Sylvester et al v. Talos Energy Offshore L L C et al

Filing 108

MEMORANDUM RULING re 56 DAUBERT MOTION to Strike Opinions of Dr. Chad Domangue filed by Joseph Sylvester, Melinda Sylvester. Signed by Judge S Maurice Hicks, Jr on 9/25/2024. (crt,Keifer, K)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
JOSEPH SYLVESTER, ET AL

CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-5192

VERSUS

JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

TALOS ENERGY OFFSHORE, LLC,
ET AL

MAGISTRATE JUDGE WHITEHURST

MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is a Motion to Exclude/Motion to Strike Opinions of Dr. Chad
Domangue (“Dr. Domangue”) filed by Plaintiffs Joseph Sylvester (“Mr. Sylvester”) and
Melinda Sylvester (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). See Record Document 56. More specifically,
Plaintiffs seek an order prohibiting Dr. Domangue from offering any opinions or testimony
at the trial of this matter, prohibiting all parties and witnesses from making any reference
to him, his report, and his opinions at trial, and/or striking certain opinions of Dr.
Domangue as they relate to his opinions on vascular issues. See id. at 2. Plaintiffs
contend that Dr. Domangue’s opinions exceed the scope of his expertise as he has no
experience or expertise in vascular surgery and/or diagnosing and treating vascular
conditions. See id. Defendants Talos Energy Offshore, LLC, Talos Energy, LLC, Talos
ERT, LLC, Rodi Marine, L.L.C., Rodi Marine Management, LLC, Wood Group PSN Inc.,
and XYZ Insurance Company (collectively, “Defendants”) oppose the motion. See Record
Document 71. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ motion (Record Document 56)
is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This is a maritime negligence case that arises out of an accident involving Mr.
Sylvester that allegedly occurred on September 23, 2021. In 2021, Talos was the operator

of the South Marsh Island 130 (“SMI 130”) field, located in the Gulf of Mexico on the Outer
Continental Shelf. See Record Document 53-3 (Declaration of Lonnie Smith) at 1. Talos’s
SMI 130 field consists of several oil and gas production platforms. See id.
Mr. Sylvester was employed as a crane mechanic by Gulf Crane Services, Inc.
("GCS"). See Record Document 1 at 3; Record Document 55-4 (Declaration of Shane
Theunissen) at 2. Between April 2021 and October 2021, Mr. Sylvester was assigned to
work for Talos on Talos's offshore production platforms in SM1130 field. See Record
Document 55-5 (Deposition of Joseph Sylvester) at 7. On the date of the accident, Mr.
Sylvester claims that he sustained personal injuries at approximately 9:30 a.m. while
being transferred in a personnel basket from the M/V MISS PEGGY ANN ("the vessel")
to Tabs's SMI 130 platform. See Record Document 1 at 2-6. He claims that when the
crane operator, Brian Spears ("Spears"), lifted him in the basket, the basket swung rapidly
causing it and Mr. Sylvester to "slam violently" into a Connex box that was on the deck of
the vessel. Id. Mr. Sylvester contends that the negligent operation of the SMI 130 platform
crane by Spears caused or contributed to his injuries. See Record Document 1 at 11.
As a result of the incident, Mr. Sylvester sustained serious injuries, including
injuries to his hip, back, and legs. See Record Document 56-1 at 4. He suffered severe
pain and swilling in his hip, thigh and leg and was diagnosed with a blood clot. See id. In
October 2021, Mr. Sylvester was diagnosed with deep vein thrombosis (“DVT”). See
Record Document 71 at 2. He underwent a surgical procedure to remove those blood
clots and was placed on two powerful blood thinners to prevent the recurrence of blood
clots. See id. Thereafter, he complained of low back pain. See id. In June 2022, he
underwent a lumbar fusion to relieve this pain. See id. Despite undergoing these two

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surgeries and taking medication, his leg pain got worse. See id. In February 2023, Mr.
Sylvester underwent an ultrasound which showed new blood clots in his left leg that
caused swelling and severe pain. See id.
Defendants retained Dr. Domangue as an expert in the fields of neurology and
pain management. See Record Document 56-1 at 5. At the request of Defendants, Dr.
Domangue was asked to conduct a physical examination of Mr. Sylvester, review his
medical records, and determine why, after all the treatment he has received, he continues
to suffer from severe leg pain. See Record Document 71 at 2. After conducting his
examination, Dr. Domangue stated, “‘[i]t is my medical opinion that all of his [Joseph
Sylvester’s] symptoms are related to his vascular abnormalities and not his lumbar
spine.’” See Record Document 56-1 at 6 (Dr. Domangue report, p. 44; Exhibit 3). Plaintiffs
contend that this statement, along with others, exceeds the scope of Dr. Domangue’s
expertise. See id. at 8.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I.

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert standard.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. Rule

702 provides:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the
proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not that:
(a)

the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b)

the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c)

the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods; and
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(d)

the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the
principles and methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702. Rule 702 “assign[s] to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an
expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.
Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles will satisfy those demands.”
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2799
(1993). The Daubert holding provided an illustrative list of factors that courts may use
when evaluating the reliability of expert testimony. See id. at 592–594. These factors
include whether the expert’s theory or technique can be or has been tested, whether it
has been subjected to peer review, whether it has a known or potential rate of error or
standards controlling its operation, and whether it is generally accepted in the relevant
scientific community. See id. at 593–594. “In short, expert testimony is admissible only if
it is both relevant and reliable.” Pipitone v. Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 244 (5th Cir.
2002). Thus, the Daubert factors should be applied with flexibility and the question of
whether an expert's testimony is reliable is ultimately a fact-specific inquiry. See Kumho
Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 138, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1170 (1999); Burleson
v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 393 F.3d 577, 584 (5th Cir. 2004).
Though the trial court must fulfill its role as gatekeeper in ensuring that all admitted
expert testimony is both reliable and relevant, “the trial court’s role as gatekeeper is not
intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary system.” U.S. v. 14.38 Acres of
Land, 80 F.3d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1996). Thus, “[t]he rejection of expert testimony is the
exception rather than the rule.” Fed. R. Evid. 702, advisory committee’s note (2000).
“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction

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on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but
admissible evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. The proponent of an expert’s testimony
bears the burden of proving that it meets the requirements of Rule 702. See Moore v.
Ashland Chem., Inc., 151 F. 3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1998). Whether these elements are
met is a preliminary question for the district court to decide under Federal Rule of
Evidence 104(a).
II.

Analysis.
Plaintiffs make several arguments under Daubert and Rule 702. See Record

Document 56-1 at 11–14. Dr. Domangue’s vascular opinions are unreliable for the
following reasons: (1) they are unsupported by any specialized knowledge that will help
the trier of fact understand the evidence or an issue; (2) they are not based on sufficient
facts or data; (3) they are unsupported by reliable principles and methodology; and (4)
there is no evidence to suggest his opinions satisfy the reliability factor. See id. at 11–13.
Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Domangue’s most glaring failure in this regard is that he failed to
consider the opinions of Dr. Christopher LaGraize (“Dr. LaGraize”), the Defendants’
vascular expert. See id. at 13.
In the opposition, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs misunderstand the fields of
neurology and pain management and the sound methodology Dr. Domangue used in
forming his opinions in this case. See Record Document 71 at 2. Physicians, like Dr.
Domangue, who specialize in neurology and pain management are routinely called upon
to create a differential diagnosis to determine if a patient’s vascular conditions are the
cause of, or a contributor to, their complaints of pain, physical limitations, or other
symptoms. See id. at 3.

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In Cedar Lodge Plantation, L.L.C. v. CSHV Fairway View I, L.L.C., the Fifth Circuit
held that “‘[a] lack of specialization should generally go to the weight of the evidence
rather than its admissibility.’” 753 Fed. Appx. 191, 195 (5th Cir. 2018). Additionally, “‘an
expert witness is not strictly confined to his area of practice, but may testify concerning
related applications.’” Id. In Cedar Lodge, the environmental expert had expertise “related
to the resolution of hazardous waste matters for commercial and industrial facilities, rather
than sewage systems for apartment complexes or multi-family residential communities.”
Id. Nevertheless, the expert’s testimony on areas he was not specialized in did not “render
his testimony unreliable.” Id. at 196.
Similarly, in Parker v. John W. Stone Oil Distributors, L.L.C., the plaintiff filed a
motion to exclude an expert from testifying about material that exceeded the scope of his
expertise and was irrelevant. No. 18-3666, 2019 WL 5212285, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 16,
2019). The expert was an ENT who gave a causation opinion about whether multiple
sclerosis caused the plaintiff’s symptoms. See id. The district court denied the plaintiff’s
motion to exclude the expert’s testimony. See id. The court reasoned that “it seems
axiomatic that an attending physician would consider alternate explanations for a patient’s
symptoms.” Id. Additionally, “[c]ourts in and around this district have sometimes allowed
the testimony of medical experts to reference areas outside of one’s particular expertise.”
Id. See, e.g., Harmeyer v. Dohm, No. 06-4220, 2007 WL 4294667, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 7,
2007) (allowing a neurosurgeon to testify as to knee pain); Bowie v. Am. Home Assur.
Co., No. 05-1381-JJB, 2009 WL 3254500, at *2 (M.D. La. June 3, 2009) (allowing a spine
surgeon to testify “on all areas of orthopedics” including knee injuries).

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In the instant case, Dr. Domangue is an expert specialized in the fields of neurology
and pain management. However, as it relates to a causation opinion to consider alternate
explanations for Mr. Sylvester’s symptoms, Dr. Domangue’s opinion on vascular issues
being a potential causal factor in the prolonged pain is proper. It makes sense for an
attending physician, like Dr. Domangue, to consider a vascular abnormality explaining
Mr. Sylvester’s ongoing symptoms and swelling. See Record Document 71 at 11.
Plaintiffs maintain that Dr. Domangue is not qualified to render an opinion on
vascular issues and has no medical or factual support for his opinions. See Record
Document 56-1 at 6. In In re Vioxx Products Liab. Litig., the defendant’s expert in prostrate
pathology was able to opine in the case, which involved cardiovascular pathology. 401 F.
Supp. 2d 565, 576 (E.D. La. 2005). The district court found that the expert had “numerous
credentials and experience in the field of pathology.” Id. Furthermore, “[t]he [p]laintiff’s
attack [was] fodder for cross-examination, not grounds to exclude [the expert] from
testifying at all.” Id. The expert’s methodology involved reviewing autopsy slides, medical
records, expert reports, and depositions. Id. This methodology, combined with the
expert’s training and experience, rendered the expert qualified to opine in the case. Id.
In the instant case, Plaintiffs assert that Dr. Domangue is not qualified to give an
opinion regarding vascular issues. See Record Document 71 at 15. Defendants argue,
however, that Dr. Domangue is well qualified to evaluate whether vascular conditions are
causing symptoms, pain, or limitations to his patients. See id. at 8. The Court agrees. Dr.
Domangue participated in an internship program at the Medical Center of South Carolina,
Charleston, South Carolina. See id. The first year of the program was internal medicine,
which included training in vascular issues. See id. Additionally, from 2005 to 2007, Dr.

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Domangue was a resident in the neurology department at the University of Virginia, where
he participated in and was trained in the stroke program. See id. In this program, he
received specific training in the diagnosis and care of vascular conditions. See id.
Moreover, in his report, Dr. Domangue reviewed Mr. Sylvester’s medical records,
including imaging studies and narrative records. See id. at 10. Dr. Domangue went
through Mr. Sylvester’s physical examination, and then based upon a differential
diagnosis, offered his opinions. See id. Similar to the expert in In re Vioxx Products, Dr.
Domangue has training involving vascular conditions, as it relates to neurology and pain
management and has reviewed a variety of materials before preparing his opinion.
Dr. Domangue’s opinions are based upon the differential diagnosis he created,
which Defendants argue is a reliable methodology. A differential diagnosis “is ‘a patientspecific process of elimination that medical practitioners use to identity the “most likely”
cause of a set of signs and symptoms from a list of possible causes.’” Pick v. Am. Med.
Sys., Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1151, 1162–63 (E.D. La. 1997) (quoting Hall v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1413 (D. Or. 1996)). When conducting a differential diagnosis,
“[t]he physician should consider the history of the patient’s symptoms, review his outside
records, conduct a physical examination and laboratory testing, then evaluate all the
possible causes of the condition, based on his medical training and available information,
ultimately selecting a diagnosis which best fits all the findings.” Id. at 1163. In Pick, the
district court stated that it, along with several other courts, hold that a differential diagnosis
meets Daubert. Id.
However, the Fifth Circuit “has cautioned that ‘the results of a differential diagnosis
are far from reliable per se.’” Sims v. Kia Motors of Am., Inc., 839 F. 3d 393, 401 (5th Cir.

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2016). This holding does not mean that a differential diagnosis can never meet the
Daubert standard; rather, “the district court has broad discretion to make the fact-specific
inquiry in a given case as to whether such an approach is sufficiently reliable, especially
in the absence of evidence ‘ruling in’ an expert’s conclusion.” Id. at 402. Additionally, if an
expert is conducting a differential diagnosis to rule out certain causes of the injury, he
must additionally rule in the suspected cause using scientifically valid methodology. Harris
v. Stryker Spine, 39 F. Supp. 3d 846, 853 (S.D. Miss. 2014); see Sims v. Kia Motors of
Am., Inc., 839 F. 3d at 402–03.
In the instant case, Dr. Domangue explains that as a neurologist and pain
management physician, he is called upon to evaluate the presence and effect of vascular
conditions on his patients and determine whether those conditions are the cause of, or a
contributor to, a patient’s complaints of pain, physical limitations, or other symptoms. See
Record Document 71 at 14–15. Dr. Domangue does not suggest treatment for Mr.
Sylvester’s blood cloths; rather, he only diagnoses the worsening venous issues as the
source of the pain. See id. at 15. After starting with a physical examination, medical
history, and imaging studies, Dr. Domangue ruled out a lumbar injury as a cause of the
clotting because it did not fit the data. See id. at 16. Therefore, Dr. Domangue ruled in
vascular issues as being a potential cause of Mr. Sylvester’s clotting, which is proper
under case law. See id.
Another argument by Plaintiffs asserts that Defendants’ vascular expert, Dr.
LaGraize, put forth an opinion that completely contradicts Dr. Domangue’s opinions on
the vascular issues. See Record Document 56-1 at 5. However, Dr. LaGraize was not
asked to perform a physical examination of Mr. Sylvester, review the extensive number

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of records, and create a differential diagnosis explaining the source of the continued pain.
See Record Document 71 at 21. Dr. LaGraize and Dr. Domangue were asked to give
separate opinions, so their opinions should not be compared against one another.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, this Court finds that there are no sufficient
grounds to exclude or strike Dr. Domangue’s opinions. Plaintiffs’ attack is better suited
during cross-examination. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude/Motion to Strike
Opinions of Dr. Chad Domangue (Record Document 56) shall be DENIED.
An order consistent with this Memorandum Ruling shall issue herewith.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 25th day of September,
2024.

________________________________
United States District Judge

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