FLANDERS v. MASS RESISTANCE et al

Filing 36

AMENDED ORDER affirming Report and Recommended Decision 21 ; granting 6 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; denying 24 Motion to Amend and Add Defendants; denying Additional Filings 26 , 28 , 29 , 30 and 33 treated as Motions to S upplement; dismissing as moot 31 Motion to Strike Plaintiffs "Additional Findings". This Amended Order corrects typographical errors contained in the Order dated 5/21/13 (ECF No. 34). Please see footnote 1 of the Amended Order for the corrections. By JUDGE JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR. (MFS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
ADAM FLANDERS
Plaintiff,
v.
MASS RESISTANCE, et al.,
Defendants.

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1:12-cv-00262-JAW

AMENDED1 ORDER AFFIRMING THE RECOMMENDED DECISION
OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
In this diversity case, Adam Flanders sued over allegedly defamatory
statements published by Brian Camenker following Mr. Flanders’ dissemination of
a tell-all letter in 2007 exposing the questionable activities of a Rockland, Mainebased homosexual youth group. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that
the allegations in Mr. Flanders’ Complaint are legally insufficient.

The Court

concludes that the supplemental allegations against Defendants Brian Camenker
and Mass Resistance in Mr. Flanders’ additional filings also lack merit, and
dismisses the case.
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 3, 2012, Adam Flanders filed a complaint against Mass Resistance

and Brian Camenker in the Maine District Court in Belfast, Maine. Compl. (ECF
No. 1-1). The Defendants removed the case to this Court on September 3, 2012, and
This Amended Order corrects typographical errors contained in the Order Affirming the
Recommended Decision of the Magistrate Judge dated 5/21/13 (ECF No. 34). On page 3, last
paragraph, a cited case contains two errors. It currently reads Rodi S. New Eng. Sch. Of Law, 389
F.3d 5, 20 (1st Cir. 2004). It should read Rodi v. New Eng. Sch. of Law, 389 F.3d 5, 20 (1st Cir.
2004).
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maintain that this Court has diversity jurisdiction over the case under 28 U.S.C. §
1332. Notice of Removal ¶ 7 (ECF No. 1). On September 4, 2012, the Defendants
answered the Complaint and moved to dismiss it for lack of personal jurisdiction
under Rule 12(b)(2) and for insufficiency under Rule 12(b)(6). Answer to Compl.
(ECF No. 5); Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss on Grounds that the Court Lacks Personal
Jurisdiction and Insufficiency of Pleading (ECF No. 6) (Defs.’ Mot.).2 Mr. Flanders
responded on September 6, 2012.

Answer (ECF No. 12) (Pl.’s Opp’n).

The

Defendants replied on September 24, 2012. Defs.’ Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to
Dismiss (ECF No. 13) (Defs.’ Reply). Mr. Flanders filed a sur-reply on September
25, 2012. Opp’n (ECF No. 14) (Pl.’s Sur-Reply). The Defendants objected to Mr.
Flanders’ sur-reply on October 1, 2012.

Defs.’ Objection to Pl.’s “Opp’n” Filed

September 25, 2012, Designated as “Surreply to Mot. to Dismiss” by the Clerk (ECF
No. 16) (Defs.’ Objection).
On November 14, 2012, the Magistrate Judge denied the Defendants’
objection to Mr. Flanders’ sur-reply and recommended that the Court grant the
Defendants’ motion to dismiss for insufficiency. Recommended Decision (ECF No.
21) (Rec. Dec.). On November 20, 2012, Mr. Flanders objected to the Magistrate
Judge’s recommendation that the Court grant the Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Objection and Mem. (ECF No. 23) (Pl.’s Objection). On November 23, 2012, Mr.
Flanders moved to amend and to add defendants. Mot. to Amend and to Add Defs.

The Defendants’ Motion states that they are moving “[p]ursuant to M.R. Civ. P. [Maine Rules
of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6).” Defs.’ Mot. at 1. However, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure apply to a civil action after it is removed from state court. FED. R. CIV. P. 81(c)(1). The
Court treats the Motion as pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6).
2

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(ECF No. 24). On November 30, 2012, the Defendants responded to Mr. Flanders’
objections to the Recommended Decision.

Resp. to Objection to Report and

Recommendations of Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 25) (Defs.’ Resp.). On December 6,
2012, the Defendants responded to Mr. Flanders’ motion to amend. Defs.’ Objection
to Pl.’s Mot. to Amend Compl. and to Add Defs. (ECF No. 27) (Defs.’ Opp’n).
Mr. Flanders has made a number of additional filings. Additional Filing
(ECF No. 26); Additional Filing (ECF No. 28); Additional Filing (ECF No. 29);
Additional Filing (ECF No. 30); Additional Filing (ECF No. 33). The Defendants
moved to strike ECF Nos. 28, 29, and 30 on January 2, 2013. Defs.’ Mot. to Strike
Pl.’s “Additional Filings” (ECF No. 31) (Defs.’ Mot. to Strike). Mr. Flanders filed a
memorandum concerning his right to privacy on January 11, 2013.

Additional

Filing: Memorandum; Right to Privacy (ECF No. 32).
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of Review for a Recommended Decision

The Magistrate Judge issued her Recommended Decision pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Upon timely objection to the Recommended Decision, this
Court is required to make “a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Gioiosa v. United States, 684 F.2d 176, 178 (1st Cir. 1982).
B.

The Plaintiff’s Pro Se Status

As the Magistrate Judge explained in her Recommended Decision, pro se
litigants are not held to the same strict standards as attorneys when it comes to

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technical rules of procedure. See Rec. Dec. at 5; Rodi v. New Eng. Sch. of Law, 389
F.3d 5, 20 (1st Cir. 2004) (“courts should endeavor, within reasonable limits, to
guard against the loss of pro se claims due to technical defects”). The Defendants
did not object to the Recommended Decision—including the Magistrate Judge’s
denial of their objection to Mr. Flanders’ technically improper filing of a sur-reply—
yet continue to press a number of technical procedural challenges. In the words of
the First Circuit, “[o]ur judicial system zealously guards the attempts of pro se
litigants on their own behalf.

We are required to construe liberally a pro se

complaint and [dismissal is warranted] only if a plaintiff cannot prove any set of
facts entitling him or her to relief.” Williams v. Mass. Coll. of Pharmacy and Allied
Health Scis., Civil Action No. 12-10313-DJC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46886, *10 (D.
Mass. Mar. 31, 2013) (quoting Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir.
1997)).
C.

Adam Flanders’ Objections

Mr. Flanders’ first objection is that the Magistrate Judge “failed to review all
relevant material,” specifically including “numerous audio and video publications,
which the Plaintiff offered to provide.”

Pl.’s Objection at 1. The principle that

courts must guard against the loss of pro se claims due to technical defects has its
limits. It does not require, for instance, that courts actively solicit evidence from a
pro se plaintiff and comb through that evidence for possible claims. The onus is on
the plaintiff, whether proceeding pro se or through counsel, to put his best claim
before the Court and to support it with specific allegations. This is particularly true

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in a defamation case, given that “a defendant is entitled to knowledge of the precise
language challenged as defamatory.”

Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated

Publications, et al., 953 F.2d 724, 728 n.6 (1st Cir. 1992). Mr. Flanders now quotes
some audio and video publications in his objection, but he gave the Magistrate
Judge no opportunity to consider these quotes. See Borden v. Sec’y of Health and
Human Servs., 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (“Parties must take before
the magistrate, not only their ‘best shot’ but all of their shots”) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
In any case, the quotes in Mr. Flanders’ objection do not differ significantly
from the statements the Magistrate Judge found legally insufficient. Compare Rec.
Dec. at 11-12 (considering statements accusing Mr. Flanders of “sexually molesting
a 14-year old boy,” “illegally having sex with young boys,” “filing a fraudulent
complaint,” and so on), with Pl.’s Objection at 1 (“convicted of molesting a 14-yearold boy,” “[t]his guy is clearly breaking the laws by harassing us and harassing the
businesses that we’re working with,” “convicted of sexually abusing a 14-year-old
boy”). The Court overrules this objection.
Mr. Flanders’ second objection is that the Magistrate Judge “did not address
Defendant’s defamation per se in reference to the allegations of child molestation.”
Pl.’s Objection at 1.

He argues that “child molestation” implies “forceful rape

against a child under the age of 12” and is a significant mischaracterization of his
conviction for Sexual Abuse of a Minor, which was based on an encounter Mr.
Flanders had with a 15-year-old boy when Mr. Flanders was 21. Id. at 1-2; Pl.’s

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Sur-Reply at 2.

“The average citizen or prudent person,” writes Mr. Flanders,

“would likely assume the Plaintiff had raped a very young child under the age of
12.” Pl.’s Objection at 2.
The Magistrate Judge carefully reviewed Mr. Flanders’ Complaint as well as
copies of the web pages referred to in the Complaint and found no indication that
the Defendants ever made this precise accusation against Mr. Flanders. See Rec.
Dec. at 10-14 (“Contrary to Flanders’s allegations, the defendants did not use the
term ‘child molestation’ in that publication”). Even in the phrases Mr. Flanders
quotes in his Objection, the Defendants accuse Mr. Flanders of “molesting a 14year-old boy” or a “teenage boy”—not of “child molestation,” and much less of any
conduct involving a “very young child under the age of 12,” as Mr. Flanders
suggests.3 As the Court observed above, “a defendant is entitled to knowledge of the
precise language challenged as defamatory.” Phantom Touring, 953 F.2d at 728
n.6. Focusing on the Defendants’ precise language rather than the Plaintiff’s selfserving rephrase, the Court overrules his objection.4
Mr. Flanders’ third objection is that the Magistrate Judge “did not address
the age discrepancy in that Defendants falsely allege that Plaintiff was convicted of
The Defendants object that these statements are not properly before the Court since they
were not part of the record considered by the Magistrate Judge. Defs.’ Objection at 2. Since the
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and since the Court concludes that the Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit
in any event, the Court does not base its ruling on this procedural objection.
4
The Court is skeptical of Mr. Flanders’ premise—that there is such a significant difference
between an accusation of child molestation and a conviction for sexual abuse of a minor that the
accusation justifies a defamation claim. Mr. Flanders was convicted of violating 17-A M.R.S. §
254(1)(A), Sexual Abuse of a Minor. To be convicted under this provision, Mr. Flanders would have
been at least five years older than his victims and his victims would have been either 14 or 15 years
old, facts that are consistent with the Defendants’ accusation. Section 254(1)(A) criminalizes the
commission of a sexual act, which covers a wide range of conduct. See 17-A M.R.S. § 251(1)(C)
(defining “sexual act”).
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sexually abusing a 14-year-old boy when in fact the alleged victim was 15 years old,
6 weeks from age 16, the absolute age of consent in the State of Maine.” Id. at 1.
Mr. Flanders is correct that the Magistrate Judge did not squarely address the age
discrepancy. She instead focused on the fact that the Defendants’ accusations had
suggested—inaccurately, according to Mr. Flanders—that Mr. Flanders’ conviction
involved one of the boys described in his letter, and concluded that this inaccuracy
did not matter because the “sting” resulted not from this inaccuracy but from the
true fact of the conviction. Rec. Dec. at 12-13.
As the Magistrate Judge correctly stated, defamation under Maine common
law requires “a false and defamatory statement.” Rec. Dec. at 9 (quoting Levesque v.
Doocy, 560 F.3d 82, 87 (1st Cir. 2009)). “Minor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity
so long as the substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge be justified.”
Fiacco v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity, 528 F.3d 94, 101 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991)); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF

TORTS § 581A cmt. f (“Slight inaccuracies of expression

are immaterial provided that the defamatory charge is true in substance”). Maine’s
criminal law makes no distinction between a 14-year-old and a 15-year-old for
purposes of Sexual Abuse of a Minor, a Class D crime. See 17-A M.R.S. § 254(1)(A).
The Defendants’ charge that Mr. Flanders had “molested a 14-year-old,” while not
strictly accurate (assuming they referred to Mr. Flanders’ conviction rather than his
letter, and accepting Mr. Flanders’ assertions as true), do not constitute a “gross
mischaracterization” of the true fact that Mr. Flanders was convicted for Sexual

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Abuse of a Minor, which under 17-A M.R.S. § 254(1)(A) must have involved either a
14 or 15 year old. Morgan v. Kooistra, 2008 ME 26, ¶¶ 27-28, 941 A.2d 447, 455
(2008); cf. Fiacco, 528 F.3d at 101 (rejecting the plaintiff’s attempt to establish
falsity based on the difference between “DWI” and “DWAI” or “DUI”). The Court
overrules the objection.
D.

Supplemental Allegations and Additional Filings

In a Motion to Amend and to Add Defendants submitted on November 23,
2012, Mr. Flanders asserts that the Defendants have “committed additional
defamation since this filing, on October 30, 2012.” Though styled as a motion to
amend, the Court analyzes this motion as a motion to supplement under Rule 15(d),
since it alleges events since the filing of the Complaint. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d). A
number of “Additional Filings” submitted by Mr. Flanders propose still more factual
allegations based on subsequent events, and the Court generally analyzes these too
as motions to supplement.
“An application for leave to file a supplemental pleading is addressed to the
discretion of the court and should be freely granted when doing so will promote the
economic and speedy disposition of the entire controversy between the parties, will
not cause undue delay or trial inconvenience, and will not prejudice the rights of
any of the other parties to the action.”

6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR A.

MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE

AND

PROCEDURE § 1504, at 257-59

(3d ed. 2010). Futility, however, is a proper reason to deny a motion to supplement,
see Prescott v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 2:09-cv-322-DBH, 2011 U.S. Dist.

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LEXIS 98553, *4 (D. Me. 2011) (quoting Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 71 F.3d 58, 66
(2d Cir. 1995)), and is the primary ground for denial urged by the Defendants, who
contend that the new allegations in the Motion to Amend are “redundant to the
former allegations.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 1-3.
1.

Motion to Amend and to Add Defendants

Mr. Flanders’ Motion to Amend and to Add Defendants concerns an October
30, 2012 interview Brian Camenker gave on RoadKill Radio and a November 16,
2012 article posted on the Thomas More Society’s website. Mr. Flanders claims that
in the radio interview, Mr. Camenker accused him “of molesting teenage boys, being
a ‘ward of the state,’ ‘abusing the court process,’ abusing other people, being a ‘sex
activist,’ [and] committing fraud.” Pl.’s Mot. at 1. This allegation does not differ in
any significant way from the allegations in Mr. Flanders’ Complaint, and the Court
denies the motion as to this allegation as futile, for the reasons in the Magistrate
Judge’s Recommended Decision.
In his motion, Mr. Flanders highlights portions of a November 16, 2012
article authored by the Thomas More Society (the article is not attributed to any
individual), including accusations that he is a pedophile, that he sexually abused
two 14-year-old boys, that he used illicit drugs, and that he engaged in criminal
activity in the youth group setting.

Pl.’s Mot. at 1.

Mr. Flanders asserts that

“Defendants’ counsel”—specifically Barry Mills, Peter Breen, and Thomas Brejcha—
are responsible for the article and should be joined as Defendants. Pl.’s Mot. at 1
(“On November 16, 2012, Defendants’ counsel spoke of the court magistrate’s recent

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recommendation for dismissal in an article titled, ‘Judge Urges Dismissal of Gay
Activist’s Slander & Libel Claims’”). Attorney Mills is Defendants Camenker and
Mass Resistance’s local counsel and Attorneys Breen and Brejcha (whose Pro Hac
Vice certifications identify them as from the Thomas More Society) are also
attorneys for the Defendants in this litigation. See Certifications for Admission Pro
Hac Vice (ECF No. 11 & ECF No. 11, Attach. 1).

The basis for Mr. Flanders’

assertion that any of these attorneys authored the article is unclear and the current
Defendants (Brian Camenker and Mass Resistance) do not concede it. Defs.’ Opp’n
at 4-5. The article itself represents that it was posted “by Thomas More Society.”5
Pl.’s Mot. Attach. 1, Judge Urges Dismissal of Gay Activist’s Slander & Libel
Claims, 1 (ECF No. 24-1).
The dispute over the article’s authorship matters little for present purposes,
however, as Mr. Flanders does not contend that the Defendants in this case—Brian
Camenker and Mass Resistance—authored it.

The Court rules today that Mr.

Flanders’ case against Mr. Camenker and Mass Resistance lacks merit and must be
dismissed. If Mr. Flanders wishes to proceed against Attorneys Mills, Breen, and
Brejcha, he should file a new complaint in an appropriate court.
2.

Additional Filing Submitted December 5, 2012

In their opposition, Mr. Camenker and Mass Resistance’s attorneys observe that Mr.
Flanders provides “no factual support for his allegation” that they “are somehow responsible for the
content of statements published on the Thomas More Society website.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 4-5. They
concede that the website identifies Thomas Brejcha, one of the Defendants’ attorneys of record, as
“president and chief counsel of the Thomas More Society,” but they point out that Mr. Flanders
“offers no reason to believe that Mr. Brejcha was responsible for any portion of the text of the website
other than his quoted statement.” Id. at 5. In his motion to amend, Mr. Flanders does not claim
that the quoted statement that is attributed to Attorney Brejcha is defamatory.
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In an “Additional Filing” submitted on December 5, 2012, Mr. Flanders
alleges that the Defendants “sent out a blast email” and “published another article
defaming me” on December 2, 2012. Additional Filing (ECF No. 26). He asserts
that the article “contains numerous falsities, such as proclaiming ‘Victory: Federal
judge dismisses $1 million lawsuit against Camenker! Homosexual activist
appeals.’” Id. He states that the article accuses him “of threatening and harassing
others, and once again . . . of ‘molestation’” and that this material “clearly
constitutes additional defamation per se.” Id. These allegations are no different in
kind from those the Magistrate Judge rightly recommended dismissed. The Court
treats this Additional Filing as a motion to supplement and denies it as futile.
3.

Additional Filing Submitted December 19, 2012

In an “Additional Filing” submitted on December 19, 2012, Mr. Flanders
alleges that Brian Camenker gave a defamatory interview with “Road Kill Radio”
that was published on December 11, 2012.

Additional Filing (ECF No. 28).

However, he does not quote any precise language from the interview. Id. In this
Additional Filing, Mr. Flanders states that he has “been contacted by hostile third
parties as a direct result of the Defendant’s publications” and that he and his family
are “genuinely concerned for [his] safety.” Id. at 1. He goes on to assert that the
Defendants’ conduct amounts to criminal stalking. Id. at 2. Whatever the merits of
this assertion, private citizens are not empowered to bring criminal charges. To the
extent this Additional Filing represents a motion to supplement, the Court denies
it.

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4.

Additional Filing Submitted December 21, 2012

In the first three paragraphs of an “Additional Filing” submitted on
December 21, 2012, Mr. Flanders discusses his attempts to have the websites he
objects to taken down. Additional Filing, 1 (ECF No. 29). He then refers to a
December 19, 2012 interview Brian Camenker gave on Road Kill Radio. Id. Mr.
Flanders alleges that in this interview, Mr. Camenker “falsely accuses [Mr.
Flanders] of harassing him and of being a ‘sex activist’” and falsely “claims that [Mr.
Flanders] is being supported and funded by some sort of hidden gay rights
organization that doesn’t want to publicly support me because of my criminal
record.” Id. To the extent this Additional Filing represents a motion to supplement
with new allegations, those allegations are no different in kind from those
addressed above, and the Court denies the motion as futile.
5.

Additional Filing Submitted December 28, 2012

In an “Additional Filing” submitted on December 28, 2012, Mr. Flanders
alleges that the Defendants “published another defamatory article” on their website
on December 23, 2012.

Additional Filing (ECF No. 30).

He claims that the

Defendants “again falsely accused me of several crimes and serious sexual
misconduct, constituting defamation per se.” Id. He reports that the Defendants
wrote that he was convicted of “sexually molesting a teenage boy”; that they “falsely
accuse [him] of attempting to ‘punish and destroy’ them”; that they “falsely accuse
[him] of committing fraud and perjury”; and that they “have raised over $30,000,
part of which is a result of their harassment, defamation, and stalking against me.”

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Id.

He again suggests that the Defendants’ behavior is criminal and refers to

threatening emails he has received from third parties. Id. Finally, he asserts that
“[a]t the very least, it constitutes intentional infliction of emotional distress,” but
provides no legal support for this claim. Id. These allegations are no different in
kind from the allegations addressed above. The Court treats this Additional Filing
as a motion to supplement and denies it as futile.
6.

Motion to Strike

In a Motion to Strike, the Defendants ask the Court to strike three of Mr.
Flanders’ Additional Filings.

Defs.’ Mot. to Strike at 1.

The Motion to Strike

appears to analyze the Additional Filings as additional objections to the
Recommended Decision, and argues that they are not properly before the Court
because the Magistrate Judge could not have considered the new allegations they
contain. Id. at 1-2. They ask for an opportunity to respond if the Court chooses to
consider the content of the Additional Filings. Id. at 2. Since the Court is treating
the Additional Filings referred to as motions to supplement and is denying them,
the Court dismisses the Motion to Strike as moot.
7.

Additional Filing Submitted January 11, 2013

In an “Additional Filing” submitted on January 11, 2013, Mr. Flanders
submits “an additional Objection to Judge Kravchuk’s recommendation” concerning
alleged violations of his privacy. Additional Filing (ECF No. 32). Although pro se
pleadings are held to less demanding standards, “such litigants are not exempt from
procedural rules.”

Dutil v. Murphy, 550 F.3d 154, 158 (1st Cir. 2008).

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The

Magistrate Judge issued her Recommended Decision on November 14, 2012. The
law provides that a party may file written objections to a recommended decision
“[w]ithin fourteen days after being served with a copy.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
Mr. Flanders in fact filed written objections six days after the issuance of the
Recommended Decision. See Pl.’s Objection. He offers no explanation for his failure
to submit this additional objection within fourteen days after being served with a
copy of the Recommended Decision. For a sustained period, scarcely a week went
by without an additional filing of one kind or another from Mr. Flanders,
demonstrating that he was capable of making the objection in a timely manner.
The Court declines to consider the additional objection contained in this untimely
filing.
8.

Additional Filing Submitted January 31, 2013

In an “Additional Filing” submitted on January 31, 2013, Mr. Flanders
alleges that “[o]n January 29, 2013 Road Kill Radio published another video
defaming, harassing, and stalking me.” Additional Filing (ECF No. 33). He quotes
Brian Camenker as saying in the video, “[f]iled a phony harassment order,” “[h]e
was later convicted and spent time in jail for sexually molesting a teenage boy,” and
“[f]ederal judge wrote a rather lengthy description of how ridiculous his charges
were and just simply didn’t hold up and that we have the right to say what we said.”
Id. Though Mr. Flanders may disagree with these statements, they are no different
in kind from his earlier allegations. The Court treats this Additional Filing as a
motion to supplement and denies it as futile.

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III.

CONCLUSION
The

Court

has

reviewed

and

considered

the

Magistrate

Judge’s

Recommended Decision, together with the entire record, and has made a de novo
determination of those portions of the Recommended Decision to which Mr.
Flanders has made timely objections. The Court concurs with the Magistrate Judge
for the reasons set forth in her Recommended Decision. For those reasons and for
the reasons set forth in this decision, the Court issues the following Orders:
1.

The Court AFFIRMS the Recommended Decision of the Magistrate
Judge (ECF No. 21);

2.

The Court GRANTS the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.
6);

3.

The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend and to Add
Defendants (ECF No. 24);

4.

The Court treats Additional Filing (ECF No. 26), Additional Filing
(ECF No. 28), Additional Filing (ECF No. 29), Additional Filing
(ECF No. 30), and Additional Filing (ECF No. 33) as motions to
supplement and DENIES them.

5.

The Court DISMISSES as moot Defendants’ Motion to Strike
Plaintiff’s “Additional Filings” (ECF No. 31).

SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
15

Dated this 10th day of June, 2013

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