Brown et al v. St Landry Parish et al

Filing 13

ORDER re 6 Jurisdictional Amount Review Ruling, Compliance Deadline set for 7/15/2016 for Plaintiffs to supplement reply to the qualified immunity defense. Sheriff Guidroz must file motion for summary judgment no later than 8/12/2016. Discovery w ith respect to Guidroz may proceed as it relates only to the qualified immunity issue. All other discovery with respect to this defendant stayed. If Guidroz fails to file motion, the partial stay of discovery is lifted. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patrick J Hanna on 5/13/16. (crt,Keller, J)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CAROLYN BROWN, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:15-2724

VERSUS

JUDGE DOHERTY

ST. LANDRY SHERIFF'S
DEPARTMENT, ET AL.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HANNA

ORDER
Before the court is plaintiffs’ Rule 7(a) reply [rec. doc. 9], which the
plaintiffs filed at the Court's direction [rec. doc. 6], addressing the qualified
immunity defense asserted by Sheriff Bobby J. Guidroz.
The qualified immunity defense affords government officials not just
immunity from liability, but immunity from suit.1 Qualified immunity shields
government officials from individual liability for performing discretionary
functions, unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.2 Thus,
“[t]he doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from civil
damages liability when their actions could reasonably have been believed to be

1

Vander Zee V. Reno, 73 F.3d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1996) citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 525-526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985).
2

Coleman v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 532-533 (5th Cir. 1997) citing
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

legal.” 3 Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law.”4 “When a defendant invokes qualified
immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate the inapplicability of the
defense.”5 To discharge this burden, a plaintiff must satisfy a two-prong test.
First, he must claim that the defendants committed a constitutional violation under
current law. Second, he must claim that the defendants' actions were objectively
unreasonable in light of the law that was clearly established at the time of the
actions complained of.6 Both prongs of the qualified immunity analysis require
precise pleading and discovery concerning the precise conduct alleged to
constitute the constitutional violation.
The Fifth Circuit has long held that the assertion of qualified immunity
shields government officials from some discovery.7 In Schultea v. Wood,8 the
Fifth Circuit considered in detail the inter-workings of pleading, the discovery
process, and the public officials' assertion of the qualified immunity defense and
3

Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 370 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).

4

Id. at 371 citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)

5

Atteberry v. Nocona General Hospital, 430 F.3d 245, 253 (5th Cir. 2005) citing McClendon
v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam).
6

Id. (internal citations omitted); Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir.

2012).
7

8

Lion Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1987).
47 F.3d 1432 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).

confirmed that qualified immunity places limits upon a plaintiff's access to the
discovery process and imposes pleading requirements stemming from
Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(a). The Schultea court held that when a plaintiff asserts a Section
1983 claim against a public official who asserts qualified immunity,
[T]he court may, in its discretion, insist that a plaintiff
file a reply tailored to an answer pleading the defense of
qualified immunity. Vindicating the immunity doctrine
will ordinarily require such a reply, and a district court''s
discretion not to do so is narrow indeed when greater
detail might assist. The district court may ban discovery
at this threshold pleading state and may limit any
necessary discovery to the defense of qualified
immunity. The district court need not allow any
discovery unless it finds that plaintiff has supported his
claim with sufficient precision and factual specificity to
raise a genuine issue as to the illegality of defendant’s
conduct at the time of the alleged acts. Even if such
limited discovery is allowed, at its end, the court can
again determine whether the case can proceed and
consider any motions for summary judgment under Rule
56.9
Thus, the Rule 7(a) reply and review process becomes a “checkpoint” for the court
to review the appropriateness of allowing a plaintiff to proceed with full discovery
when a qualified immunity defense has been asserted.
Although the Court is perplexed to the extent that the plaintiffs' reply does
not precisely set forth the basis on which Sheriff Guidroz is alleged to be
individually liable for the alleged constitutional deprivations, there are sufficient
9

Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433-34.

allegations in both the Complaint and Rule 7A Reply to raise a genuine issue as to
the illegality of the Sheriff's conduct.
Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint that Guidroz "condoned the
establishment of . . . policies . . .which allowed the deprivation of plaintiff's
constitutional rights . . ." [rec. doc. 1, ¶ 38].
In their Rule &A Reply, plaintiffs expound upon this allegation stating that
"well before" the date of the incident herein, the Sheriff's Department "had been
put on notice of the fact that Mr. Brown suffered from various health maladies,
including hypertension" and that the "Sheriff's Department did not provide staff
that could adequately, and properly, treat individuals with medical conditions such
as Mr. Brown's health issues." They further states that "[d]espite being directly
responsible for hiring staff, and presumably being aware of his constitutional
obligations to the inmates st the St. Landry Parish jail, Sheriff Guidroz failed to
hire trained staff able to treat Mr. Brown during the time leading up to his
demise." [rec. doc. 9, pg. 3]. Moreover, plaintiffs state that "Sheriff Guidroz had
knowledge of the fact that none of his deputies were medically trained, and that
there were no persons at the parish jail who could address serious and potentially
life threatening conditions, such as Mr. Brown's hypertension." [Id at pg. 5].
The Court liberally construes these allegations, for purposes of this review
only, as asserting liability against the Sheriff on the basis of an alleged

implementation of an unconstitutional policy of failing to hire or train medical
staff, that resulted in the plaintiff's injury.10 However, the Court is unable to rule
on the Sheriff's immunity defense without further clarification of the facts. Thus,
an order limiting discovery is necessary.11
Applying Schultea, therefore;
IT IS ORDERED that discovery with respect to Sheriff Bobby J. Guidroz
is limited, at the current time, to that which is necessary to address the qualified
immunity defense asserted by this defendant.

10

In a Section 1983 action, a supervisory official may be held liable only if: (I) he affirmatively
participated in the acts that resulted in a constitutional deprivation; or (ii) he implemented unconstitutional
policies that resulted in the plaintiff's injury. Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2011); Gates v. Texas
Depot of Prot. & Reg. Serve., 537 F.3d 404, 435 (5th Cir. 2008). To establish supervisor liability for
constitutional violations committed by subordinate employees, the plaintiff must show that the supervisor
acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference to the violation of others’ constitutional rights committed
by their subordinates. Porter, 659 F.3d at 446. Deliberate indifference requires “proof that a municipal actor
disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Id. at 446-47; Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S.
51, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011).
A supervisory official may be held personally liable for a failure to train his subordinates only where
the failure to train or supervise amounts to deliberate indifference and is a proximate cause of a constitutional
violation. Porter, 659 F.3d at 446; Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 254 n. 1 (5th Cir.2010), cert. denied,
131 S.Ct. 2932, 180 L.Ed.2d 225 (2011). “[D]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, requiring
proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Id. at 446-447
citing Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1360 (internal quotation marks omitted) quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown,
520 U.S. at 409. To establish that a state actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his actions,
there must be “actual or constructive notice” “that a particular omission in their training program causes .
. . employees to violate citizens' constitutional rights” and the actor nevertheless “choose[s] to retain that
program.” Id. at 447 citing Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 407. Thus, “[a] pattern of similar constitutional
violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference,” because
“[w]ithout notice that a course of training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be
said to have deliberately chosen a training program that will cause violations of constitutional rights .” Id.

11

See Lion Boulos, 834 F.2d at 507–08; Wicks v. Mississippi State Employment Services, 41
F.3d 991, 994–995 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1131, 115 S.Ct. 2555, 132 L.Ed.2d 809 (1995).

Furthermore, to assure that the qualified immunity issue can be
expeditiously addressed in the manner contemplated by Schultea,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:
(1) Not later than July 15, 2016, the plaintiffs must supplement thier reply
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(a) to the qualified immunity defense of Sheriff Bobby
J. Guidroz, specifying the precise conduct of this individual defendant and the
corresponding constitutional violation(s) arising from that conduct upon which the
plaintiffs base their § 1983 claims against Sheriff Bobby J. Guidroz;
(2) Not later than August 12, 2016, Sheriff Bobby J. Guidroz must file a
motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity;
(3) Discovery with respect to Sheriff Bobby J. Guidroz may proceed insofar
as it relates only to the qualified immunity issue. All other discovery with respect
to this defendant is stayed until such time as this defendant's qualified immunity
motion is determined by the Court. However, if Sheriff Bobby J. Guidroz fails
to file his qualified immunity motion by August 12, 2016, the partial stay of
discovery set forth in this Order is automatically lifted without further order
of this Court.
Signed in Lafayette, Louisiana, this 13th day of May, 2016.
________________________________
PATRICK J. HANNA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE