Sapienza v. Trahan, et al

Filing 269

ORDER: IT IS ORDERED that the Judgment at rec doc 192 granting Wayne Cutrer and Downhole Chemical Solutions, LLCs Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Judgment at rec doc 234 granting David Trahan, Chem Advances, LLC, Cypress Technologies, LLC, Ben Davis, and Tarrytown Ventures, LPs Motion for Summary Judgment, are hereby certified as final pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 54(b). Signed by Magistrate Judge Patrick J Hanna on 6/13/2019. (crt,Chicola, C)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
RICHARD SAPIENZA

CASE NO. 6:16-CV-01701

VERSUS

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HANNA

DAVID O TRAHAN ET AL
ORDER
The Court ordered the parties to file briefs addressing their respective
positions as to whether the Court should sever the remaining counter-claims and
direct entry of a Rule 54(b) final judgment as to all claims which have been
adjudicated or whether the Court should proceed to try the remaining counter-claims
first. (Rec. Doc. 244). The parties timely complied. (Plaintiffs’ Response at Rec.
Doc. 245; Defendants’ Joint Response at Rec. Doc. 246). The Court also conducted
a telephone status conference on June 13, 2019 on the record wherein the parties
discussed this issue.
Defendants urged the Court to sever the pending counter-claims and designate
the previously adjudicated claims as Rule 54(b) final judgments, thereby allowing
the parties to proceed to trial on Defendants’ counter-claims. Defendants also asked
the Court to realign the parties for trial, so that Defendants/Counter-Claimants are
repositioned as Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants are repositioned as

Defendants, and set the remaining claims for trial as soon the parties and the Court’s
schedule will allow.
Plaintiffs disagree, arguing that two of their claims remain pending: “Count
Fifteen for Judicial Dissolution and, Alternatively, for Buy-Out and/or Dissolution
Due to Oppression,” and Dr. Sapienza’s ownership interest in AAR and “the five (5)
trade secrets at issue.” (Rec. Doc. 245, at 1). Contrary to Plaintiffs’ position, the
Court notes that all of Plaintiffs’ claims have been either voluntarily dismissed by
Plaintiffs, rendered moot by agreement, or dismissed with prejudice by the Court.
Specifically, Count Fifteen for judicial dissolution became moot when Defendants
agreed to dissolve AAR. (See Rec. Doc. 233, at 2, citing Rec. Doc. 187, ¶84 and
176-1, ¶76). Similarly, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Count Sixteen seeking
declaratory judgment as to Dr. Sapienza’s ownership interests. (Rec. Doc. 233, at 2,
citing Rec. Doc. 230-231). Further, the Court has already ruled that Plaintiffs
presented evidence of the existence of only two trade secrets, rather than five as
Plaintiffs maintain. (Rec. Doc. 233, at 28, citing Rec. Doc. 123, at 17). Nonetheless,
the Court is still called upon to determine whether final judgment designation is
appropriate under F.R.C.P. Rule 54.
Rule 54(b) provides:
When an action presents more than one claim for relief--whether
as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim--or when
multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final
judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if
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the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.
Otherwise, any order or other decision, however designated, that
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer
than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or
parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment
adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.
In making a determination under Rule 54(b), “[a] district court must first
determine that it is dealing with a ‘final judgment,’…in the sense that it is a decision
upon a cognizable claim for relief, and it must be ‘final’ in the sense that it is ‘an
ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims
action.’” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7 (1980), citing Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436 (1956). Next, the district court must
determine whether there is “no just reason for delay,” considering “such factors as
whether the claims under review were separable from the others remaining to be
adjudicated and whether the nature of the claims already determined was such that
no appellate court would have to decide the same issues more than once even if there
were subsequent appeals.” Id. “The mere presence of [counter-claims] does not
render a Rule 54(b) certification inappropriate.” Id. at 9.
The Court agrees with Defendants that the judgments granting Defendants’
Motions for Summary Judgment are final in the sense that they were ultimate
dispositions of all remaining claims. The Court also agrees that there is “no just
reason for delay,” emphasizing that none of Plaintiffs’ claims remain pending.
Although the interplay of the parties’ business relationships and the extent to which
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boundaries were defined and/or enforced is at the heart of this litigation, the majority
of Defendants’ counter-claims are materially different from those asserted in the
main demand. For instance, Defendants’ counter-claims allege Sapienza breached
his fiduciary duties and/or was unjustly enriched in several respects: 1) by usurping
and/or misrepresenting a business opportunity by pursuing a gas to liquids
opportunity in Malaysia (for personal gain), while also using AAR resources and
property; 2) by misrepresenting rights to use technology owned by his former
employer, METSS, thereby exposing AAR to potential liability for improper use or
disclosure of that companies’ information; 3) by improperly sharing financial
information with non-member employees and third parties, and that this, along with
other allegedly non-professional behavior, caused AAR to lose business
opportunities; and 4) by suing Cutrer and DCS, AAR’s only customer, causing DCS
to discontinue business with AAR and ultimately put AAR out of business. (See Rec.
Doc. 241, at 28-29).
While Defendants’ counter-claims are, in some respects, related to Plaintiffs’
now dismissed claims (such as Defendants’ counter-claims seeking to recover
attorneys’ fees under the Defend Trade Secrets Act and the Louisiana Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, alleging Plaintiffs’ trade secret claims in the main demand were brought
in bad faith), the Court finds that the interests of judicial economy and efficiency is
best served by certifying the judgments granting Defendants’ Motions for Summary
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Judgment as final and allowing Plaintiffs to proceed with appeal if desired. Once
appellate review has determined whether Plaintiffs’ claims were properly dismissed
or whether Plaintiffs should be allowed to proceed, the Court will set trial for all
unresolved issues. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Judgment at Rec. Doc. 192 (Memorandum Ruling
at Rec. Doc. 191), granting Wayne Cutrer and Downhole Chemical Solutions, LLC’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Judgment at Rec. Doc. 234 (Memorandum
Ruling at Rec. Doc. 233), granting David Trahan, Chem Advances, LLC, Cypress
Technologies, LLC, Ben Davis, and Tarrytown Ventures, LP’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, are hereby certified as final pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 54(b).
THUS DONE in Chambers, Lafayette, Louisiana on this 13th day of June,
2019.
______________________________
PATRICK J. HANNA

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