KILROY v. MAYHEW

Filing 18

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS granting 7 Motion to Dismiss By JUDGE GEORGE Z. SINGAL. (lrc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
TIMOTHY KILROY,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARY MAYHEW, COMISSIONER,
MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES,

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) Docket no. 1:11-cv-343
)
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Defendant.

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Before the Court is Defendant‟s Motion to Dismiss (Docket # 7) Plaintiff‟s Complaint.
As explained herein, the line of cases starting with Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943),
requires that the Court ABSTAIN. Defendant‟s Motion to Dismiss is therefore GRANTED.
I.

LEGAL STANDARD
Defendant moves to dismiss this case under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

and 12(b)(6). Generally, under Rule 12(b)(1), a party may move to dismiss a case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Am. Fiber & Finishing, Inc. v. Tyco Healthcare Group, LP,
362 F.3d 136, 138 (1st Cir. 2004) (“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. In the
absence of jurisdiction, a court is powerless to act.”). After determining that it in fact has
jurisdiction, under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court then considers the “legal sufficiency” of a complaint.
Gomes v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 304 F. Supp. 2d 117, 120 (D. Me. 2004).
Courts in this circuit have disagreed as to how the general rubric applies in the context of
abstention doctrines. See Mass. Delivery Ass‟n v. Coakley, 797 F. Supp. 2d 164, 168 n.2 (D.
Mass. 2011) (collecting cases involving Younger abstention); see also Burckhart Search Group,

Inc. v. Doral Fin. Corp., Civil No. 11-1565 (JAF), 2011 WL 6029817, at *3 n.5 (D.P.R. Nov. 30,
2011).

This Court has previously noted that “abstention is a prudential rather than a

jurisdictional ground for dismissal,” and, therefore, when considering abstention it does “not rely
upon the pleading or burden requirements of either Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6).”

See

Christian Action Network v. Maine, 679 F. Supp. 2d 140, 143 n.2 (D. Me. 2010). In the context
of this Motion, the relevant facts in this case are not in dispute nor do the parties dispute the
Court‟s ability to consider the Amended Administrative Hearing Decision attached to
Defendant‟s Motion. See id.; Biddeford Internet Corp. v. Verizon New Eng. Inc., 456 F. Supp.
2d 165, 169 (D. Me. 2006) (allowing for the consideration of a document attached to a motion to
dismiss if the document is: one whose authenticity is not in dispute; an official public record;
central to the plaintiff‟s claims; or sufficiently referred to in the complaint) (internal citations
omitted). Therefore, the Court proceeds to lay out the factual background.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Timothy Kilroy (“Kilroy”) is a divorced parent of the minor child, C.K.1 (See

Complaint (Docket # 1) ¶ 1.) Kilroy is also disabled. Plaintiff and his ex-wife, C.K.‟s mother
(“Ms. Kilroy), reside separate and apart from each other. (See id. ¶ 8.) C.K. resides in Plaintiff‟s
house half of the time and in his mother‟s house half of the time. (See id. ¶ 9.) Pursuant to a
Child Support Order dated December 1, 2001, Plaintiff is required to pay Ms. Kilroy $61.00 per
week in child support for C.K. (See id. ¶ 11.)
Due to his disability, Plaintiff receives disability benefits from the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”). (See id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff‟s son, C.K., is entitled to SSA dependent
benefits in the amount of $844.00 per month. Those benefits are paid directly to Ms. Kilroy
1

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a), the Court refers to Plaintiff‟s minor child by his initials, C.K. Rule 5.2(a) states
that unless the Court orders otherwise, a filing with the Court that contains the name of an individual known to be a
minor may only include the minor‟s initials.

2

from the SSA. (See id. ¶ 10, 13.) Pursuant to the December 1, 2001 Child Support Order, in any
month where the SSA dependent benefits received by Ms. Kilroy for C.K. exceed Plaintiff‟s total
monthly child support obligation, Plaintiff receives a credit for his monthly child support
obligation. (See id. ¶ 12.) However, Plaintiff is not given credit toward past or future child
support obligations where the SSA dependent benefits received by Ms. Kilroy in any given
month exceed Plaintiff‟s monthly child support obligation. (See id.)
Kilroy also receives food assistance benefits under the federal Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (“SNAP”) for himself and C.K.

(See id. ¶ 7.)

The United States

Department of Agriculture has promulgated various regulations with respect to the SNAP
program, but responsibility for administering the program in Maine has been delegated to the
Maine Department of Health and Human Services (the “Department”) and thus the Department
makes individual eligibility determinations and distributes the food assistance benefits to eligible
households. (See id. ¶ 6, 15; 7 U.S.C. § 2020(a), (e); 7 C.F.R. §§ 271.4(a), 272.3.) Defendant is
the Commissioner of the Department. (See id. ¶ 6.)
Although the SSA dependent benefits are paid directly to Ms. Kilroy, the Department
made a determination that it would include those SSA payments (approximately $844.00 per
month) as income in Plaintiff‟s household for the purpose of calculating food assistance benefits
for Plaintiff‟s household. (See id. ¶ 15.) As a result of this determination, the food assistance
benefits for Plaintiff‟s household are lower than they would be if the SSA payments to Ms.
Kilroy were not counted as household income. The SSA dependent benefits received by Ms.
Kilroy on behalf of C.K. are not used to purchase food for Plaintiff‟s household, nor are they
used to pay any of Plaintiff‟s other household expenses. (See id. ¶ 16.)

3

Plaintiff disagreed with the Department‟s determination and requested a hearing to appeal
the decision. (See Amended Administrative Hearing Decision (Docket # 7-1) at 1.) On June 22,
2011, a hearing was held to determine whether the Department was correct when it counted
C.K.‟s SSA benefit as Plaintiff‟s household income. (See id.) Following the hearing, on June
29, 2011, the Department issued a Decision affirming the Department‟s calculation of food
assistance benefits for Plaintiff‟s household. (See id.) On July 22, 2011, Plaintiff requested that
the Hearing Officer amend his Decision on the grounds that (1) the Department had failed to
meet its burden in showing that C.K.‟s SSA benefit received by Ms. Kilroy is used for C.K.‟s
benefit, (2) C.K.‟s SSA benefit should be treated as excluded income in computing Plaintiff‟s
food assistance benefit amount because a court ordered that C.K.‟s SSA benefit be paid to Ms.
Kilroy in order to satisfy Plaintiff‟s child support obligations, and (3) C.K.‟s SSA benefit should
be considered excluded income as a legally obligated child support payment that is paid to Ms.
Kilroy. (See id. at 2, 4.)
The Hearing Officer re-opened the hearing record and received briefing from Plaintiff
and the Department.

After reviewing the parties‟ briefings, the Hearing Officer issued an

Amended Decision, which concluded that the Department was correct when it counted C.K.‟s
SSA benefit as income in computing Plaintiff‟s food assistance benefits, even though that
income is not paid to Plaintiff. The Amended Decision further noted that Maine‟s food stamp
rules – specifically, 10-144-301 Me. Code R. § 555-3(2) – includes Social Security benefits as
countable unearned income and that § 555-3(9) states that money legally due a household
member but received and used for that household member by a non-household member must be
included as countable unearned income. (See id. at 4.) Meanwhile, under § 555-4(21), legally
obligated child support payments made by a household member to or for an individual who is not

4

a household member is excluded from income for the purpose of calculating food assistance
benefits. The Hearing Officer ruled that § 555-4(21) did not apply to Plaintiff‟s case, however,
because C.K.‟s SSA benefit is his benefit and not his father‟s benefit. To be excluded as income,
the payment must be a payment made by Plaintiff. Plaintiff, however, does not make the SSA
benefit payment – the SSA makes the payment.

The Hearing Officer agreed with the

Department‟s argument that “[c]rediting the child‟s entitlement toward Mr. Kilroy‟s child
support does not amount to a child support payment made by Mr. Kilroy, as Mr. Kilroy did not
expend his own resources to make that payment.” (See id. at 5 (internal emphasis omitted).)
The Hearing Officer further observed that Mr. Kilroy‟s “income is not used to pay his child
support obligation and [C.K.] is not the Food Stamp household member legally obligated to pay
child support even though a portion of his income is used as a credit against the support
obligation owed by his father.”

(Id.) The Hearing Officer concluded that C.K.‟s “Social

Security benefit is used for his care and support and because of that the Food Stamp rules clearly
require his Social Security benefit to be used as countable unearned income in computing Mr.
Kilroy‟s Food Stamp benefit.” (Id.)
Within thirty days of the Hearing Officer‟s Amended Decision, Plaintiff filed the instant
action seeking an injunction stating that inclusion of C.K.‟s SSA benefit paid to his mother‟s
household is not income for the purpose of calculating Plaintiff‟s food assistance benefit. In
addition, Plaintiff seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining Defendant from
reducing Plaintiff‟s food assistance allotment because of the SSA dependent benefit. Plaintiff
also asks that Defendant issue the food assistance benefits Plaintiff would have received but for
its allegedly improper benefit calculation methodology. Finally, Plaintiff seeks an award for the
cost of this litigation as well as reasonable attorneys‟ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

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III.

DISCUSSION
As the First Circuit has repeatedly emphasized, “federal courts have a virtually

unflagging obligation to exercise the jurisdiction given them.” See Chico Serv. Station, Inc. v.
Sol P.R. Ltd., 633 F.3d 20, 29 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689,
705 (1992); United States v. Fairway Capital Corp., 483 F.3d 34, 44 (1st Cir. 2007)). In a
discrete set of “exceptional circumstances,” however, federal district courts may decline to
exercise jurisdiction “where denying a federal forum would clearly serve an important
countervailing interest, such as regard for federal-state relations or wise judicial administration.”
See id. (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996)); see also
Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gomez, 585 F.3d 508, 517 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005)). “[B]ecause abstention runs so
firmly against the jurisprudential grain,” the First Circuit instructs that “abstention should be the
exception, not the rule.” Chico, 633 F.3d at 29 (stating further that abstention is proper only in
“narrowly circumscribed situations where deference to a state‟s administrative processes for the
determination of complex, policy-laden, state law issues would serve a significant local interest
and would render federal-court review inappropriate”). Similarly, the Supreme Court has held
that “the balance of state and federal interests only rarely favors abstention.” See GuillemardGinorio, 585 F.3d at 517 (citing Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 728; Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S.
193, 202 (1988)).
At issue in this case is whether the Court should abstain from hearing Plaintiff‟s case
pursuant to the abstention doctrines set forth in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), and
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Plaintiff argues that the circumstances of this case, in
which the state agency responsible for calculating food assistance benefits allegedly misapplied

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federal statutory and regulatory law in determining Plaintiff‟s benefits, cannot support the
Court‟s deference to state administrative processes. Defendant counters that abstention is proper
because Plaintiff‟s action encroaches on Maine state law and administrative processes for the
determination and review of food assistance benefits calculations (Burford abstention) and
because the exercise of jurisdiction would needlessly inject the Court in an ongoing state
proceeding (Younger abstention).
A. Burford Abstention
Defendant contends that the Court should abstain from hearing this case under the
doctrine set forth in Burford.

Plaintiff disagrees, and argues that the Court must decline

abstention because (1) Burford abstention requires the presence of a local law or policy, which
does not exist in this case, and (2) the instant case poses a question of federal law regarding the
state administration of a federal program and is not simply an issue of local law and policy.
As the First Circuit has repeatedly stated, the fundamental concern of the Burford
doctrine is “to prevent federal courts from bypassing a state administrative scheme and resolving
issues of state law and policy that are committed in the first instance to expert administrative
resolution.” Chico, 633 F.3d at 29; Vaqueria Tres Monjitas, Inc. v. Irizarry, 587 F.3d 464, 474
(1st Cir. 2009) (citing Pub. Serv. Co. of New Hampshire v. Patch, 167 F.3d 15, 27 (1st Cir.
1998)). The Supreme Court has set forth the Burford abstention doctrine as follows:
Where timely and adequate state-court review is available, a federal court sitting
in equity must decline to interfere with the proceedings or orders of state
administrative agencies: (1) when there are “difficult questions of state law
bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance
transcends the result in the case then at bar”; or (2) where the “exercise of federal
review of the question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state
efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public
concern.”

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Chico, 633 F.3d at 29 (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans,
491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989)).
While the Burford abstention doctrine could be interpreted broadly, the First Circuit rule
is narrow: “Burford abstention must only apply in „unusual circumstances,‟ when federal review
risks having the district court become the „regulatory decision-making center.‟”

Id. at 30

(quoting Vaqueria Tres Monjitas, 587 F.3d at 747); see also Bath Mem‟l Hosp. v. Maine Health
Care Fin. Comm‟n, 853 F.2d 1007, 1012-13 (1st Cir. 1988). “Thus, when a federal court‟s
interference would effectively create a dual review structure for adjudicating a state‟s specific
regulatory actions, abstention under Burford may be appropriate.” Vaqueria Tres Monjitas, 587
F.3d at 747 (citing Bath Mem‟l Hosp., 853 F.2d at 1012-13); see also Chico, 633 F.3d at 34.
Here, Defendant argues that Burford abstention is appropriate because federal review of
Plaintiff‟s action risks having the Court become the regulatory decision-making center for food
assistance benefits determinations. Defendant also cautions that the Court‟s review of Plaintiff‟s
case would effectively create a dual review structure whereby a Maine recipient of federal food
assistance benefits could challenge a benefits determination in either state or federal court, which
would jeopardize Maine‟s ability to coherently administer its system of providing food assistance
benefits. See Bath Mem‟l Hosp. v. Me. Health Care Fin. Comm‟n, 853 F.2d 1007, 1012 (1st Cir.
1988).
In arguing that abstention is inappropriate in this case, Plaintiff relies heavily on the First
Circuit‟s recent decision, Chico Serv. Station, Inc. v. Sol P.R. Ltd., 633 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2011).
In Chico, the First Circuit overturned the district court‟s decision to abstain from a citizen suit
brought pursuant to the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) in an effort
to force the cleanup of contamination caused by leaking underground storage tanks at a former

8

gasoline station. Id. at 22. While Chico provides the framework for considering Burford
abstention in this case, the Court initially notes that RCRA and the SNAP statute are
fundamentally distinguishable with respect to the delineation of federal and state court review of
state agency actions. Whereas RCRA delineates specific situations in which a state or federal
agency action forecloses federal court review of a citizen suit, see Chico, 633 F.3d at 31, the
SNAP statute requires that participating states provide a hearing process for households
aggrieved by a state agency decision. See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10) (providing that a participating
state must provide “for the granting of a fair hearing and a prompt determination thereafter to
any household aggrieved by the action of the State agency … as it affects the participation of
such household in the supplemental nutrition assistance program”).
With this statutory difference in mind, the Court nonetheless considers the three factors
enumerated in Chico:
(1) the availability of timely and adequate state-court review, (2) the potential that
federal court jurisdiction over the suit will interfere with state administrative
policymaking, and (3) whether conflict with state proceedings can be avoided by
careful management of the federal case.
633 F.3d at 32.
1. Availability of State-Court Review
In weighing abstention under the Burford doctrine, the Court “must first determine
whether timely and adequate state-court review is available.” Id. at 32 (quoting NOPSI, 491
U.S. at 361). Under Maine law, a party to an administrative proceeding may appeal any final
agency action to a state Superior Court, which will review the decision for abuse of discretion,
errors of law, or findings not supported by the evidence. See 5 M.R.S.A. § 11002; Me. R. Civ.
P. 80C; Centamore v. Dep‟t of Human Servs., 664 A.2d 369, 370 (Me. 1995). To commence the
appeal process, an individual must file a petition with the Superior Court within thirty days after

9

receiving notice of the adverse agency decision.2 See 5 M.R.S.A. § 11002; Me. R. Civ. P. 80C.
Once the petition is filed, the agency must file the administrative record within 30 days. See 5
M.R.S.A. § 11005. The briefing schedule for the parties then proceeds: after the agency files the
administrative record the petitioner must file his or her brief within forty days, the agency then
must respond within thirty days, the petitioner may file a reply brief within fourteen days, and
the case must be in order for oral argument twenty days later. See Me. R. Civ. P. 80C(g), (l).
During the appeal process, a party may challenge the administrative record, conduct discovery,
and request the taking of additional evidence. See 5 M.R.S.A. § 11006; Me. R. Civ. P. 80C(e),
(f), (j). Finally, if unsuccessful, the petitioner may appeal the agency‟s decision to the State
Supreme Court sitting as the Law Court. See 5 M.R.S.A. § 11008.
After evaluating the procedure for state court review of state agency decisions under
Maine law, this Court finds that state court review is sufficiently timely and adequate to support
Burford abstention. Compare Chico, 633 F.3d at 33 (ruling that state court review was not
timely because site cleanup had been under consideration by Puerto Rico‟s Environmental
Quality Board for seventeen years but the Board had issued no final order appealable to the
commonwealth courts during that time).

Instead of filing this action, Plaintiff could have

appealed his food assistance benefits determination to the state Superior Court, and, if
unsuccessful there, to the Law Court. The Court concludes that Plaintiff‟s effort to circumvent
this timely and adequate state court procedure triggers a fundamental concern of Burford
abstention – specifically, having the district court become the “regulatory decision-making
center” and creating a dual review structure for adjudicating Maine regulatory actions. See
Chico, 633 F.3d at 30; Vaqueria, 587 F.3d at 747.

2

Any aggrieved person other than an aggrieved party to the administrative proceeding shall have 40 days from the
date the decision was rendered to petition for review. See 5 M.R.S.A. § 11002.

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2. Interference with State Policymaking
As noted by the First Circuit, “the animating concern under Burford is the threat that
federal courts will usurp the role of state administrative agencies in deciding issues of state law
and policy that are committed in the first instance to expert administrative resolution.” Chico,
633 F.3d at 32 (citing Patch, 167 F.3d at 24). That concern is triggered here, because Plaintiff‟s
suit directly challenges Maine regulations – specifically, 10-144-301 Me. Code R. §§ FS 5553(2) & 3(9) – and policy governing food assistance benefits determinations and seeks to
circumvent the state‟s process for challenging benefits determinations.
SNAP and its implementing regulations delegate authority to participating states to
promulgate regulations governing benefits determinations and a process for challenging those
benefits determinations. See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(a), (e); 7 C.F.R. §§ 271.4(a), 272.3; 7 C.F.R. §
273.15. To be eligible for SNAP, a state must develop and submit a plan of operation for
approval by the United States Secretary of Agriculture. See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(d); 7 C.F.R. §
272.2.

Once approved, participating states assume many of the core administrative

responsibilities for the food assistance program. See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(a), (e); 7 C.F.R. §§
271.4(a), 272.3.

As a participating state, Maine performs these administrative functions,

including, developing regulations to govern eligibility determinations, conducting eligibility
determinations for applicant households, issuing electronic benefit transfer cards, and developing
procedures for appealing eligibility determinations. See 10-144-301 Me. Code R. § FS-1 et seq.;
see also 7 U.S.C. § 2020(a), (e); 7 C.F.R. §§ 271.4(a), 272.3; 7 C.F.R. § 273.15.
Furthermore, pursuant to its authority under SNAP, Maine has developed comprehensive
procedures for appealing the Department‟s benefits determinations.

Pursuant to these

procedures, when the Department takes any action that affects a household‟s eligibility or level

11

of benefits, it must provide written notice of the basis for its action, the right to a fair hearing,
and the availability of free legal counsel. §§ FS-777-5, 999-1. An individual has ninety days to
request a hearing, and has numerous procedural rights during the course of the appeals process,
including access to a translator, the right to subpoena and call witnesses, and to submit evidence
at the hearing. § FS-777-5. The Department officer conducting the hearing must render a
decision within sixty days of the hearing request that specifies the factual and legal basis for the
decision. § FS-777-5. Moreover, as stated supra, an aggrieved individual may appeal a written
agency decision to the Superior Court. See Me. R. Civ. P. 80C.
Because Maine has developed comprehensive rules and regulations governing the
administration of SNAP benefits, pursuant to its authority under SNAP, the Court finds that the
administration of the SNAP program in Maine is a matter of substantial public concern and that
the State has a substantial interest in establishing a coherent policy with respect to the
administration of SNAP in Maine. See Huffmire v. Town of Boothbay, 35 F. Supp. 2d 122, 133
(D. Me. 1999). Plaintiff‟s action challenges the Department‟s application of Me. Code R. §§ FS555-3(2) and 3(9) to the determination of his household food assistance benefit allotment.
Accordingly, Plaintiff‟s case presents questions of Maine law and policy, although they are
framed by the federal SNAP statute. The Court is concerned that federal review of Maine‟s food
assistance benefits regulations “would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent
policy” with respect to Maine‟s food assistance benefits program, undoubtedly “a matter of
substantial public concern.” See Chico, 633 F.3d at 33 (citing NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 361). Federal
court review in this case would interfere with the coherency of Maine‟s administrative
regulations and processes for eligibility determinations and appeals – authority specifically
delegated to states such as Maine by Congress through passage of SNAP. Thus, because federal

12

court review of this case will interfere with state law and policymaking, the Court finds that
Burford abstention is warranted.3
3. Likelihood of Conflict with State Proceeding
In addition to the Court‟s findings in regards to factors one and two, the First Circuit has
cautioned that “a federal court may abstain only where conflict with state administrative
processes cannot be avoided through careful conduct of the federal case.” Chico, 633 F.3d at 33
(citing Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Belotti, 868 F.2d 459, 464 (1st Cir. 1989)).
Federal court review of this case would conflict with the state proceeding, as Plaintiff seeks
review of a state administrative decision in federal court rather than state court, “effectively
creating a dual review structure for adjudicating a state‟s specific regulatory actions.” Id. at 34
(citing Vaqueria, 587 F.3d at 474).
The First Circuit‟s decision in Vaqueria is instructive. In declining abstention, the First
Circuit ruled that abstention was inappropriate because: (1) federal court review would not
disrupt the state agency‟s “role as the regulatory decision-maker or interfere with the agency‟s
ability to apply its expertise to local facts in establishing a coherent state policy;” and (2) the
“heart of plaintiffs‟ action” was a constitutional challenge to the state agency‟s “decision-making
process as a whole, and not to the reasonableness of their particular determinations.” 587 F.3d at
474. Furthermore, the First Circuit found it important that the district court did not rule on the
merits of specific agency orders and instead focused its ruling on the overall administrative
decision-making process, which it found to be arbitrary and unconstitutional. Id. The First
3

To support its argument that this case presents a question concerning a federal regulatory scheme rather than
questions of state law and policy, Plaintiff cites Meachem v. Wing, 77 F. Supp. 2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), in which
the district court declined to abstain from a case challenging New York‟s implementation of the predecessor to
SNAP – the Food Stamp Act. Id. at 443. Meachem, however, is readily distinguishable from the instant case.
Meachem involved a class action brought by all individuals whose benefits had been terminated and that challenged
the fairness of benefits termination hearings under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
435. This case does not implicate the important federal interests raised by a challenge under the Due Process
Clause, nor does Plaintiff here challenge the Department‟s hearings process.

13

Circuit highlighted that the district court had not conducted a “highly individualized review of
particular, firm-specific regulatory decisions.” Id. at 475 (quoting Bath Mem‟l Hosp., 853 F.2d
at 1014). Rather, the district court addressed the plaintiffs‟ claims that the entire system by
which the administrative agency rendered its decisions violated the Due Process and Equal
Protection rights of those subject to its regulations. Id. at 477.
The differences between Plaintiff‟s action and Vaqueria are instructive. Here, Plaintiff
seeks an order declaring that the Department improperly calculated his food assistance benefits.
The heart of Plaintiff‟s case is not a constitutional challenge to the Department‟s overall
decision-making or hearings process; rather, the relief requested by Plaintiff requires that the
Court directly review actions taken by the Department‟s Administrative Hearing Officer and
circumvent Maine‟s state court appeals process. Under the Plaintiff‟s desired scenario, the Court
would make a particularized determination regarding food assistance benefits, and, in doing so,
would lack the Department‟s subject-matter expertise and local knowledge. Thus, the Court‟s
review of this action would be prohibited by the First Circuit‟s prohibition against disrupting the
state agency‟s “role as the regulatory decision-maker [and] interfer[ing] with the agency‟s ability
to apply its expertise to local facts in establishing a coherent state policy.” Id. at 474. In effect,
Plaintiff is asking the Court to act in a prohibited capacity – that of an appellate court reviewing,
and overturning, the state hearing officer‟s decision. See Huffmire, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 133 (“[A]
federal court does not have appellate power over original proceedings in a state‟s administrative
tribunals.”). Thus, because conflict with state administrative processes cannot be avoided in this
case, Burford abstention is warranted.4

4

Because the Court holds that abstention is appropriate in this case pursuant to the doctrine set forth by Burford and
its progeny, the Court need not determine whether federal court review of this case is precluded by res judicata.
Nevertheless, the Court notes that “[c]ommon law res judicata doctrine may still apply to unreviewed administrative
findings in section 1983 actions, depending upon a balancing of factors including the interests involved, the power

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B. Younger Abstention
Younger and its progeny set for the “principle that, with limited exceptions, federal
courts should refrain from issuing injunctions that interfere with ongoing state-court litigation,
or, in some cases, with state administrative proceedings.”

Maymo-Melendez v. Alvarez-

Ramirez, 364 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45, 53-54). While the
Younger doctrine initially applied to protect state criminal prosecutions against interference, it
“has been extended to „coercive‟ civil cases involving the state and to comparable state
administrative proceedings that are quasi-judicial in character and implicate important state
interests.” Id. (citing Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 603-05 (1975); Ohio Civil Rights
Comm‟n v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 623-27 (1986); Middlesex County Ethics
Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass‟n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 435 (1982)). Accordingly, the First
Circuit requires Younger abstention if: “(1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding
involving the federal plaintiff that (2) implicates important state interests and (3) provides an
adequate opportunity for the federal plaintiff to assert his federal claims.” Christian Action
Network v. Maine, 679 F. Supp. 2d 140, 145 (D. Me. 2010). If those requirements are met,
abstention is mandatory unless there are “extraordinary circumstances, which “include bad faith,
harassment and extreme bias; great and immediate irreparable harm to core constitutional
values;” and a statute that “flagrantly and patently” violates the Constitution. See id. (citing Esso
Std. Oil Co. v. Lopez-Freytes, 522 F.3d 136, 143 (1st Cir. 2008), and Younger, 401 U.S. at 5354).

of the agency to decide the claims, and the adequacy of agency procedures.” See Diaz-Seijo v. Fajardo-Velez, 397
F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass‟n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1991)). “The
circuit courts have split over the relationship between state agency actions and subsequent section 1983 suits arising
out of the same underlying facts.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

15

The key question here is whether the State proceedings qualify under Younger and its
progeny as the proper type of administrative proceeding to warrant abstention. The First Circuit
has held that Younger abstention does not apply to remedial proceedings; rather, “proceedings
must be coercive, and in most cases, state-initiated, in order to warrant abstention.” GuillemardGinorio v. Contreras-Gomez, 585 F.3d 508, 522 (1st Cir. 2009). In Guillemard-Ginorio, the
First Circuit explained that if the state proceeding “does not require any kind of formal procedure
before an administrative order becomes final and if an appeal process is available only upon
request, then appeal proceedings are remedial and not coercive, and abstention is inappropriate.”
Christian Action Network, 679 F. Supp. 2d at 146 (citing Guillemard-Ginorio, 585 F.3d at 523).
Here, Plaintiff argues that the state proceedings at issue in this case were remedial – not
coercive – and therefore that abstention is inappropriate. The record does not indicate when the
Department determined that C.K.‟s Social Security benefits would be counted as income in
calculating the food assistance benefits allotted to Plaintiff‟s household. However, the record
does indicate that the Department‟s determination was applied to Plaintiff‟s benefits allotment
before undertaking any process that was judicial in character. See Guillemard-Ginorio, 585 F.3d
at 521 (citing Maymo-Melendez, 364 F.3d at 35-36 (holding that “where the federal plaintiff was
sanctioned by the local racing board only after full-fledged administrative proceedings that were
judicial in character, abstention pursuant to Younger was required through the full continuum of
those proceedings, including judicial review of agency action”)). Here, there is no indication in
the record that a hearing took place, that witnesses were called on behalf of Plaintiff, or that
Plaintiff had a chance to present an argument prior to the Department‟s determination of
Plaintiff‟s benefit.

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After the Department‟s determination went into effect, Plaintiff requested a hearing
challenging the Department‟s decision. This administrative hearing was remedial rather than
coercive because the administrative appeal process could be triggered only on Plaintiff‟s
initiative if he wished to pursue his remedies within Maine‟s administrative framework. See
Guillemard-Ginorio, 585 F.3d at 523. Accordingly, Younger abstention is inapplicable.5
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant‟s Motion to Dismiss (Docket #

7) and DISMISSES this action.
SO ORDERED.

Dated this 13th day of January, 2012.

5

Defendant argues that the precise type of proceeding involved is not the touchstone for Younger abstention; rather
the salient fact is whether federal interference in the proceeding at issue is “an offense to the State‟s interest likely to
be every bit as great as it would be were [it] a criminal proceeding.” See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977).
Defendant‟s analysis ignores the clearly stated rulings of this Court and the First Circuit, both of which have made
clear that the type of state proceeding involved is a key factor in determining whether Younger abstention applies.
See, e.g., Guillemard-Ginorio, 585 F.3d at 522-23; Christian Action Network, 679 F. Supp. 2d at 146.

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