Bradley et al v. Ackal et al
Filing
154
MEMORANDUM RULING denying 153 Motion to Vacate Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patrick J Hanna on 8/31/2018. (crt,Williams, L)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DIVISION OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
SHANDELL MARIE BRADLEY,
ET AL.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:15-cv-00459
VERSUS
MAGISTRATE JUDGE HANNA
LOUIS ACKAL, ET AL.
BY CONSENT OF THE PARTIES
MEMORANDUM RULING
Currently pending is the motion to vacate a court order (Rec. Doc. 153),
which was filed by the intervenors, Capital City Press, LLC d/b/a The Advocate and
KATC Communications, LLC. The motion is opposed. Oral argument was held on
July 26, 2018, and post-hearing briefing was ordered. Considering the evidence, the
law, and the arguments of the parties, and for the reasons fully explained below, the
motion is DENIED.
Background
On March 3, 2014, Victor White, III was arrested by Iberia Parish sheriff’s
deputies, handcuffed, placed in the back seat of a patrol unit, and driven to the
parking lot of the Iberia Parish Sheriff’s Patrol Center. While in the custody of the
Iberia Parish Sheriff’s Office, still in the back seat of the patrol car, and with his
hands still handcuffed behind his back, Mr. White died as the result of a single
gunshot wound. Thereafter, this lawsuit was filed on behalf of Mr. White’s minor
child, seeking to recover from the Iberia Parish Sheriff’s Office, Sheriff Louis M.
Ackal, and Deputy Sheriff Justin Ortis under federal and state law for, inter alia, the
alleged violation of Mr. White’s constitutional rights and his allegedly wrongful
death. On March 15, 2018, Magistrate Judge Carol B. Whitehurst held a settlement
conference in the case, and an amicable resolution of the dispute was reached. The
terms of the settlement, in the form of an audiotaped statement by counsel, were
placed on the record under seal at the request of the parties.
Thereafter, the Advocate and KATC were permitted to intervene in this action
for the purpose of arguing the instant motion, which seeks to have this Court vacate
Judge Whitehurst’s order sealing the terms of the settlement. The intervenors
contend that the order sealing the settlement violates the public’s First Amendment
right of access to court proceedings and the common law right of access to court
documents. They further contend that the settlement documents, particularly those
stating the amount paid to settle the plaintiff’s claims, are public records subject to
inspection under Louisiana law. The plaintiff contends, to the contrary, that the
public’s right to know the amount paid to settle the lawsuit must yield to her interest
in keeping her child free from the notoriety and harassment that would likely follow
from public knowledge of the settlement amount.
At the hearing, counsel for the movants explained that they had received
copies of the settlement documents from the Louisiana Sheriffs’ Law Enforcement
2
Program pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request but the amount on the
settlement check was redacted. Counsel for the movants clarified that it is only the
amount of the settlement that the intervenors are seeking to have revealed to the
public. This Court asked the parties to submit supplemental briefs. In particular,
this Court asked the movants to address (a) whether they were requesting that Judge
Whitehurst’s order sealing the recording of the parties’ placing of the settlement
agreement on the record be vacated or whether they were requesting that the
defendants be ordered to reveal the amount of the settlement; (b) whether
Louisiana’s public records laws1 or sunshine laws2 are applicable to the dispute; (c)
how the court should balance the public’s interest in knowing the amount of the
settlement, the minor’s interest in being protected from the disclosure of the amount
of the settlement, and the court’s interest in protecting the judicial process; and (4)
any other relevant factors. The plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to respond.
The parties complied with the order and submitted post-hearing briefs.
Analysis
La. R.S. 44:31 et seq. Notably, La R.S. 44:31(B)(1) states that “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided in this Chapter or as otherwise specifically provided by law. . . any person of the age of
majority may inspect, copy, or reproduce any public record.”
1
2
La. R.S. 42:11 et seq. (also known as the “Open Meetings Law.”)
3
The public has a well-established First Amendment right of access to criminal
proceedings.3 At least one court in the Fifth Circuit has held that this right of access
extends to civil trials,4 and the Fifth Circuit has said, in the context of a civil case,
that “First Amendment guarantees are implicated when a court decides to restrict
public scrutiny of judicial proceedings.”5 The United States Supreme Court has also
noted that “the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy
public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.”6 The
public also has a common law right to inspect and copy judicial records, but that
right is not absolute.7 “Every court has supervisory power over its own records and
files, and access has been denied where court files might have become a vehicle for
improper purposes.”8 Thus, “the common law merely establishes a presumption of
3
See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (holding that absent
an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public);
In re Hearst Newspapers, L.L.C., 641 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2011) (regarding the closure of a
courtroom during the sentencing of a convicted criminal); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court
of California, Riverside County, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (regarding the closure of a courtroom during
voir dire).
4
Doe v. Santa Fe Independent School District, 933 F.Supp. 647, 650 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
5
Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 1981).
6
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
7
SEC v. Van Waeyenberghe, 990 F.2d 845, 848 (5th Cir. 1993).
8
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. at 598.
4
public access to judicial records,”9 and the decision as to access is one left to the
sound discretion of the trial court.”10 A district court should exercise its discretion
both cautiously11 and “in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the
particular case”12 since a number of factors may militate against public access.13
Thus, “[i]n exercising its discretion to seal judicial records, a court must balance the
public's common law right of access against the interests favoring nondisclosure.”14
The principle of public access to judicial records furthers not only the interests of
the outside public, but also the integrity of the judicial system itself.15 It “serves to
promote trustworthiness of the judicial process, to curb judicial abuses, and to
9
SEC v. Van Waeyenberghe, 990 F.2d at 848.
10
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. at 599.
11
Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Blain, 808 F.2d 395, 399 (5th Cir. 1987).
12
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. at 599. See, also, Belo Broadcasting
Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 434 (5th Cir. 1981).
13
Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d at 434.
14
SEC v. Van Waeyenberghe, 990 F.2d at 848. See, also, Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark,
654 F.2d at 434.
15
United States v. Holy Land Foundation For Relief and Development, 624 F.3d 685, 690
(5 Cir. 2010).
th
5
provide the public with a more complete understanding of the judicial system,
including a better perception of its fairness.”16
This motion is concerned not with the specific terms and provisions of a
settlement agreement; rather, the intervenors only want to know the amount paid on
behalf of a political subdivision and its employees to settle a civil lawsuit. The Fifth
Circuit has found that “[o]nce a settlement is filed in district court, it becomes a
judicial record.”17 Although no settlement “document” was filed in this proceeding,
the basic terms of the agreement were recited into the record, including the amount
paid to compromise the plaintiff’s claims. Therefore, it is arguable that the recited
terms are subject to the balancing test that must be applied to determine whether the
contents of a judicial record should be disclosed to the public.
The Relief Requested
The intervenors represented to this Court, in their supplemental briefing, that
the Louisiana Sheriffs’ Law Enforcement Program was “the official public records
custodian” of the records sought to be produced. The intervenors further represented
that the Louisiana Sheriffs’ Law Enforcement Program responded to a Freedom of
16
United States v. Holy Land Foundation, 624 F.3d at 690 (quoting Littlejohn v. BIC Corp.,
851 F.2d 673, 682 (3rd Cir. 1988)).
17
SEC v. Van Waeyenberghe, 990 F.2d at 849.
6
Information Request seeking copies of the settlement documents by indicating that
the amount of the settlement “was required to be redacted due to this Court’s March
15,
2018
Order
sealing
the
record
and
minutes
of
the
successful
settlement conference.” (Rec. Doc. 153-1 at 3). For that reason, the movants
“seek vacatur of this Court’s March 15, 2018 Order sealing the settlement.” (Rec.
Doc. 153-1 at 3). Since the Louisiana Sheriffs’ Law Enforcement Program was
not a party to this lawsuit, an order by this Court unsealing an order of Judge
Whitehurst would not require the Louisiana Sheriffs’ Law Enforcement Program
to do or not do anything. Can this Court Vacate Another Judge’s Order?
The first issue that must be considered is whether this Court has the authority
to vacate the order that was issued by another judge sealing the terms of the parties’
settlement agreement.
Although this lawsuit is assigned to the undersigned
Magistrate Judge, a different Magistrate Judge in the same division conducted the
settlement conference on March 15, 2018. As the presiding judge, this Court did not
participate in that process at all. During the settlement conference, the parties agreed
to an amicable resolution of their dispute after extensive negotiations that were
conducted in confidence. Rather than drafting a settlement agreement at that time,
the terms of the settlement were placed on the record by means of an audiotaped
recording of the parties’ counsel orally reciting the terms of the agreement. That
7
recording was placed under seal. The intervenors suggest that this Court should have
interrupted another judge’s court proceeding in order to make findings as to the
factors weighing in favor of and against sealing the terms of the settlement just
reached by the parties before the other judge’s order was entered. Not being privy
to the details of the proceeding as it was ongoing, as a practical matter this Court
would not consider injecting itself into another court’s proceeding and whether the
undersigned has the authority to vacate another judge’s order was not addressed by
the intervenors in their briefing. Furthermore, the parties to a settlement agreement
may agree to keep the terms and provisions of their settlement confidential by
entering into a contractual agreement saying just that. Therefore, since the parties
requested that the record be sealed, it may be that Judge Whitehurst’s order was
nothing more than recognition of an agreement between the parties. If so, then there
may be no basis on which this Court is authorized to step in and alter the parties’
agreement. This issue also was not addressed by the intervenors.
The Involvement of a Government Actor
The intervenors argued that the amount paid in settlement of the plaintiff’s
claims should be disclosed to the public because the defendants in this case are
governmental entities, officials, or employees. In support of this argument, the
8
intervenors cited a district court case from the Eastern District of Louisiana 18 that
quoted a decision from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which has appellate
jurisdiction over the district courts for Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. In
that decision, the Third Circuit stated that the “public's interest is particularly
legitimate and important where . . . at least one of the parties to the action is a public
entity or official”19 and further stated that “[i]f a settlement agreement involves
issues or parties of a public nature, and involves matters of legitimate public concern,
that should be a factor weighing against entering or maintaining an order of
confidentiality.”20 This Court located no decision in which the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals relied on the quoted reasoning from the Third Circuit’s decision, but did
find decisions in which this same language was cited by district courts in the Fifth
Circuit – but never by the Western District of Louisiana.
Thus, there is no
controlling jurisprudence requiring that the scales be tipped in favor of disclosure of
a settlement agreement simply because one of the parties is a governmental entity.
18
Marcus v. St. Tammany Parish School Board, No. Civ. A 95-3140, 1997 WL 313418 at *5
(E.D. La. June 9, 1997).
19
Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3rd Cir. 1994).
20
Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d at 788.
9
Upon closer examination, it is also apparent that the cited decision from the
Third Circuit actually does not stand for the proposition for which it was cited. In
that case, a former public official – a former police chief – had sued the borough by
which he was formerly employed. He alleged that his civil rights were violated when
he was demoted and suspended before being charged with crimes for which he was
tried and acquitted. It was the former chief who was seeking to maintain the
confidentiality of a settlement agreement he reached with the governmental entity
that had formerly employed him. The court explained that “[i]t is appropriate for
courts to order confidentiality to prevent the infliction of unnecessary or serious pain
on parties who the court reasonably finds are entitled to such protection. In this vein,
a factor to consider is whether the information is being sought for a legitimate
purpose or for an improper purpose. However, privacy interests are diminished
when the party seeking protection is a public person subject to legitimate public
scrutiny.”21 Consistently, the court said that a factor to be considered in conducting
the balancing test is “whether a party benefitting from the order of confidentiality is
a public entity or official.”22 Thus, the lesson from the cited case is not the one
espoused by the intervenors here. The decision does not stand for the proposition
21
Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d at 787.
22
Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d at 788.
10
that disclosure should be favored each and every time a public or governmental
entity is a party to the settlement agreement; rather, the ruling states that disclosure
should be favored when it is a public person or governmental entity that is seeking
to prevent disclosure of the settlement agreement. That is not the situation presented
here, as the person seeking to prevent disclosure is a private party acting on behalf
of a minor child. Therefore, the cited decision is neither controlling nor persuasive.
Factors for Rebutting the Presumption in Favor of Disclosure
Next, the intervenors argue that the settlement agreement should be disclosed
to the public because the plaintiff has not articulated a countervailing “overriding
interest.” They contend that “[t]he presumption of openness may be overcome only
by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher
values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”23 That, however, is the
standard that was used by the United States Supreme Court in deciding whether voir
dire conducted during a criminal trial should be closed to the public. The Fifth
Circuit has instructed that a court called upon to decide whether, in its discretion,
judicial records should be sealed must simply balance the public’s common law right
23
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside County, 464 U.S. at 510
(closure of courtroom during voir dire).
11
of access against any interests favoring nondisclosure.24 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit
expressly distinguished the standard applicable to a First Amendment dispute
regarding court access from that applicable to a dispute regarding access to judicial
documents under the common law and declined to apply the more stringent standard
in a case where broadcasters sought the production of exhibits filed with the court.25
The court found that, in denying the request for access to the relevant materials, the
district court did not abuse its discretion.26
The movants cited several cases in which settlement agreements were
disclosed but most of them did not involve the settlement of a civil lawsuit on behalf
of a minor.27 This Court finds those cases to be distinguishable for that reason.
The movants rely in large part on the decision reached in the Fort Totten
Metrorail Cases,28 a case that did involve a dispute regarding the disclosure of the
terms of minors’ settlements following a train collision. In Fort Totten, the court
24
SEC v. Van Waeyenberghe, 990 F.2d at 848.
25
Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d at 434.
26
Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d at 434.
27
SEC v. Van Waeyenberghe, 990 F.2d at 848 (5th Cir. 1993); Bank of Am. Nat. Trust & Sav.
Ass’n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339 (3rd Cir. 1986); Marcus v. St. Tammany Parish
School Board, No. 95-3140, 1997 WL 3131418 (E.D. La. June 9, 1997); Mullins v. City of Griffin,
886 F.Supp. 1 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
28
Fort Totten Metrorail Cases, 960 F.Supp.2d 2 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
12
applied a six-factor test based on a previous decision from the D.C. Circuit that is
not binding on this Court. The test required the court to consider (1) the need for
public access to the documents at issue, (2) the extent of previous public access to
the documents, (3) the fact that someone objected to disclosure and the identity of
the person who objected, (4) the strength of any property and privacy interests
asserted, (5) the possibility of prejudice to the party opposing disclosure, and (6) the
purposes for which the documents were introduced during the judicial proceeding.
The defendants asserted that documents relating to certain minors’ settlements of
their claims against a governmental entity following a train collision should be
protected from disclosure to the public on the basis that it might expose the minors
to the potential avarice and ill will of those who may not share the minors’ best
interests and could result in the minors receiving ill-intentioned attention from
persons who would have no interest in them but for their receipt of settlement funds.
In other words, the same argument that the plaintiff is making in this case was
presented. But there is an important distinction. In Fort Totten, that argument was
not advanced on behalf of the minors; instead, it was advanced by the governmental
entity defendants. The court found that the defendants did not have standing to raise
these concerns on behalf of the minors and further noted that the minors did not raise
the particular privacy concerns that the defendants attempted to assert on the minors’
13
behalf. Thus, while the Fort Totten case is interesting, the factors considered there
are not controlling on this Court, and the balancing of interests set forth in that case
cannot serve as a guidepost for the resolution of this case.
Another important distinction between the minors’ settlements at issue in the
Fort Totten case and the settlement that was reached in this case is that the
settlements in Fort Totten were not valid unless approved by a judge in the court
where the action was pending, under the law applicable in that venue. Therefore,
the purpose for which the documents were introduced was a factor that weighed
heavily in favor of disclosure. In this case, however, there was no requirement that
the settlement be approved by either the Magistrate Judge presiding over the
settlement conference or by this Court.
The Fifth Circuit has stated that the
presumption in favor of public disclosure generally applies to settlement agreements
that are filed and submitted to the district court for approval.29 In this case, the
settlement agreement was not filed in the suit record nor was the settlement
agreement submitted to the court for approval.
This is similar to what occurred in Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg,30 a Third
Circuit case cited by the intervenors. There, the court issued an order stating that it
29
SEC v. Van Waeyenberghe, 990 F.2d at 849.
30
Cited supra.
14
had reviewed the terms of the settlement, the terms of the settlement were
confidential, and the parties were ordered to abide by the order of confidentiality.31
The court held that the settlement agreement was not a judicial document subject to
the right of access doctrine because it had not been filed with the court, interpreted
by the court, or enforced by the court.32 That logic coincides with the Fifth Circuit’s
description of those settlement agreements to which the presumption in favor of
public disclosure applies.
Therefore, in this case, the same significance cannot be placed on this factor
– the purpose for which the document was introduced during the judicial proceeding
– as the court did in Fort Totten. Here, the settlement terms were placed on the
record as a means of quickly memorializing them without having to confect a written
document at the conclusion of the settlement conference. But in Fort Totten, the
court was required to approve the minors’ settlements. Moreover, in the Fort Totten
case only this factor and one other – the need for public access to the documents –
weighed in favor of disclosure; three others weighed against disclosure, and one
factor was neutral. The court found that the weight of those two factors overcame
the remaining factors. Thus, it is clear that the court placed a great deal of reliance
31
23 F.3d at 776.
32
23 F.3d at 781.
15
on the fact that court approval of the settlements was necessary. In this case, that
factor that weighed heavily in favor of disclosure is completely absent. Therefore,
the same result is not mandated.
Agreed-Upon Confidentiality
This Court understands that, at the conclusion of the settlement conference,
the parties asked the Magistrate Judge presiding over the conference to seal the
record with regard to the terms of the settlement agreement, including but not limited
to the amount paid by the defendants to resolve the dispute. This Court does not
know whether keeping the settlement terms confidential was a factor in the parties’
decision to settle. However, the Fort Totten case recognized that the parties’ reliance
on an agreement to maintain confidentiality is a valid consideration in balancing the
interests and may counsel against the disclosure of sealed documents.33 Therefore,
if the parties to the settlement agreement mutually agreed upon confidentiality as a
condition of their settlement, this factor weighs against public disclosure.
Protection of the Child
It is axiomatic that the protection of children is a laudable goal. In this case,
the plaintiff seeks to maintain confidentiality of the settlement amount in order to
33
Fort Totten Metrorail Cases, 960 F.Supp.2d at 9.
16
protect her minor child from unwanted solicitors and financial predators, and she
argues that this interest outweighs the public’s right to know the amount of the
settlement. Although this Court was unable to locate a Fifth Circuit case directly on
point, the Seventh Circuit has recognized that the privacy of children may constitute
a compelling interest that outweighs the presumption in favor of public access.34
Louisiana statutes reflect a public policy favoring the confidentiality of juvenile
court proceedings involving children.35 This is consistent with the United States
Supreme Court’s observation that safeguarding the physical and psychological wellbeing of a minor is a compelling interest.36
Two district court cases in the Fifth Circuit have considered this issue but not
in the context of a minor’s settlement of a lawsuit. In BG, III v. Banks,37 the court
found that the interests favoring nondisclosure outweighed the public's common law
right to access judicial records. There, the defendants had attached as exhibits to a
Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2002) (“When there is a compelling interest
in secrecy, as in the case of trade secrets, the identity of informers, and the privacy of children,
portions and in extreme cases the entirety of a trial record can be sealed.”).
34
35
Jaufre ex rel. Jaufre v. Taylor, 351 F.Supp.2d 514, 517 (E.D. La. 2005) (citing La. Ch.
Code Arts. 307, 407, and 412).
36
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982).
37
BG, III v. Banks, No. 4:16-CV-64-DMB-JMV, 2017 WL 318836, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Jan.
23, 2017).
17
motion for summary judgment a minor child’s “Youth Court File” and some
affidavits referencing that file. The appellate court agreed with the trial court that
because the plaintiff was a child, he was owed additional protections from having
the public review the documents. The court also found that public disclosure of the
exhibits could have a negative effect on the child as an adult. Finally, the court
observed that the case did not present any particular risk of calling into question the
trustworthiness of the judicial process. Therefore, although the court found that the
best interest of a child did not always outweigh the public’s right to access court
documents, the minor’s interest was paramount.
In Jaufre ex rel. Jaufre v. Taylor,38 the plaintiff’s minor son attended “Court
School,” a joint venture between the St. Charles Parish School Board, the St. Charles
Parish Sheriff’s Office, and the 29th Judicial District Court for St. Charles Parish,
Louisiana, for children with disciplinary problems. The plaintiff sued when her son
was subjected to corporal punishment without her permission. The parties reached
a settlement of their dispute and sought to seal the record in the interest of justice.
To reiterate, the issue was not whether the terms of the settlement agreement should
be sealed but whether the entire record should be sealed. The court balanced the
38
Cited supra.
18
interests, noting (1) that while the case involved the privacy interest of the minor
child, it also involved allegations of abuse by a public office; (2) that the plaintiff
did not file a brief in support of the motion to seal and therefore did not explain how
the disclosure would be injurious; (3) that the parties had previously filed exhibits
without seeking a protective order, which allowed the public to have access to them;
and (4) that the record contained a lot of general information not likely to be
stigmatizing or embarrassing. Therefore, the court sealed only certain parts of the
record, including detailed descriptions of the minor’s behavioral problems, pictures
of his injuries, his deposition testimony, and certain arguments of counsel.
While both of these cases had to do with protecting sensitive information
concerning a child’s medical or psychological conditions, his school disciplinary
records, or other similar topics from disclosure, neither addressed whether the
amount of a settlement paid to a minor child should be protected from disclosure to
the public. What is illustrative is the extent to which both involved a balancing of a
minor child’s interest but allowing public disclosure where appropriate.
In this case, the record is replete with the factual details of the events that form
the subject matter of this litigation that were put forth by the parties and the rulings
of this Court. This Court went into explicit detail in its memorandum ruling of
October 23, 2017, and no part of that ruling or the exhibits offered by the parties in
19
support of their legal positions were sealed from the public. The only thing the
intervenors want, as admitted in open court, is the amount that was agreed to be paid
to a minor child after extensive, confidential negotiations concerning highly
contested and emotionally charged issues. The decisions reached by the parties were
undoubtedly reached after the normal give and take associated with any mediation,
and that process is also confidential. Indeed, under Louisiana law, the oral and
written communications and records made during mediation are generally protected
from disclosure.39 Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the minor child’s
interest in being protected from potential predators is a factor that outweighs the
public’s interest in knowing the amount of the settlement.
Louisiana’s Public Records Laws Do Not Apply
The intervenors argued that whether the settlement amount should be
disclosed is an issue implicating Louisiana’s public records laws. But what Judge
Whitehurst sealed was an audiotaped recording made in the federal courthouse in
Lafayette, Louisiana at the conclusion of the parties’ settlement conference. That
recording is not a document subject to Louisiana’s public records laws. The parties
are not asking this Court to decide whether the check written on behalf of the
39
La. R.S. 9:4111.
20
defendants to settle the plaintiff’s claims should be disclosed to the public. To the
contrary, the intervenors are asking this Court to vacate a court order sealing a
recording. Those are two very different things. While a dispute concerning the
former might implicate Louisiana’s public records laws, this Court cannot fathom
how a request to vacate a court order does so.
Chilling Effect on Other Cases
Several other Section 1983 lawsuits involving claims of excessive force
similar to those asserted by the plaintiff in this suit remain pending in this forum
against some of the same defendants. In Fort Totten, one of the factors considered
in balancing the parties’ interest was the possibility of prejudice to those opposing
disclosure, and the defendants argued that disclosing the amounts of the minors’
settlements would complicate their ability to settle with the remaining plaintiffs and
taint future jury pools. The court found this factor to be neutral, relying on cases
from the Seventh and Ninth Circuits that downplayed the significance of this
concern. The parties cited to no similar jurisprudence from the Fifth Circuit.
In this case, this Court respectfully disagrees with the decisions of the other
circuit courts. In some of the remaining cases against the Iberia Parish Sheriff’s
Office, significant and volatile allegations were asserted. These civil cases must
play out against the backdrop of the recent criminal prosecution of the sheriff himself
21
and the guilty pleas of several of his deputies with regard to the use of excessive
force in making arrests and during the incarceration of prisoners in the parish jail.
While each case must be resolved on its own merit, and therefore, what one plaintiff
may receive should have no bearing on what another may receive, revealing the
amount of the settlement reached in this case might have a chilling effect on potential
settlement negotiations in the other cases. This Court believes this is a valid concern.
Balancing the Interests
This Court finds that the interests to be balanced in this case are, on one side,
the child’s privacy interest in being protected from financial predators or those who
would harass the child simply because they know the amount received when the suit
was settled, the protection of the judicial process in permitting orders to be sealed,
and the chilling effect that the public’s knowledge of the settlement amount might
have on the settlement negotiations and jury deliberations in upcoming similar cases
and, on the other side, the media’s interest in releasing a sensational story regarding
the amount of money paid to resolve this lawsuit without knowing anything about
how the decisions were ultimately reached in the parties’ settlement negotiations.
Exercising its discretion, as it is authorized to do, this Court finds that the minor
child’s privacy interest outweighs the public’s right to know the amount paid to settle
the case.
22
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion to vacate order (Rec. Doc. 153), which
was filed by the intervenors, Capital City Press, LLC d/b/a The Advocate and KATC
Communications, LLC is DENIED.
Signed at Lafayette, Louisiana, this 31st day of August 2018.
____________________________________
PATRICK J. HANNA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
23
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