Carter v. Swiftships L L C

Filing 43

MEMORANDUM RULING re 23 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Swiftships L L C. Signed by Chief Judge S Maurice Hicks, Jr on 1/19/2018. (crt,McDonnell, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
JORDAN CARTER

CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-0370

VERSUS

JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

SWIFTSHIPS, L.L.C.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE WHITEHURST
MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Record Document 23) filed
by the Defendant, Swiftships, L.L.C. (“Swiftships”). Plaintiff, Jordan Carter (“Carter”) has
sued Swiftships for alleged discrimination against her on the basis of her pregnancy in
violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (“PDA”), 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e(k), as
amended by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) and in
violation of the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law (“LEDL”), La. Rev. Stat.
23:342. Swiftships moves for summary judgment dismissing all of Carter’s claims. After
careful consideration of all parties’ submissions, and the law applicable before the Court,
Swiftships’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN
PART.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Carter is a former employee of Swiftships. Swiftships is a shipbuilder which
designs and constructs vessels for government and commercial entities. See Record
Document 23-2 at 1, ¶ 1. On March 19, 2016, Carter initiated this lawsuit, asserting that
she has been discriminated against on the basis of her pregnancy in violation of the PDA.
See Record Document 1 at 4, ¶ 18. Additionally, Carter alleges corresponding violations
under the LEDL. See id. The parties conducted discovery on these claims. Discovery is

Page 1 of 16

now complete, and Swiftships submits that summary judgment on all of Carter’s claims is
appropriate. In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, Swiftships presents the
Court with affidavits of Jeff Leleux (“Leleux”), the President of Swiftships, Danny Knope
(“Knope”), the Purchasing Manager at Swiftships, and Shehraze Shah (“Shah”), the Chief
Executive Officer of Swiftships. Carter presents the Court with affidavits from her mother,
Tamara Thomas, her step-father, Michael Thomas, and herself. Furthermore, she
submits to the Court email correspondence and other documents in order to defeat the
present Motion for Summary Judgment.
On April 22, 2013, Carter was hired by Swiftships to the role of Contracts
Administrator. See Record Document 23-2 at 1, ¶ 2. Carter alleges that within a year of
being hired as Contracts Administrator, she was promoted to the position of Contracts
Manager. See Record Document 1 at 2, ¶ 6. She alleges that an increase in pay was
supposed to accompany the position, but she never received the increase. See id. In
September of 2014, Carter informed Shah and Rickie Bertrand (“Bertrand”), Human
Resources Manager, that she was pregnant. See id. at 2-3, ¶ 8, see Record Document
23-5 at 8, ¶ 5. On November 23, 2014, Carter received an email from Shah advising her
that he “appointed [Knope] as the [C]ontracts [M]anager and would like for [Carter] to
report to him going forward for all [her] contracting responsibilities.” Record Document
27-3 at 1. Carter alleges that she was replaced in this position by Knope, a Caucasianmale employee, “who was being promoted to the Contracts Manager position previously
held by Carter.” Record Document 1 at 3, ¶ 10. After the purported demotion, Carter
alleges that she began to receive fewer work assignments and that the demotion occurred
two months after informing Shah and Bertrand that she was pregnant. See id. at ¶ 11.

Page 2 of 16

She further claims that on or around December 26, 2014, she was notified that her
employment with Swiftships was being terminated effective January 9, 2015 on account
of a reduction in force. See id. at 3-4, ¶ 13. She alleges that Knope, her “replacement,”
was not terminated as part of the reduction in force. See id. at 4, ¶ 14.
Swiftships denied the allegations of discrimination. Swiftships argues that in 2014
there were economic developments that negatively impacted the company such as losing
a bid to construct vessels for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that was estimated to be worth
$ 1 billion dollars in gross revenue and the drastic decline in oil prices in 2014. See Record
Document 23-2 at 2-3, ¶¶ 10-11. According to Swiftships, Shah and Leleux made a joint
determination that a reduction in force in the areas of general administration and
production was required to reduce overhead and expenses. See id. at 3, ¶ 12. Swiftships
argues that there was no need for Carter’s position due to the lack of anticipated work
and that her pregnancy did not factor into the decision. See id. at ¶¶ 15-16.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I.

Legal Standards
A.

The Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs summary judgment. This
rule provides that the court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Also, "a party asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the motion by citing to particular parts of materials in the
record." Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). "If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact

Page 3 of 16

or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the
court may . . . grant summary judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3).
In a summary judgment motion, "a party seeking summary judgment always bears
the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of the pleadings . . . [and] affidavits, if any, which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). If the movant meets this initial burden, then the non-movant has the burden of
going beyond the pleadings and designating specific facts that prove that a genuine issue
of material fact exists. See id. at 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2554; see Little v. Liquid Air Corp.,
37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). A non-movant, however, cannot meet the burden of
proving that a genuine issue of material fact exists by providing only "some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions,
or by only a scintilla of evidence." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. Additionally, in deciding a
summary judgment motion, courts "resolve factual controversies in favor of the
nonmoving party, but only when there is an actual controversy, that is when both parties
have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Id. Courts "do not, however, in the
absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the
necessary facts." Id.
Affidavits are a permissible and common form of evidence that may be used to
oppose a motion for summary judgment. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S. Ct.
2548, 2553. To be competent summary judgment evidence, an affidavit “must be made
on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that

Page 4 of 16

the affiant . . . is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).
However, a party may not manufacture a genuine issue of material fact by submitting an
affidavit that impeaches sworn testimony without explanation. See S.W.S. Erectors v.
Infax, Inc., 72 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 1996). If a party submits such a “sham” affidavit, the
Court may properly disregard or strike such an affidavit, grant summary judgment for the
movant, and award attorney’s fees to the opponent of the submitting party. See id. at 49596; see also Doe ex rel. Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 380, 385-86 (5th Cir.
2000); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(h).
B.

Standard of Proof under the PDA and LEDL

“Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer ‘to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’” Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572,
577 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)). Claims brought under the PDA are
analyzed like any other Title VII discrimination claims. See id. at 578. Furthermore,
Louisiana courts apply the same analysis to LEDL claims that federal courts apply to PDA
claims. 1 Therefore, the Court’s analysis of Carter’s claims under the PDA will apply to
Carter’s LEDL claims as well.
Claims of discrimination can be established through either direct or circumstantial
evidence. See id. at 578. In the present action, the parties disagree over what burdenshifting framework should govern as different frameworks apply, depending on whether

1

“Louisiana's anti-discrimination law is substantively similar to the federal statute; it is
thus appropriate to consider interpretations of the federal statute.” Brittain v. Family Care
Servs., Inc., 34-787 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/20/01), 801 So.2d 457, 461.
Page 5 of 16

a party has presented direct or circumstantial evidence. Nonetheless, for purposes of the
present Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court will treat the evidence offered by all
parties as circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court will analyze Carter’s claims
using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Under the McDonnell Douglas
framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination.
In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must show that she:
“(1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for her position; (3) was subject
to an adverse employment action; and (4) was replaced by someone outside the
protected class, or, that other similarly situated employees were more favorably treated.”
Adcock v. Sunquest Properties Inc., 421 F. App'x 446, 448 (5th Cir. 2011). Upon a plaintiff
meeting her prima facie burden of showing employment discrimination, the burden shifts
to the defendant-employer to offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action. See Okoye v. Univ. of Texas Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 245 F.3d 507,
512 (5th Cir. 2001). If a defendant is able to produce a legitimate reason, then the
presumption of discrimination vanishes. See id. at 512. A plaintiff must now prove by a
preponderance of evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by a defendant were not
true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. See id. In order to meet this burden,
a plaintiff “must put forward evidence rebutting each of the nondiscriminatory reasons the
employer articulates.” Fairchild v. All Am. Check Cashing, Inc., 815 F.3d 959, 967–68 (5th
Cir. 2016).
II.

Analysis of Carter’s Demotion Claim under the PDA and LEDL
The Court will first address Carter’s alleged demotion claim utilizing the McDonnell

Douglas framework. Next, the Court will address Carter’s termination claim utilizing the

Page 6 of 16

McDonnell Douglas framework. However, before the Court addresses these claims, the
Court deems it necessary to address Swiftships’ objection to the summary judgment
evidence presented by Carter.
A.

Objection to Summary Judgment Evidence

Before getting into the analysis, Swiftships’ objection to the affidavits of Carter,
Michael Thomas, and Tamara Thomas should first be addressed. Swiftships contends
that the three affiants’ affidavits contain hearsay resulting in the affidavits being
inadmissible at trial. However, Swiftships has failed to offer material to substantiate its
objection. Rather, Swiftships only offers conclusory assertions that the affidavits
constitute hearsay and should not be considered by the Court. On the other hand, Carter
has provided the Court with case law detailing why the Court should consider the
affidavits. First, Carter argues that the affidavits fit within the party-opponent exception of
the Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) and 801(d)(2)(D). To bolster this argument,
Carter cites to a case decided by the Fifth Circuit that is factually similar to the present
action. See Magiera v. City of Dallas, 389 F. App’x 433, 435 (5th Cir. 2010). Moreover,
Carter argues that if the party-opponent exception does not apply, which the Court finds
it does, Federal Rule of Evidence 613(b) applies. In support of this argument, Carter cites
to a case decided by another Court within this jurisdiction that held that if a declarant is
expected to be called as a witness at trial, then the affidavit is admissible for summary
judgment purposes. See Fontenot v. Safety Council of Sw. Louisiana, No. 16-CV-84,
2017 WL 2727266, at *4 (W.D. La. June 23, 2017). Carter, Michael Thomas, and Tamara
Thomas are all expected to be called upon to testify at trial. Accordingly, at this stage in
the litigation, it appears Carter has met her burden regarding the admissibility of the

Page 7 of 16

affidavits. Therefore, the Court overrules the objection lodged by Swiftships in its
Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment.
B.

Carter’s Prima Facie Case Concerning the Alleged Demotion

As indicated supra, Carter must show that she: “(1) is a member of a protected
class; (2) was qualified for her position; (3) was subject to an adverse employment action;
and (4) was replaced by someone outside the protected class, or, that other similarly
situated employees were more favorably treated.” Adcock v. Sunquest Properties Inc.,
421 F. App'x 446, 448 (5th Cir. 2011). It is undisputed that Carter as a pregnant female
is a member of a protected class. Moreover, it is undisputed that Carter was qualified for
her position whether it be Contracts Administrator or Contracts Manager. However,
elements three and four are disputed by the parties. Therefore, as to the third element,
Carter must provide sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether she has been subjected to an adverse employment action, i.e., a demotion.
First, the Court will address whether this jurisdiction considers a demotion to be an
adverse employment action. The Fifth Circuit has a strict interpretation of what constitutes
an adverse employment action. See Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 282 (5th
Cir. 2004). Under Title VII principles, . . . an employment action that “does not affect job
duties, compensation, or benefits” is not an adverse employment action. Id. at 282
(citations omitted). “Adverse employment actions include only ultimate employment
decisions such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, or compensating.” Ackel
v. Nat'l Commc'ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 385 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Green v. Adm'rs of
Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 657 (5th Cir. 2002)). Moreover, “[a] demotion also
qualifies as an ultimate employment decision under Title VII.” Pegram, 361 F.3d at 282

Page 8 of 16

(citing Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 933 (5th Cir. 1999)). A plaintiff need not
show a decrease in pay, title or grade to prove a demotion occurred. See Alvarado v.
Texas Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 613 (5th Cir. 2007). Courts will find a demotion occurred
if the plaintiff shows that the new position is objectively worse, i.e., such as being less
prestigious or less interesting or providing less room for advancement. See id. at 613.
Swiftships argues that Carter was not demoted. In support of this argument,
Swiftships relies on the affidavit of Leleux. In the affidavit, Leleux attests that “any position
changes, promotions, demotions, or pay increases must be authorized by [him] and at no
point in time did he promote or demote Carter.” Record Document 23-5 at 1. Moreover,
Carter never received a pay increase as a result of Carter’s alleged promotion as
Contracts Manager. See id. at 1-2. Carter has presented evidence that she was the
Contracts Manager for Swiftships at one point in time based on email correspondence
with company employees as well as other evidence showing that Carter held the position
of Contracts Manager. See Record Documents 27-1-6 and 27-9. Furthermore, Carter
cites to her own affidavit as well as the affidavits of her mother and step-father attesting
that Shah told Knope, who then relayed the message to Carter, her mother, and stepfather, that because of her pregnancy she would not be able to handle the responsibilities
required of a Contracts Manager at Swiftships. Based on the evidence offered by Carter,
the Court finds that Carter has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
alleged demotion from Contracts Manager to Contracts Administrator was objectively
worse. See Alvarado v. Texas Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 613 (5th Cir. 2007). Under the
objective standard, it would be reasonable for the trier of fact to determine that the move
from Contracts Manager to Contracts Administrator was objectively worse. Furthermore,

Page 9 of 16

Carter potentially suffered a decrease in title based on the evidence offered by Carter,
which the Court finds raises a genuine issue of material fact. See Ackel, 339 F.3d at 385.
Accordingly, Carter has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her demotion
equated to an adverse employment action.
Next, the Court must determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact
as to the fourth element. The fourth element requires Carter to show that she was
replaced by someone outside of her protected class. In this case, Knope, as a Caucasianmale, would be considered an individual outside the protected class. However, Swiftships
argues that Carter never held the position of Contracts Manager because the promotion
was never approved by Leleux; thus, it was impossible for Knope to replace Carter as
Contracts Manager. However, Carter has presented evidence that would raise a genuine
issue of material fact to the question of whether she was replaced by someone outside
her protected class. For example, in Carter’s affidavit she attests that Shah informed
Knope, who then informed Carter, that because Carter would have to take maternity leave
after giving birth, Shah intended to have Knope take Carter’s place as Contracts Manager
with Carter working under Knope as Contracts Administrator. See Record Document 279 at 1.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Carter has raised genuine issues of material facts
as to elements three and four in order to meet her prima facie burden of proving
discrimination.
C.

Whether Swiftships Presented a Legitimate Nondiscriminatory
Reason for the Alleged Demotion

As indicated supra, upon Carter meeting her prima facie burden of employment
discrimination, the burden shifts to the Swiftships to offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory
Page 10 of 16

reason for the adverse employment action. See Okoye v. Univ. of Texas Houston Health
Sci. Ctr., 245 F.3d 507, 512 (5th Cir. 2001). Swiftships presents the Court with affidavits
from Leleux, Shah, and Knope attesting to the fact that there was a shortage of
contracting work based on the company losing a bid for vessel construction work for the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Border Guards Fleet. Moreover, those employees of Swiftships
cite that the 2014 decline in oil prices had a substantial negative impact on the companies’
prospects for additional business. Accordingly, the Court finds that Swiftships has
presented legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for Carter’s alleged demotion. Therefore,
Swiftships has met its burden.
D.

Whether the Reasons Offered by Swiftships for the Demotion
Constituted Pretext

Carter must now prove by a preponderance of evidence that the legitimate reasons
offered by Swiftships were not true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. See
Okoye v. Univ. of Texas Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 245 F.3d 507, 512 (5th Cir. 2001). In
order to meet this burden, Carter “must put forward evidence rebutting each of the
nondiscriminatory reasons . . . [Swiftships] articulates.” Fairchild v. All Am. Check
Cashing, Inc., 815 F.3d 959, 967–68 (5th Cir. 2016).
In the present action, Carter has provided affidavits from herself, her step-father,
and her mother that contain alleged statements made by Danny Knope, who assumed
Carter’s duties. In both Michael Thomas and Tamara Thomas’s affidavits, they attest
under penalty of perjury that they had an encounter with Knope at the supermarket. See
Record Document 27-1 and 27-2. During this encounter, Knope informed Carter’s mother
and step-father that Swiftships’ officers, including Shah, had informed him that Carter was
demoted because she was pregnant and they feared that she therefore would not be able
Page 11 of 16

to work as many hours after giving birth. See Record Document 27-1 at 2. Furthermore,
in Carter’s affidavit, she attests under penalty of perjury that on November 24, 2014, she
and Knope met in his office where Carter questioned why she was demoted. See Record
Document 27-9 at 1. Carter attests that Knope explained that he met with Shah a few
weeks before the demotion where Shah informed Knope that because Carter would have
to take maternity leave after giving birth, he intended to have Knope assume Carter’s
position as Contracts Manager with Carter working under Knope as Contracts
Administrator. See id. Furthermore, according to Knope, Shah stated that he needed
someone in the Contracts Manager position that would not be distracted by a newborn
child and viewed it as a favor to Carter, i.e., giving Carter more time to spend with her
child. See id. Accordingly, based on these affidavits presented to the Court, the Court
finds that Carter has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Swiftships’
reasoning for demoting Carter was pre-textual.
Therefore, Swiftships’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Carter’s demotion
claim is DENIED.
III.

Analysis of Carter’s Termination Claim under the PDA and LEDL
A.

Carter’s Prima Facie Case Concerning Her Termination from
Swiftships

First it is undisputed that Carter, as a pregnant woman, is a member of a protected
class. Moreover, it is undisputed that Carter was qualified for the positions of both
Contracts Administrator and Contracts Manager. Finally, it is undisputed by the parties
that Swiftships’ termination of Carter was an adverse employment action. However,
element four appears to be in dispute. Accordingly, the final issue left for consideration
by the Court is whether Carter (1) was replaced by an individual who was not a member
Page 12 of 16

of her protected class, or, (2) that other similarly situated employees were more favorably
treated. See Adcock v. Sunquest Properties Inc., 421 F. App'x 446, 448 (5th Cir. 2011).
First, the Court finds that Carter was not replaced by an individual who was not a member
of her protected class because the evidence indicates that Carter’s position as Contracts
Administrator was never filled. See Record Document 23-5 at 3, ¶ 12. Therefore, it is
impossible for her to be replaced. In order for the first prong of element four to be met,
Carter would have needed to be terminated from her position as Contracts Administrator
and the position filled by a male. However, it appears that Carter argues that she was
otherwise discriminated against, or treated less favorably than a “similarly situated”
individual (Knope), who was not a member of the protected class. In order to meet the
“similarly situated” prong, “a plaintiff must show that he was treated less favorably than
others ‘under nearly identical circumstances.’” Morris v. Town of Indep., 827 F.3d 396,
401 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 314, 320 (5th Cir. 2014)). In
determining whether an employee is “similarly situated,” the Fifth Circuit considers a
number of factors such as:
Employees with different supervisors, who work for different divisions of a
company or who were the subject of adverse employment actions too
remote in time from that taken against the plaintiff generally will not be
deemed similarly situated. Likewise, employees who have different work
responsibilities or who are subjected to adverse employment action for
dissimilar violations are not similarly situated.
Morris v. Town of Indep., 827 F.3d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Lee v. Kansas City S.
Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 2009)). The goal of the “similarly situated” analysis
is to ensure that the challenged action was taken under nearly identical circumstances.
See Morris, 827 F.3d at 401.

Page 13 of 16

According to Carter, Knope was treated more favorably under nearly identical
circumstances. However, Carter has failed to present the Court with evidence that would
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Knope and Carter were “similarly
situated” employees. Knope’s job title with Swiftships was Purchasing Manager. See
Record Document 23-5 at 5, ¶ 1. According to Knope’s affidavit, he merely “assumed
oversight of the contracting process.” Id. at ¶ 3. Consequently, Carter has failed to present
evidence that the Purchasing Manager and Contracts Administrator shared the same job
responsibilities. It is unclear whether Carter and Knope shared the same supervisor.
Carter and Knope not sharing the same job or responsibilities weighs heavily in favor of
the Court finding that Carter and Knope were not “similarly situated” employees.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Carter has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether Carter and Knope were “similarly situated” employees. Therefore, Carter
has failed to meet her prima facie burden as it concerns her termination claim.
C.

Whether Swiftships Presented a Legitimate Nondiscriminatory
Reason for the Alleged Termination

However, assuming arguendo, that Carter was able to meet her prima facie
burden, Swiftships must present a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged
termination. With respect to Carter’s demotion claim, the Court earlier found that
Swiftships offered legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the alleged demotion. The
alleged reasons offered by Swiftships for Carter’s termination was due to a shortage of
contracting work based on the company losing out on a bid for vessel construction work
for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Border Guards Fleet. Moreover, the 2014 oil bust had a
substantial negative impact on Swiftships prospects for additional business. Swiftships
also cites to a chart in Leleux’s affidavit that indicates between July of 2014 and February
Page 14 of 16

of 2017, Swiftships laid off 16 males as opposed to four females. See Record Document
23-5 at 2-3.This strengthens Swiftships contention that the company was suffering due to
the drop in oil prices and needed to reduce its force rather than laying off Carter as a
result of her pregnancy. Accordingly, the Court finds that Swiftships has presented a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged termination. Therefore, Swiftships has
met its burden and the burden now shifts back to Carter to show the reasons offered were
pre-textual.
D.

Whether the Reasons Offered by Swiftships for the Termination
Constituted Pretext

Assuming arguendo, Carter must now offer evidence to rebut the reasons for the
termination offered by Swiftships. See Fairchild v. All Am. Check Cashing, Inc., 815 F.3d
959, 967–68 (5th Cir. 2016). If Carter can produce evidence to cast doubt on the
Swiftships’ stated reason, the case should go to trial. See Marzano v. Computer Sci. Corp.
Inc., 91 F.3d 497, 509 (3d Cir. 1996). Swiftships argues that Carter has failed to offer
evidence that would show that the decision by Swiftships was pre-textual, i.e., Carter fails
to offer evidence rebutting the explanation of the loss of the Saudi Arabian contract and
the decline in oil prices as the reasons for Carter’s termination. Furthermore, Swiftships
argues that the affidavits presented to this Court by Carter do not concern her termination,
but rather her demotion. Carter argues that the temporal proximity between Swiftships
learning of Carter’s pregnancy and her termination supports the Court finding that the
decision to terminate Carter was pre-textual. However, the Fifth Circuit has held that
“although the temporal proximity between the employer learning of the plaintiff's
pregnancy and her termination may support a plaintiff's claim of pretext, such evidence
without more is insufficient.” Fairchild, 815 F.3d at 968.
Page 15 of 16

In the present action, Carter has failed to offer evidence that would raise a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Swiftships’ decision to terminate Carter was pretextual. Carter relies on the temporal proximity (3 months) of informing Shah of her
pregnancy and her termination from Swiftships, but has failed to offer other evidence to
strengthen her temporal proximity argument as required by the Fifth Circuit. The evidence
offered by Carter only concerns her demotion. Moreover, the affidavits the Court relies on
in denying Swiftships’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Carter’s demotion claim fail
to mention anything related to Carter’s termination from Swiftships. Accordingly, the Court
finds that Carter has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Swiftships’ reasoning for terminating her was pre-textual. Therefore, Swiftships’ Motion
for Summary Judgment as to the termination claim lodged by Carter should be
GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
Swiftships’ Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment (Record Document 23) is
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Carter’s demotion claim under the PDA
and LEDL SHALL PROCEED. However, Carter’s termination claim under the PDA and
LEDL is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
An order consistent with the terms of the instant Memorandum Ruling shall issue
herewith.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, on this the 19th day of
January, 2018.

Page 16 of 16