Mercury Rents, Inc. v. Crenshaw Enterprises, Ltd.

Filing 32

MEMORANDUM RULING re 8 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction or Alternatively MOTION to Change Venue filed by Crenshaw Enterprises L L C, 19 MOTION to Amend 1 Petition and 29 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge. Signed by Judge Robert G James on 5/30/2017. (crt,Crawford, A)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
MERCURY RENTS, INC.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-1741

VERSUS

JUDGE ROBERT G. JAMES

CRENSHAW ENTERPRISES LTD.
MAG. JUDGE CAROL B. WHITEHURST
d/b/a TIGER INDUSTRIAL RENTALS
RULING
Pending before the Court are a Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, Motion to Transfer
Venue [Doc. No. 8] filed by Defendant Crenshaw Enterprises, LLC, d/b/a Tiger Industrial Rentals
(“Tiger Industrial”) and a Motion for Leave to File First Supplemental, Amended, and Restated
Complaint [Doc. No. 19] filed by Plaintiff Mercury Rents, Inc. (“Mercury Rents”).
After full briefing, on April 13, 2017, Magistrate Judge Carol B. Whitehurst issued a Report
and Recommendation [Doc. No. 29] in which she recommended that the Court grant Tiger
Industrial’s Motion to Dismiss, deny Tiger Industrial’s Motion to Transfer Venue as moot, and deny
Mercury Rents’ Motion to Amend Complaint.
On May 1, 2017, Mercury Rents filed objections [Doc. No. 30] to the Report and
Recommendation. On May 15, 2017, Tiger Industrial filed a response [Doc. No. 31] to Mercury
Rents’ objections.
Having fully reviewed the record in this matter, including Mercury Rents’ objections and
Tiger Industrial’s responses, the Court finds that Magistrate Judge Whitehurst correctly stated and
applied the law and hereby ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation. The Court issues this Ruling
to consider one argument which does not appear to be addressed in the Report and Recommendation:

whether Tiger Industrial consented to jurisdiction.
Mercury Rents objects to the Report and Recommendation because Magistrate Judge
Whitehurst failed to consider whether Tiger Industrial’s pervasive contacts with Louisiana show it
has consented to jurisdiction in Louisiana. [Doc. No. 30-1, p. 17].1 First, Mercury Rents argues that
the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a defendant consents to jurisdiction by registering to do
business in the forum. Id. at 18; see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. OKC Ltd., 634 So.2d 1186 (La. 1994).
However, as at least one other district court has noted, that proposition comes from “dicta from
Phillips, and a Louisiana appellate court has noted that the registration statute should not be read so
broadly.” Gulf Coast Bank v. Designed Conveyor Sys., LLC, CV 16-412-JJB-RLB, 2017 WL
120645, at *3 (M.D. La. Jan. 12, 2017). The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Whitehurst,
registering to do business in a forum State does not establish general jurisdiction. Id.(citing Wenche
Siemer v. The Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 183 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding no authority to
support “the proposition that the appointment of an agent for process and the registration to do
business within the state, without more, suffices to satisfy the criteria for the exercise of general
jurisdiction”)). The Court disagrees with Mercury Rents’ assertion that a defendant consents to
jurisdiction by registering to do business in the forum.
Next, Mercury Rents contends that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
found that a defendant voluntarily subjected itself to process in the forum state by registering to do
business, appointing a registered agent, and actually doing business in the forum state. [Doc. No. 301, p. 18 (citing Cowan v. Ford Motor Co., 694 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1982))]. Although, Cowan does

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The Court notes that this argument was not alleged by Mercury Rents until its opposition
to Judge Whitehurst’s Report and Recommendation. [Doc. No. 30].
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not control the issue in this matter, as that case was decided prior to Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413 (1984), where the distinction between specific personal
jurisdiction and general personal jurisdiction was first adopted. Thus, the Cowan Court did not
address that general personal jurisdiction requires “continuous and systematic general business
contacts.” Id. at 416.
Further, in Siemer, the Fifth Circuit held that registration specifically to do business in the
forum State and the appointment of an agent for service of process was “of no special weight in
evaluating general personal jurisdiction.” 966 F.2d at 181. Instead, “a foreign corporation that
properly complies with the [State] Registration statute only consents to personal jurisdiction where
such jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible.” Id. at 183. Having found that jurisdiction in this
instance is not constitutionally permissible, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Tiger
Industrial.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons and those set forth in Magistrate Judge
Whitehurst’s Report and Recommendation, the Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, Motion to
Transfer Venue [Doc. No. 8] filed by Defendant Tiger Industrial is GRANTED IN PART AND
DENIED IN PART. To the extent that the motion seeks to dismiss the action for lack of personal
jurisdiction, the motion is GRANTED, and Mercury Rents’ claims against Tiger Industrial are
hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. To the extent the motion seeks to transfer venue, the
motion is DENIED as MOOT. Further, the Motion for Leave to File First Supplemental,
Amended, and Restated Complaint [Doc. No. 19] filed by Mercury Rents is DENIED.

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MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 30th day of May, 2017.

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