Theriot v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co et al
Filing
97
ORDER AND REASONS: The 25 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Defendants State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co, State Farm Life Insurance Co, State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Co, and State Farm General Insurance Co is DENIED. The 30 Motion to Expedite is DENIED AS MOOT. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan on 3/21/2019. (crt,Putch, A)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
KATHERYN H. THERIOT,
Plaintiff
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 17-1688
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.,
Defendants
SECTION: “E” (3)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, State Farm Life Insurance Company,
State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, and State Farm General Insurance
Company (“State Farm”).1 Plaintiff Katheryn Theriot opposes the motion.2 State Farm
filed a reply.3 For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.
FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Katheryn Theriot is the surviving spouse of John Patrick Theriot (“Mr.
Theriot”), who was an agent/broker for State Farm before his death on September 16,
2013.4 The parties do not dispute that Mr. Theriot and State Farm entered into an Agent’s
Agreement which provides for the payment of certain termination payments.5 According
to the Agent’s Agreement, Section IV Termination Payments became payable upon Mr.
Theriot’s death.6 Section V Extended Termination Payments begin in September of 2018,
the 61st month after Mr. Theriot’s death.7 It is undisputed that the Agent’s Agreement
R. Doc. 25.
R. Doc. 70.
3 R. Doc. 80.
4 R. Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 2, 6; R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 5.
5 R. Doc. 25-4 at ¶ 3; R. Doc. 70-11 at ¶ 3.
6 R. Doc. 25-4 at ¶ 3; R. Doc. 70-11 at ¶ 3.
7 R. Doc. 25-4 at ¶ 3; R. Doc. 70-11 at ¶ 3.
1
2
1
outlines the formula for calculating Section IV and Section V Termination Payments. 8 On
May 17, 2017, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals determined Plaintiff Katheryn
Theriot is the proper recipient of the Section IV and Section V Termination Payments.9
The parties do not dispute that State Farm has made several termination payments
under Section IV and Section V of the Agent’s Agreement.10 In 2013, State Farm paid the
Executor of Mr. Theriot’s succession one Section IV Termination Payment in the amount
of $14,471.27; the executor forwarded the payment to Plaintiff.11 State Farm made a
second payment in the amount of $650,000 to Plaintiff on October 10, 2017 for Section
IV Termination Payments.12 State Farm made a third Section IV payment on October 24,
2017 in the amount of $24,846.11.13 State Farm also made monthly Section IV
Termination Payments from October of 2017 to September of 2018.14 On October 31,
2o18, State Farm began paying Plaintiff monthly Section V Extended Termination
Payments in the amount of $6,144.98.15 State Farm will continue making these monthly
payments to Plaintiff for the remainder of her life.16
The parties dispute whether the payments made by State Farm constitute the total
amount of Section IV and Section V Termination Payments owed. State Farm contends it
has paid any and all amounts that accrued for Section IV Termination Payments and that
it will pay Plaintiff $6,144.98 per month for Section V Extended Termination Payments,
R. Doc. 25-4 at ¶ 3; R. Doc. 70-11 at ¶ 3.
R. Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 10; R. Doc. 55 at ¶ 10.
10 R. Doc. 25-4 at ¶¶ 4, 7; R. Doc. 70-11 at ¶¶ 4, 7.
11 R. Doc. 25-4 at ¶ 4; R. Doc. 70-11 at ¶ 4.
12 R. Doc. 25-4 at ¶ 4; R. Doc. 70-11 at ¶ 4.
13 R. Doc. 25-4 at ¶ 4; R. Doc. 70-11 at ¶ 4.
14 R. Doc. 25-4 at ¶¶ 5-6; R. Doc. 70-11 at ¶¶ 5-6.
15 R. Doc. 25-4 at ¶ 7; R. Doc. 70-11 at ¶ 7.
16 R. Doc. 25-4 at ¶ 7; R. Doc. 70-11 at ¶ 7.
8
9
2
beginning October 31, 2018.17 Plaintiff disputes whether the Section IV Termination
Payments and the monthly Section V Extended Termination Payments represent the full
amount owed because she is unable to verify the data used in the calculation of the
Termination Payments to confirm the proper amount was and will be paid.18
On November 20, 2017 Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit, seeking “all amounts
which were due to her under the Agent’s Agreement” and “all additional amounts owed
to her as the sole beneficiary of the Termination Payments owed by State Farm under the
Agent’s Agreement.”19 On May 8, 2018, State Farm filed the instant Motion for Summary
Judgment, arguing it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s claims for
Section IV and Section V Termination Payments.20
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.”21 “An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.” 22
When assessing whether a material factual dispute exists, the Court considers “all of the
evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or weighing
the evidence.”23 All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party.24
There is no genuine issue of material fact if, even viewing the evidence in the light most
R. Doc. 25-4 at ¶ 4, 8. At the time State Farm filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, it had not begun
to pay Section V Extended Termination Payments.
18 R. Doc. 70-11 at ¶ 5.
19 R. Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 22, 24.
20 R. Doc. 25.
21 FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).
22 DIRECTV, Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2005).
23 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2008); see
also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150–51 (2000).
24 Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
17
3
favorable to the non-moving party, no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party, thus entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.25
“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of
[the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden of
persuasion at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence which would
‘entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’” 26 If the
moving party fails to carry this burden, the motion must be denied. If the moving party
successfully carries this burden, the burden of production then shifts to the nonmoving
party to direct the Court’s attention to something in the pleadings or other evidence in the
record setting forth specific facts sufficient to establish that a genuine issue of material
fact does indeed exist.27
If the dispositive issue is one on which the non-moving party will bear the burden
of persuasion at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden of production by either (1)
submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the non-movant’s
claim, or (2) affirmatively demonstrating that there is no evidence in the record to
establish an essential element of the non-movant’s claim.28 If the movant fails to
affirmatively show the absence of evidence in the record, its motion for summary
judgment must be denied.29 If the moving party successfully carries this burden, the
Hibernia Nat. Bank v. Carner, 997 F.2d 94, 98 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Horwell
Energy, Inc., 969 F.2d 146, 147–48 (5th Cir. 1992)).
26 Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263–64 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Golden Rule Ins. Co.
v. Lease, 755 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D. Colo. 1991)).
27 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–24.
28 Id. at 331–32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
29 See id. at 332.
25
4
burden of production then shifts to the non-moving party to direct the Court’s attention
to something in the pleadings or other evidence in the record setting forth specific facts
sufficient to establish that a genuine issue of material fact does indeed exist.30 Thus, the
non-moving party may defeat a motion for summary judgment by “calling the Court’s
attention to supporting evidence already in the record that was overlooked or ignored by
the moving party.”31 “[U]nsubstantiated assertions are not competent summary judgment
evidence. The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence
in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or
her claim. ‘Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the
record in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment.’” 32
LAW AND ANALYSIS
First, State Farm argues it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for
Section IV Termination Payments because it has paid Plaintiff all of the Section IV
Termination Payments owed to her. State Farm provides the declaration of Kenneth
Large, a Business Analysist with State Farm.33 Mr. Large itemizes the dates and amounts
of the various Section IV Termination Payments made to Plaintiff and declares, “Plaintiff
Katheryn Theriot has been paid all Section IV Termination Payments that she is entitled
Id. at 322–24.
Id. at 332–33. The burden would then shift back to the movant to demonstrate the inadequacy of the
evidence relied upon by the non-movant. Once attacked, “the burden of production shifts to the nonmoving
party, who must either (1) rehabilitate the evidence attacked in the moving party’s papers, (2) produce
additional evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial as provided in Rule 56(e), or (3) submit
an affidavit explaining why further discovery is necessary as provided in Rule 56(f).” Id. at 332–33, 333 n.3.
32 Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324;
Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994) and quoting Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d
909, 915–16 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1992)).
33 R. Doc. 25-2 (Exhibit 1).
30
31
5
to under the Agent’s Agreement.”34 State Farm also provides correspondence with
Plaintiff’s counsel, listing the date and amount of each Section IV Termination Payment.35
State Farm has failed to demonstrate it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
on Plaintiff’s claim for Section IV Termination Payments. The unilateral declaration by
State Farm that it has paid Plaintiff all she is owed in Section IV Termination Payments,
without facts regarding the calculation of the payments to demonstrate the declaration is
correct, does not satisfy State Farm’s burden as the movant on summary judgment.36
“[U]nsubstantiated assertions are not competent summary judgment evidence.”37 State
Farm has not submitted affirmative evidence to negate Plaintiff’s claim that she is owed
additional amounts in Section IV Termination Payments.38 As a result, State Farm’s
Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for Section IV Termination payments
is denied.
Second, State Farm argues Plaintiff’s claim for Section IV Termination Payments
is extinguished through accord and satisfaction. Accord and satisfaction is an affirmative
defense applicable when there is an unliquidated or disputed claim between the debtor
and creditor, a tender by the debtor for less than the sum claimed, and acceptance of the
tender by negotiation of the check.39 Mutual consent and understanding of the
transaction are required for accord and satisfaction.40
R. Doc. 25-2 (Exhibit 1) at ¶ 129.
R. Doc. 25-2 (Exhibit 5).
36 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331–32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37 Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458.
38 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 3231-32.
39 Anesthesia East, Inc. v. Bares, 594 So.2d 1085, 1087 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1992).
40 Precision Drywall & Painting, Inc. v. Woodrow Wilson Constr. Co., 2003-0015 (La. App. 3 Cir.
4/30/03), 843 So. 2d 1286, 1289.
34
35
6
State Farm has not met its burden as the movant to “come forward with evidence
which would ‘entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial’”
with respect to the defense of accord and satisfaction. 41 State Farm’s statement of
uncontested material facts does not contain facts related to the mutual consent and
understanding of the parties with respect to the Section IV Termination Payments made
by State Farm to Plaintiff.42 State Farm has not identified portions of the record to support
its argument that Plaintiff’s claim for Section IV Termination Payments is extinguished
through accord and satisfaction. As a result, State Farm’s Motion for Summary Judgment
on the defense of accord and satisfaction to Plaintiff’s claim for Section IV Termination
Payments is denied.
Third, State Farm argues it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims
for Section V Extended Termination Payments because those payments were not due at
the time Plaintiff filed the instant suit and, as a result, Plaintiff’s Petition did not state a
claim for Section V Extended Termination Payments or put State Farm on notice of such
a claim. In the Petition, Plaintiff does not distinguish between Section IV and Section V
Termination Payments.43 Plaintiff requests an accounting of all Termination Payments
owed “from the date the first payment became due . . . through the present date, and into
the future” and seeks to recover “all additional Termination Payments owed as
determined by a complete accounting.”44 October 31, 2o18, State Farm began paying
Plaintiff monthly Section V Extended Termination Payments in the amount of
Celotex, 477 U.S. at at 332–33; Int’l Shortstop, Inc., 939 F.2d at 1263–64 (quoting Golden Rule Ins. Co.,
755 F. Supp. at 951).
42 R. Doc. 25-4.
43 R. Doc. 1-1.
44 R. Doc. 1-1 at 8.
41
7
$6,144.98.45 The parties dispute whether the amount of monthly Section V payments
constitutes the total amount owed.46 As a result, State Farm’s motion for summary
judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s claims for Section V Extended Termination Payments
is denied.
CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment47 filed by
Defendants State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, State Farm Life
Insurance Company, State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, and State Farm
General Insurance Company is DENIED.48
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 21st day of March, 2019.
________________________ _______
SUSIE MORGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
R. Doc. 25-2 at ¶ 124-28.
R. Doc. 70-11 at ¶ 3.
47 R. Doc. 25.
48 R. Doc. 30 is DENIED AS MOOT.
45
46
8
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?