Marceaux v. Social Security Administration

Filing 36

ORDER granting 28 Motion for Attorney Fees. The Court awards fees in the amount of $20,000 to be paid from the past-due benefits held by the Commissioner for such purposes. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, upon receipt of the section 405(b) fee, Lane shall return to Marceaux the $4,957.50 EAJA fee that was awarded pursuant to the Stipulated Order of Attorney Fees. Signed by Magistrate Judge Carol B Whitehurst on 11/14/2016. (crt,Chicola, C)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
Marceaux

Civil Action No. 14-03281

versus

Judge Rebecca F. Doherty

Commissioner of Social Security

Magistrate Judge Carol Whitehurst
ORDER

Pending before the undersigned is A Motion for Authorization of Attorneys’
Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) filed by attorney Matthew David Lane, Jr.
(“Lane”), representing Social Security Claimant, Ramona Marceaux (“Marceaux”),
on October 3, 2016 [Rec. Doc.28], Defendant, the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration’s (“Commissioner”) Response filed on October 3, 2016 [Rec.
Doc. 32] and Claimant’s Reply filed on October 5, 2016 [Rec. Doc. 33].
Background
Lane seeks an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $20,000.00,
representing 17.8 % of Marceaux’s total past-due benefits through August 2016, based
on Lane’s contingency fee contract with Marceaux. For the following reasons, the
Motion for Authorization of Attorneys’ Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) [Rec.
Doc. 28] is GRANTED.
Analysis
Lane is entitled to apply to the Court, under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), for an award

for his work before the court. Section 406(b) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter
who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and
allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of
25 percent of the total of the past due benefits to which the claimant is entitled . .” 42
U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A).
In his motion, Lane requests an award of $20,000.00 which represents 17.8 %
of past-due benefits that were awarded to Marceaux. It is uncontested that there exists
a contingency fee agreement between Lane and Marceaux, which provides for
attorney’s fees of “twenty-five percent (25% percent) of any and all past-due benefits
awarded to my family and me.” R. 28-2. Lane has submitted a time sheet detailing the
professional services he rendered from April 20, 2012 to August 19, 2016 for
representing Marceaux in the federal-court proceedings. R. 28-4. The time sheet
shows a total of 33.05 hours. Lane acknowledges that if he is awarded the $20,000.00
requested in this motion, he will be required to refund the EAJA award of $4,957.50
to Marceaux. The Commissioner agrees that Lane is entitled to a reasonable fee for
court-related representation, but defers to the Court’s determination of reasonableness.
R. 32.
In Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002), the United States Supreme
Court held that section 406 does not displace contingent-fee agreements within the

statutory ceiling; instead, it instructs courts to review for reasonableness the fees
calculated based on such agreements. The Court rejected the “lodestar” method (hours
reasonably spent on the case times reasonable hourly rate) of evaluating attorney fee
petitions under 42 U.S.C. §406(b) and held that section 406(b) “calls for court review
of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable
results in particular cases.” Id. at 807. The Court referenced the following factors as
bearing on the reasonableness of the requested fee: the character of the representation,
the results the representative achieved, whether the attorney was responsible for delay,
whether the representation was substandard, whether benefits are large in comparison
to the time spent on the case, and whether the attorney is receiving a windfall. Id.
The Fifth Circuit has held that “courts may consider the lodestar in their
analysis so long as the court can articulate additional factors demonstrating that the
excessively high fee would result in an unearned advantage. Jeter v. Astrue, 622 F.3d
371 (5th Cir. 2010). The court explained that the “windfall” does not preclude
attorneys from recovering what may seem like a high award if the attorney’s success
on appeal is of his own making. If “success on appeal can be attributed to his
attorney’s endeavors before the district court, then that attorney should reap the
benefit of his work – even if he managed to accomplish a great deal in a small window
of time.” Id. at 381. The court noted that “[a]lthough in some instances a twenty-five
percent contingency fee may result in a seemingly large fee, a particular claimant’s

attorney often is not compensated at all for Social Security work in federal court.” Id.
at 379. Congress wrote § 406(b) to “ensure that attorneys representing successful
claimants would not risk ‘nonpayment of [appropriate] fees.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at
805 (quoting SSA Report 66).
Lane argues that the contingency fee agreement complies with the provisions
of section 406(b) and is reasonable in light of the results achieved and the factors set
forth by the Supreme Court in Gisbrecht. The undersigned agrees.
Lane provided professional and competent representation to Marceaux. Lane’s
efforts resulted in a reversal of an adverse ruling and an award of a substantial amount
of past-due benefits in this case. Lane did not cause delay in the resolution of the
matter and did not provide substandard representation. Also, the benefits to Marceaux
were large in comparison to the time spent on the case.
Additionally, Lane’s experience before this Court supports the amount claimed.
Lane’s practice is focused on the area of Social Security disability law and he is one
of only a few attorneys in the area who represents Social Security claimants in federal
court. His zealous advocacy led to Marceaux receiving a significant amount of past
due benefits, as well as continuing benefits and medicare coverage. Although the
contingency fee authorized by the agreement may result in a somewhat higher fee
award in this case, this must be balanced against the fact that Lane often is not
compensated at all for Social Security work in federal court. Jeter, 622 F.3d at 379.

The undersigned finds that, in light of the additional factors, the requested
fee is reasonable and not attributable to anything other than the Lane’s own work.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Authorization of Attorneys’ Fees
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) [Rec. Doc. 26], is GRANTED. The Court awards fees
in the amount of $20,000.00 to be paid from the past-due benefits held by the
Commissioner for such purposes.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, upon receipt of the section 406(b) fee,
Lane shall return to Marceaux the $4,957.50 EAJA fee that was awarded pursuant to
the Stipulated Order of Attorneys Fees.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED this 14th day of November, 2016.