Rideau v. Lafayette Health Ventures Inc et al

Filing 28

MEMORANDUM RULING denying 10 Motion to Strike Certain Allegation in Plaintiff Complaint. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patrick J Hanna on 8/2/2018. (crt,Williams, L)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
ALECIA M. RIDEAU, M.D.

CASE NO. 6:18-CV-00473

VERSUS

JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

LAFAYETTE HEALTH VENTURES,
INC., LAFAYETTE GENERAL
HEALTH SYSTEM, INC. AND AL
PATIN

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HANNA

MEMORANDUM RULING
Currently pending before the court is the motion to strike certain allegations
of the plaintiff’s complaint, which was filed by the defendants, Lafayette Health
Ventures, Inc., Lafayette General Health System Inc., and Al Patin. (Rec. Doc. 10).
The motion is opposed. (Rec. Doc. 16). Considering the evidence, the law, and the
arguments of the parties, and for the reasons fully explained below, the motion is
DENIED.
Background
The plaintiff’s complaint asserted a claim under the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. According to the complaint,
Dr. Alecia M. Rideau is a radiologist whose specialty is interpreting breast imaging.
She was allegedly hired to work at the Breast Center at Lafayette General Medical
Center in Lafayette, Louisiana, in December 2014.

In February 2016, Dr. Rideau was diagnosed with breast cancer. She took
eight weeks of the FMLA leave from March 28, 2016 to May 23, 2016 to
accommodate the first stage of her cancer treatment. Upon her return from leave,
she requested an additional two weeks of leave in the fall of 2016 to have the second
stage of her breast cancer treatment – reconstruction of her breasts following
bilateral mastectomy. Dr. Rideau claims that, although she was entitled to another
four weeks of FMLA leave in 2016, her direct supervisor, defendant Al Patin, told
her that reconstructive surgery was a cosmetic procedure that was not medically
necessary, denied her request for leave, and advised that she would have to wait until
2017 to schedule the reconstruction. Mr. Patin also allegedly told Dr. Rideau that
he would require her to find a temporary replacement to cover her duties before
scheduling her leave. Mr. Patin also allegedly informed Dr. Rideau that her leave in
the spring of 2016 had “inconvenienced the staff” and “was distressing” to the other
Breast Center radiologist.
In August 2016, Dr. Rideau requested two weeks of medical leave in March
2017 for breast reconstructive surgery. Approximately a week later, Mr. Patin
allegedly summoned Dr. Rideau to his office to discuss her FMLA request. He
allegedly fired her instead.
In this lawsuit, Dr. Rideau seeks to recover for the defendants’ alleged
violation of the FMLA. She claims that the defendants both interfered with her
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FMLA rights by illegally denying her FMLA leave to which she was entitled and
also retaliated against her for requesting FMLA leave, treating her less favorably
than employees who did not request FMLA leave, and ultimately terminating her
employment.
Law and Analysis
The defendants filed the instant motion, seeking to strike certain allegations
set forth in Dr. Rideau’s complaint, claiming that they are “immaterial, impertinent,
or scandalous” (Rec. Doc. 10 at 1; Rec. Doc. 10-1 at 2) and have no bearing on the
plaintiff’s claims. Specifically, the defendants moved to strike Paragraph 27 of the
complaint, in its entirety, which reads as follows:
Since 1998, health insurers have been required by federal law to
provide coverage for reconstructive surgery following mastectomies.
See the Women’s Health and Cancer Rights Act of 1998 (“WHCRA”),
29 U.S.C. § 1185b. At the time the WHCRA was under consideration,
insurers quite commonly refused to pay for breast reconstruction after
mastectomy on the ground that it was a “cosmetic” procedure and was
“not medically necessary.” 144 Cong. Rec. S. 4644, 4650 (1998). The
WHCRA remedied this problem.
The defendants also moved to strike the portion of Paragraph 29 of the complaint,
which is underlined below:
Patin informed Plaintiff that he considered reconstructive breast
surgery to be a cosmetic and elective procedure; this statement
contradicts federal law under the WHCRA. For twenty (20) years, it
has been well established in the healthcare field that reconstructive
breast surgery is not considered a cosmetic, medically unnecessary
procedure. Patin is a registered nurse and a corporate officer of LHV
and LGHS, and was well aware or should have been well-aware of this
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fact. Patin’s statement was an attempt to dissuade and restrain Plaintiff
from asserting her federally protected rights to FMLA leave for a
serious health condition
Motions to strike are governed by Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which states that “[t]he court may strike from a pleading an insufficient
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Deciding
whether to strike all or a portion of a pleading lies within the court's discretion. 1 A
motion to strike under Rule 12(f) “is a drastic remedy to be resorted to only when
required for the purposes of justice.”2 Accordingly, Rule 12(f) motions to strike are
viewed with disfavor, and are infrequently granted.3
Immaterial matter is that which has no essential or important relationship to
the claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded.4 Immateriality is established by
showing that the challenged allegations “can have no possible bearing upon the

1

In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, MDL Docket No. 248, 600 F.2d 1148, 1168–69
(5th Cir. 1979) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1382 at 807
(1969)). See, also, Cambridge Toxicology Group, Inc. v. Exnicios, 495 F.3d 169, 178 (5th Cir.
2007).
2

Augustus v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Escambia County, Fla., 306 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir.
1962) (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 201 F.2d 819, 822 (6th Cir.
1953)).
3

Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1057
(5th Cir. 1982); C. Wright & A. Miller, 5C Fed. Prac. & Proc. 3d § 1380.
4

C. Wright & A. Miller, 5C Fed. Prac. & Proc. 3d § 1382.

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subject matter of the litigation.”5 Impertinent matter consists of statements that do
not pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question; while scandalous matter
is that which improperly casts a derogatory light on someone, most typically on a
party to the action.6 “The granting of a motion to strike scandalous matter is aimed,
in part, at avoiding prejudice to a party by preventing a jury from seeing the offensive
matter or giving the allegations any other unnecessary notoriety inasmuch as, once
filed, pleadings generally are public documents and become generally available.”7
Therefore, a motion to strike should be granted only when “the allegations are
prejudicial to the defendant or immaterial to the lawsuit.”8
Here, despite expressly characterizing the language sought to be stricken from
the complaint as “immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous,” the defendants actually
claimed that the references to the WHCRA in the plaintiff’s complaint are
“immaterial” and “impertinent;” they did not argue that the complaint’s references
to the WHCRA are either redundant or scandalous. Therefore, to prevail on their
motion, the defendants must show that the text sought to be stricken has no possible

5

Bayou Fleet Partnership, LLC v. St. Charles Parish, 2011 WL 2680686, at *5 (E.D. La.
July 8, 2011).
6

C. Wright & A. Miller, 5C Fed. Prac. & Proc. 3d § 1382.

7

C. Wright & A. Miller, 5C Fed. Prac. & Proc. 3d § 1382.

8

Eubanks v. Jordan, 2006 WL 1476111, at *1 (W.D. La. May 26, 2006).

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bearing upon the subject matter of the litigation or is not necessary to the resolution
of the issues presented by the complaint.
The defendants argued that the WHCRA solely relates to health insurers who
provide insurance coverage to those who elect breast reconstruction following
mastectomy and “bears absolutely no relationship to Plaintiff’s allegations under the
FMLA.” (Rec. Doc. 10-1 at 2). They further argued that the WHCRA does not
“declare[] that reconstructive breast surgery is medically necessary” and “is nothing
more than an insurance coverage mandate.” (Rec. Doc. 10-1 at 3).
It is obvious from the face of the complaint that Dr. Rideau did not allege that
the defendants are insurers or that they are liable to her under the WHCRA.
Furthermore, the plaintiff argued that the references to the WHCRA in the complaint
are material and pertinent because they relate to the liquidated damages provision of
the FMLA. Under 29 U.S.C. § 2617, an employer who violates the FMLA “shall be
liable” for “an additional amount as liquidated damages” unless the employer
“proves to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission which violated [the
FMLA] was in good faith and that the employer had reasonable grounds for
believing that the act or omission was not a violation.” Liquidated damages under
the FMLA double a plaintiff’s recovery of wages, salary, employment benefits, and
interest9 and consequently are a significant part of the damages sought to be

9

See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(A)(1)(A)(iii).

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recovered in this – or any – FMLA lawsuit. The employer has the burden of
establishing that a failure to obey the FMLA was in good faith,10 and there is a strong
presumption in favor of liquidated damages.11 If it is ultimately proven that Mr.
Patin actually did tell Dr. Rideau that he believed her request for additional FMLA
leave was for a procedure that was cosmetic in nature and not medically necessary,
then his knowledge of the WHCRA will be an important factual issue. Therefore,
the cited references to the WHCRA should not be stricken from the complaint.
Dr. Rideau’s reference to the WHCRA is not immaterial or impertinent under
Rule 12(f) because the good faith of the defendants in denying FMLA leave to the
plaintiff and terminating her employment after she requested FMLA leave will be
central issues in this case. The defendants are healthcare providers who frequently
deal with insurance companies, they are likely familiar with the WHCRA, and they
might be expected to be aware of what procedures – particularly those related to
breast cancer – are considered to be medically necessary and what procedures are
considered to be purely cosmetic in nature. The defendants’ familiarity with the
WHCRA might ultimately be determined to be a factor in evaluating their good faith
in responding to the plaintiff’s requests for FMLA leave.

10

Crain v. Schlumberger Technology Co., No. 15-1777, 2017 WL 713673, at *3 (E.D. La.
Feb. 23, 2017) (citing Nero v. Industrial Molding Corp., 167 F.3d 921, 928 (5th Cir. 1999)).
11

Nero v. Industrial Molding Corp., 167 F.3d at 929.

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Accordingly, since the portions of the complaint sought to be stricken are not
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous, there is no basis for striking them
under Rule 12(f).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to strike certain allegations in
plaintiff’s complaint (Rec. Doc. 10) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that oral argument on the motion to strikes,
which was previously scheduled for August 23, 2018, is CANCELLED.
Signed at Lafayette, Louisiana, this 2nd day of August 2018.

___________________________________
PATRICK J. HANNA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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