Fitton v. Social Security Administration

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM RULING: IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED and this matter is dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Magistrate Judge Carol B Whitehurst on 1/12/2017. (crt,Chicola, C)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
Fitton

Civil Action No. 6:15-02894

versus

Magistrate Judge Carol B. Whitehurst

U.S. Commissioner Social
Security Administration

By Consent of the Parties

MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is an appeal of the Commissioner’s finding of non-disability.
Considering the administrative record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable
law, it is recommended that the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
The claimant, Sharon Elaine Fitton, fully exhausted her administrative
remedies prior to filing this action in federal court. The claimant filed an application
for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and an application for supplemental security
income benefits (“SSI”), alleging disability beginning May 27, 2011.1 Her
applications were denied.2 The claimant requested a hearing,3 which was held on May

1

R. 10, Ruling, p. 25.

2

Id. at pp. 25 - 33.

3

Id. at pp. 39 - 55.
1

15, 2014, before Administrative Law Judge John H. Maclean.4 The ALJ issued a
decision on August 12, 2014,5 concluding that the claimant was not disabled within
the meaning of the Social Security Act from May 27, 2011 through the date of the
decision. The claimant asked for review of the decision, but the Appeals Council
concluded on November 6, 2015 that there was no basis for review.6 Therefore, the
ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner for the purpose of the
Court’s review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Claimant then filed this action
seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision.
SUMMARY OF PERTINENT FACTS
The claimant was born on July 2, 1964.7 At the time of the ALJ’s decision, she
was forty-six years old. She graduated from high school,8 and has past relevant work
experience working for Lowe’s as a cashier, convenience store manager, convenience
store cashier and medical transport company driver.9 She alleges that she has been

4

Id. at pp. 25-33.

5

Id.

6

Id., Appeals Council, pp. 1 - 6.

7

Id. at p. 187.

8

Id. at p. 233.

9

Id. at p. 234.
2

disabled since May 27, 201110 due to rheumatoid arthritis, degenerative joint disease
of the left shoulder, diminished vision, migraines and asthma.
On September 6, 2011, the claimant was first seen at East Georgia Regional
Medical Center with complaints of left ear pain and a cough. Her history included
hypertension, rheumatoid arthritis, migraines and asthma. It was noted that she denied
threats or abuse and that she was a smoker.11 She was given an antibiotic and
discharged. The claimant was seen again on September 26, 2011, following a motor
vehicle accident. X-rays of her pelvic and left knee were normal and her left shoulder
demonstrated mild degenerative changes of the AC joint.12 On October 23, 2011, she
again presented with complaints of migraine headaches since the motor vehicle
accident.13 At that time she denied tobacco use.14 She was discharged with Motrin.15
On April 17, 2012, following another motor vehicle accident, the claimant presented
with pain in the left temple, shoulder and knee.16 Her visual acuity was noted as 20/25

10

Id. at pp. 56 - 57.

11

Id. at pp. 347 - 348.

12

Id. at pp. 332, 441.

13

Id. at pp. 366 - 368.

14

Id.

15

Id.

16

Id. at p. 359.
3

in the left eye and 20/20 in the right eye.17 She left the facility following triage “due
to unknown reason.”18
On July 14, 2012, Dr. Lee McGill, performed a disability determination
examination on the claimant. Upon examining the complainant’s spine and
extremities, Dr. McGill found full range of motion of her knees with limited range of
motion on abduction and forward elevation of the right shoulder. Dr. McGill opined
the claimant would have difficulty lifting heavy items as well as pushing and pulling
with her right arm. The claimant’s eye chart examination was 20/200 in both eyes
with no evident abnormality. Dr. McGill indicated the claimant would be referred for
an ophthalmology consultation.19
The September 10, 2012 records of the claimant’s ophthalmology examination
with Dr. Smalley at Vidalia Eye Associates, provided that the claimant stated she had
been gradually experiencing loss of vision and “intermittent migraine headaches”
related to spousal physical abuse dating back to May 2011 in which she was struck
in the head with a bat several times.20 Dr. Smalley’s notes indicated, Visual fields–“I
am a little doubtful about” based on the “large number of false positive and false
17

Id. at p. 360.

18

Id. at p. 361.

19

Id. at pp. 334-336.

20

Id. at pp. 402-403.
4

negative errors” in the right eye and “no distinct pattern of vision loss” on the left
eye.21 Dr. Smalley recommended yearly follow-up exams for ocular hypertension.
The claimant was seen by Dr. Moogerfeld on December 20, 2012 for a
disability physical. She stated that she had rheumatoid arthritis, was “legally blind in
the left eye,” as she had “good results” with Imitrex for her migraine headaches, and
had attempted to quit smoking two times.22 Dr. Moogerfeld found that the claimant’s
right shoulder range of motion (ROM) was completely normal, her left shoulder ROM
demonstrated functional impairment.23 Her final assessment provided that the
claimant exhibited functional impairment due to rheumatoid arthritis, no functional
impairment due to asthma, her migraine headaches were currently stable and noted
the need to obtain her vision records.24
On January 16, 2013, the radiology report of East Georgia Regional Medical
Center indicted that x-rays of the claimant’s knees, left hip and left shoulder were
normal.25 On February 14, 2013 the claimant was examined by Dr. Schere at St.

21

Id.

22

Id. at p. 421.

23

Id. at pp. 423-425.

24

Id.

25

Id. at pp. 444-448.
5

Joseph’s Hospital.26 While the claimant reported that she could only see 20/200 in
both eyes, her OTO-Neurology Test Summary provided “normal visual evoked
potential in both eyes.”27 On December 16, 2013, the claimant was examined by Dr.
Kenneth Johnson, an orthopedist with East Georgia Orthopedic Center. R. 48 Dr.
Johnson found no evidence of bone pathology.28
The claimant established as a new patient with Dr. Okungbowa on November
5, 2013 at which time she indicated that she was a current smoker, smoking 11-20
cigarettes per day, and that her medical history included asthma, hypertension,
shoulder surgery and a broken pelvis.29 Dr. Okungbowa ordered blood tests, including
a rheumatoid factor, and allergy testing. The claimant’s rheumatoid factor was
negative but she was administered allergy shot treatments from December 23, 2013
through April 24, 2014.30
On February 18, 2014, the complainant presented to Dr. Okungbowa for a note
advising of her medical condition as she was required to perform community service
for committing an aggravated assault. At that time, none of Dr. Okungbowa’s office

26

Id. at 450- 451.

27

Id.

28

Id. at p. 567.

29

Id. at p. 520.

30

Id. at pp. 532-564.
6

notes provided any indication that the claimant had abnormalities in her extremities
or her gait. Rather, his notes on that date stated that she had “normal range of motion
all joints, no trigger points on joints.”31 He ultimately stated that the claimant used a
walker, but had no obvious deformity and diagnosed “non specific disability, ?
Malingering.”32 At that time the claimant’s medication regimen included Atorvastatin
Calcium, Cyclobenzaprine, Ibuprofen, Percocet, Ventolin, Aerosol Solution,
Lisinopril, Zyrtec and Mobic.33
At the May 15, 2014 hearing, the claimant testified that she could see but could
not read out of her left eye.34 She stated that she had been tested (with x-rays) for
rheumatoid arthritis and the results were positive. She stated she had been prescribed
physical therapy but it only exacerbated her pain.35 She confirmed that she uses her
inhaler and that her migraine medication, Imitrex, works but causes nausea for which
she takes another medication.36 She stated that she quit smoking in 2012 and that her

31

Id. at pp. 552-553.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id., hearing transcript, p. 44.

35

Id.

36

Id. at p. 45
7

asthma had improved.37 She further stated that Dr. Okungbowa prescribed her
walking cane and wanted her to have a knee replacement.38 She stated that she had
not worked since she left her job at Lowe’s.39 She stated that she lives with her
daughter in an apartment, does no housework or cooking, has no hobbies and mostly
spends her day watching TV or sleeping.
In her brief opposing the Commissioner’s ruling, the claimant argues, “[t]he
evidence as [a] whole both medical and non-medical is sufficient to support [her]
claim of disability.”40 She asserts that she has enclosed “a few ... medical exams ...
that support [her] claim.” She further argues that the Agency found she was
“disabled, but can’t decide which year” her disability began.41 Thus, the claimant
contends that she is disabled, and she seeks to have the Commissioner’s adverse
ruling reversed.
ANALYSIS
A.

Standard of Review
Judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of disability benefits is limited

37

Id. at p. 52.

38

Id. at p. 46.

39

Id. at p. 48.

40

R. 11, p. 1.

41

Id.
8

to determining whether substantial evidence supports the decision and whether the
proper legal standards were used in evaluating the evidence.42 “Substantial evidence
is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”43 Substantial
evidence “must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be
established, but ‘no substantial evidence’ will only be found when there is a
‘conspicuous absence of credible choices' or ‘no contrary medical evidence.’”44
If the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, then they
are conclusive and must be affirmed.45 In reviewing the Commissioner's findings, a
court must carefully examine the entire record, but refrain from re-weighing the
evidence or substituting its judgment for that of the Commissioner.46 Conflicts in the
evidence and credibility assessments are for the Commissioner to resolve, not the
courts.47 Four elements of proof are weighed by the courts in determining if
42

Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990).

43

Villa at 1021-22 (quoting Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1983)).

44

Hames at 164 (quoting Hemphill v. Weinberger, 483 F.2d 1137. 1139 (5th Cir.
1973), and Payne v. Weinberger, 480 F.2d 1006, 1007 (5th Cir. 1973)).
45

42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 173 (5th Cir. 1995); Carey v.
Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 135 (5th Cir. 2000).
46

Harris v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2000)(citing Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d
552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995)).
47

Martinez at 174.
9

substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's determination: (1) objective
medical facts, (2) diagnoses and opinions of treating and examining physicians, (3)
the claimant's subjective evidence of pain and disability, and (4) the claimant's age,
education and work experience.48
B.

Entitlement to Benefits
The Disability Insurance Benefit (“DIB”) program provides income to

individuals who are forced into involuntary, premature retirement, provided they are
both insured and disabled, regardless of indigence.49 Every individual who meets
certain income and resource requirements, has filed an application for benefits, and
is determined to be disabled is eligible to receive Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”) benefits.50
The term “disabled” or “disability” means the inability to “engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.”51 A
claimant shall be determined to be disabled only if his physical or mental impairment
48

Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 126 (5th Cir. 1991); Martinez at 174.

49

See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a).

50

42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(1) & (2).

51

42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).
10

or impairments are so severe that he is unable to not only do his previous work, but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, participate in any other
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in significant numbers in the national
economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the area in which the claimant
lives, whether a specific job vacancy exists, or whether the claimant would be hired
if he applied for work.52
C.

Evaluation Process and Burden of Proof
The Commissioner uses a sequential five-step inquiry to determine whether a

claimant is disabled. This process required the ALJ to determine whether the
claimant (1) is currently working; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has an impairment
listed in or medically equivalent to those in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1; (4) is able to do the kind of work he did in the past; and (5) can perform any other
work at step five.53 If it is determined at any step of that process that a claimant is or
is not disabled, the sequential process ends. “A finding that a claimant is disabled or
is not disabled at any point in the five-step review is conclusive and terminates the
analysis.”54
52

42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).

53

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see, e.g., Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir.
2005); Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 271-72 (5th Cir. 2002); Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d
448, 453 (5th Cir. 2000).
54

Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994).
11

Before going from step three to step four, the Commissioner assesses the
claimant's residual functional capacity55 by determining the most the claimant can still
do despite his physical and mental limitations based on all relevant evidence in the
record.56 The claimant's residual functional capacity is used at the fourth step to
determine if he can still do his past relevant work and at the fifth step to determine
whether he can adjust to any other type of work.57
The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps.58 At the fifth
step, however, the Commissioner bears the burden of showing that the claimant can
perform other substantial work in the national economy.59 This burden may be
satisfied by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines of the regulations, by
expert vocational testimony, or by other similar evidence.60 If the Commissioner
makes the necessary showing at step five, the burden shifts back to the claimant to
rebut this finding.61 If the Commissioner determines that the claimant is disabled or

55

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).

56

20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1).

57

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).

58

Perez, 415 F.3d at 461; Masterson, 309 F.3d at 272; Newton, 209 F.3d at 453.

59

Id.

60

Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296, 1304 (5th Cir. 1987).

61

Perez at 461; Masterson at 272; Newton at 453.
12

not disabled at any step, the analysis ends.62
If the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, then they
are conclusive and must be affirmed.63 In reviewing the Commissioner's findings, a
court must carefully examine the entire record, but refrain from re-weighing the
evidence or substituting its judgment for that of the Commissioner.64 Conflicts in the
evidence and credibility assessments are for the Commissioner to resolve, not the
courts.65 Four elements of proof are weighed by the courts in determining if
substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's determination: (1) objective
medical facts, (2) diagnoses and opinions of treating and examining physicians, (3)
the claimant's subjective evidence of pain and disability, and (4) the claimant's age,
education and work experience.66
D. The ALJ’s Findings and Conclusions
In this case, the ALJ determined at step one, that the claimant has not engaged

62

Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Johnson v. Bowen,
851 F.2d 748, 751 (5th Cir. 1988)). See, also, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
63

42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Martinez, 64 F.3d at 173; Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 135

(5th Cir. 2000).
64

Hollis, 837 F.2d at 1383; Villa, 895 F.2d at 1021; Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698,
704 (5th Cir. 2001).
65

Martinez at 174.

66

Wren, 925 F.2d at126; Martinez at 174.
13

in substantial gainful activity since May 2, 2011.67 This finding is supported by the
evidence in the record.
At step two, the ALJ found that the claimant has the following severe
impairments: rheumatoid arthritis, degenerative joint disease of the left shoulder,
asthma, diminished vision in the left eye, and obesity.68 This finding is supported by
evidence in the record and is not challenged by the claimant.
At step three, the ALJ found that the claimant has no impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of a listed
impairment.69 The claimant does not challenge this finding.
The ALJ found that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform
work at the light level except that she it limited to occasional crouching, kneeling,
crawling and stooping; can have no exposure to heavy fumes or dust; is limited to
occasional work at heights; can not engage in overhead lifting with the left shoulder;
and can not engage in tasks requiring fine visual acuity or depth perception.70 The
Court assumes that the claimant challenges this finding.
At step four, the ALJ found that the claimant is not capable of performing any
67

R. 10, Ruling, p. 27.

68

Id.

69

Id.

70

Id.
14

of her past relevant work.71 The claimant does not challenge this finding.
At step five, the ALJ found that the claimant was not disabled from May27,
2011 through August 12, 2014 (the date of the decision) because there are jobs in the
national economy that she can perform.72
E. The Allegations of Error
Ms. Fitton generally claims that the ALJ erred in concluding that she is not
disabled and was not entitled to a period of disability. More specifically, Ms. Fitton
claims that the ALJ failed to properly consider the evidence in making his decision.
As to the claimant’s assertion that the Agency found she was disabled but
could not determine when her disability began. It appears to this Court that Ms. Fitton
was referring to the Appeal Council’s letter declining to review the ALJ’s August 12,
2014 decision based on her evidence submitted after the relevant period ended. While
the Appeals Council in no way stated or implied that the claimant was found to be
disabled, the claimant appears to be referring to a “Disabled Person’s Parking
Affidavit” attached to her brief, in which she was apparently issued a disabled
parking permit.73 The Court will not address this contention as it is not an alleged

71

Id. at p. 31.

72

Id. at p. 32.

73

Id. at p. 13.
15

error of the ALJ.
F. The Claimant’s General Allegations of Error
An assignment of error such as that asserted by the claimant, that the ALJ erred
in reaching the ultimate conclusion that the claimant is not disabled and erred in not
ordering a period of disability, is too general to be considered by the Court. The
Court’s scheduling order requires a claimant to set forth the specific errors committed
at the administrative level and states that a general allegations that the ALJ’s findings
are unsupported by substantial evidence is insufficient to invoke the appellate
function of the Court. The claimant’s briefing fails to satisfy these minimal
requirements. As the claimant is pro se the Court will first determine whether the ALJ
properly advised the claimant of her right to retain counsel and then review the
findings the ALJ made against the claimant, that is, the evidence used in making the
determination and the finding that the claimant was not credible.
G.

Did The ALJ Fully Advised Ms. Fitton Of Her Right To Representation?
A Social Security claimant such as Ms. Fitton has a statutory right to be

represented by counsel or another qualified person at a hearing.74 “A claimant is
entitled to adequate notice of her right to counsel at a hearing before an ALJ.”75 The

74

42 U.S.C. § 406; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1700.

75

Castillo v. Barnhart, 325 F.3d 550, 552 (5th Cir. 2003).
16

claimant may waive this right if given sufficient information to enable her to decide
intelligently whether to retain counsel or proceed pro se.76 A claimant may not have
sufficient information to make an intelligent waiver unless she receives an
explanation of the possibility of free counsel or a contingency arrangement, and the
limitation on attorney's fees to 25% of past due benefits awarded.77
In this case, Ms. Fitton appeared at the hearing before the ALJ without her
attorney. When asked about her attorney situation by the ALJ, she stated that her
attorney informed her the day before that she would not be attending the hearing with
the claimant. The ALJ then provided Ms. Fitton with the waiver of representation
form and went over the form with her. He stated:
We have a form and I’ll go over the form. The form says that apparently
you don’t have a lawyer or representative anymore. Although we don’t
have a withdrawal, you’re telling this Court that they called you
yesterday and said they weren’t going to show. So you have the right to
ask me to postpone this hearing to give you time to find a lawyer or
representative. And if you do, we will postpone for about two months,
give you that time. Then we’ll come back here and do this all over again.
A lawyer or representative can help your case by collecting evidence,
arguing your case. They may not charge you a fee without my approval
and even then, from back benefits if any. They may charge you for out
of pocket costs like phone calls and fax machines, things like that. And
there are some organizations like legal aid that will occasionally take
these cases without charge. So you have the right to ask me to postpone.

76

Stansel v. Shalala, 41 F.3d 664, 1994 WL 684761, at *1 (5th Cir. 1994)(citing
Clark v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 399, 403-04 (5th Cir. 1981)).
77

Clark at 403-04.
17

And if you do, I’ll certainly do that and we’ll come back here in about
two months. Now, you also have the right to ask me to go forward with
the case if you want to. 78
Ms. Fitton stated that she wished to go forward.79
To ensure valid waiver of the right to counsel, the ALJ must explain to the pro
se claimant the manner in which an attorney can aid in proceedings, possibility of free
counsel or contingency arrangement, limitation on attorney fees to 25 percent of past
due benefits, and required court approval of fees.80 The undersigned finds that the
ALJ met his burden of explaining the claimant’s waiver of counsel.
H. Does Substantial Evidence Support the ALJ ‘s Disability Determination?
In assessing the claimant’s Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”), the ALJ
properly reviewed the medical and non-medical evidence.81 The RFC finding is an
administrative assessment of the extent to which an individual’s medically
determinable impairment(s), including any related symptoms, such as pain, may cause
physical or mental limitations or restrictions that may affect her capacity to do workrelated physical and mental activities. The RFC is based on the totality of the
evidence and this assessment of a claimant’s work capacity is a determination
78

R. 10, p. 42.

79

Id.

80

42 U.S.C.A. § 406; 20 C.F.R § 404.1700; Clark, 652 F.2d at 403.

81

R. 10, Ruling, pp. 28-31.
18

reserved solely to the ALJ.82 An ALJ correctly considers all of the evidence, not just
the medical evidence, in assessing a claimant’s RFC.83 The ALJ weighs the evidence
and makes the RFC assessment, not the claimant.84
In determining that the claimant was not disabled but could perform some light
work activity, the ALJ thoroughly reviewed the claimant’s medical records as well
as her non-medical records. He found it significant that the state agency medical
experts “universally opined the claimant could perform less than light work” and was
not disabled.85 He noted that the claimant’s commission of aggravated assault during
her alleged period of disability confirmed the examinations in which she
demonstrated only few range of motion deficits and few pathologies indicated in
imaging studies. He further noted that she required no significant treatment for her
arthritis and continued to smoke despite her asthma. Based on this evidence, the ALJ
determined there was “no credible evidence that [the claimant’s] limitations [we]re
greater than indicated by the state agency experts.”86 Here, the ALJ correctly
considered all of the evidence and the evidence as a whole provides substantial

82

See Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(2), 416.927(e)(2)

83

Id.

84

Carey, 230 F.3d. at 135.

85

R. 10, Ruling, p. 31 (citing Exhs. 2A; 5A).

86

Id. at p. 31.
19

support for his decision.
H. Did the ALJ Improperly Evaluate the Claimant’s Credibility?
The ALJ concluded that the claimant has medically determinable impairments
that could reasonably be expected to cause her alleged symptoms, but opined that her
statements regarding the severity, persistence and limiting effects of her symptoms
were not credible:87
(1) statements regarding her activities of daily living
The ALJ found that the claimant was inconsistent in her statements regarding
her activities of daily living. He observed that on June 1, 2012, the claimant stated
that she sometimes goes shopping alone and with her daughter, while on July 14,
2012, she told a consultative examiner that she did not shop at all.
(2) allegations that she has significant left knee dysfunction
The claimant alleged at the hearing that she had such significant left knee
dysfunction that her treating physician recommended a knee replacement. Her
imaging studies, however, showed no pathologies of the left knee an in early 2014 she
denied any joint pain. Before March of 2014, the claimant displayed no pain on range
of motion in the left knee. Thus, the ALJ found her credibility as her own medical
historian significantly lessened.

87

See, Id., Ruling, at pp. 25-33.
20

(3) allegations as to her visual limitations
Despite the claimant’s own allegations of visual limitations, the ALJ found that
her statements to physicians and validity problems with her presentation reduced her
credibility considerably. He noted, in April of 2012 her visual acuity in the right eye
was 20/20, and in the left eye was 20/25. In July of 2014, she demonstrate no visual
limitations in a consultation exam and on the follow-up ophthalmology examination
she demonstrate too many false positives and negatives for the findings to be valid.
In a third consultation examination, the claimant stated she was unable to read any
of the visual acuity chart. Finally, in a fourth consultation examination in February
of 2013, her visual acuity was 20/200 in both eyes. Later, over several years of
treatment with her treating physician she denied any visual problems. The ALJ found
that these inconsistencies undermined her credibility considerably.
(4) allegations as to her asthma
The fact that the claimant smokes 11 - 20 cigarettes per day, has no respiratory
abnormalities on examination and has never been hospitalized for an asthma
exacerbation undermines any abnormal pulmonary function tests.
(5) allegations as to her rheumatoid arthritis
The ALJ found that the claimant has rheumatoid arthritis but is negative for the
rheumatoid factor, requires no specialized treatment and demonstrates no deformities

21

of any joint. Her strength/grip test results are inconsistent and are also inconsistent
with the objective evidence with regard to her activities. He further found that the
claimant does have degenerative joint disease of the left shoulder. While her limited
range of motion indicates she should not perform overhead lifting, the minimal
abnormal findings on the objective imaging studies along with her frequent
asymptomatic presentation upon examination indicates she has no greater limitations.
This Court finds that the ALJ’s evaluation of Ms. Fitton’s credibility was
conducted in accordance with the required legal standards and is supported by
substantial evidence in the record, as provided in the disability applications, the
medical records and the hearing transcript.
Therefore, the ALJ’s analysis of the claimant’s credibility is supported by
substantial evidence in the record. When an ALJ’s credibility determination is
supported by substantial evidence, it is entitled to judicial deference.88 Having found
that the ALJ in this case applied the proper legal standard in evaluating the claimant’s
credibility and having found that the ALJ’s evaluation was supported by substantial
evidence, this Court defers to the ALJ’s credibility analysis.
CONCLUSION
The undersigned finds that the ALJ applied appropriate legal standards in

88

Villa, 895 F.2d at 1024.
22

ruling on this case, and the ALJ’s findings are based on substantial evidence in the
record. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED and
this matter is dismissed with prejudice.
Signed in Lafayette, Louisiana, this 12th day of January, 2017.

23