In re: Padco Pressure Control L L C
MEMORANDUM RULING re 3 MOTION for Reconsideration re 2 Order on Motion to Transfer Case filed by Case Energy Services L L C. Signed by Judge Robert G James on 1/13/17. (crt,Crawford, A)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
IN RE: PADCO PRESSURE CONTROL, LLC
CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-mc-0056
JUDGE ROBERT G. JAMES
Pending before the Court is a “Motion to Reconsider, Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), Case
Energy Services, LLC’s Motion for Intra-District Transfer Based on Forum Non Conveniens”
(“Motion to Reconsider”) [Doc. No. 3]. Case Energy Services, LLC (“Case Energy”) moves the
Court to reconsider its order [Doc. No. 2] denying Case Energy’s “Motion to Transfer Venue Based
on Forum Non Conveniens” (“Motion to Transfer”) [Doc. No. 1]. Padco Pressure Control, LLC
(“Padco”) and the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Padco (“the Committee”) have filed
memoranda in opposition to the motion. [Doc. Nos. 7, 8 &12]. Case Energy has filed reply
memoranda. [Doc. Nos. 9 & 13].
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize a motion for reconsideration per se.
Instead, a motion challenging a judgment or order may be filed under Rules 54, 59, or 60. Rules 59
and 60 apply only to final judgments. Rule 54(b) provides that any order “that adjudicates fewer
than all the claims... [among] all the parties... may be revised at any time before the entry of a [final]
judgment.” FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). “Under Rule 54[(b)], a district court has the inherent procedural
power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be sufficient.”
Iturralde v. Shaw Grp., Inc., 512 F. App’x 430, 432 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Melancon v. Texaco,
Inc., 659 F2.d 551, 553 (5th Cir. 1981)) (citations omitted); see also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp.
v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 n. 14 (1983) (holding that “virtually all interlocutory orders
may be altered or amended before final judgment if sufficient cause is shown”). Courts evaluate
motions to reconsider interlocutory orders under a “less exacting” standard than Rule 59(e), but,
nevertheless, look to similar considerations for guidance.1 See HBM Interests, LLC v. Chesapeake
Louisiana, LP, No. 12-1048, 2013 WL 3893989 (W.D. La. July 26, 2013) (quoting Livingston
Downs Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. Jefferson Downs Corp., 259 F. Supp. 2d 471, 475 (M.D. La. 2002));
Sw. Louisiana Hosp. Ass’n v. BASF Const. Chemicals, LLC, No. 2:10-CV-902, 2013 WL 1858610
(W.D. La. Apr. 29, 2013) (quoting Livingston Downs, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 475). Therefore, in
determining whether to grant the motion, the Court must evaluate whether there are “manifest errors
of law or fact upon which judgment is based[,]” whether “new evidence” is available, whether there
is a need “to prevent manifest injustice,”or whether there has been “an intervening change in
controlling law.” HBM Interests, 2013 WL 3893989, at *1 (internal quotation marks and citations
“[I]mportantly, Rule 54(b) motions, like those under Rules 59(e) and 60(b), are not the proper
vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments.” S. Snow Mfg. Co. v. SnoWizard
Holdings, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 2d 548, 565 (E.D. La. 2013) (citing Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d
1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990)). “While reconsideration is generally not available to ‘raise arguments
Procedurally, this case is unusual because the Court has ruled on the only issue before it:
the Motion to Transfer, and, thus, this miscellaneous matter was resolved upon entry of the
Court’s prior order. In that respect, Case Energy’s Motion for Reconsideration is more like a
motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e). However, all claims in the case, i.e., the
bankruptcy case, have not been resolved. Thus, the Court has applied the more generous Rule
54(b) standard. Given the Court’s conclusions, Case Energy certainly could not prevail if the
Court had applied the more stringent standard of Rule 59(e) to its review of the Motion for
that could, and should have been made’ . . . earlier . . . courts have considerable discretion [under
Rule 54(b)] to revise, ‘reconsider and reverse its decision’ . . . on interlocutory motions for summary
judgment ‘for any reason it deems sufficient.’” Riley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CIV.A.
H-13-0608, 2014 WL 2506241, at *1 (S.D. Tex. May 15, 2014), report and recommendation
adopted, No. CIV.A. H-13 0608, 2014 WL 2505686 (S.D. Tex. June 3, 2014)(quoting In re
Elevating Boats, LLC, 286 Fed. App’x. 118, 122 (5 th Cir.2008)).
In this case, Case Energy admits that the statute upon which it relied in its original motion,
28 U.S.C. § 1412, provides only for interdistrict, not intradistrict, transfers. Instead, Case Energy
argues that it should have cited 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which allows a district court to transfer a case
within the district (intradistrict) from one division to another. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (“For the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division
to which all parties have consented.”). Case Energy argues further that if the Court applies the §
1404(a) factors, it will find that the Shreveport Division of the Bankruptcy Court is the appropriate
forum for the bankruptcy case.
Padco and the Committee respond that (1) Case Energy cannot rely on arguments that it could
have raised in the original motion, (2) any motion to transfer venue between divisions should be filed
in the bankruptcy court under the Court’s standing order of reference, and (3) if the bankruptcy court
applies the § 1404(a) factors, those factors weigh heavily in favor of the Lafayette Division. The
Committee points out that Bankruptcy Judge Robert Summerhays has considered a motion to
transfer venue in the bankruptcy case of another Padco entity and determined that the case should
remain in the Lafayette division.
Case Energy responds that this Court has original jurisdiction and “may decide what it refers
to bankruptcy court, not vice-versa.” [Doc. No. 9, p. 1]. Case Energy points out that the Court can
“refer the motion” to the Bankruptcy Court if it wishes and that the cases it cited stand for that
proposition. Id. However, Case Energy argues that the Court should consider the substantive merits
of its motion and that the § 1404(a) factors support a transfer to Shreveport. Finally, in a
supplemental memorandum, Case Energy points to the procedural and factual history of the case
before Bankruptcy Judge Summerhays and argues that he was not presented with the facts that it has
provided to the Court in its motion.
First, the Court finds that Case Energy had the opportunity to raise its § 1404(a) arguments
in its original motion. The Court could deny the Motion for Reconsideration on this basis alone.
However, given the discretionary authority of Rule 54(b), the Court has considered Case Energy’s
substantive arguments and the opposing arguments advanced by Padco and the Committee. After
due consideration, the Court finds that the Motion for Reconsideration should be denied.
While federal district courts have original jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases, acting within
that authority, the Judges of the Western District of Louisiana have “automatically referred” all
“[b]ankruptcy cases and proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or related to a case under
Title 11 of the United States Code” with limited exceptions which do not apply to a motion to
transfer venue. Standing Order 1.32 (emphasis added). Pursuant to this referral, “Bankruptcy Judges
may exercise full authority allowed them by law.” Id. As argued by Padco, a decision about the
division assignment of a bankruptcy case is a “core” matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A),
because it “concern[s] the administration of the estate.” Therefore, any motion for intradistrict, or
divisional, transfer is appropriately filed in the Bankruptcy Court where the debtor’s case is pending.
It is not the policy of any court in this District to “take back” certain motions from the general
referral to the Bankruptcy Court or to encourage the piecemeal filing of such motions in the district
court on a case by case basis. It serves neither the interests of justice nor judicial economy for the
district court to do so.2
Case Energy’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED without prejudice to Case Energy’s
right to file a motion to transfer in the pending bankruptcy case.
MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 13th day of January, 2017.
Notably, as in this case, it is not unusual for multiple business entities to have separate
bankruptcy cases. If the Court were to do as Case Energy asks and rule contrary to Bankruptcy
Judge Summerhays in this case, the same witnesses, debtor-principals, and creditors could be
involved in cases in the Lafayette and Shreveport divisions. That outcome would not serve the
interests of justice.
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