WATSON v. EASTERN MAINE MEDICAL CENTER
Filing
150
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 140 Motion to Amend Judgment to Include Award of Prejudgment Interest By JUDGE JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR. (jlg)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
LORRAINE MORIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
EASTERN MAINE MEDICAL
CENTER,
Defendant.
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1:09-cv-00258-JAW
ORDER ON MOTION TO AMEND JUDGEMENT TO INCLUDE AWARD OF
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
Following a jury verdict granting her compensatory and punitive damages in
this Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. §
1395dd, claim, Lorraine Morin moves for prejudgment interest pursuant to 14
M.R.S. § 1602-B. The Court grants Ms. Morin‟s motion only as to compensatory
damages.
I.
BACKGROUND
A.
Procedural History
On October 20, 2010, after a three day trial, the jury issued a verdict finding
that Eastern Maine Medical Center (EMMC) had violated EMTALA and that its
EMTALA violation had directly caused Lorraine Morin personal harm.
Form (Docket # 118).
Verdict
The jury awarded Ms. Morin compensatory damages of
$50,000 and punitive damages of $150,000. Id. On October 21, 2010, the Court
reduced the verdict to Judgment. J. (Docket # 120).
On October 21, 2010, Ms. Morin moved for an Order granting equitable relief
against EMMC. Pl.’s Mot. for Equitable Relief Followed by Entry of Final J. Under
Rule 54(b) (Docket # 121) (Pl.’s Mot. for Equitable Relief). On November 16, 2010,
EMMC renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law and for new trial. Def.
E. Me. Med. Ctr.’s Renewed Mot for J. as a Matter of Law and Mot. for New Trial
(Docket # 127) (Def.’s Mot. for New Trial). The parties filed timely response and
reply briefs to the respective motions. Def. E. Me. Med. Ctr.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot for
Equitable Relief Followed by Entry of Final J. Under Rule 54(b) (Docket # 126); Pl.’s
Reply Mem. in Support of her Mot. for Equitable Relief (Docket # 128); Pl.’s Mem. in
Opp’n. to Def.’s Renewed Mot for J. as a Matter of Law and Mot. for New Trial
(Docket # 133); Def. E. Me. Med. Ctr.’s Reply Mem. in Further Support of its
Renewed Mot. for J. as a Matter of Law and Mot. for a New Trial (Docket # 134).
On March 25, 2011, the Court issued an order denying Ms. Morin‟s motion for
equitable relief and denying EMMC‟s motions for judgment as a matter of law and
for new trial. Order on Mot. for Order Granting Equitable Relief and on Renewed
Mot. for J. as a Matter of Law (Docket # 138) (Order). On March 28, 2011, the Court
entered an amended judgment reflecting its denial of Ms. Morin‟s motion for
equitable relief. Am. J. (Docket # 139).
On March 31, 2011, Ms. Morin moved to amend the Court‟s March 28, 2011
judgment to include an award of prejudgment interest.
Pl.’s Mot to Am. J. to
Include Award of Pre-judgment Interest (Docket # 140) (Pl.’s Mot.). On April 12,
2011, EMMC responded. Def. E. Me. Med. Ctr.’s Opp’n. to Pl.’s Mot. to Am. J. to
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Include Award of Prejudgment Interest (Docket # 142) (Def.’s Opp’n.). On April 19,
2011, Ms. Morin replied to EMMC‟s response. Pl.’s Reply Mem. in Support of her
Mot. to Am. J. to Include Award of Pre-judgment Interest (Docket # 143) (Pl.’s
Reply).
B.
The Parties’ Positions
Ms. Morin observes that EMTALA makes available to prevailing plaintiffs
“those damages available for personal injury under the law of the State in which the
hospital is located.” Pl.’s Mot. at 1 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A)). As such,
she contends that Maine‟s prejudgment interest statute, 14 M.R.S. § 1602-B, applies
to her damage award and that interest should accrue from the date she filed the
Complaint to the date of the Judgment. Id.
EMMC acknowledges that Maine awards prejudgment interest as a matter of
right to litigants who have properly reserved that right. Id. at 1. However, it
contends that Ms. Morin is not entitled to prejudgment interest because her motion
is not timely. Def.’s Opp’n. at 1-4. It notes that Ms. Morin brought her motion
pursuant to Rule 59(e) and asserts that such motions must be filed within twentyeight days of judgment. Id. at 1 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e)). More specifically, it
contends that a Rule 59(e) motion must be filed within twenty-eight days of the
judgment it seeks to amend. Id. at 2-3. EMMC asserts that Ms. Morin‟s motion
seeks to amend the Court‟s October 21, 2010 judgment rather than its March 28,
2011 judgment. Id. It notes that Ms. Morin‟s motion deals only with her damage
award, which was the subject of the October 21 judgment and unaltered by the
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March 28 judgment. Id. Because her motion was filed on March 31, 2011, EMMC
argues that it was filed more than twenty-eight days after the October 21, 2010
judgment it seeks to alter and is thus untimely. Id.
EMMC argues that if any prejudgment interest is assessed, it should not be
assessed on the jury‟s punitive damage award. Id. at 4-5. It cites caselaw for the
proposition that prejudgment interest cannot be assessed on punitive damages
because prejudgment interest is itself a form of compensatory damages.
Id.
Notably, it points out that the Court declined to assess prejudgment interest on
punitive damages. Id. (citing Harding v. Cianbro Corp., 473 F. Supp. 2d 89, 100,
100 n.16 (D. Me. 2007)). It contends that “interest on punitive damages does not
make the Plaintiff whole; it only serves to further pile on EMMC.” Id. at 5.
Ms. Morin replies that her motion was timely. She contends that the twentyeight day period contemplated by Rule 59(e) runs from the entry of a final
judgment, as opposed to an interim judgment. Pl.’s Reply at 2. She asserts that the
Court‟s October 21, 2010 judgment was an interim judgment because it did not
resolve her request for equitable relief. Id. at 3. Instead, she submits that there
was no final judgment until March 28, 2011, when the Court resolved her request
for equitable relief.
Id. at 4. She notes that her motion was filed well within
twenty-eight days of that date.
She further argues that prejudgment interest should be assessed on her
punitive damage award. Id. at 4. She observes that the case relied upon by EMMC
for the proposition that the Court has declined to assess prejudgment interest on
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punitive damages did not deal with Maine‟s prejudgment interest statute. Id. She
cites two cases in which she says the Maine Law Court upheld trial courts‟
assessments of prejudgment interest on punitive damage awards. Id. at 5.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Timeliness
Ms. Morin‟s motion for prejudgment interest is timely. Ms. Morin brought
her motion for prejudgment interest pursuant to Rule 59(e), the proper vehicle for
such a motion. See FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e); Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S.
169, 176 (1989) (holding “that a postjudgment motion for discretionary prejudgment
interest involves the kind of reconsideration of matters encompassed within the
merits of a judgment to which Rule 59(e) was intended to apply”); Crowe v. Bolduc,
365 F.3d 86, 90-93 (1st Cir. 2004) (extending Osterneck‟s holding to post-judgment
motions for mandatory prejudgment interest). A rule 59(e) motion must be filed no
later than twenty-eight days after the entry of the judgment. The parties dispute
the meaning of “judgment” for the purpose of triggering the twenty-eight day
period.
Rule 54(a) defines “judgment” for purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and courts have applied that definition to Rule 59(e). See FED. R. CIV. P.
54(a). 12 Martin H. Redish, MOORE‟S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 59.31[5] (3d ed. 2011);
United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2000) (“A judgment is defined
by Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as „any order from which an
appeal lies,‟ in other words, a final order”). Rule 54(a) defines “judgment” as “a
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decree and any order from which an appeal lies.” Consistent with this definition,
the First Circuit held that Rule 59(e)‟s twenty-eight day time limit does not run
until a court has issued an appealable judgment. Nieves-Luciano v. HernandezTorres, 397 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Rule 59(e) does not apply to motions for
reconsideration of interlocutory orders from which no immediate appeal may be
taken”); Roque-Rodriguez v. Lema Moya, 926 F.2d 103, 106-07 (1st Cir. 1991)
(holding that “[t]he march of time began” for the period in which to file a Rule 59(e)
motion on the date the court entered an order that was “immediately appealable”).
With limited exceptions not applicable here,1 appellate review is available
only for “final decisions.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Seven
Provinces Ins. Co., 217 F.3d 33, 36-37 (1st Cir. 2000). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
“a party cannot initiate an appeal until a final decision has been rendered—that is,
one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do
but execute the judgment.” Commercial Union, 217 F.3d at 37 (quoting Budinich v.
Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The First Circuit held that a decision is not final for purposes of § 1291 when it
decides liability but leaves certain prayers for relief unresolved.2 Alman v. Taunton
Sportswear Mfg. Corp., 857 F.2d 840, 844 (1st Cir. 1988). See also Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744 (1976) (“judgments . . . where assessment of
The exceptions relate to decisions “made appealable by statute on an interlocutory basis.” 10 Fern
M. Smith, MOORE‟S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 54.02[2] (3d ed. 2011).
2 This lack of finality does not apply when the only relief to be resolved is the award of attorney fees.
Budinich, 486 U.S. at 196.
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damages or awarding of other relief remains to be resolved have never been
considered to be „final‟ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291”).
Ms. Morin carefully reserved her prayer for equitable relief. Her Complaint
sought “relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.” Compl. ¶ 9 (Docket #
1). Her Final Pretrial Memorandum stated more specifically that she would “be
seeking a court order directing the Defendant to change its policies for women
facing contractions whose discharge poses a threat of harm to themselves or their
unborn children.” Pl.’s Final Pretrial Mem. at 3 (Docket # 57). Moreover, during
the charging conference, her counsel reiterated on the record her intention to seek
equitable relief. Trial Tr. III 445:6-8 (Docket # 125). Following through on that
intention, Ms. Morin filed a motion for equitable relief on October 21, 2010, the
same day the initial judgment was entered. Pl.’s Mot. for Equitable Relief; J. The
Court ruled on that motion on March 25, 2011, Order, and entered judgment on that
order on March 28, 2011, Am. J.
According to First Circuit precedent, final
judgment could not have issued before that time because the Court had not yet
resolved Ms. Morin‟s prayer for equitable relief. Ms. Morin filed her motion for
prejudgment interest on March 31, 2011, three days after the Court‟s order and well
within the twenty-eight day period contemplated by Rule 59(e).
B.
Interest on Punitive Damages
The Court is aware of no express authority that holds that prejudgment
interest applies to punitive damages. Contrary to Ms. Morin‟s assertions, the cases
she cites are not examples of courts assessing interest on punitive damages. In
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Fitzgerald v. Gamester, 1999 ME 92, 732 A.2d 273, the Maine Law Court considered
whether it should assess the interest even though the plaintiff‟s total damage award
exceeded the Maine District Court‟s jurisdictional limit. There, the plaintiff was
awarded punitive damages of $15,000 against one defendant, $25,000 against
another, and compensatory damages of $3,500 against the defendants jointly and
severally, for a total damage award of $43,500. Fitzgerald, 1999 ME 92, ¶ 3, 732
A.2d 273, 275. A Maine statute established a jurisdictional limit of $30,000 on
damage awards in Maine District Court and separate statutes provided for different
interest rate calculations for damage awards that exceeded that limit and those
that did not. Id. ¶ 12, 732 A.2d at 276-77 (citing 14 M.R.S. § 1602(1); 14 M.R.S. §
1602-A; 4 M.R.S. § 152)). The Law Court concluded that it should combine the
compensatory and punitive damages awarded against both defendants to determine
whether the $30,000 limit had been reached.
As such, the plaintiff‟s aggregate
$43,000 award exceeded the limit. Id. ¶ 14, 732 A.2d at 277. The Law Court said
nothing about whether interest should be assessed on the punitive damages, only
that the interest rate—for whichever award on which it was assessed—would be the
rate provided for damage awards that exceed the jurisdictional limit. Id.
Similarly, the Law Court in Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148
(Me. 1978), addressed a jury verdict for both compensatory and punitive damages
and the impact of a newly revised Maine prejudgment interest statute, which
forfeited interest whenever the prevailing party obtained a continuance for more
than thirty days. Id. at 156-57 (citing 14 M.R.S. § 1602 (Supp. 1978-79), as modified
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by P.L. 1977, ch. 147 (eff. Oct. 24, 1977)). In Vicnire, the plaintiff had obtained a
continuance in excess of thirty days and the Vicnire Court merely upheld the trial
court‟s decision to apply the newly-enacted version of section 1602 to the case. Id.
at 156-57. The Vicnire Court never addressed whether prejudgment interest was
applicable to the punitive damages portion of the judgment.
Id.
In neither
Fitzgerald nor Vicnire did the Maine Supreme Judicial Court approve an award of
prejudgment interest on a punitive damages award.
By contrast, there is a long line of Maine caselaw, which establishes that
prejudgment interest “is designed to compensate an injured party for the inability
to use money rightfully belonging to that party between the date suit is filed and
the date judgment is entered.” Osgood v. Osgood, 1997 ME 192, ¶ 10, 698 A.2d
1071, 1073-4 (citing Masters Machine Co. v. Brookfield Athletic Shoe Co., 663 F.
Supp. 439, 443 (D. Me. 1987); Inhabitants of Town of Norridgewock v. Inhabitants of
Town of Hebron, 128 A.2d 215, 217 (1957)). From that principle, the Law Court has
reasoned that prejudgment interest is an element of compensatory damages, Trask
v. Auto. Ins. Co., 1999 ME 94, ¶ 8, 736 A.2d 237, 239, and that it “falls within th[e]
definition” of compensatory damages, Moholland v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
2000 ME 26, ¶ 6, 746 A.2d 362, 364. The Court has previously cited that authority
in concluding that prejudgment interest is not available on punitive damages under
14 M.R.S. § 1602-B. Rooney v. Sprague Energy Corp., No. CV-06-20-B-W, 2008 WL
2568157, at *15 (D. Me. June 24, 2008); Harding v. Cianbro Corp., 473 F. Supp. 2d
89, 100 n.16 (D. Me. 2007). Moreover, this is consistent with the general rule and
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sound policy regarding prejudgment interest. See Bennett v. City of Holyoke, 362
F.3d 1, 11, 11 n.4 (1st Cir. 2004) (explaining that the rule against awarding
prejudgment interest on punitive damage is “based on sound policy” because the
purpose of prejudgment interest is not to penalize the wrongdoer or make the
damaged party more than whole); Right to Prejudgment Interest on Punitive or
Multiple Damages Awards, 9 A.L.R.5th 63 (1993) (noting that the majority of courts
deny prejudgment interest on punitive damages).
III.
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Ms. Morin‟s Motion to
Amend the Judgment (Docket # 140). The Court grants her motion to the extent
she seeks prejudgment interest on her compensatory damage award. The Court
denies her motion to the extent she seeks prejudgment interest on her punitive
damage award.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 22nd day of August, 2011
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