) (“It is well-established that, if a
waiver of sovereign immunity contains a limitations period, a plaintiff's failure to file his action
within that period deprives the court of jurisdiction.”).
5

Bridgmon v. Array Systems Corp., 325 F.3d 572, 575 (5th Cir. 2003); Hospitality
House, Inc. v. Gilbert, 298 F.3d 424, 429 (5th Cir. 2002); Ziegler v. Champion Mortgage Co., 913
F.2d 228, 229 (5th Cir. 1990).
6

Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 945 (5th Cir. 2003). See also Quinn v. Roach,
326 Fed. App'x 280, 289 (5th Cir. 2009); Bloss v. Moore, 269 Fed. App'x 446, 448 (5th Cir. 2008);
Moore v. Blanco, 255 Fed. App'x 824, 825-26 (5th Cir. 2007).
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Federal law does not establish a statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims;
therefore, federal courts hearing Section 1983 claims must borrow a relevant statute
of limitations from the forum state.7 Section 1983 claims are best characterized as
personal injury actions, and federal courts borrow the forum state’s law governing the
prescription of personal injury claims.8 In Louisiana, personal injury claims are
governed by Civil Code Article 3492, which provides for a one-year prescriptive
period.

Consequently, Louisiana’s one-year prescriptive period governs the

plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim.9 On the other hand, federal law determines when a
Section 1983 claim accrues.10 Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury on which his action is based.11 As

7

Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Rodriguez v. Holmes, 963 F.2d 799, 803

th

(5 Cir. 1992).
8

Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994).

9

Elzy v. Roberson, 868 F.2d 793, 794 (5th Cir. 1989); McGregor v. LSU Board of
Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850, 863 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1131 (1994); Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133
F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1998).
10

Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d at 319; Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir.

1994).
11

Smith v. Regional Transit Authority, 827 F.3d 412, 421 (5th Cir. 2016); Hitt v.
Connell, 301 F.3d 240, 246 (5th Cir. 2002); Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d at 257.
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a result, the limitations period begins “when the plaintiff is in possession of the
‘critical facts that he has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury.’”12
A specific rule applies with regard to the commencement of the prescriptive
period for a Section 1983 claim based on false arrest allegations. Such a claim
accrues “as soon as the allegedly wrongful arrest occurred, subjecting [the plaintiff]
to the harm of involuntary detention,”13 and the limitations period begins to run
“when the allegedly false imprisonment ends.”14 Or, as the Fifth Circuit has stated,
“[i]n the context of. . . a claim for. . . wrongful arrest, it is a plaintiff's knowledge of
those two events that triggers the limitations period.”15
This rule has been applied several times. For example, when a plaintiff was
allegedly falsely arrested on August 21, 1994 for interfering with a police
investigation and jailed, the Fifth Circuit found that his claim accrued not later than
the next day when he was released from jail.16 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit found that
a plaintiff “became aware of the injuries upon which his claims for. . . false arrest are
12

Smith v. Regional Transit Authority, 827 F.3d at 421 (quoting Lavellee v. Listi, 611
F.2d 1129, 1130 (5th Cir. 1980)).
13

Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. at 388.

14

Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. at 389. See, also, White v. Gusman, 347 Fed. App’x 66,
67-68 (5th Cir. 2009).
15

Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1998).

16

Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d at 319.
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based on the day that those injuries occurred” and held that the limitations period
begin running at that time.17
In this district another court also found that a Section 1983 claim for false
arrest and false imprisonment accrued when the plaintiff was released from jail and
prescribed one year later.18 Consistently, this Court has previously found that a
plaintiff’s claim for false arrest accrued on the day that he was arrested and prescribed
before his suit was filed four years later.19
Although the plaintiff stated in his complaint that he “was imprisoned for
nearly (3) years before successfully defending his case” (Rec. Doc. 1 at 6), evidence
included in the bench books submitted for this Court’s perusal prior to trial indicated
that the plaintiff was incarcerated from February 2010 until May 2013 in connection
with a separate crime. This Court, therefore, was skeptical about the relevance of that
incarceration. Accordingly, this Court ordered the parties to file briefs addressing
whether the plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims prescribed before this lawsuit was filed.

17

Humphreys v. City of Ganado, Tex., 467 Fed. App’x 252, 255 (5th Cir. 2012).

18

Matthews v. City of Alexandria, No. 1:13-CV-02303, 2014 WL 3925191, at *2 (W.D.
La. July 18, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 3924638 (W.D. La. Aug. 11,
2014).
19

Alexander v. Lafayette City Parish Consol. Government, No. 09-1016, 2011 WL
1832616, at *4 (W.D. La. Apr. 15, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 1828379
(W.D. La. May 11, 2011).
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The parties complied with the order and submitted briefs addressing this issue. (Rec.
Docs. 40, 41).
The plaintiff submitted documents establishing that he was arrested on June 4,
2009 and released from custody on June 8, 2009, when he bonded out of jail. (Rec.
Doc. 41-1 at 1). The defendants submitted the affidavit of the assistant warden of the
St. Landry Parish Jail, who confirmed that the plaintiff was arrested on June 6, 2009
and released on June 8, 2009 when he posted bond. (Rec. Doc. 40-1 at 1). Because
a one-year prescriptive period is applicable, the prescriptive period accrued not later
than June 9, 2009 and elapsed at the latest on June 9, 2010. This lawsuit was not filed
until October 24, 2014. Therefore, it is clear that the plaintiff’s claims accrued on the
date that he was released from jail and prescribed one year later. The plaintiff
concedes as much but argues that some form of equitable tolling is applicable.
In applying the forum state's statute of limitations, a federal court should also
give effect to any applicable state-law tolling provisions.20 In other words, when a
state-law prescriptive period is borrowed, any coordinate state-law tolling rules are
also borrowed.21

Louisiana’s general rule for tolling – referred to as contra non

20

Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 257 (5th Cir. 1993); Rodriguez v. Holmes, 963 F.2d
799, 803 (5 Cir. 1992).
th

21

Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989) (quoting Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
N.Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 484 (1980)); King-White v. Humble Independent School Dist., 803
F.3d 754, 764 (5th Cir. 2015); Walker v. Epps, 550 F.3d 407, 415 (5th Cir. 2008); Jackson v. Johnson,
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valentem – is that prescription is tolled or suspended when the plaintiff is “effectually
prevented from enforcing his rights for reasons external to his own will.”22
Louisiana’s federal courts have, on numerous occasions, applied contra non valentem
in Section 1983 cases.23 There are four factual situations in which contra non
valentem prevents the running of the prescriptive period: (1) when a legal cause
prevented the courts or court officers from taking cognizance of or acting on the
plaintiff's action; (2) when a condition coupled with a contract or connected with the
proceedings prevented the plaintiff from suing or acting; (3) when the defendant
himself has done some act to prevent the plaintiff from availing himself of his cause
of action; or (4) when the cause of action is neither known nor reasonably knowable
by the plaintiff even though the plaintiff's ignorance was not induced by the
defendant.24

950 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1992); Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 996 F.2d 786, 788 (5th Cir. 1993).
22

Wimberly v. Gatch, 635 So.2d 206, 211 (La. 1994).

23

See, e.g., Broussard v. Brown, 599 Fed. App’x 188 (5th Cir. 2015); Walker v. Gusman,
No. 12-2521, 2015 WL 2354071, at *9 (E.D. La. May 15, 2015); Hernandez v. Smith, No. 15-cv2271, 2015 WL 9921067, at *3 (W.D. La. Sept. 28, 2015), report and recommendation adopted,
2016 WL 356044 (W.D. La. Jan. 27, 2016).
24

Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2009-2368 (La. 10/19/10), 48 So.3d 234, 245 (quoting
Plaquemines Parish Com'n Council v. Delta Development Co., Inc., 502 So.2d 1034 (La. 1987));
Corsey v. State, Through Dept. of Corrections, 375 So.2d 1319, 1321-22 (La. 1979); Burge v. Parish
of St. Tammany, 996 F.2d at 788; Romero v. City of Youngsville, No. 13-2928, 2016 WL 2859077,
at *2 (W.D. La. May 16, 2016).
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The doctrine of contra non valentem specifically recognizes that “prescription
does not run against a party who is unable to act.”25 “Contra non valentem does not
suspend prescription when a litigant is perfectly able to bring its claim, but fails or
refuses to do so.”26
In White v. Gusman, the plaintiff was arrested on August 25, 2005 for public
drunkenness, and the arresting officers confused him with another person with the
same name, resulting in his being charged with a parole violation. He was jailed in
Orleans Parish then moved to the Catahoula Correctional Center after Hurricane
Katrina. At both jails, he told the authorities that he had been misidentified. He was
released from custody on August 18, 2006 but he did not file suit until September 21,
2007. He argued that his suit was timely because the defendants had concealed from
him the fact that he had been wrongfully imprisoned. But the court found that he
“was aware of, and actively protested, his wrongful imprisonment well before the date
of his release, when the prescriptive period began to run. Because he can point to no

25

Corsey v. State, Through Dept. of Corrections, 375 So.2d at 1321.

26

Terrebonne Parish School Bd. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 310 F.3d 870, 885 (5th Cir. 2002).
See, also, Daigle v. McCarthy, 444 F.Supp.2d 705, 710 (W.D. La. 2006), affirmed, 238 Fed. App’x
1 (5th Cir. 2007).
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material fact that was concealed from him, contra non valentem provides no relief
from prescription.”27
The plaintiff has offered no evidence whatsoever that would suggest he was
unable to bring the suit on a cause of action which indisputably accrued more than
four years before suit was actually filed. The plaintiff’s argument that his claim did
not accrue until the charges against him were dismissed lacks merit, and there is no
basis for applying equitable tolling or contra non valentem. The plaintiff knew when
he was arrested, he knew that his arrest was based on the allegedly erroneous affidavit
prepared by Deputy Joshua Godchaux, he knew that he was incarcerated for a few
days, but he waited more than four years to assert his claim. For that reason, his
claim is prescribed and this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Signed at Lafayette, Louisiana on this 24th day of April 2018.

____________________________________
PATRICK J. HANNA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

27

White v. Gusman, 347 Fed. App’x at 68.
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