Alexander v. Neustrom et al
Filing
95
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 81 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss filed by the DOC defendants, Michelle David, Tamyra Young, Melanie Benedict, Stayce Falgout and Dr Raman Singh, [Rec. Doc. 81], is GRANTED IN PART, in that Plaintiff's state law claims against the DOC defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and Plantiff's § 1983 claims against the DOC defendants in their official capacities, with the exception of injunctive relief under the Ex Parte Young Doctrine, are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and DENIED IN PART as to Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the DOC Defendants in their individual capacities under Rule 12(b)(6). Signed by Magistrate Judge Carol B Whitehurst on 6/1/2017. (crt,Crick, S)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
Alexander
Civil Action No. 16-00470
versus
Judge Carol B. Whitehurst
Neustrom, et al
By Consent of the Parties
MEMORANDUM RULING AND ORDER
Before the Court is A Motion To Dismiss under FRCP Rule 12(b)(1), lack of
jurisdiction, and FRCP Rule 12(b)(6) failure to state a claim as to the Department of
Corrections defendants, Michelle David, Tamyra Young, Melanie Benedict, Stayce
Falgout and Dr. Raman Singh (“DOC Defendants”). [Rec. Doc. 81]. The Court
conducted a hearing with the parties on May 19, 2017 in which oral argument was
allowed. For the oral reasons assigned in the hearing and the reasons which follow,
the Court grants the motion in part and denies the motion in part.
I. Background
This action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arises out of an incident on March 18,
2015, when Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee in the Lafayette Parish Correctional
Center (“LPCC”). Plaintiff alleges while he was detained in the LPCC, he was
attacked by inmate Cody Fruge and struck twice in the face, causing injury to
Plaintiff’s jaw. Plaintiff was taken to University Medical Center (“UHC”) where he
was diagnosed with bilateral mandible angle fractures, treated and released to the
defendants. The providers at UHC instructed defendants that Plaintiff should be seen
within 1 week (or by March 25th) at the ENT Clinic or with an oral maxiofacial
specialist. Medical personnel submitted an “urgent” consult form to LSU Health
Systems on March 19, 2015.
On March 20, 2016, UHC indicated that Plaintiff was scheduled for an
appointment with the ENT Clinic on April 14, 2015—27 days after the incident. On
his April 14 visit to the ENT Clinic, new CT scans and an evaluation and surgery at
the LSU Health Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery Perkins Surgery Center on April 21,
2015 were ordered. Plaintiff was not seen at the LSU Clinic on April 21, 2015
because the LPSO “was not aware” of the appointment. Plaintiff was rescheduled and
seen on April 27, 2015. At that visit a follow-up appointment was scheduled for May
5, 2015. After being seen at LSU Clinic on May 5 (LPSO contends no report is
available), Plaintiff was scheduled for a follow-up appointment on June 11, 2015. On
June 11, the LSU physician noted the jaw fractures were improperly healed and a CT
scan and surgery were scheduled on June 15 and June 22, 2016, respectively. Surgery
was performed on June 22 and Plaintiff was to follow-up in one week, June 30.
Plaintiff’s follow-up was scheduled for July 2, 2015 but LSU cancelled the
appointment and rescheduled it for July 16, 2015. In the July 16 appointment,
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Plaintiff was advised to follow-up in one week, but was rescheduled for July 27,11
days later. After his July 27 appointment, LPSO was told that “due to a missed
appointment” Plaintiff needed another surgery. On August 4, 2015, Plaintiff’s arch
bars were removed at LSU Oral Surgery Clinic. On August 5, 2015 he was seen by
DOC staff and placed on a regular diet. Plaintiff was released from custody on August
14, 2015.
Plaintiff filed this action in the Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Lafayette
Parish; it was removed to this Court on April 7, 2016. R.1. In his original Petition,
Plaintiff named as defendants various individuals employed with the Lafayette Parish
Sheriff’s Office, as well as the Sheriff of Lafayette Parish. R. 1-2. On July 13, 2016,
Plaintiff filed a First Supplemental and Amended Petition for Damages, in which he
named as an additional defendant, the State of Louisiana through the Louisiana
Department of Corrections (“DOC”).1 R. 34. On December 22, 2016, Plaintiff filed
a Second Supplemental and Amended Petition for Damages, in which he named as
additional defendants, Michelle David, Tamyra Young, Melanie Benedict, Stayce
Falgout, and Dr. Raman Singh, employees of DOC. R. 60. Plaintiff alleges that DOC,
by and through its individual employees, breached its responsibilities and duties to
1
On January 1, 2017, this Court issued a Memorandum Ruling and Order [Rec. Doc.
69], dismissing plaintiff’s claims against the State of Louisiana through the DOC without
prejudice.
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ensure that Plaintiff’s appointments were scheduled and that he received
transportation, medical care, and treatment to appointments outside of the correction
facilities. Id. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and other relief under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and Louisiana state law against these defendants.
II. Legal Standard - Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss
Motions filed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
allow a party to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court to hear
a case. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.2001). A Rule 12(b)(1)
motion to dismiss is the proper method with which to bring a motion to dismiss for
lack of standing. Harrison v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 2007 WL 1244268, at *3
(E.D.La. Jan. 26, 2007) (citing Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161). The burden of proof for
a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction. Ramming, at
161. Accordingly, the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction
does in fact exist. Id.
The standard for review of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is the same
as that for a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Harrison, 2007 WL
1244268, at *3. When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he court
accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir.2007).
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To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” In re Katrina Breaches
Litig., at 205 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level[.]” In re Katrina Breaches Litig. at 205 (quoting Twombly, at 555).
III. Law and Analysis
A. Motion To Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1)
In their Motion to Dismiss, the DOC defendants contend that Plaintiff’s § 1983
claims against them in their official capacities, as well as the state law claims against
them, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and should be dismissed pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
“The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution bars an individual
from suing a state in federal court unless the state consents to suit or Congress has
clearly and validly abrogated the state's sovereign immunity.” See Perez v. Region 20
Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 326 (5th Cir.2002) (citing U.S. Const. amend. XI).
Sovereign immunity protects not just the state itself, but also “any state agency or
entity deemed an ‘alter ego’ or ‘arm’ of the state.” Id. This immunity applies unless
it is waived by consent of a state or abrogated by Congress.” Cozzo v. Tangipahoa
Parish Council–President Government, 279 F.3d 273, 280–81 (5th Cir.2002).
Congress did not abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity by enacting §
1983. Champagne v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 188 F.3d 312, 314 (5th
Cir.1999). Moreover, Louisiana has not waived sovereign immunity. La. R.S.
13:5106(A) (prohibiting suits against the State in any court other than a Louisiana
state court); Champagne at 314.
While Plaintiff does not identify what capacity in which he is suing the
individual defendants, to the extent he is seeking monetary damages against the DOC
defendants in their official capacities under §1983, such claims are deemed to be
against the State of Louisiana. See Hafer v. Melo,502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)(“Suits
against state officials in their official capacity therefore should be treated as suits
against the state.”). Because the State did not waive sovereign immunity with respect
to the DOC defendants in their official capacities, the Eleventh Amendment bars
Plaintiff’s claims against them.
Plaintiff also brings claims against the DOC through their employees under
various state law theories of negligence. Such claims of state law negligence against
state officials performing acts within the course and scope of their employment are
barred by the Eleventh Amendment as they are not claims against the employee in
their individual capacity, but rather a claim against the state. Hughes v. Savell, 902
F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1990); Puollard v. Turner, 184 F.3d 815, *1 (5th Cir.1999) (per
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curiam) (“when a plaintiff accuses a state official of violating state common law when
acting in the acting in the course and scope of their employment, the Eleventh
Amendment prevents him from raising the claim in federal court”). Because
Plaintiff’s claims operate as claims against the State of Louisiana itself, this Court is
without subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s state law claims against
the DOC.2
In his opposition memorandum, Plaintiff argues that his claim for injunctive
relief against the DOC defendants survives under the Ex parte Young doctrine—an
equitable exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908). The Ex parte Young doctrine allows a plaintiff to sue
a state official, in his official capacity, in seeking to enjoin enforcement of a state law
that conflicts with federal law. See id. at 159–60. It is a threshold question which,
therefore, does not consider the merits of an action, focusing instead on whether the
complaint makes the requisite claims against proper parties. During oral argument,
the DOC defendants conceded they are not addressing the Ex parte Young exception
2
During oral argument, counsel for Plaintiff explained that because he had a pending
state count lawsuit against the DOC defendants he had no preference as whether or not the Court
dismissed the individual state law claims. He argued, however, that the Court’s dismissal would
result in “ piecemealing” this litigation. Thereafter, the Court stated that it would deny the
motion as to the DOC defendants in their individual capacities and grant it in part as to the
official capacity, except for the claims for injunctive relief. Upon reviewing the aforesaid
jurisprudence as well as the jurisprudence cited by the parties in their oral arguments, the Court
will grant the Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiff’s state law claims against the individual DOC
defendants and dismiss them without prejudice.
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and any such exception involving the DOC defendants in their official capacity
remains.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims under § 1983 as well as the
individual Louisiana state law claims against the DOC Defendants will be dismissed
without prejudice pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.
B. Motion to Dismiss For Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 12(b)(6)
The DOC defendants argue that they are also entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claims against them in their official capacities as such an action is considered
against the state. They further argue that Plaintiff’s claims asserted against them in
their individual capacities should be dismissed with prejudice under the qualified
immunity defense.
1. § 1983 Official Capacity Claims
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must establish that a person,
acting under color of law, deprived her of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. State agencies and state officials
acting in their official capacities are not “persons” within the meaning of the statute.
There is no dispute that the LPCC is a state agency, nor that the DOC defendants are
LPCC employees. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against the DOC employees and/or
officials in their official capacities must be dismissed under § 1983.
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2. § 1983 Individual Capacity Claims
Defendants contend the DOC defendants individual capacity claims should also
be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to plead that each individual DOC defendant
acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs necessary to violate
Plaintiff’s 14th Amendment rights.
Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a
municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action. Even
under the objective standard, liability requires more than unintentional negligent
oversight or even gross negligence; there must be a deliberate choice. City of Canton,
489 U.S. at 388, n. 7; Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2010). A
claimant, however, need not show that a prison official acted or failed to act believing
that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the official acted or failed
to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825 (1994).
In paragraphs 16–19 of the Second Amended Complaint, R. 60, Plaintiff
contends that the named DOC defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s
need for prompt and necessary medical care and pain medications, including their
failure to timely return him to UHC for treatment of his jaw—resulting in a surgical
procedure and improper healing. In paragraph 25, Plaintiff alleges:
Defendants failed to act with deliberate indifference upon known serious
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medical needs in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. This
failure included the failure to promulgate and enforce proper procedures
providing prompt medical treatment to Petitioner, by and through
Defendants employees and contractors, by unnecessarily delaying
treatment and placing Mr. Alexander at risk of improper healing due to
untimely transportation to necessary appointments.
In considering the DOC defendant’s motion under 12(b)(6), the Court must
accept the factual allegations in Plaintiff’s complaints as true and view them in the
light must favorable to Plaintiff. Plaintiff has pled enough facts to state a plausible
claim that the DOC defendants, in their individual capacities were deliberately
indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs under § 1983 and State law
negligence, including assuring that he properly and timely received the prescribed
treatment for his fractured jaw. The Court will deny the motion as to the DOC
defendants in their individual capacities.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion To Dismiss filed by the DOC defendants,
Michelle David, Tamyra Young, Melanie Benedict, Stayce Falgout and Dr. Raman
Singh, [Rec. Doc. 81], is GRANTED IN PART, in that Plaintiff’s state law claims
against the DOC defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the DOC defendants in their official capacities, with
the exception of injunctive relief under the Ex Parte Young Doctrine, are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and DENIED IN PART as to Plaintiff’s § 1983
claims against the DOC defendants in their individual capacities under Rule 12(b)(6).
THUS DONE AND SIGNED this 1st day of June, 2017.
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