Sanders v. Michaud Construction Group L L C
Filing
20
MEMORANDUM RULING: IT IS ORDERED that 12 Motion to Set Aside Default, Motion to file Responsive pleadings is GRANTED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patrick J Hanna on 7/19/2018. (crt,Chicola, C)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
TERRY C. SANDERS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:18-cv-00423
VERSUS
UNASSIGNED DISTRICT JUDGE
MICHAUD CONSTRUCTION
GROUP, LLC
MAGISTRATE JUDGE HANNA
MEMORANDUM RULING
Currently pending before the court is the motion to set aside default and permit
the filing of responsive pleadings (Rec. Doc. 12), which was filed by the defendant,
Michaud Construction Group, LLC. The motion is not opposed. Considering the
evidence, the law, and the arguments of the parties, and for the reasons fully
explained below, the motion is GRANTED.
Background
The plaintiff filed this lawsuit in March 2018, contending that his employer
failed to properly pay overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. The defendant agreed to waive service, and the
signed waiver of service form was filed in the record. (Rec. Doc. 7). When no
responsive pleadings were timely filed, however, the plaintiff filed a motion for entry
of default. (Rec. Doc. 8). On June 21, 2018, the Clerk of Court filed an entry of
default. (Rec. Doc. 9). The next day, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim and for more definite statement of claims. (Rec. Doc. 10).
But that motion was deemed deficient because the only permissible response to the
entry of default is a motion to set aside default. (Rec. Doc. 11). The defendant
promptly filed a motion to set aside default (Rec. Doc. 12), which is now before the
court for resolution.
Law and Analysis
Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs applications for
default judgment. It states that a default judgment is proper “[w]hen a party against
whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise
defend.”1 However, the Fifth Circuit generally disfavors default judgments and
favors resolving cases on their merits.2 Consequently, “[d]efault judgments are a
drastic remedy, not favored by the Federal Rules and resorted to by courts only in
extreme situations.”3 Even when a defendant is technically in default, a “party is not
entitled to a default judgment as a matter of right.”4 This principle, however, is
“counterbalanced by considerations of social goals, justice, and expediency, a
1
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
2
See, e.g., Lacy v. Sitel Corp., 227 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 2000); Rogers v. Hartford Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 933, 936 (5th Cir. 1999).
3
Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass'n, 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989).
4
Ganther v. Ingle, 75 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1996).
2
weighing process [that] lies largely within the domain of the trial judge's
discretion.”5
Therefore, the entry of a default judgment is committed to the
discretion of the district court.6
A party is entitled to the entry of default by the clerk of court if the opposing
party fails to plead or otherwise defend as required by law.7 This first step, entry of
a default, is a ministerial matter performed by the clerk, and is a prerequisite to a
later default judgment. A default judgment may be entered by the clerk of court if
the claim is for a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by calculation, but
in all other cases may be entered by the court on the motion of the plaintiff.8 In this
case, the plaintiff has not prayed for the recovery of a sum certain or a calculable
amount of damages nor has the plaintiff requested that a judgment of default be
entered against the defendants. However, the defendant has requested that the clerk's
entry of default be set aside.
5
Rogers v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 933, 936 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Pelican
Prod. Corp. v. Marino, 893 F.2d 1143, 1146 (10th Cir. 1990) (internal quotations omitted)).
6
Mason v. Lister, 562 F.2d 343, 345 (5th Cir. 1977).
7
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
8
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b).
3
An entry of default may be set aside if the party seeking relief shows good
cause.9 The decision lies within the sound discretion of the district court,10 and the
district court should consider whether the default was willful, whether setting it aside
would prejudice the adversary, and whether a meritorious defense is presented.11
These factors are neither talismanic nor exclusive, and other factors may be
considered,12 including whether “the defendant acted expeditiously to correct the
default.”13 Regardless of the specific factors considered, any doubt as to whether to
enter or set aside a default judgment must be resolved in favor of the defaulting
party.14 Furthermore, “the requirement of good cause has generally been interpreted
liberally,”15 and in this case, this Court finds that there is good cause to set aside the
clerk's entry of default.
9
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c).
10
United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 763 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1985).
11
Lacy v. Sitel Corp., 227 F.3d at 292; CJC Holdings, Inc. v. Wright & Lato, Inc., 979 F.2d
60, 64 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 763 F.2d at 183.
12
CJC Holdings, Inc. v. Wright & Lato, Inc., 979 F.2d at 64; In re Dierschke, 975 F.2d 181,
184 (5 Cir. 1992).
th
13
Lacy v. Sitel Corp., 227 F.3d at 292; In re Dierschke, 975 F.2d at 184.
14
Chavers v. Hall, 488 Fed. App’x 874, 878-79 (5th Cir. 2012).
15
Effjohn Int'l Cruise Holdings, Inc. v. A&L Sales, Inc., 346 F.3d 552, 563 (5th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Amberg v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 934 F.2d 681, 685 (5th Cir. 1991)).
4
The defendant candidly admitted that the failure to timely respond to the
complaint was due to an inadvertent error in calendaring the date on which
responsive pleadings were due. (Rec. Doc. 12-1 at 4). Accordingly, the default was
not willful or intentionally designed to delay the proceedings. At this early stage in
the litigation, setting the default aside will not prejudice the plaintiff. This is
particularly true since the defendant has potentially meritorious defenses.
In
particular, the defendant has suggested that it actually was not the plaintiff’s
employer at relevant times, and the plaintiff has filed a motion seeking to amend his
complaint to identify another entity as the plaintiff’s employer and the proper
defendant in the lawsuit. Additionally, it is clear that the defendant meant to respond
to the complaint in a timely fashion, as evidenced by the filing of a motion to dismiss
on the day that the defendant erroneous thought to be the day when responsive
pleadings were due. Further, the defendant acted expeditiously to cure the default,
filing the motion to set aside the entry of default just five days after default was
entered. These factors weigh heavily and unanimously in favor of setting aside the
clerk’s entry of default.
Conclusion
Having found that all relevant factors favor setting aside the clerk of court’s
entry of default,
5
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant’s motion to set aside default and permit
the filing of responsive pleadings (Rec. Doc. 12) is GRANTED.
Signed at Lafayette, Louisiana, this 19th day of July 2018
____________________________________
PATRICK J. HANNA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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