Lebrun v. Baker Hughes Inc et al

Filing 108

MEMORANDUM RULING re 59 MOTION for Summary Judgment on plaintiff's Sieracki seaman status filed by Jonathan Lebrun. The Court finds that oral argument on this Motion is not necessary. For the reasons that follow, the Motion will be denied. Signed by Magistrate Judge Carol B Whitehurst on 9/18/2017. (crt,Chicola, C)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
Lebrun
versus

Civil Action No. 15-01828
Magistrate Judge Carol B. Whitehurst

Baker Hughes Inc et al

By Consent of the Parties

MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Plaintiff’s
Sieracki Seaman Status filed by plaintiff, Jonathan Lebrun, [Rec. Doc. 59],
Defendant, Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc (“Transocean”) and Baker
Hughes Incorporated’s (“BHI”) Memorandum in Opposition [Rec. Doc. 61], and
Plaintiff’s Reply [Rec. Doc. 104]. The Court finds that oral argument on this Motion
is not necessary. For the reasons that follow, the Motion will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Jonathan Lebrun, worked for Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc.
(“BHOOI”) from December 2005 until April 24, 2015. The affidavit of Jeff Ivory,
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc.’s Operations Director, states that
Plaintiff was assigned to work as a sample catcher or “mudlogger”1 aboard
Transocean’s drillship, the DEEPWATER CHAMPION, from March 13, 2015,

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Plaintiff’s job duties were to collect mud samples from shale shakers and deliver the mud
samples to on-site data engineers and geologists for analysis. R. 44.

until April 24, 2015. R. 61-1, Ivory Aff., p. 1. Ivory attests that, during that entire time,
the DEEPWATER CHAMPION was located in the waters above the continental shelf
of Guyana, South America, approximately 120 miles northeast of Georgetown,
Guyana, and was drilling a hydrocarbon well for ExxonMobil. Id. at pp. 1-2. Plaintiff
alleges while he was aboard the DEEPWATER CHAMPION he injured his back. R.
1. In his Motion, Plaintiff contends “the main source of injury to plaintiff’s lower
back occurred when plaintiff had to open a sealed door to the enclosed shaker house.”
R. 59-1, p. 3.
Plaintiff filed this action alleging claims under the Jones Act. R. 1. On June 14,
2016, this Court found that Plaintiff was not a Jones Act seaman as he did not
demonstrate “a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of
such vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature.” R. 44. In
his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged a claim for unseaworthiness as a
Sieracki seaman as well as for negligence and gross negligence under the general
maritime law. R. 56. Alternatively, Plaintiff alleged his action arises under the
Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act (“LHWCA”) and the general
maritime law. R. 56.
II. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
Plaintiff filed this Motion urging the Court to find that, at the time he worked

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on the DEEPWATER CHAMPION, he was a Sieracki seaman. Plaintiff contends
that because he was working aboard the DEEPWATER CHAMPION within the
waters of Guyana, South America, the LHWCA does not extend to non-Jones Act
American maritime workers like Plaintiff working in foreign waters.
Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion arguing that any such injury alleged by
Plaintiff would be covered under the LHWCA. They assert that the DEEPWATER
CHAMPION was not in the waters of a foreign sovereign, but rather was at all times
in the high seas—over 120 miles off the coast of Guyana.
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issue of material fact exists and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Under
Rule 56(c), the moving party bears the initial burden of “informing the district court
of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see Stahl v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 283 F.3d
254, 263 (5th Cir.2002). The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact but need not negate the elements of the
nonmovant’s case. Exxon Corp. v. Oxxford Clothes XX, Inc., 109 F.3d 1070, 1074 (5th
Cir.1997). When the moving party, has met its Rule 56(c) burden, the nonmoving

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party, cannot survive a summary judgment motion by resting on the mere allegations
of its pleadings. “[T]he nonmovant must identify specific evidence in the record and
articulate the manner in which that evidence supports that party’s claim.” Johnson v.
Deep E. Tex. Reg'l Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379 F.3d 293, 301 (5th
Cir.2004).
IV. ANALYSIS
After the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Jones Act claim, Plaintiff filed an
Amended Complaint bringing an unseaworthiness claim under the general maritime
law. In the alternative, Plaintiff stated a claim under the LHWCA. Defendants assert
that Plaintiff was, at all times, a maritime worker covered by the LHWCA. Plaintiff
now contends that he was a Sieracki seaman at the time he served on the
DEEPWATER CHAMPION. Essentially, Plaintiff challenges the characterization
that his claims arise under the LHWCA. He argues he is properly characterized as a
so-called “Sieracki seaman” such that he may bring an action for unseaworthiness
against the vessel owner, Transocean, regardless of the traditional limitations on
vessel liability afforded under the LHWCA.
The LHWCA provides a federal recovery scheme to a wide range of maritime
workers. Willis v. McDonough Marine Service, 2015 WL 3824366, at *3
(E.D.La.,2015) (citing Thomas J. Schoenbaum, 1 Admiralty and Maritime Law § 7–1

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(5th Ed.2014)). The Act was passed primarily to fill a gap created by Supreme Court
rulings that application of state workers’ compensation schemes to maritime
employees is unconstitutional. Id. Thus, the statutory framework operates as a
traditional workers’ compensation scheme under which employers receive immunity
from tort liability in exchange for providing no-fault compensation benefits to injured
workers.
In Seas Shipping v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 99 (1946), the Supreme Court
extended the remedy of unseaworthiness to longshoremen “doing a seaman’s work
and incurring a seaman’s hazards.” See Schoenbaum, at § 7–10 (citing Sieracki).
Thereafter, the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA effectively created two mutually
exclusive categories of maritime workers: seamen and longshoremen. These
amendments eliminated the unseaworthiness remedy for any employee covered under
the LHWCA by enacting 33 U.S. C. § 905(b) which recognizes a limited statutory
cause of action on behalf of injured maritime workers against vessel owners for
negligence in maritime tort. Id. Thus, a threshold inquiry for purposes of § 905(b) is
as to the existence of a duty of care owed by vessel owners to workers. Id. The
Supreme Court has accordingly defined three such narrow duties. See Scindia Steam
Nav. Co., Ltd. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 167 (1981). These are : (1) the
“turnover” duty, (2) the “active control” duty, and (3) the duty to intervene. Id.;

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Kirksey v. Tonghai Maritime, 535 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 2008).
The Fifth Circuit has held that persons excluded from the LHWCA’s coverage
but who previously qualified for the Sieracki exception, retain their cause of action
for unseaworthiness against the vessel owner, absent a clear indication that Congress
intended to deprive them of that otherwise available remedy. See Aparicio v. Swan
Lake, 643 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir.1981) (Linehandlers on a vessel in foreign seas
(Panama) who were excluded under LHWCA had Sieracki remedy); Schoenbaum, at
§ 6–27.
To qualify as a Sieracki seaman, a plaintiff must show that he meets the
standard of a Sieracki seaman, i.e., that he is doing a traditional seaman’s work and
incurring a seaman's hazard. Bergeron v. Atlantic Pacific Marine, 899 F.Supp. 1544,
1548 (W.D.La.,1993); Sieracki, 328 U.S. at 99. Here, Plaintiff’s work as a sampler
was not traditional seaman’s work such that he incurred a seaman’s hazard. Rather
than performing traditional navigational chores and/or contributing to the function,
mission, or maintenance of the vessel, Plaintiff performed oilfield services that were
developed on land and transferred to the sea when oil and gas was discovered beneath
the sea floor. McDermott, Inc. v. Boudreaux, 679 F.2d 452, 457 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing
Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 781 (5th Cir. 1959). As asserted by
Defendants, Plaintiff was not subject to the classical hazards in performing work

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aboard the DEEPWATER CHAMPION as it was stationary and attached to the sea
floor during his employment.2 Finally, Plaintiff was not contracted to perform work
by the vessel owner in an attempt to limit its liability. Instead, Plaintiff’s employer,
BHOOI, was contracted to ExxonMobil, the owner of the oil well, to provide mud
logging services. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not meet
the standard to be considered a Sieracki seaman.
Defendants state that “the plaintiff’s alleged injury is covered under the
LHWCA” and the parties do not brief otherwise. R. 61, p. 1. Defendants contend that
Plaintiff’s argument in the instant motion is based on his mistaken belief that his
injury is not covered by the LHWCA because the DEEPWATER CHAMPION was
within the territorial limits of a foreign state while Plaintiff worked on board. Citing
the affidavit of Jeff Ivory, Defendants maintain, and the record does not dispute, that
the DEEPWATER CHAMPION was located in the waters above the continental shelf
of Guyana, approximately one hundred and twenty (120) miles northeast of
Georgetown, Guyana. R. 61-1, Ivory’s Aff. The Court agrees. The Fifth Circuit law
is long settled that the LHWCA extends to workers on vessels on the high seas, such
as Plaintiff. Aparicio v. Swan Lake, 643 F.2d 1109, 1118 n. 17 (5th Cir. 1981)
(plaintiff was not covered by the LHWCA for two independent reasons, one of which

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It is axiomatic, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that the drillship was stationary during the
time it was engaged in drilling operations.

was because the situs of his injuries was “outside the territorial reach of the
LHWCA”); Cormier v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 696 F.2d 1112, 1113 (5th
Cir.1983) (following Aparicio, holding that a welder “injured when he fell while
working aboard a barge moored for loading” in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, was
outside of the LHWCA's coverage and noting that “the employee, although a
harborworker, was not under the reach of the LHWCA because he worked in a
foreign country”); Perio v. Titan Maritime, LLC, 2013 WL 5563711, at *8
(S.D.Tex.,2013) (citing Cormier).
Based on the Court’s determination that Plaintiff does not meet the standard
required to be classified as a Sieracki seaman as well as the fact that the
DEEPWATER CHAMPION was not located in foreign waters during the period
Plaintiff worked on board, the Court will deny the Motion for Summary Judgment.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED September 18, 2017, at Lafayette, Louisiana.