Kinnerson v. Arena Offshore L P et al

Filing 112

ORDER & REASONS granting 107 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Eldon E Fallon on 2/26/2019. (crt,Williams, L)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RYAN KINNERSON

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 16-720

ARENA OFFSHORE L.P. ET AL.

SECTION "L" (1)
JUDGE ELDON E. FALLON
Mag. Judge Van Meerveld

ORDER & REASONS

Before the Court is Third Party Defendant Island Operating Company, Inc. (“IOC”)’s
motion for summary judgment dismissing all claims against it with prejudice. R. Doc. 107. The
motion is unopposed. For the reasons that follow, the unopposed motion is GRANTED.
I.

BACKGROUND
This case arises out of injuries Plaintiff Ryan Kinnerson allegedly sustained while working

on a fixed platform, owned by Defendant Arena Offshore, LP (“Arena”), off the coast of Louisiana.
Plaintiff alleges that he was injured when he was transferred from the platform to the M/V Miss
Claire by a temporary crane on the platform.
Arena hired IOC to provide skilled labor operators to assist with the daily operations on
the platform. In addition to this ongoing production work, Arena hired several independent
contractors to furnish services, personnel, equipment, and materials in order to drill a new well
from the platform. Specifically, Arena hired Sparrows Offshore, LLC (“Sparrows”) to provide and
operate a temporary crane on the platform; Paloma energy Consultants, LP (“Paloma”) to provide
construction project management, coordination, and inspection services; and Oceaneering
International, Inc. (“Oceaneering”), Plaintiff’s employer, to provide labor, materials, and
supervision. Finally, Arena chartered the M/V Miss Claire, operated and crewed by SeaTran, to
transport the material, equipment, and personnel associated with the construction work. These
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independent contractors were performing separate and distinct services from IOC.
Plaintiff was allegedly injured when he was being transferred in a personnel basket from
the platform to the M/V Miss Claire by the Sparrows temporary crane. He alleges that the
“personnel basket violently struck the M/V Miss Claire’s railing throwing petitioner off the
personnel basket onto the deck of the M/V Miss Claire thereby causing petitioner to sustain severe
disabling personal injuries.” Plaintiff sued Sparrows, Sea Tran, Arena, and Paloma. Paloma filed
a third party complaint against IOC, alleging that Plaintiff’s injuries were due to the negligence
and lack of care of IOC and its employees.
IOC now moves for summary judgment dismissing Paloma’s claims against it with
prejudice, on the grounds that it had no role in the planning and/or execution of the personnel
basket transfer in which Plaintiff was injured. The motion is unopposed.
II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “Rule 56(c) mandates the
entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party
who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party’s case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. A party moving for
summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the basis for summary judgment and
identifying those portions of the record, discovery, and any affidavits supporting the conclusion
that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. If the moving party meets that burden,
then the nonmoving party must use evidence cognizable under Rule 56 to demonstrate the

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existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 324.
A genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1996).
“[U]nsubstantiated assertions,” “conclusory allegations,” and merely colorable factual bases are
insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92, 97 (5th
Cir. 1994); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. In ruling on a summary judgment motion, a
court may not resolve credibility issues or weigh evidence. See Int'l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's Inc.,
939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5th Cir. 1991). Furthermore, a court must assess the evidence, review the
facts and draw any appropriate inferences based on the evidence in the light most favorable to the
party opposing summary judgment. See Daniels v. City of Arlington, Tex., 246 F.3d 500, 502 (5th
Cir. 2001); Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986).
At the time of the accident, IOC did not own or have legal custody of the platform,
temporary crane, personnel basket, tag line, M/V Miss Claire, or any other equipment used in the
execution of the personnel basket transfer. IOC had no contractual relationship with Sparrows,
Paloma, SeaTran, or any other independent contractors engaged in the construction operations.
IOC did not coordinate or supervise any of the work being performed by the other independent
contractors and was engaged in separate and distinct work on the platform – IOC’s personnel were
not even approached with the Job Safety Analysis relating to the personnel basket transfer at issue.
The evidence shows that IOC had no role in the planning or execution of the personnel basket
transfer in which Plaintiff was allegedly inured.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, IOC’s unopposed motion for summary judgment, R. Doc. 107, is
GRANTED. Paloma’s Third-Party Complaint against IOC is hereby DISMISSED WITH

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PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana, on this 26th day of February, 2019.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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