Sapienza v. Trahan, et al
Filing
243
MEMORANDUM RULING AND ORDER re 235 Motion for Reconsideration re 234 Judgment. For the reasons herein, the motion is DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patrick J Hanna on 3/18/2019. (crt,Alexander, E)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
RICHARD SAPIENZA
CASE NO. 6:16-CV-01701
VERSUS
MAGISTRATE JUDGE HANNA
TRAHAN ET AL
BY CONSENT OF THE PARTIES
MEMORANDUM RULING & ORDER
Currently pending is a Motion to Reconsider, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b), filed by Plaintiffs, Richard Sapienza (“Sapienza”), individually
and/or derivatively as member and manager on behalf of Advanced Applied
Research, LLC (“AAR”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), as well as exhibits filed
separately in support thereof [Rec. Docs. 235, 240]. The motion urges the Court to
reconsider its memorandum ruling and judgment [Rec. Docs. 233, 234], which
granted in part and denied in part two motions for summary judgment and to sever,
filed by Defendants David O. Trahan, Chem Advances, LLC, and Cypress
Technologies, LLC [Rec. Doc. 173]; and Defendants Ben D. Davis and Tarrytown
Ventures, LP [Rec. Doc. 176] (collectively, “Defendants”). For the reasons that
follow, the motion is DENIED.
1
As Plaintiffs’ motion acknowledges, “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
do not recognize a motion for reconsideration per se.”1 “Nevertheless, motions
requesting reconsideration of court orders have been construed as falling under Rule
54(b), Rule 59(e), or Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”2 “Rules
59 and 60 apply only to final judgments.”3 When a party seeks reconsideration of an
order that adjudicates fewer than all the claims among all of the parties, then Rule
54(b) controls.4 “Under Rule 54(b), the district court possesses the inherent power
to reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be
sufficient.”5 Rule 54(b) provides that an order that adjudicates fewer than all the
claims among all the parties “may be revised at any time” before the entry of a final
judgment.6 That said, “[r]econsideration of a judgment after its entry is an
extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly.”7
Here, Plaintiffs have moved the Court to reconsider a memorandum ruling
and judgment, which adjudicated fewer than all claims among all parties to this suit;
therefore, Rule 54(b) governs. Rule 54(b) motions are construed under the same
1
Cormier v. Turnkey Cleaning Servs., L.L.C., 295 F. Supp. 3d 717, 719 (W.D. La. 2017) (citing
Shield Pack, LLC v. CDF Corp., 2010 WL 4719431, *1 (W.D. La. 2010)).
2
Id. (citing Collins v. Brice Building Co., LLC, 2013 WL 121655, *2 (E.D. La. 2013) (and cases
cited therein)).
3
Id.
4
Id. at 719-20.
5
Id. at 720 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)).
6
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
7
Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
2
standards that govern motions brought under Rules 59(e) or 60, depending on the
timing thereof.8 “[T]he Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a motion for
reconsideration filed within twenty-eight days after the entry of judgment or the
issuance of an interlocutory order is treated as a motion to alter or amend judgment
under Rule 59(e), while a motion for reconsideration that is filed more than twentyeight days after the entry of judgment or the issuance of an order is treated as a
motion seeking relief from judgment under Rule 60(b).”9 Because the relevant ruling
and judgment were entered on January 28, 2019, and the instant motion was filed
more than twenty-eight days thereafter, on March 6, 2019, the motion will be treated
as one seeking relief from judgment under Rule 60(b).
“The purpose of Rule 60(b) is to balance the principle of finality of a judgment
with the interest of the court in seeing that justice is done in light of all the facts.”10
The Rule states that “[o]n motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party . . .
from a . . . judgment, [or] order,” for certain specified reasons, set out in six
subsections.11 Here, Plaintiffs specifically rely upon Rule 60(b)(1), (3), and (6).12
8
Cormier, 295 F.Supp.3d at 720 (citing Collins, 2013 WL 121655, *2 (and cases cited therein));
Mosing v. Boston, 2017 WL 1573172, at *2 (W.D. La. 2017); see also Hamilton Plaintiffs v.
Williams Plaintiffs, 147 F.3d 367, 371 n.10 (5th Cir. 1998).
9
Mosing, 2017 WL 1573172, at *2; Hamilton Plaintiffs, 147 F.3d at 371 n.10.
10
Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632, 638 (5th Cir. 2005).
11
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
12
Rec. Doc. 235-1, pp. 24-25, 27, and 43-44.
3
Rule 60(b)(1) allows a court to grant relief on the grounds of “mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”13 Plaintiffs argue that the personal
circumstances of their attorney, the facts of which have been detailed in previous
filings, constitute “excusable neglect.”14 However, as indicated by Plaintiffs’
reference to previous filings, the Court is, and was at the time of the relevant ruling,
aware of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s personal circumstances. Over the course of many
months and requests for extensions of various deadlines, the Court has considered
counsel’s circumstances and, where appropriate, granted relief at various stages of
this litigation. In the relevant ruling, before reaching the merits of Defendants’
unopposed motions for summary judgment, the Court considered whether Plaintiffs
should be allowed additional discovery or relief from the scheduling order, pursuant
to Rules 56(d) or 16(b)(4), respectively.15 The bases for those requests were the same
as those set forth in support of Plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b)(1) argument, and the Court’s
original reasons for denying those requests are clearly laid out in the ruling.16
Nothing in the instant motion provides sufficient cause for reconsideration thereof.17
Brittingham v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 543 F. App’x 372, 374 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(1)).
14
Rec. Doc. 235-1, pp. 24, 43 (citing Rec. Doc. 210-1, pp. 5-12).
15
See Rec. Doc. 233, pp. 17-24.
16
Id.
17
The Fifth Circuit has “held that a district court does not abuse its discretion when it denies a
Rule 60(b)(1) motion where the proffered justification for relief is the careless mistake of counsel.”
Brittingham, 543 F. App’x at 374 (citing Edward H. Bohlin Co., Inc. v. Banning Co., Inc., 6 F.3d
350, 356–57 (5th Cir. 1993)). While Plaintiffs’ counsel’s circumstances are unfortunate, and
certainly do not themselves constitute carelessness, the extent to which counsel has allowed those
13
4
Next, Plaintiffs seek relief under Rule 60(b)(3), which allows a court to grant
relief on the grounds of “fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.”18 “A party making a Rule
60(b)(3) motion must establish (1) that the adverse party engaged in fraud or other
misconduct, and (2) that this misconduct prevented the moving party from fully and
fairly presenting his case.”19 “The moving party has the burden of proving the
misconduct by clear and convincing evidence.”20 Rule 60(b)(3) “does not require
that the information withheld be such that it can alter the outcome of the case[;]”
rather, it “‘is aimed at judgments which were unfairly obtained, not at those which
are factually incorrect.’”21
Here, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants committed fraud and made
misrepresentations during the time period relevant to the substantive allegations in
this lawsuit and, in doing so, refer the Court to the factual challenges to the merits
of the Court’s ruling, set forth in some thirty-two pages of their brief.22 Plaintiffs
circumstances to affect her representation in this case, despite the Court’s leniency surrounding
missed deadlines herein, does rise to the level of carelessness. And, “it has long been held,
particularly in civil litigation, that the mistakes of counsel, who is the legal agent of the client, are
chargeable to the client, no matter how unfair this on occasion may seem.” Pryor v. U.S. Postal
Service, 769 F.2d 281, 288 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962)).
18
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3).
19
Hesling, 396 F.3d at 641 (citing Gov’t Fin. Servs. One Ltd. P’ship v. Peyton Place, 62 F.3d 767,
772 (5th Cir. 1995) (quotations and citations omitted)).
20
Id. (citing Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1339 (5th Cir. 1978))
21
Id. (quoting Rozier, 573 F.2d at 1339).
22
Rec. Doc. 235-1, pp. 24-25, 43 (citing Rec. Doc. 235-1, pp. 7-24; p. 8, n.3 (regarding references
to exhibits “produced for, but not introduced at, the preliminary injunction hearing”); and 27-42).
5
explicitly note that this argument is made “[o]n the merits.”23 Therein, Plaintiffs reallege the claims of fraud and misrepresentation contained in their amended
complaint and attempt to support same by drawing on testimony and exhibits,
whether introduced or not, from the preliminary injunction hearing.24 However,
“Rule 60(b)(3) concerns litigation-related fraud perpetrated in the course of litigation
that ‘interferes with the process of adjudication.’”25 These assertions, which are
directed purely toward the underlying subject-matter of this litigation, amount to
nothing more than an untimely, improper attempt by Plaintiffs to oppose the motions
upon which the Court has already ruled.
Moreover, as noted above, to succeed under Rule 60(b)(3), Plaintiffs must
show that Defendants’ misconduct prevented Plaintiffs “from fully and fairly
presenting [their] case.”26 Plaintiffs have failed to explain how any misconduct by
the defense has interfered with their ability to present their case.27 To the contrary,
23
Id.
Rec. Doc. 235-1, pp. 7-24, 27-42; and p. 8, n.3 (regarding references to exhibits).
25
Taylor Newman Cabinetry, Inc. v. Classic Soft Trim, Inc., 2012 WL 5989387, at *8 (M.D. Fla.
2012) (quoting Roger Edwards, LLC v. Fiddes & Son Ltd., 427 F.3d 129, 134 (1st Cir. 2005)).
26
Hesling, 396 F.3d at 641 (citing Gov’t Fin. Servs. One Ltd. P’ship v. Peyton Place, 62 F.3d 767,
772 (5th Cir. 1995) (quotations and citations omitted)).
27
The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ brief makes passing references, almost entirely in footnotes, to
allegations of potential fraud or misrepresentation during the course of this litigation. See, e.g.,
Rec. Doc. 235-1, p. 13, n.26 (“Plaintiffs seriously question the veracity and authenticity of
Defendants’ Exh. 12 . . .”). However, Plaintiffs made the same objections at the time this exhibit
was admitted during the preliminary injunction hearing, and discussed during the testimony of
both Sapienza and Trahan. See Rec. Doc. 125-1, pp. 48-50; and Rec. Doc. 125-2, pp. 75-77.
Regardless, the argument is not properly made under Rule 60(b)(3) and is used, instead, as another
means to attack the merits of the underlying ruling and the findings contained therein.
24
6
as detailed in the relevant ruling, Defendants have responded to all discovery
requests propounded by Plaintiffs and produced over 12,000 pages of bates
numbered documents over the course of this litigation.28 Further, upon order of the
Court, the parties submitted copies of all interrogatories and document requests
propounded and the written responses thereto, in addition to any agreed-upon
responses or production, for the Court’s review.29 This allowed the Court to fully
examine the extent of the discovery undertaken and assess the adequacy and fairness
thereof in light of Plaintiffs’ then-pending request for additional discovery. The
Court ultimately denied Plaintiffs’ requests for additional discovery and/or further
relief from the scheduling order, and explained, as follows:
Having thoroughly reviewed and considered the parties’ submissions,
the Court remains satisfied that Plaintiffs have had ample
opportunity within which to conduct any necessary discovery and
have failed to do so or to provide specific reasons why additional time
is necessary to do so. Moreover, despite having engaged in significant
discovery, which included depositions of both Trahan and CA, and
having a 741-page transcript available from the [preliminary
injunction] hearing, Plaintiffs have failed to make any effort to oppose
the pending dispositive motions.30
Again, nothing in the instant motion undermines the above-quoted findings or
provides sufficient cause for reconsideration thereof.
28
See Rec. Doc. 233, pp. 19-24; and Rec. Doc. 213.
See Rec. Docs. 215, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, and 233.
30
Rec. Doc. 233, p. 23 (first emphasis added; second emphasis in original).
29
7
Third and finally, Plaintiffs rely upon Rule 60(b)(6), which allows a court to
grant relief “for any other reason that justifies relief.”31 The Fifth Circuit “has
consistently held that relief under 60(b)(6) is mutually exclusive from relief
available under sections (1)-(5).”32 “The reason for relief set forth under 60(b)(6)
cannot be the reason for relief sought under another subsection of 60(b).”33 Rather,
“Rule 60(b)(6) ‘is a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular
case when relief is not warranted by the preceding clauses.’”34 “The broad language
of clause (6) gives the courts ample power to vacate judgments whenever such action
is appropriate to accomplish justice.”35 However, “[t]o justify relief under subsection
(6), a party must show ‘extraordinary circumstances’ suggesting that the party is
faultless in the delay.”36 “If a party is partly to blame for the delay, relief must be
sought . . . under subsection (1) and the party’s neglect must be excusable.”37
Here, Plaintiffs attempt to rehash arguments already presented, thoroughly
considered, and rejected by the Court. Essentially, Plaintiffs argue that the
31
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
Hesling, 396 F.3d at 642 (citing Transit Cas. Co. v. Sec. Trust Co., 441 F.2d 788, 792 (5th Cir.
1971)).
33
Hesling, 396 F.3d at 642 (citing Hess v. Cockrell, 281 F.3d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 2002)).
34
Hesling, 396 F.3d at 642 (quoting Harrell v. DCS Equip. Leasing Corp., 951 F.2d 1453, 1458
(5th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted)).
35
Hesling, 396 F.3d at 642 (quoting Harrell, 951 F.2d at 1458).
36
Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993); see also
Hesling, 396 F.3d at 642 (“However, ‘[r]elief under this section is granted “only if extraordinary
circumstances are present.”’”) (quoting American Totalisator Co., Inc. v. Fair Grounds Corp., 3
F.3d 810, 815 (5th Cir.1993) (citation omitted)); Id. at 642, n.6 (collecting cases where
extraordinary circumstances were found to exist and support relief under Rule 60(b)(6)).
37
Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 393.
32
8
preliminary injunction hearing, and related discovery, was limited, such that
Plaintiffs have not been given the opportunity to submit evidence in support of all
claims brought in this lawsuit.38 This argument fails to account for the depth of the
preliminary injunction hearing, which was conducted over the course of four days
and produced over 700 pages of transcript.39 Likewise, and perhaps most
importantly, Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge that they have had ample opportunity to
engage in discovery since then and have repeatedly failed to do so or to make any
effort to use the record already created, including the 741-page hearing transcript, to
either oppose summary judgment or provide support for a proper Rule 56(d) motion
for additional discovery. This is true, despite the Court’s leniency in granting nearly
all of Plaintiffs’ timely and untimely requests for extensions of deadlines, throughout
the course of this litigation.
Moreover, in their “Combined Response,” to the then-pending dispositive
motions, Plaintiffs detailed these exact same arguments, in moving the Court for
relief from the scheduling order and/or additional discovery. There, inter alia,
Plaintiffs argued that previous discovery had been limited to “preliminary injunction
38
Rec. Doc. 235-1, pp. 25. 43-44.
The Court further notes that, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the successful plaintiff
must first show “a substantial likelihood of success on the merits,” which the Court assesses by
looking to the “standards provided by the substantive law.” Rec. Doc. 123, pp. 12, 13 (quoting
Canal Authority of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974); Janvey v. Alguire, 647
F.3d 585, 596 (5th Cir. 2011); and Roho, Inc. v. Marquis, 902 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir. 1990)
(citation
omitted)).
39
9
issues;” the parties exchanged only informal discovery; and only a limited number
of depositions had been taken.40 On the surface, the Court was unpersuaded by
Plaintiffs’ untimely requests; however, out of an abundance of caution, the parties
were allowed to submit their discovery, as detailed above, for the Court’s review.
After consideration thereof, the Court remained satisfied that Plaintiffs had been
afforded an adequate opportunity to engage in discovery yet failed to do so, and the
Court ruled in Defendants’ favor on the dispositive motions. Thus, the Court finds
that reconsidering the ruling and judgment, which clearly and carefully considered
each of the arguments now before the Court, would unfairly penalize Defendants
because of Plaintiffs’ dilatory conduct and failure to pay proper attention to this
litigation.41 Accordingly,
For the reasons outlined herein, Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration [Rec.
Doc. 235] is hereby DENIED.
Signed at Lafayette, Louisiana on this 18th day of March, 2019.
____________________________________
PATRICK J. HANNA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
40
41
Rec. Doc. 210-1.
See Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 393.
10
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