GOGUEN v. GILBLAIR et al
Filing
167
DECISION AND ORDER denying 160 Motion for Relief from Judgment; denying 161 Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order; denying 161 Motion for New Trial; denying 162 Motion for Relief from Judgment; denying 162 Motion for New Trial. By MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN C. NIVISON. (CWP)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
ROBERT GOGUEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
JENNIFER GILBLAIR, et al.,
Defendants
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1:12-cv-00048-JCN
DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S
MOTIONS FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
On October 13, 2015, following a jury verdict, the Court entered judgment in favor
of Defendants on Plaintiff’s complaint. (ECF No. 133.) Plaintiff subsequently filed a
notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. (ECF No. 134.) On March
7, 2016, the First Circuit, in affirming the judgment, concluded “that the jury’s verdict was
supported by sufficient evidence” and rejected “[Plaintiff’s] claim of perjury, which is
based exclusively on unfounded speculation.” (ECF No. 155.)
The matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion for Relief from
Judgment (ECF No. 160), Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order (ECF No. 161), and
Supplemental Motion for Relief from Judgment. (ECF No. 162.)1 The Court denies
Plaintiff’s motions.
1
The filings at docket numbers 161 and 162 are nearly identical. In docket item 162, Plaintiff included an
additional paragraph on page 10.
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BACKGROUND
After a three-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants on
Plaintiff’s claims asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Through his motions, Plaintiff
requests relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) and, if successful, a new trial. Plaintiff
asserts that Defendants provided perjured testimony at trial, that his counsel failed to
conduct an adequate investigation or introduce evidence in support of his claims, and that
his counsel improperly abandoned certain claims.
DISCUSSION
A party may seek relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60.
Rule 60(b) provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or
a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for
the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation,
or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule 60(d) also provides that a court may “set aside a judgment for
fraud on the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3).
Rule 60(b) affords relief from final judgments only under exceptional
circumstances. Skrabec v. Town of N. Attleboro, 878 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 2017). “A party
seeking Rule 60(b) relief must show, at a bare minimum, ‘that his motion is timely; that
exceptional circumstances exist, favoring extraordinary relief; that if the judgment is set
aside, he has the right stuff to mount a potentially meritorious claim or defense; and that
no unfair prejudice will accrue to the opposing parties should the motion be granted.’” Id.
(quoting Karak v. Bursaw Oil Corp., 288 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2002)).
A.
Fraud and Misrepresentation
Through his motions, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants testified falsely at trial and,
therefore, the judgment was the product of fraud. Plaintiff’s arguments potentially
implicate Rule 60(b)(3) and/or Rule 60(d)(3).
The First Circuit has held that “perjury alone … has never been sufficient” to justify
relief under the Rule. Roger Edwards, LLC v. Fiddes & Son Ltd., 427 F.3d 129, 133 (1st
Cir. 2005) (quoting Geo. P. Reintjes Co. v. Riley Stoker Corp., 71 F.3d 44, 48 n.5 (1st Cir.
1995). More recently, the First Circuit has observed that a motion for relief based on fraud
or misrepresentation in the form of perjured testimony would require additional evidence
that the misconduct substantially interfered with the movant’s ability to fully and fairly
present his case. Fontanillas-Lopez v. Morell Bauza Cartagena & Dapena, LLC, 832 F.3d
50, 63 (1st Cir. 2016).
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Relief based on “fraud on the court,” is even more demanding. To support relief
from judgment, the evidence would have to reveal “an unconscionable scheme” or “the
most egregious conduct designed to corrupt the judicial process.” Roger Edwards, LLC,
427 F.3d at 133.
To the extent Plaintiff’s motions are based on fraud, misrepresentation, or
misconduct governed by Rule 60(b)(3), Plaintiff’s motions were untimely filed. Plaintiff
was required to request relief from judgment within one year following entry of the
judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c). Plaintiff filed his motions more than two years after
the Court entered its judgment.2 Accordingly, in the event Plaintiff’s motions are construed
to seek relief based on “some form of misrepresentation or fraud, which is less than ‘fraud
on the court’ and, would therefore fall under Rule 60(b)(3), such an action is clearly time
barred.” Greater Omaha Packing Co. Inc. v. Fairbank Reconstruction Corp., No. 2:13cv-00436-GZS, 2014 WL 4723083, at *11 (D. Me. Sept. 23, 2014).
Even if Plaintiff had filed the motions timely, as mentioned above, perjury alone
does not warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(3). Roger Edwards, LLC, 427 F.3d at 133. In
addition, Plaintiff has failed to present any credible evidence to support his perjury claim.
Similarly, to the extent Plaintiff contends Defendants perpetrated a fraud on the Court,
Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence to support the finding of “an unconscionable
2
Because relief from judgment under Rule 60 must be sought in the district court, Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe
Colocotroni, 601 F.2d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 1979), Plaintiff’s appeal did not toll the one-year period of limitation.
See also King v. First Am. Investigations, Inc., 287 F.3d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 2002) (appeal does not toll the oneyear limitations period for filing a Rule 60(b) motion).
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scheme or the most egregious conduct designed to corrupt the judicial process.” Id.
Plaintiff, therefore, is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(3) or Rule 60(d)(3).
B.
Performance of Counsel
Plaintiff asks the Court to grant relief from judgment based on alleged shortcomings
of his counsel’s representation. According to Plaintiff, counsel’s contact with Plaintiff
before trial was minimal, counsel refused to present certain evidence Plaintiff wanted
counsel to present, and counsel did not pursue Plaintiff’s First Amendment, Due Process,
Excessive Force, and state law claims.
To the extent Plaintiff contends counsel’s conduct constitutes excusable neglect
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), Plaintiff did not file the motion within the one-year time limit
and the motion is thus barred. To the extent Plaintiff seeks relief under Rule 60(b)(6),
Plaintiff’s claim also fails. Although relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is potentially available
“when an attorney’s neglect is gross and inexcusable,” Chang v. Smith, 778 F.2d 83, 85
(1st Cir. 1995), the record lacks any evidence that would support such a finding.
C.
Plaintiff’s Claims Under Subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) of Rule 60(b)
Plaintiff also references subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) of Rule 60(b) in support of his
motion for relief from judgment. A motion based on 60(b)(1) or 60(b)(2) must be filed
within one-year of the entry of judgment. Because Plaintiff filed his motion more than a
year after the entry of judgment, Plaintiff is precluded from asserting a motion based on
the grounds identified in Rule 60(b)(1) and (2).
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D.
Summary
In support of his motion for relief from judgment, Plaintiff primarily cites Rule
60(b)(1) – (3). Plaintiff filed his motion more than two years after the entry of judgment.
Plaintiff, therefore, is precluded from prosecuting a motion based on the grounds identified
in Rule 60(b)(1) – (3). Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Even if the Court were to consider the
merits of Plaintiff’s motion under Rule 60(b)(6), Plaintiff’s motion is not persuasive.
Plaintiff argued in part that the evidence demonstrated Defendants violated his
constitutional rights, that Defendants committed perjury during their trial testimony and
otherwise prevented him from presenting his claim, and that his counsel’s performance was
substandard. The First Circuit determined on Plaintiff’s appeal that the verdict is supported
by “sufficient evidence,” and Plaintiff’s perjury allegations are based on “unfounded
speculation.” (ECF No. 155.) Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that would support
a contrary finding. Finally, as explained above, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that
would support a finding that his counsel’s representation was “gross and inexcusable.”
Chang, 778 F.2d at 85.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion
for Relief from Judgment (ECF No. 160), Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order (ECF
No. 161), and Supplemental Motion for Relief from Judgment (ECF No. 162).
/s/ John C. Nivison
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Dated this 1st day of February, 2018.
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