STILE v. SOMERSET COUNTY et al

Filing 601

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENTAND PLAINTIFF'S RELATED MOTIONS dismissing 431 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; granting in part and dismissing in part 431 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and dismis sing in part 434 Motion for Summary Judgment; dismissing 434 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; dismissing 438 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; granting 438 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and dismissing in part 440 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 499 Motion to Strike ; denying 562 Motion for Order Pursuant to Rule 56(d); denying 583 Motion for Ruling on Motion to Stike By JUDGE JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR. (CCS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
JAMES STILE,
Plaintiff,
v.
SOMERSET COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.

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1:13-cv-00248-JAW

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND PLAINTIFF’S RELATED MOTIONS
In this action, James Stile alleges that while he was a pretrial detainee at the
Somerset County Jail, Defendants deprived him of several constitutionallyguaranteed rights, 1 as well as his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Before the Court are the following motions:
Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and for Summary
Judgment. Majority Defs.’ Mot. for J. on the Pleadings and for Summ. J.
(ECF No. 431); 2
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and for Summary Judgment by
Defendants Keith Plourd and Jeffrey Jacques. Defs. Plourd’s and
Jacques’s Mot. for J. on the Pleadings and for Summ. J. (ECF No. 434);
Defendants Somerset County and Barry DeLong’s (the County
Defendants) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion for
Mr. Stile asserts claims of excessive force, deprivation of First Amendment rights, unlawful
search and seizure, unconstitutional strip searches, denial of due process, and denial of medically
necessary treatment. Mr. Stile also asserts a state law claim of assault. Am. Compl. Final (ECF No.
92) (Final Compl.)
2
The motion was filed on behalf of all of the Defendants except Defendants Plourd, Jacques,
Allen, DeLong, and Somerset County, who filed separate dispositive motions. The Defendants other
than Defendants Plourd, Jacques, Allen, DeLong, and Somerset County, will be referred to collectively
as the Majority Defendants.
1

Summary Judgment. County Defs.’ Mot. for J. on the Pleadings and for
Summ. J. (ECF No. 438);
Defendant David Allen’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Def. Allen’s
Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 440);
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Video Exhibits, including a separate motion
for a ruling on the motion to strike. Pl.’s Mot. to Strike Video Exs. (ECF
No. 499); Mot. for Ruling on Mot. to Strike (ECF No. 583);
Plaintiff’s Motion for Court to Grant Order Pursuant to Rule 56(d). Pl.’s
Mot. for Court to Grant Order Pursuant to Rule 56(d) (ECF No. 562).
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 1, 2013, James Stile filed a § 1983 suit alleging various constitutional

violations and state tort claims against numerous defendants. Compl. (ECF No. 1).
On August 14, 2014, Mr. Stile filed an Amended Complaint with authorization of this
Court, except as to the “medical defendants” and corrections officer Simonds. Am.
Compl. Final (ECF No. 92) (Final Compl.); Order (ECF No. 86). Since then, this case
has been extended largely in part due to Mr. Stile’s unconventional and repetitive
filings. At the time of this order, this case has nearly 600 docket entries. The Court,
therefore, will not review this case’s entire procedural history but will focus on the
procedural history relevant to the pending motions.
On August 15, 2017, a Magistrate Judge of this Court removed the stay on this
case and ordered that all dispositive motions be filed by September 15, 2017. Order
Removing Stay/Establishing Mot. Deadline (ECF No. 427). On September 13, 2017,
Majority Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion for
summary judgment together with a statement of material facts. Majority Defs.’ Mot.
for J. on the Pleadings and for Summ. J. (ECF No. 431) (Majority Mots.); Statement
2

of Material Facts in Support of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 432) (Majority
DSMF). Also, on September 13, 2017, Defendants Keith Plourd and Jeffrey Jacques
filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion for summary judgment
together with a statement of material facts. Defs. Plourd’s and Jacques’s Mot. for J.
on the Pleadings and for Summ. J. (ECF No. 434) (Plourd/Jacques Mots.); Statement
of Material Facts by Defs. Keith Plourd and Jeffrey Jacques (ECF No. 435)
(Plourd/Jacques DSMF). On September 15, 2017, County Defendants filed a motion
for judgment on the pleadings and motion for summary judgment together with a
statement of material facts. County Defs.’ Mot. for J. on the Pleadings and for Summ.
J. (ECF No. 438) (County Mots.); County Defs. Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts in Support of Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 439) (County DSMF). On the same
day, Defendant David Allen filed a motion for summary judgment together with a
statement of material facts together with a statement of material facts. Def. Allen’s
Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 440) (Allen. Mot.); Def. David Allen’s Statement of
Material Facts in Support of Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 441) (Allen DSMF).
On December 7, 2017, Mr. Stile filed an opposition to majority defendant’s
motions for judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment along with his
statement of fact. Statement of Fact & Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 486).
However, Mr. Stile subsequently represented that he could not completely respond to
the various motions for summary judgment because he did not have certain evidence
relevant to the dispositive motions, and on April 20, 2018, the Magistrate Judge

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extended the time for him to complete his responses to Defendants’ four motions until
May 25, 2018. Order on Mot. to Extend Time (ECF No. 540).
On June 22, 2018, Mr. Stile filed a response in opposition to Defendants
Plourd’s and Jacques’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment.
Resp. & Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Defs. Plourd’s and Jacques’s Mot. for J. on the
Pleadings and Summ. J. (ECF No. 554) (Resp. to Defs. Plourd’s and Jacque’s Mots.).
Defendants Plourd and Jacques filed their reply on June 29, 2018. Reply to Pl.’s
Opp’n to Mot. for J. on the Pleadings and Summ. J. by Defs. Plourd and Jacques (ECF
No. 556) (Defs. Plourd and Jacques Reply).
On July 5, 2018, Mr. Stile filed a response and affidavit to County Defendants’
motions. Aff. and Resp. to County Defs.’ Mot. for J. on the Pleadings and for Summ.
J. (ECF No. 561) (Resp. to County Defs.’ Mots.). Mr. Stile filed another response on
July 16, 2018. Resp. to County Defs.’ Mot. for J. on the Pleadings and for Summ. J.
(ECF No. 566) (Resp. to County Defs.’ Mots. II). County Defendants filed a reply on
July 30, 2018). County’s Reply to Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. for J. on the Pleadings & Mot. for
Summ. J. (ECF No. 575) (County Defs.’ Reply).
On July 16, 2018, Mr. Stile filed a response in opposition to David Allen’s
motion for summary judgment. Pl.’s Resp. to Def. Allen’s Mot. for Summ. J. with
Incorporated Mem. of Law (ECF No. 567) (Pl.’s Resp. to Def. Allen’s Mot.). Defendant
Allen filed a reply on July 26, 2018. Def. David Allen Reply Mem. of Law in Support
of Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 570) (Def. Allen’s Reply).

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On July 30, 2018, Mr. Stile filed a response to Majority Defendant’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment. Resp. to Majority Defs.’ Mot. for
J. on the Pleadings and Summ. J. (ECF No. 576) (Pl.’s Majority Resp.). On August 9,
2018, Majority Defendants filed a reply to Mr. Stile’s response to their motions. Defs.’
Reply Mem. of Law in Support of Their Mot. for J. on the Pleadings & Summ. J. (ECF
No. 587) (Majority Defs. Reply). Mr. Stile filed a supplemental response to his own
response to Majority Defendants’ motions on August 20, 2018, and Majority
Defendants filed a supplemental reply to Mr. Stile’s supplemental response on
August 31, 2018. Pl.’s Suppl. Resp. (ECF No. 589) (Pl.’s Supp. Majority Resp.); Defs.
Suppl. Reply (ECF No. 592); (Majority Suppl. Reply).
Also before the Court is Mr. Stile’s motion to strike video exhibits filed on
March 1, 2018, and a separate motion for a ruling on that motion, filed on August 6,
2018. Pl.’s Mot. to Strike Video Exs. (ECF No. 499); Mot. for Ruling on Mot. to Strike
(ECF No. 583). Mr. Stile also filed a motion for order pursuant to Rule 56(d). Pl.’s
Mot. for Court to Grant Order Pursuant to Rule 56(d) (ECF No. 562).
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
A.

Summary Judgment Standard 3

All Defendants, except David Allen, filed motions for judgment on the pleadings in conjunction
with their motions for summary judgment. As the First Circuit noted, “the fate of [a motion for
judgment on the pleadings] will depend upon whether the pleadings, taken as a whole, reveal any
potential dispute about one or more of the material facts.” Gulf Coast Bank & Trust Co., v. Reder, 355
F.3d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1367, at 509-10 (2d ed. 1995)). Here, Mr. Stile and the Defendants have disputed most
of the essential facts set forth in the Complaint. Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(d), the Court treated the motions for judgment on the pleadings as motions for summary
judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56.”).
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“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “After the moving party has presented evidence
in support of its motion for summary judgment, ‘the burden shifts to the nonmoving
party, with respect to each issue on which he has the burden of proof, to demonstrate
that a trier of fact reasonably could find in his favor.’” Woodward v. Emulex Corp.,
714 F.3d 632, 637 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d
151, 158 (1st Cir. 1998)).

A court reviews the factual record in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, resolving evidentiary conflicts and drawing
reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor. Perry v. Roy, 782 F.3d 73, 77 (1st
Cir. 2015). If a court’s review of the record reveals evidence sufficient to support
findings in favor of the non-moving party on one or more of his claims, a trial-worthy
controversy exists and summary judgment must be denied as to any supported claim.
Id. (“The district court’s role is limited to assessing whether there exists evidence
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Unsupported claims are properly dismissed. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
B.

Local Rules 7(b) and 56 and Pro Se Prisoner Litigants

As the Defendants also filed accompanying motions for summary judgment, the Court
effectively resolved each motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis of the accompanying motion
for summary judgment. Whether technically the Court is ruling on the motions for judgment on the
pleadings converted into motions for summary judgment or on the motions for summary judgment
themselves is academic. To clarify the record, the Court is dismissing without prejudice each of the
motions for judgment on the pleadings and has grounded its disposition on the pending motions for
summary judgment.

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The various unorthodox filings and numerous extensions in this case have
made the resolution of the pending motions unnecessarily complicated and obtuse.
Local Rule 7(b) states that “[u]nless within 21 days after the filing of a motion the
opposing party files written objection thereto, incorporating a memorandum of law,
the opposing party shall be deemed to have waived objection.” Local Rule 56 section
(c) provides that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall submit its
own statement of material facts in which it admits, denies, or qualifies the movant’s
statement of material facts, and section (f) provides that facts shall be deemed
admitted if not properly controverted. Local Rule 7(b) has been extensively applied
to a variety of motions and the Court enjoys “broad latitude” in administrating its
application. NEPSK, Inc. v. Town of Houlton, 283 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2012). In
NEPSK, the First Circuit discussed how a court should approach a motion for
summary judgment when an opposing party failed to follow a local rule. Id. at 5-9.
The First Circuit concluded that a court may not simply grant a motion for summary
judgment because an opposing party failed to properly respond, but must instead
“determine whether summary judgment is appropriate.” Id. at 8 (internal quotations
omitted).

However, “[b]y failing to file the required response within the time

prescribed by the applicable local rule, the non-moving party waives the right to
controvert the facts asserted by the moving party in the motion for summary
judgment and the supporting materials accompanying it.” Id. at 8 (quoting Jaroma
v. Massey, 873 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1989)).

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At the same time, courts are generally more relaxed about compliance with
procedural rules when a litigant is acting pro se. In Clarke v. Blais, 473 F. Supp. 2d
(D. Me. 2007), Judge Hornby thoughtfully outlined the competing interests courts
encounter when dealing with ineffective rule compliance by pro se litigants. In
Demmons v. Tritch, 484 F. Supp. 2d 177, 182-84 (D. Me. 2007), this Court confronted
the same questions and stated “[t]here are no easy solutions” to these issues. Even
so, the First Circuit has written that pro se litigants are not exempt from local and
federal rules. See Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d 24, 27–28 & n.2 (1st Cir. 2000).
In this case, the Defendants filed their dispositive motions in mid-September
of 2017. The Court granted in part Mr. Stile’s motion for an extension of time to
respond to these motions and set the deadline as November 15, 2017. Order (ECF
No. 444).

Mr. Stile subsequently filed four partial responses to Defendants’

statements of material facts nearly a month after the Court’s imposed deadline on
December 12, 2017. Resp. to Statement of Fact (ECF No. 483) (Resp. to Statement of
Fact I); Resp. to Statement of Fact (ECF No. 484) (Resp. to Statement of Fact II); Resp.
to Statement of Fact (ECF No. 485) (Resp. to Statement of Fact III); Resp. to Statement
of Fact (ECF No. 486) (Resp. to Statement of Fact IV). In his letter accompanying
these responses, Mr. Stile recognized that the Court extended his response time to
November 15, 2017, but stated that given the voluminous pleadings, and other issues,
he could not meet that deadline. Letter at 2 (ECF No. 487). Then, after a telephonic
conference on February 14, 2018, the Magistrate Judge extended the time for Mr.
Stile to file his response memoranda to Defendants’ motions until April 20, 2018.

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Procedural Order (ECF No. 497). Subsequent to this order, but before the April 20
deadline, Mr. Stile filed fourteen motions and letters with the Court.
On April 20, 2018, the Court again extended Mr. Stile’s response time to
Defendants’ dispositive motions until May 25, 2018. Order on Mot. to Extend Time
(ECF No. 540). Mr. Stile eventually filed a response to Defendants Plourd’s and
Jacques’ motions on June 22, 2018, almost a full month after the Court’s deadline.
Resp. to Defs. Plourd’s & Jacque’s Mots. (ECF No. 554). Mr. Stile filed a response to
Defendant’s Allen’s Motion for Summary Judgment on July 16, 2018, nearly two
months after the response deadline. Pl.’s Resp. to Def. Allen’s Mot. (ECF No. 567).
Mr. Stile also filed an Affidavit pertaining to County Defendants’ motions on July 5,
2018, and his response to their motions on July 16, 2018. 4 Resp. to County Defs.’
Mots. (ECF No. 561); Resp. to County Defs.’ Mots. II (ECF No. 566). Lastly, Mr. Stile
filed his response to Majority Defendants’ motions on July 30, 2018, with a
supplemental filing on August 20, 2018. Resp. to Majority Defs.’ Mot. for J. on the
Pleadings and Summ. J. (ECF No. 576); Pl.’s Suppl. Resp. (ECF No. 589).
As the Court stated in its order entered on September 4, 2018, this case has
been pending for over five years and Mr. Stile elected to name dozens of Defendants.
Order on Mot. For Judicial Intervention and for Extension of Time and on Mot. to a
Partial Resps. and to Allow the R. to Remain Open, and Mot. for Ct. to Obtain Bate
Stamped Materials from Defs.’ that Pl. Cited in his Resps. to Dispositive Pleadings at

On July 17, 2018, Mr. Stile filed a separate Affidavit pertaining to his responses to County
Defendants’ motions, Defendant Allen’s motion, and Defendants Jacque’s and Plourd’s motion. Aff. of
James Stile (ECF No. 569).
4

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14 (ECF No. 594). Mr. Stile’s responses to Defendants’ dispositive motions have been
unorthodox, untimely, and at times incoherent. If the Court ruled on the pending
motions for summary judgment based on Mr. Stile’s submissions in response to the
dispositive motions and if it applied the rules strictly against him, the Defendants
would prevail in every motion, because Mr. Stile failed to comply with the Local Rules
in presenting his responses.
Nevertheless, in an effort to be fair (perhaps excessively so) to Mr. Stile, the
Court treated his two complaints--the initial and the amended--as verified
complaints, which at the summary judgment stage may be viewed as affidavit
equivalents, to frame his position in this suit. Sheinkopf v. Stone, 927 F.2d 1259,
1262 (1st Cir. 1991); Demmons, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 182. This District has generally
considered prisoner affidavits even if noncompliant with Local Rule 56. See e.g.,
Clarke v. Blais, 473 F. Supp. 2d 124, 130 (D. Me. 2007). Mr. Stile’s two complaints
are notarized and contain the words “sworn to before me” above the notary’s stamp.
See Compl. at 23; Final Compl. at 31. The Court considers this sufficient for a verified
complaint and treats both as affidavit equivalents. At the same time, the Court will
consider only specific facts outlined in Mr. Stile’s complaints, and will not consider
conclusory allegations that do not make a factual showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. Sheinkopf, 927 F.2d at 1262; Sullivan v. City of Springfield, 561 F.3d
7, 24 (1st Cir. 2009) (citation omitted) (Courts will “ignore conclusory allegations,
improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation”); Perry v. Ryan, No. 90–1826,

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1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 7098, at *7, 940 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1991) (discussing Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)).
III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

The Criminal Case

In United States v. James Stile, a federal grand jury charged Mr. Stile with,
and he ultimately pleaded guilty to, Robbery of a Controlled Substance from a DEA
Registered Pharmacy. Indictment (ECF No. 8 – No. 1:11-cr-00185-JAW); Min. Entry
(ECF No. 541 - No. 1:11-cr-00185-JAW). On May 29, 2015, this Court sentenced Mr.
Stile to 120 months incarceration, five years supervised release, a special assessment
of $100.00, restitution in the amount of $13,306.93, and no fine. J. (ECF No. 579 No. 1:11-cr-00185-JAW).
Mr. Stile first appeared in this Court on the criminal charges on November 2,
2011 following the execution of a federal arrest warrant. Arrest Warrant Returned
Executed (ECF No. 20 - No. 1:11-cr-00185-JAW). At a November 8, 2011, detention
hearing, the Magistrate Judge ordered Mr. Stile detained pending trial, and Mr.
Stile’s pretrial detention continued at the Somerset County Jail, where he had been
held beginning September 13, 2011. Order of Detention (ECF No. 33 - No. 1:11-cr00185-JAW); Final Compl. ¶ 3; Majority DSMF ¶¶ 1-2; County DSMF ¶ 17;
Plourd/Jacques DSMF ¶ 1; Allen DSMF Intro. On January 25, 2012, Mr. Stile’s
criminal defense counsel moved to enforce the order of detention, asserting that Mr.
Stile had been denied the ability to communicate with counsel by phone or written

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correspondence. Mot. to Enforce Order of Detention (ECF No. 45). 5 Mr. Stile’s counsel
asked that the Court order Mr. Stile moved to another facility. Id. at 2.
In an affidavit in support of the motion, Mr. Stile asserted that he suffered
from degenerative disc disease, with a medical history of two discectomies and one
laminectomy, and that his spinal condition was aggravated on December 20, 2011
when corrections officers separated Mr. Stile and another inmate during an
altercation in which Mr. Stile attacked the other inmate. 6 Id. Attach. Decl. of James
Stile I. ¶¶ 3-4; Majority DSMF ¶¶ 6-7. Mr. Stile further stated that he was placed
in administrative segregation due to the altercation with the prisoner, and that he
began refusing his meals on December 26, 2011 because he did not feel safe given
that an officer who served his meal tray was a relative of the inmate with whom Mr.
Stile fought. Id. Attach. Decl. of James Stile I. ¶¶ 4, 6.
B.

Extractions at Samoset County Jail7

At his deposition, Mr. Stile’s counsel in the criminal matter testified that he went to the
Somerset County Jail on January 16, 2012, to visit Mr. Stile, and was informed that he could not meet
with Mr. Stile because, according to jail personnel, Mr. Stile stated he was unable to walk to the
visitation room. Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. for J. on the Pleadings & for Summ. J. Attach. 13, Ex. B (ECF
No. 566-13). Counsel had last spoken with Mr. Stile by phone on December 23, 2011. Id. (ECF No.
566-15). Counsel returned to the jail on January 24, 2012, and had a non-contact meeting with Mr.
Stile, at which meeting Mr. Stile appeared in a wheelchair. Resp. to Def. Allen Mot. for J. on the
Pleadings & for Summ. J. Attach. 2, Ex. B1-B2 (ECF No. 567-2). The next day Counsel moved to
enforce the order of detention.
6
Following a January 30, 2011 hearing on the motion to enforce order of detention, the U.S.
Marshal informed the Court that it had arranged for Mr. Stile to be transferred to the Cumberland
County Jail. After his transfer, Mr. Stile returned to Somerset County Jail on a “couple” occasions,
but only for a short duration; the last on September 30, 2013. Majority DSMF ¶ 15.
7
The Court notes it has already conducted an extensive review of all of the DVDs relevant to
the claims at issue. Order on Mot. For Judicial Intervention and for Extension of Time and on Mot. to
a Partial Resps. and to Allow the R. to Remain Open, and Mot. for Ct. to Obtain Bate Stamped Materials
from Defs.’ that Pl. Cited in his Resps. to Dispositive Pleadings, at 14 (ECF No. 594).
5

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Mr. Stile was initially classified as a medium security inmate on September
16, 2011, and this classification remained in effect on October 3, 2011 and December
13, 2011. Majority DSMF ¶ 5; Plourd/Jacques DSMF ¶ 1; Allen DSMF Intro. On
December 20, 2011, Mr. Stile was involved in an altercation with another inmate,
Ernest Almeida, which resulted in Mr. Stile being taken to the Special Management
Unit. Final Compl. ¶ 10; Majority DMSF ¶¶ 6, 8; County DSMF ¶ 20; Plourd/Jacques
DSMF ¶ 1; Allen DSMF Intro. Inmate Almeida is a relative of Defendant Corrections
Officer Almeida. Final Compl. ¶ 11. The Special Management Unit is located in Apod and is where inmates on administrative segregation and disciplinary segregation
are housed, in addition to inmates classified as maximum security. Majority DMSF
¶ 8; County DSMF ¶ 18; Plourd/Jacques DSMF ¶ 1; Allen DSMF Intro. A decision to
return an inmate from A-Pod to general population is based on the behavior and
statements of the inmate while in the unit and/or or recommendations by medical
staff.

County DSMF ¶ 21.

Either the jail administrator or the assistant jail

administrator would make this decision, after consulting with medical and A-Pod
staff. Id. ¶ 22. Mr. Stile was subjected to numerous strip searches while at Somerset
County Jail. Final Compl. ¶ 12.
The next day, on December 21, 2011, Mr. Stile’s classification was changed to
maximum security. Majority DMSF ¶ 9; Plourd/Jacques DSMF ¶ 1; Allen DSMF
Intro. For about thirty-nine days, Mr. Stile did not eat his meals for fear that they
were being tampered with and he experienced mental and physical issues. Final
Compl. ¶ 14. Mr. Stile previously observed Defendants Almedia and Meunier spit in

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his food tray before handing him the tray. Id. ¶ 13. Mr. Stile also heard Defendant
Meunier state that there would be shards of glass in his food. 8 Id. ¶ 13. When Mr.
Stile first refused his meals, he was also reclassified as an inmate requiring a suicide
watch, and was required to visit the medical department daily (later twice daily or
once per shift) so that his “vitals” could be monitored. 9 Majority DSMF ¶¶ 12, 62022; County DSMF ¶ 9, Ex. I; Plourd/Jacques DSMF ¶ 1; Allen DSMF Intro.
The first of several extractions occurred on December 26, 2011. 10 On the
morning of December 26, Mr. Stile refused an order to relinquish his bedding and
blankets. Final Compl. ¶ 15; Majority DSMF ¶ 252. 11 Mr. Stile says when he refused,
he was sprayed with a chemical agent.

Final Compl. ¶ 15.

Mr. Stile then

unsuccessfully tried to set off the sprinklers. Majority DSMF ¶ 254. The CERT Team
was assembled to remove Mr. Stile from his cell to give him medical treatment and
move him to another cell. Id. ¶ 256. Before entering his cell, Defendant Bugbee asked
Mr. Stile again if he wanted to cuff up; Mr. Stile refused. Id. ¶ 261. Mr. Stile had

In his Amended Complaint, Mr. Stile alleges he was unable to reach the water in his sink, and
unsuccessfully asked the Defendants to hydrate him. Final Compl. ¶ 32. A review of the record
confirms that Mr. Stile drank various liquids while on his hunger strike.
9
Mr. Stile’s refusal to eat was classified as a “hunger strike” and that strike lasted
approximately thirty-nine days. Majority DSMF ¶ 12. The County Defendants attached to their
motion a copy of the Jail’s Emergency Response – Hunger or Medication Strike Policy, Policy 4.18.
10
Before this date on December 22, 2011, Mr. Stile asserts that he cell was searched pursuant
to a federal search warrant but that no warrant was provided to him and that all of his materials were
seized and boxed up. Final Compl. ¶ 11. Mr. Stile asserts that he was also stripped of his clothes and
was left naked in his cell. Id. Defendant Plourd observed and videotaped this search, which was
conducted by a Federal ATF agent. Plourd/Jacques DSMF ¶ 3. The Court views Mr. Stile’s verified
complaints in the light most favorable to his theory of the case that is consistent with the record.
Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2002). Therefore, the Courts states
Mr. Stile’s version of these events insofar as no search warrant was presented to him and his
belongings and clothes were seized.
11
Defendants assert that Mr. Stile refused to make his bed. Majority DSMF ¶ 252. Because the
Court must take all reasonable inferences consistent with the record in favor to Mr. Stile, it states his
version of this event.
8

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pinned his mattress up against his cell door. Id. ¶ 260. Upon entering the cell, Mr.
Stile was shocked with an electric shield at various points. Id. ¶ 263-64; Final Compl.
¶ 15. 12 Mr. Stile was given the clothes he was wearing previously when the chemical
agent was deployed. Final Compl. ¶ 15. 13 A nurse came to examine Mr. Stile and
offer treatment, but he did not respond to her. Id. ¶ 267. Mr. Stile walked on his own
power to a chair in the dayroom in A-pod. Id. ¶ 266. The video of the extraction ends
with a visual strip search. Id. ¶ 268. 14 The video of that extraction reflects that Mr.
Stile walked on that date, both before and after the extraction. Majority DSMF ¶
266. 15
The next extraction occurred on December 31, 2011. Id. ¶ 269. Mr. Stile
refused to come to the door and cuff up. Id.; Plourd/Jacques DSMF ¶ 9. The electric
shield was used to contain Mr. Stile but not deployed.

Majority DSMF ¶ 273;

Plourd/Jacques DSMF ¶ 12. Defendant Plourd, without a prior verbal warning, used
the handheld electronic device after Mr. Stile refused several orders to stand up.

Mr. Stile asserts that other devices were deployed against him and that he was beaten with
fists. Final Compl. ¶ 15. The record only shows that the electronic shield was deployed against Mr.
Stile. Majority DSFM ¶ 262-64, Video Ex. 1.
13
Mr. Stile claims he was denied a request for clean clothing. Id. The video does not show such
a denial. Majority DSFM ¶ 268, Video Ex. 1. The Majority Defendants assert that Mr. Stile was given
new clothes after he was placed in an A-pod dayroom. Id. The video for this extraction does not clearly
show whether the clothes given to Mr. Stile were new or the same clothes he had at the time of
extraction. Because the Court must take all reasonable inferences consistent with the record in favor
to Mr. Stile, it accepts his version of this event.
14
During the first extraction, Mr. Stile was on his feet carrying his foam mattress, and Mr. Stile
forcibly attempted to prevent the officers from entering his cell. Majority DSMF ¶¶ 255, 262; Video
Ex. 1. Defendant Meunier shielded officers from Mr. Stile with the use of a shield device capable of
emitting an electrical shock. Id ¶¶ 263-264. Mr. Stile’s assertive use of his mattress, for whatever
purpose, demonstrates that he was physically capable of coming to the door of his cell to cuff up.
Indeed, even after being restrained on the floor and carried to and from the medical department, Mr.
Stile can be seen standing and walking in his new cell, the “camera cell.” Id. ¶¶ 266, 268; Video Ex. 1.
15
Mr. Stile asserts that his inability to walk arose sometime after a cell extraction that occurred
on December 26, 2011. See Final Compl. ¶¶ 15-18.
12

15

Majority DSMF ¶ 275-76; Plourd/Jacques DSMF ¶¶ 10-11. 16 Mr. Stile was placed in
handcuffs and leg irons and was taken first to the medical department and then to
be weighed. Majority DSMF ¶ 269, 274; Plourd/Jacques DSMF ¶ 9. The Defendants
carried Mr. Stile to the medical department. 17 Majority DSMF ¶ 272; Video Ex. 2.
Upon Mr. Stile’s arrival at medical, a nurse evaluated him. Id. ¶ 278. While in
medical, Mr. Stile told the officers, “You hurt me Monday,” evidently a reference to
the December 26, 2011 extraction. 18
On January 1, 2012, Mr. Stile was extracted from his cell, taken to the medical
department, and then to the laundry room to be weighed by Defendants Herrera,
Libby, Lightbody, and Soares with the supervision of Defendant Munn. Id. ¶¶ 279282. Similar extractions occurred on January 4 and 5, 2012 by different groups of
corrections officers. Id. ¶¶ 285, 287, 293, 295, 304, 306, Video Exs. 3, 4 and 35. On
these dates, Mr. Stile was transported from the medical department to the laundry
room and from the laundry room to his cell in a wheelchair. Id. ¶¶ 290, 301, 319.
Two extractions occurred on January 5. Id. ¶¶ 292, 301, 303. In each instance,
Defendants first offered Mr. Stile the option to present himself at the door to be
handcuffed before the officers entered, but Mr. Stile continued to deny the ability to
walk to the door. Id. ¶¶ 298, 309. In the first instance, Defendant Plourd deployed
the handheld electronic device without a prior verbal warning.

Id. ¶¶ 298-99;

Plourd/Jacques DSMF ¶¶ 13-15. If unsuccessful in getting Mr. Stile to walk, the

16

¶ 18.
17
18

Mr. Stile had two previous back surgeries which he never fully recovered from. Final Compl.
Plaintiff is unclothed in the video, and officers placed a turtle suit on him for the transport.
Video Ex. 2.

16

supervising officer would tell the present corrections officers to carry him out. Final
Compl. ¶ 20. 19
In the second instance, Mr. Stile was handcuffed and shackled while he was
lying down on the floor, and was lifted to a kneeling position. Majority DSMF ¶¶ 30708; Plourd/Jacques DSMF ¶¶ 51-52. Mr. Stile was ordered to stand several times,
but he refused, and was told he would be shocked if continued to refuse to stand.
Majority DSMF ¶¶ 309-11; Plourd/Jacques DSMF ¶¶ 53-54. Defendant Fails said he
would give Mr. Stile three warnings, and if he failed to stand by the third warning,
then Defendant Fails would deploy an electronic device. Final Compl. ¶ 19; Majority
DSMF ¶¶ 309-11, Video Ex. 35. Defendant Fails eventually deployed the handheld
electronic device twice to Mr. Stile’s upper right thigh, and after Mr. Stile continued
to refuse to stand, Defendant Fails deployed the device once more. Majority DSMF
¶¶ 313-14; Plourd/Jacques DSMF ¶¶ 56-57.
One extraction occurred on each day thereafter until January 11. 20 Majority
DSMF ¶¶ 323, 327, 332, 337, 343, 350. On January 10, Mr. Stile was placed into the
shower in his restraint chair because he had not showered in several days. Id. ¶ 355;
Plourd/Jacques DSMF ¶ 26. The method in which Mr. Stile was placed in and taken
out of the restraint chair caused him pain because correction officers would force his
face downwards towards his knees. Final Compl. ¶ 21. He was also hurt when

Mr. Stile states the supervising officer would tell the corrections officers to “drag him out”;
however, a review of the video exhibits does not support this characterization.
20
On January 9, 2012, Defendants began to use a wheeled restraint chair to transport Mr. Stile.
Majority DSMF ¶ 330. According to Mr. Stile, the change did not prevent certain officers from hurting
him by moving him in the chair in a way that aggravated Mr. Stile’s spinal condition. Final Compl. ¶
21; e.g., January 9, 18, 21, and 24, 2012 videos.
19

17

Defendants used the arm bar maneuver. Id. When placed in the turtle suit, Mr.
Stile’s genitals were partially exposed to female staff. 21 Id. ¶ 24.
When Mr. Stile was placed in the shower, he spit at Defendant Plourd and hit
him in the right arm. Majority DSMF ¶ 356; Plourd/Jacques DSMF ¶ 28. However,
on one occasion Defendants Hayden and Rivard took Mr. Stile in a standard
wheelchair without incident. Final Compl. ¶ 30.
From January 10 through January 19, there were typically two extractions
each day. Majority DSMF ¶¶ 350, 359, 366, 372, 379, 386, 393, 400, 406, 416, 425,
433, 439, 446, 455, 462, 469, 476, 483, 490. 22 There was one extraction on January
20 (Id. ¶ 496), two on January 21 (Id. ¶¶ 503, 510), three on January 22 (Id. ¶¶ 517,
524, 531), and two on January 23. Id. ¶¶ 538, 546. From January 24 through
January 29, there was one extraction each day. Id. ¶¶ 555, 564, 572, 579, 586, 592. 23
C.

Other Issues at Somerset County Jail

Defendant Campbell told other correction officers that Mr. Stile must walk on
his own accord to be allowed to use the telephone. Final Compl. ¶ 16. Defendant
Campbell also turned away Mr. Stile’s attorney and said he must walk on his accord
to see his attorney. Id. Mr. Stile requested access to clergy and to attend religious

The Court qualifies this statement insofar as the turtle suit covered Mr. Stile’s genitals but
not completely depending on the angle of a given individual.
22
During the first extraction on January 14, 2012, Mr. Stile attempted to kick Defendant Kelley
several times and threatened her. Majority DSMF ¶¶ 412-14. Defendant Kelley stepped on the chain
between the shackles on Mr. Stile’s feet when he was being placed in the restraint chair and when he
was being taken out of the restraint chair, which does not cause pressure on the legs or feet unless the
inmate is struggling. Id. ¶ 413.
23
Plaintiff saw his counsel on January 24, 2012.
21

18

services. Id. ¶ 34. While in SMU, Mr. Stile was not allowed his eyeglasses, which
prevented him from reading disciplinary papers or any newspapers. Id. ¶ 35.
Mr. Stile asked Defendant Libby to make an anonymous phone call to his
attorney or the press and divulge the abuses he was suffering. Id. ¶ 20. In September
of 2012, Mr. Stile was not given his medication for about six days. 24 Id. ¶ 36. During
a transport from Somerset County Jail to Cumberland County Jail, Defendants
Andrews and Kline lost more than 1,000 pages of Mr. Stile’s legal documents,
pertaining to his civil and legal cases as well as to his filed grievances with the
Somerset County Jail. Id. ¶ 39. 25
D.

David Allen

Defendant Allen was the Somerset County Jail administrator from September
2011 to February 2013. Allen DSMF ¶ 1. During Mr. Stile’s time at Somerset County
Jail, Defendant Allen had no direct contact with Mr. Stile, meaning he had no
involvement in Mr. Stile’s extractions, conducted no strip searches, did not place Mr.
Stile in a restraint chair, conducted no searches of his cell, and was not involved in
Mr. Stile’s disciplinary hearings or access to his attorney. Id. ¶¶ 2-15. Defendant
Allen was not aware of any reason for Mr. Stile to be extracted except to check his
health status. Id. ¶ 16. Defendant Allen also did not have any advanced knowledge

Mr. Stile asserts that he routinely asked for an MRI to assess his injuries. Final Compl. ¶ 16.
The record illustrates Mr. Stile denied medical evaluations when offered during his extractions, and
the Court excludes this assertion as incomplete and misleading.
25
Majority Defendants state that they initially failed to drop off one of Mr. Stile’s three bags of
property when he was transported to Cumberland County Jail as they headed to New Hampshire, but
they dropped off the third bag on their way back. Majority DSMF ¶¶ 26, 150. Because the Court must
take all reasonable inferences consistent with the record in favor to Mr. Stile, it accepts his version of
this event.
24

19

of the deployment of the electronic shield, the handheld electronic device, or OC spray
with regard to Mr. Stile, and was not aware of any use of these instruments contrary
to jail policies. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. Similarly, Defendant Allen was not aware of corrections
officers ever engaging in the various other actions complained of Mr. Stile’s
Complaint in a manner contrary to jail policies or for any reason not justified by jail
policies or legitimate penological considerations. Id. ¶¶ 19-23, 26-28, 30. 26
E.

Barry Delong

Defendant Barry Delong was the Sheriff of Somerset County while Mr. Stile
was at the Somerset County Jail. County DSMF ¶ 1. Defendant Delong retired on
December 31, 2014, and at that time, neither Somerset County nor Somerset County
Jail had received notice of any state tort claims against the County, Defendant
Delong, or any other county employees. Id. ¶ 2. During Defendant Delong’s tenure,
however, there were meetings every day at shift changes in which jail employees
exchanged information regarding inmates’ issues, including their health or medical
needs. Id. ¶ 15. Once a week there was a meeting of administrative staff and
supervisors called “Grand Rounds” to discuss all inmate issues, including any need
to address inmates’ medical needs with the medical staff. Id. ¶ 16.
While Defendant DeLong had overall responsibility for the jail, the day-to-day
were handled by the jail administrator. Id. ¶ 23. 27 Defendant DeLong never had any

Defendant Allen did not order, and was not aware, of Mr. Stile being forced to lie in his own
urine and did not order Mr. Stile placed in the shower. Id. ¶¶ 24-25. Nor did Defendant Allen order,
or was otherwise aware of, any burden on Mr. Stile’s access to his attorney. Id. ¶ 29.
27
Defendant Delong responsibilities also included patrol division, criminal division, court
security, service of process, and other general administrative duties. Id. ¶ 24.
26

20

personal contact with Mr. Stile during his incarceration. Id. ¶ 25. Defendant Delong
did not witness or have any personal knowledge of any cell extractions of Mr. Stile,
including any alleged force used against him during the extractions.

Id. ¶ 26.

Defendant Delong had no knowledge of any grievances or appeals filed by Mr. Stile.
Id. ¶ 28. While Mr. Stile was incarcerated at Somerset County Jail, Defendant
DeLong had not been made aware of prior claims of any widespread problems
regarding the use of excessive force against inmates, inappropriate use of approved
weapons, denial of medical care, denial of access to attorneys, strip searching beyond
that authorized by the jail’s policies, inappropriate searches of inmates’ cells,
inappropriate seizure of inmates’ legal papers, denial of access to religious services,
denial of due process in conjunction with disciplinary hearings, deficiencies in
training or supervision of jail employees, or jail employees’ adherence to policies
governing these matters. Id. ¶ 44.
F.

Disciplinary Hearings

On October 12, 2011, Defendant Garling conducted two disciplinary hearings
concerning Mr. Stile, during which he was present for both hearings. Majority DSMF
¶ 100. Mr. Stile appealed one of these hearings. Id ¶ 619. On January 12, 2012,
Defendant Garling conducted a disciplinary hearing regarding Mr. Stile and when he
went to Mr. Stile’s cell door and asked Mr. Stile if he wanted to be present for the
hearing, Mr. Stile refused. Id. ¶ 101.
On January 19, 2012, Lt. Jacques conducted a disciplinary hearing, 12-48,
regarding Mr. Stile; Mr. Stile refused to be present for this hearing, and Mr. Stile did

21

not appeal the hearing results. Plourd/Jacques DSMF ¶ 72. On May 23, 2013,
Defendant Jacques conducted three disciplinary hearings, 13-459-DI, 13-460-DI and
13-464-DI, regarding Mr. Stile; Mr. Stile was not present because he was not in the
facility, and he did not appeal the results of those hearings. 28 Id. ¶ 73.
On September 26, 2012, Defendant Plourd conducted two disciplinary
hearings, 12-781-DI and 12-776-DI, regarding Mr. Stile; Mr. Stile was not present
because he was not in the facility. 29 Plourd/Jacques DSMF ¶ 31. Mr. Stile appealed
these two hearings around April 2013. Majority DSMF ¶ 619; Plourd/Jacques ¶ 33.
The disciplinary hearings were held without Mr. Stile being present, and so he was
unable to present his own case. Final Compl. ¶ 33.

In his absence at one of the

hearings, he was assessed penalties of disciplinary segregation in SMU and monetary
fines over $500, which were deducted from his inmate account. Id.
G.

Somerset County Jail Policies

At all times relevant to Mr. Stile’s claims, Somerset County Jail had policies
in effect concerning responding to various emergencies. County DSMF ¶9, Exs. G-J.
Somerset County Jail also had policies in effect at the time of Mr. Stile’s claims
pertaining to use of force, administrative and disciplinary segregation, classification
of prisoners, cell extractions, and the use of restraints. Id. ¶ 10. 30 Somerset County
Jail employed a full time training officer and numerous academy certified instructors

These are the only hearings Defendant Jacques conducted regarding Mr. Stile. Id. ¶ 74.
This was the only disciplinary hearings Defendant Plourd conducted regarding Mr. Stile.
Jacques/Plourd DSMF ¶ 32.
30
Annually, the correctional administrator or compliance officer is required to review the jail’s
operations and programs to ensure compliance with DOC-approved policies and procedure. Id. ¶ 10.
28
29

22

to ensure that all jail employees were trained regarding all SCJ policies and
procedures. Id. ¶ 12. 31
All inmates are given a copy of the Inmate Handbook which describes the
grievance procedure and also advises them that the Prison Litigation Reform Act
requires they exhaust all administrative remedies before they can file suit alleging
violations of federal law. Id. ¶ 29. Under the jail’s grievance policy, an inmate must
first file a Level 1 grievance. Majority DSMF ¶ 600; Id. ¶ 30. If an inmate is not
satisfied with the response to a Level 1 grievance, the inmate may file a Level 2
grievance; the final step in the grievance procedure is to appeal to the Maine
Department of Corrections for external review. Majority DSMF ¶¶ 601-02; County
DSMF ¶ 31. Mr. Stile only filed one Level 2 grievance at the Jail, which was received
by the Jail on October 17, 2011, and concerned problems with medical staff. Majority
DSMF ¶ 603; County DSMF ¶ 36. Mr. Stile only filed one grievance with the Maine
Department of Corrections, dated May 8, 2014, concerning alleged assaults and
batteries during December 2011 and January 2012. Majority DSMF ¶ 605; County
DSMF ¶ 37.
Somerset County Jail policy 10.1, entitled “Inmate Discipline”, implements an
inmate discipline system to hold inmates accountable for misconduct and to
encourage acceptable behavior; policy 10.1 provides a list of disciplinary penalties
that can be imposed upon inmates for the violation of a Somerset County Jail policies.

The required training includes, but is not limited to, training with respect to the use of
chemical and electrical devices, the use of non-deadly force in general, and the protocol for responding
to emergencies or medical needs of inmates, such as hunger strikes.
31

23

County DSMF ¶ 32. Under this policy, an inmate may appeal the decision of a
disciplinary hearing officer to the jail administrator within ten days of the
disciplinary hearing. Id. ¶ 33. Mr. Stile appealed only three disciplinary hearings
while at Somerset County Jail. Majority DSMF ¶ 619; Id. ¶ 35. 32
Somerset County Jail policy 12.16 is applicable to inmates with disabilities and
requires inmates to file a complaint with medical staff regarding any service issues.
County DSMF ¶ 39. Under this policy, an inmate is required to submit a brief written
description of the complaint and submit it to any staff member. Id. ¶ 40. The medical
staff reviews the complaint and provides a written reply within five business days
with copies of the complaint and the reply forwarded to the medical director. Id. ¶
41.
The Jail also has policies governing searches, including strip searches, and
provides the conditions that must be present for an inmate to be subject to a strip
search. Id. ¶ 42. Under these policies, an inmate may be subject to a strip search
following a contact visit and there is no exception provided under the Policy for when
an inmate meets with his or her attorney. Id. ¶ 43.
H.

Insurance Coverage

Somerset County has liability coverage on its behalf and on behalf of its
employees through the Maine County Commissioners Association Self-Funded Risk
Management Pool, a self-insured governmental risk pool, from 2011 to 2013. County

These were for hearings conducted on October 12, 2011, by Defendant Garling for infraction #
11-616-DI, and on September 26, 2012, by Defendant Plourd for infraction #s 12-776-DI and 12-781DI. Majority DSMF ¶ 619. Mr. Stile appealed the two disciplinary hearings conducted by Defendant
Plourd around April 12, 2013. Plourd/Jacques DSMF ¶ 33.
32

24

DSMF ¶¶ 3, 5. 33 The Maine County Commissioners Association Self-Funded Risk
Management Pool provides coverage to the County for claims arising under state tort
law only if the entity or its employees did not enjoy immunity under state law. Id. ¶
4.
IV.

SUMMARY OF THE MOTIONS
A.

Mr. Stile’s Amended Complaint

Mr. Stile makes a variety of constitutional and tort-related claims against the
Defendants. Mr. Stile asserts he was stripped of his clothing and lacked bedding
while in the Special Management Unit (“SMU”). Final Compl. ¶ 10. While in the
SMU, Mr. Stile avers he was subject to regular strip and body cavity searches, and
witnessed corrections officers spit in his food, and due to the latter conduct, did not
eat for thirty-nine days. Id. ¶¶ 12-14. Mr. Stile maintains that during the time in
the SMU, he was wrongfully sprayed with chemical agents, shocked, and assaulted
numerous times as well as denied access to medical care, a phone, writing materials,
and his glasses, and he had no ability to contact his counsel or the Court. Id. ¶¶ 1630. Mr. Stile also complains of disciplinary hearings being held without his presence
and assessing him fines in excess of $500. Id. ¶ 33. Mr. Stile maintains that while
in transport from Somerset County Jail to Cumberland County Jail, two of the
Defendants lost more than 1,000 pages of his legal and previously filed grievance
papers. Id. ¶ 39.

County Defendants attached a copy of these coverage certificates to their Statement of
Material Facts. County DSMF ¶ 5, Ex. 2 (ECF No. 439-2).
33

25

As a result, Mr. Stile asserts that during his pretrial detention at the Somerset
County Jail, Defendants assaulted him, subjected him to excessive force, deprived
him of due process, the right to contact counsel, the right to petition for redress of
grievances, denied the right to medical care, and the right to receive religious
services, discriminated against him in violation of the ADA, and subjected him to
unlawful strip and cell searches. See generally Final Compl.
B.

Majority Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and
for Summary Judgment

The Majority Defendants consist of individuals employed at the Somerset
County Jail. In their motion for judgment on the pleadings, Defendants argue they
have no individual liability on an ADA claim. Majority Defs. Mots. at 3 (citations
omitted). They contend that Mr. Stile failed to adequately allege an actual injury in
being limited access to a telephone, visits with his attorney, and the misplacement of
legal papers. Id. (citing Lewis v. Arizona Dep’t of Corrections, 518 U.S. 343, 351
(1995)). They dismiss Mr. Stile’s unlawful search claims noting that under Hudson
v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984), the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on
unreasonable searches is inapplicable to prison cells. Id. at 4. 34
In their summary judgment motion, the Defendants maintain Mr. Stile’s §
1983 claims are barred because before bringing these claims, Mr. Stile failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies as required under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (“PLRA”). Id. at 5-7. Alternatively, Defendants contend that their individual
To the extent Mr. Stile may argue that the harm he suffered related to his counsel’s
effectiveness in his criminal case, Defendants argue that Mr. Stile cannot pursue the claim without
obtaining habeas corpus relief. Id. at 44.
34

26

circumstances warrant summary judgment on Mr. Stile’s excessive force claim and
any claim regarding strip searches. 35

In regard to the excessive force claim,

Defendants assert that they are shielded under qualified immunity, and moreover,
the utilized force was not objectively unreasonable. Id. at 7-9.
Defendant Meunier, who used OC spray and a shocking device on December
26, 2011, maintains that the use was appropriate, and that although he witnessed
the use of a shocking device on December 21, 2011 and January 5, 2012, he did not
have a reasonable opportunity to intervene. Id. at 36. Defendants Fails, Simonds,
and Smith argue they should be granted summary judgment on Mr. Stile’s excessive
force claims because in the particular circumstances presented in Mr. Stile’s case, his
right not to have the handheld electronic device deployed against him is not clearly
established. Id. at 38-39. Certain individuals also had supervisory authority, and
they argue the facts do not support a finding of supervisory liability given that the
record lacks the prerequisites for imposing supervisory liability as there were no

Defendants ask for summary judgment on Mr. Stile’s excessive force claim as to Defendants
Andrews, Berube, Brown, Carson, Julie (Hayden) Gilblair, Kline, LaPlante, Madore, and Pike because
they did not participate in any extractions. Id. at 10. Defendants also request summary judgment on
Mr. Stile’s excessive force claim relating to the use of an electronic devices on him as to Defendants
Almeida, Baldinelli, Boone, Bussell, Campbell, Cunningham, (Whitney) Cusson, David Davis, Gary
Davis, Garling, Garnett, Grant, Hapworth, Herrera, Hinton, Jewell, Karwanski, Libby, Lightbody,
Maroney, Martin, McLaughlin, Milligan, Moore, Morrow, Munn, Pooler, Pullen, Rivard, Sher, and
Soare because they did not use or witness the use of such devices. Id. at 11.
Defendants further state that Defendants Bugbee, Ducharme, French, Gilblair, Haley, Kelley,
Meunier, Richards, and Rizzo are entitled to summary judgment on the excessive force claims because,
although they witnessed the use of electronic devices on Mr. Stile, the use was not excessive and/or
these Defendants did not have a reasonable opportunity to intervene. Id. at 28.
Defendants request individual assessments with respect to any claim involving strip searches
because they were not participants in any strip searches. These defendants are all of the female
officers, Defendants Almeida, Boone, Brown, Carson, Cunningham, Cusson, Jennifer Gilblair,
Hapworth, Julie Gilblair (Hayden), Jewell, Kelley, Pooler and Smith, and certain male officers,
Andrews, Berube, Crafts, Kline, Lancaster, Madore, Maguire, Morrow, and Swope. Id. at 45.
35

27

unconstitutional conditions and no causal connection between their conduct and Mr.
Stile’s alleged constitutional violations. 36
Defendants contend Mr. Stile’s claim of being denied medical care contradicts
the record, and so they should be afforded summary judgment on that theory. Id. at
42. Defendants also maintain they are entitled to summary judgment on any due
process claim related to disciplinary hearings, because Defendant Garling was the
only one among them who participated in a hearing involving Mr. Stile, and Mr. Stile
was present at that hearing and did not appeal the result of that hearing. Id. at 46.
Finally, Defendants assert that any state law tort claims are barred by Mr. Stile’s
failure to serve a notice of claim under the Maine Tort Claims Act. 37 Id. at 46-47.
C.

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and for Summary
Judgment by Defendants Plourd and Jacques

Defendants Plourd and Jacques adopt and incorporate the arguments asserted
by the Majority Defendants in support of their motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Plourd/Jacques’s Mots. at 1. Throughout their summary judgment motion,
Defendants Plourd and Jacques argue the record will not support a finding of liability.
Defendant Plourd, a sergeant, participated in fourteen cell extractions and
administered electrical shocks on multiple occasions. Id. at 2-4. He also participated
in a cell search on December 22, 2011 conducted by ATF Agent Brent McSweyn. Id.
at 2. He argues he appropriately used the electronic device because Mr. Stile was
fully able to walk and was refusing an order to do so. Id. at 3-4. Defendant Plourd

Defendants Swope, Maguire, and Crafts.
One individual, Defendant Lancaster, did not work at the Somerset County Jail until months
after the U.S. Marshal removed Mr. Stile from the Somerset County Jail. Majority DSMF ¶ 153.
36
37

28

also conducted two disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 5. Mr. Stile was not present for
the hearings, both of which occurred on September 26, 2012, because he was no longer
at the facility when the hearings occurred. Id. Defendant Plourd contends he was
not involved in the preparation of any meals and was not involved in the decision
regarding Mr. Stile’s ability to see his attorney. Id. at 5. Defendant Plourd did not
conduct a strip search, but he was the supervisor when some searches were
conducted. He argues the searches were appropriate because maximum security
inmates are subject to such searches whenever they leave or return to the cell,
including for escorted trips to the medical department. Id. at 6.
Defendant Jacques, a lieutenant, participated in two cell extractions. Id. at 67. During one, Defendant Fails used the shocking device three times. Id. at 7-8.
Defendant Jacques maintains the device was used before he arrived at the cell. Id.
at 8. On the second occasion, although an electric shield was present, neither it nor
any other electronic shocking device was applied to Mr. Stile. Id. at 8. Defendant
Jacques conducted four disciplinary hearings. Id. at 9. Mr. Stile refused to attend
and failed to appeal from the decision following a January 19, 2012 hearing. Id.
Defendant Jacques conducted the other hearings after Mr. Stile was no longer an
inmate at the jail. Id. at 9. Defendant Jacques was not involved in meal preparation
or in decisions related to Mr. Stile’s communication with counsel. Id.
Defendants Plourd and Jacques argue they are entitled to summary judgment
on the excessive force claim because Mr. Stile did not exhaust the available
administrative remedies and because the doctrine of qualified immunity precludes

29

recovery. Id. at 10-17. They note that Mr. Stile only filed one Level 2 grievance at
Somerset County Jail received on October 17, 2011 and it concerned problems with
the medical staff, which was before the incidents in his complaint took place. Id. at
11. Defendants Plourd and Jacques argue that even if Mr. Stile’s claims are not
barred under the PLRA, they are entitled to qualified immunity as there are no cases
of controlling authority in the First Circuit to support a finding that any conduct by
Defendant Jacques or Defendant Plourd violated a clearly established constitutional
right. Id. at 12-13. They further argue that there is no evidence that their conduct
inexorably led to any of the alleged constitutional violations by their subordinates,
and thus, there can be no supervisory liability. Id. at 15.
Defendants Plourd and Jacques contend that the force used against Mr. Stile,
considering the circumstances in which it was done, was not objectively unreasonable
because Mr. Stile “generally was hostile, belligerent, and uncooperative.” Id. at 17
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th
Cir. 2004)). In regard to Mr. Stile’s First Amendment claims, they note that Mr. Stile
has not specified which Defendants were responsible for these alleged violations, and
nevertheless, reasonable restrictions on inmate’s First Amendment rights have been
upheld if they further legitimate penological goals. Id. at 18 (citing Beard v. Banks,
548 U.S. 521, 524-35 (2006); Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 128-137 (2003)).
Lastly, Defendants Plourd and Jacques argue any claim concerning access to court or
searches and seizures is not supported by governing law or the record. Id. at 17-19.
D.

Defendants Somerset County and Barry Delong’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion for Summary Judgment
30

Defendant Barry Delong, former Somerset County Sheriff, 38 argues he has no
individual liability under the ADA, and that Mr. Stile failed to state an actionable
claim for the denial of access to the courts because there are no facts alleged or
established that would support a finding of harm to Mr. Stile’s interest in litigation.
County Defs.’ Mot. for J. on the Pleadings and for Summ. J. at 2-3. Defendant Delong
contends summary judgment on any claim asserted against him in his individual
capacity is warranted because he had no personal contact with Mr. Stile and he did
not participate in any of the alleged matters or incidents. Id. at 4-5 (citing Sanchez
v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 49-50 (1st Cir. 2009); Pinto v. Nettleship, 737 F.2d
130, 132 (1st Cir. 1984)).
County Defendants also argue summary judgment is appropriate on Mr. Stiles’
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the ADA because other than any complaints
regarding three disciplinary hearings, Mr. Stile failed to exhaust available
administrative remedies, and under the PLRA, to bring any suit challenging prison
conditions, an inmate needs to exhaust his or her administrative remedies. Id. at 57. County Defendants further contend that Mr. Stile failed to establish facts that
would support a claim under the ADA or under § 1983, including a claim of municipal
or supervisory liability. 39 Id. at 8-13, 19-20. Finally, County Defendants argue that
Defendant Delong retired on December 31, 2014. County DSMF ¶ 2.
Defendants contend the record lacks any evidence of an established policy or custom that
promoted or condoned the use of excessive force, that deprived Mr. Stile access to the courts or
appropriate medical care, that required inappropriate strip searches, or that interfered with his
religious practice. In his Amended Complaint, Mr. Stile alleges that his detention in the SMU deprived
him of “rights guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution to freedom of
speech and religion,” and that he requested clergy after twenty days in the SMU because “he did not
believe he was going to live.” Final Compl. ¶ 34.
38
39

31

Mr. Stile’s state law tort claims are barred because he failed to serve a notice of claim
as required by the Maine Tort Claims Act and because of the immunity afforded by
the Act to the County Defendants. Id. at 17-19.
E.

David Allen’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant David Allen, the jail administrator, incorporates the Majority
Defendants’ arguments from their motions. Allen’s Mot. at 4. He reiterates that Mr.
Stile’s claims are barred because he did not exhaust his administrative remedies as
required under the PLRA. Id. at 3-4. He also maintains the record does not support
supervisory liability given his lack of involvement in the underlying events, and that
he is immune from liability in his individual capacity. Id. at 6-20 40
F.

Mr. Stile’s Motion to Strike Video Exhibits

Through this motion, Mr. Stile asks the Court to exclude all video evidence
cited by Defendants that depicts a January 17, 2012 cell extraction, because the
recordings were not produced in discovery. Pl.’s Mot. to Strike Video Exs. at 1.
Specifically, he references “Exhibits 20A, 20B, and 20C.” Id. Alternatively, Mr. Stile
argues that if the Court considers the video recordings, he should be permitted to
have a forensic examination of the jail computers to detect any additional video
recordings that might exist. Id. In his motion for ruling on his motion to strike video
exhibits, Mr. Stile reiterates these contentions. Mot. for Ruling on Mot. to Strike at
1.

According to other Defendants, the jail administrator or the assistant jail administrator would
make the decision when to return an inmate from segregation to the general population after
consulting with medical and A-Pod staff. County DSMF ¶ 22.
40

32

G.

Mr. Stile’s Motion for Court to Grant Order Pursuant to Rule
56(d)

Mr. Stile’s motion for relief under Rule 56(d) relates to Defendant Somerset
County’s assertion of absolute immunity under the Maine Tort Claims Act. Pl.’s Mot.
for Court to Grant Order Pursuant to Rule 56(d) at 1-2. According to Mr. Stile, he
cannot access Maine statutes or cases through the library resources provided by the
Federal Bureau of Prisons. Id. at 2. In response, Defendants provided Mr. Stile with
copies of the applicable statutes and the state court opinion cited in the Defendants
Somerset County’s motion. Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Court to Grant Order Pursuant to
Rule 56(d) (ECF No. 565).
V.

DISCUSSIONS
A.

Plaintiff’s Motions
1.

Motion to Strike

Through the motion to strike, Mr. Stile asks the Court to strike three video
recordings included in Majority Defendants’ Exhibits 20A, 20B, and 20C, which
depict an extraction on January 17, 2012. Mr. Stile contends Majority Defendant did
not previously disclose the video and that the videos should, therefore, be excluded.
The Majority Defendants assert that they disclosed the videos in discovery but
labeled the videos differently at the time. Defs. Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. to Strike Video Exs.
at 2, (ECF No. 502). Mr. Stile argues the alleged nondisclosure of the January 17,
2012 extraction prevented him from joining “M. Jacques” as a defendant. Reply to
Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. to Strike Video Exs. at 2, (ECF No. 514). He also cites the summary
judgment record, which suggests the video of a January 17 extraction was recorded
33

over. 41 Id. (citing Majority DSMF ¶ 458). Because Mr. Stile was provided all of the
video recordings that form the summary judgment record, and because Mr. Stile does
not argue that the alleged missing recording contains information that would support
his challenge to Defendants’ summary judgment motions, the Court denies Mr. Stile’s
motion to strike.
2.

Motion for Rule 56(d) Order

Mr. Stile argues that relief pursuant to Rule 56(d) is appropriate because he
did not have access to the Maine Revised Statutes and therefore was unable to
respond to arguments asserting immunity under the Maine Tort Claims Act. Pl.’s
Mot. for Court to Grant Order Pursuant to Rule 56(d) at 1-2. The County Defendants,
through their opposition, furnished copies of the relevant law and a state court
opinion to Mr. Stile. Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Court to Grant Order Pursuant to Rule
56(d), Attach. 1-2 (ECF No. 565). Separately, Mr. Stile filed a letter with the Court
in which he asserts that his ability to review materials produced in discovery had
been significantly impacted by the limited access he had to digital storage media.
Letter at 1-3 (ECF No. 563). Insofar as Defendants provided Mr. Stile with the Maine
authority Mr. Stile claims he lacked, Mr. Stile’s motion for relief under Rule 56(d) is
moot. To the extent Mr. Stile contends more time is necessary to permit him access
to certain video evidence, the Court notes that whatever limitations he might have
experienced with regard to accessing some information due to his transfer to another

Evidently there were two extractions on January 17, 2012, and the one in the video occurred
at 21:30 p.m. Defendants’ statement concerning the unavailable video was in reference to the other
extraction, which occurred at 15:25 p.m.
41

34

facility and the policies of various facilities, the record demonstrates that Mr. Stile
has had access to the information for extended periods during the more than ten
months the dispositive motions have been pending. The Court denies Mr. Stile’s Rule
56(d) motion.
B.

Defendants’ Dispositive Motions
1.

Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Federal law requires a prisoner to exhaust the available administrative
remedies before initiating a lawsuit based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or any other federal
law. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Specifically, “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to
prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a
prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see
also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (“There is no question that exhaustion is
mandatory under the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act] and that unexhausted
claims cannot be brought in court.”).
The Supreme Court held that § 1997e(a) requires “proper exhaustion” of a
prisoner’s administrative remedies. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006). “Proper
exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical
procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without
imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Id. at 90-91.
“Compliance with prison grievance procedures . . . is all that is required . . . to

35

‘properly exhaust.’” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. “[I]t is the prison’s requirements, and
not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Id.
A defendant may raise the § 1997e exhaustion requirement as an affirmative
defense. Id. at 216; see also Ramos v. Patnaude, 640 F.3d 485, 488 (1st Cir. 2011)
(“The Supreme Court made it plain . . . that exhaustion under § 1997e(a) is not a
jurisdictional condition, and has held it to be an affirmative defense.” (citing Jones,
549 U.S. at 212)).

Because failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an

affirmative defense rather than a jurisdictional issue, initially, a defendant bears the
burden of proof. Jones, 549 U.S. at 216. To satisfy that burden, a defendant must
establish “that there was an available administrative remedy, and that the prisoner
did not exhaust that available remedy.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom., Scott v. Albino, 135 S. Ct. 403 (2014).
Thereafter, the plaintiff must present evidence that demonstrates “that there is
something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available
administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Id.
The requirement that Mr. Stile exhaust administrative remedies applies to his
claims under both § 1983 and the ADA. “[E]xhaustion of available administrative
remedies is required for any suit challenging prison conditions, not just for suits
under § 1983.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006). See also Porter v. Nussle,
534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (“[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate
suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular
episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong”); O’Guinn v.

36

Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Because the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act are federal laws, the plain language of the PLRA requires that
prisoners bringing an action under these federal statutes challenging prison
conditions must first exhaust available administrative remedies”); see also
Nottingham v. Richardson, 499 F. App’x 368, 373 (5th Cir. 2012) (ADA).
Exhaustion is required even though the prisoner’s suit seeks monetary
damages not available through the prison’s grievance process. Booth v. Churner, 532
U.S. 731, 734-35 (2001). Exhaustion is also required even though the claim raises
constitutional claims, such as claims alleging excessive force by prison officials.
Woodford, 548 U.S. at 91 n.2; Porter, 534 U.S. at 520. However, “[a] prisoner need
not exhaust remedies if they are not ‘available.’” Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1855
(2016). Thus, “an inmate is required to exhaust those, but only those, grievance
procedures that are ‘capable of use’ to obtain ‘some relief for the action complained
of.’” Id. at 1859 (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at 738). In Ross, the Supreme Court
identified “three kinds of circumstances in which an administrative remedy, although
officially on the books, is not capable of use to obtain relief.” Id.
“First, . . . an administrative procedure is unavailable when (despite what
regulations or guidance materials may promise) it operates as a simple dead end—
with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved
inmates.” Id. (citing Booth, 532 U.S. at 736, and providing as examples a situation
in which a handbook tells prisoners to send a grievance to an officer who then
“disclaims the capacity to consider the grievance,” and a situation where

37

“administrative officials have apparent authority, but decline ever to exercise it”).
Second, “an administrative scheme might be so opaque that it becomes, practically
speaking, incapable of use.” Id. In other words, a process that, viewed objectively, is
too confusing to understand, is not an available process. Id. Third, an otherwise
available grievance process is not available “when prison administrators thwart
inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination,
misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. at 1860. 42 The record establishes that for
each of Mr. Stile’s various claims there existed a process through which a prisoner
could pursue administrative relief.
a.

Grievance of Unconstitutional Prison Conditions

All inmates at the Somerset County Jail are given a copy of the Inmate
Handbook, which describes the grievance procedure and advises that the Prison
Litigation Reform Act requires that inmates exhaust all administrative remedies
before they can file suit alleging violations of federal law. A grievance is authorized
by an inmate for an alleged violation of civil, constitutional, or statutory rights, for
an alleged criminal or prohibited act by a staff member, to resolve a condition existing
within the jail that creates unsafe or unsanitary living conditions, or to resolve a
chronic condition existing within the jail that contradicts the Detention and
Correctional Standards for Maine Counties and Municipalities.

In Ross, the Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings where the record
suggested that the commencement of an investigation into prisoner abuse by the prison’s Internal
Investigation Unit cut off any further processing of the prisoner’s related prisoner grievance and
foreclosed his access to any relief through that process. 136 S. Ct. at 1860-62.
42

38

The jail grievance policy, SCJ Policy 11.3, requires that an inmate first file a
Level 1 grievance. If an inmate is not satisfied with the response to a Level 1
grievance, the inmate may file a Level 2 grievance. If an inmate remains unsatisfied
after receiving a response to a Level 2 grievance, the inmate may file a grievance with
the Maine Department of Corrections for external review.

The filing with the

Department of Corrections is the final step in the Somerset County Jail grievance
procedure. 43 Mr. Stile filed one Level 2 grievance at the Somerset County Jail, which
was received by the jail on October 17, 2011, but the grievance does not concern the
claims in this action. Two years after the events that gave rise to this action, and
months after filing this action, Mr. Stile sent a letter dated May 8, 2014 to the Maine
Department of Corrections regarding alleged assaults, in which he requested an
investigation and referral for prosecution.
b.

Appeal of disciplinary proceedings

SCJ Policy 10.1, entitled “Inmate Discipline,” sets forth an inmate discipline
system designed to hold inmates accountable for misconduct, and to encourage
acceptable behavior. This policy includes a list of disciplinary penalties that can be
imposed for the violation of a jail rule. Pursuant to SCJ Policy 10.1, an inmate may
appeal from the decision of a disciplinary hearing officer to the jail administrator
within ten days of the disciplinary hearing. The decision of the jail administrator is
The Majority Defendants did not file a copy of the grievance policy, but the County Defendants
did. (ECF No. 439-12). According to the Second Circuit, “defendants bear the initial burden of
establishing, by pointing to legally sufficient sources such as statutes, regulations, or grievance
procedures that a grievance process exists and applies to the underlying dispute.” Hubbs v. Suffolk
Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 788 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 2015) (quotation marks and brackets omitted).
43

39

final and cannot be appealed. Mr. Stile appealed three disciplinary hearings while
at the Somerset County Jail.
c.

Medical concerns

SCJ Policy 12.16 applies to inmates with disabilities and requires an inmate
with a disability to file a complaint with medical staff regarding any service issues. 44
Pursuant to SCJ Policy 12.16, an inmate is required to submit a brief written
description of the complaint and submit it to any staff member. The medical staff
reviews the complaint and provides a written reply within five business days, with
copies of the complaint and the reply forwarded to the medical director.
d.

Analysis

Defendants’ motions for summary judgment question whether Mr. Stile
exhausted all the available administrative remedies. 45 To be an available remedy, a
grievance procedure must actually apply to the type of claim at issue. Bean v.
Barnhart, No. 1:13-cv-00196-NT, 2015 WL 3935777, at *5 (D. Me. June 26, 2015)
(citing Booth, 532 U.S. at 736 n.4, and Malik v. D.C., 574 F.3d 781, 785 (D.C. Cir.
2009)). The summary judgment record establishes that SJC Policy 11.3, the jail
grievance policy, applied to all of the claims that underlie Mr. Stile’s § 1983 action
regarding the conditions of his confinement in the SMU. In addition, the record

The policy states that it is “provided as guidance for health care staff to ensure the civil rights
of inmates regarding access to ‘medically necessary’ program services in compliance with the
Americans with Disabilities Act.” (ECF No. 439-26).
45
The Majority Defendants took the lead on this argument, and the County Defendants provided
some supplemental briefing, particularly as to Mr. Stile’s ADA claim. Majority Defs.’ Mot. for J. on the
Pleadings and for Summ. J. at 5-8; County Defs.’ Mot. for J. on the Pleadings and for Summ. J. at 58. Defendants Jacques and Plourd and Defendant Allen advanced the argument as well. Defs. Plourd’s
and Jacques’s Mot. for J. on the Pleadings and for Summ. J. at 11-12. Defendant Allen adopted the
submissions of the Majority Defendants. Def. Allen’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 4-6.
44

40

establishes that policy 12.16 applied to Mr. Stile’s assertion that he was entitled to
different treatment based on the protections afforded by the ADA. Finally, the record
establishes that SJC Policy 10.1 applied to any of Mr. Stile’s claims concerning the
disciplinary proceedings that transpired before or after his detention in the SMU. 46
As the facts outlined above demonstrate, Mr. Stile did not comply with or
exhaust the Somerset County Jail grievance process. Mr. Stile’s May 8, 2014 letter
to the Department of Corrections is insufficient given that he did not file a Level 2
grievance before he sent the letter to the Department.

Mr. Stile’s “[p]roper

exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical
procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without
imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Woodford, 548
U.S. at 90-91. Mr. Stile also did not file any complaint regarding the jail’s failure to
comply with the ADA. The only matters for which Mr. Stile exhausted the available
administrative remedies are three disciplinary matters.
In his amended complaint, Mr. Stile alleged that he “grieved” the manner by
which meals were served to inmates in the SMU and “his grievances went
unanswered.”

Final Compl. ¶ 14.

Additionally, he claimed that a box of legal

documents was “intentionally lost” by Defendants Andrews and Kline, and that the

Mr. Stile entered the SMU following his assault on another prisoner. At that time, he was
under administrative segregation, as his placement in the SMU was not the product of a disciplinary
sanction. Furthermore, the conditions of which Mr. Stile complains (use of force, lack of clothing, lack
of phone access, and the failure to address medical need) were measures administratively imposed in
response to his hunger strike and what Defendants describe as Mr. Stile’s refusal to comply with orders
to submit to handcuffing and walk to medical, i.e., they were not imposed as sanctions at the conclusion
of a disciplinary process. Given the lack of relationship between the conditions of confinement
challenged in Mr. Stile’s action and the disciplinary process, his available means to challenge the
imposition of those conditions was policy 11.3.
46

41

box “contained many grievances already filed with the Somerset County Jail.” Id. ¶
39.
To demonstrate that he was thwarted in an attempt to follow the grievance
procedure, at a minimum, Mr. Stile must demonstrate that he asked to address his
circumstances through the grievance procedure. Thompson v. Coulter, 680 F. App’x
707, 711 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 180 (2017) (“[Plaintiff] contends that he
was prevented from filing a grievance on the sexual assaults because immediately
after the assaults he was placed in segregation without his writing materials . . . .
Mr. Thompson has not alleged, however, that he attempted to file a grievance but
was prevented, thwarted, or hindered from doing so by prison personnel”); compare
Thomas v. Reese, 787 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding that administrative
remedies were unavailable where the plaintiff asked three officers how he could file
a grievance, only one officer answered, and that officer told the plaintiff he could not
file a grievance). While the record establishes that he made oral complaints during
various interactions with jail personnel, the record lacks any evidence to support a
finding that Mr. Stile asked for and was denied assistance to file an official
grievance or to pursue a disability-related accommodation through the applicable
administrative process. Even if Mr. Stile had filed the required Level 2 grievance,
his May 8, 2014 letter to the Department of Corrections would not constitute a
timely filing. 47

The grievance policy states, “Inmates have unrestricted access to file alleged complaints of
non-compliance with mandatory standards against the facility with the Maine Department of
Corrections, Inspections Division, when a condition or issue is not resolved through the facility
47

42

In sum, Defendants have established that the Somerset County Jail
maintained policies that provided administrative remedies for the particular matters
that underlie Mr. Stile’s federal claims. The burden shifts to Mr. Stile to demonstrate
that the remedies were not available to him. Mr. Stile has not met this burden
because he has not demonstrated that he ever properly attempted to pursue a
grievance with respect to the matters at issue. Based on Mr. Stile’s failure to exhaust
the available administrative remedies, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
on all claims, except for the claims arising out of three disciplinary proceedings for
which Mr. Stile exhausted available remedies.
2.

Violation of Due Process

Pretrial detainees are entitled to certain process before punishment is
imposed. That is, they have the right “to be free from punishment” without due
process. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979). “It is . . . well established that the
process that a pretrial detainee must be afforded at a disciplinary hearing is that set
forth by the Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-71 (1974).” Ford
v. Bender, 768 F.3d 15, 27 (1st Cir. 2014). Wolff provides that an inmate should be
permitted to appear to present his position on disciplinary charges. 418 U.S. at 56566.
Mr. Stile alleges he was deprived of due process when disciplinary board
hearings were held in his absence, which resulted in in disciplinary segregation and
monetary fines. Final Compl. ¶ 33. Mr. Stile exhausted available administrative
grievance process.” Id. § A.4.
mandatory first step. Id. § B.1.

The policy elsewhere specifies that the informal grievance is a

43

process regarding three disciplinary hearings, by filing appeals. Defendants Garling
and Plourd conducted the hearings.
On October 12, 2011, Defendant Garling conducted two disciplinary hearings
concerning Mr. Stile, and Mr. Stile was present for both hearings. On January 12,
2012, Defendant Garling conducted another disciplinary hearing. The record does
not indicate Mr. Stile appealed the January 12 disciplinary hearing. The only hearing
conducted by Defendant Garling for which Mr. Stile exhausted the available
administrative remedies was the October 12 hearing, outside the timeframe of his
claims. Mr. Stile, however, was not present for the hearing on January 12, 2012.
Defendant Plourd conducted two disciplinary hearings on September 26, 2012,
to address two matters: infraction 12-776-DI and infraction 12-781-DI. 48

The

hearings occurred without Mr. Stile present. Mr. Stile later appealed. According to
Mr. Stile’s amended complaint, “Defendants” imposed disciplinary segregation in the
SMU and monetary fines in excess of $500.00,” which was deducted from his inmate
account. Final Compl. ¶ 33. The imposition of a monetary fine, standing alone, would
require compliance with certain procedural due process requirements as it qualifies
as a property interest. 49 Drewry v. Maine Dept. of Corrections, 1:16-cv-00075-GZS,
Defendants have not identified the charges.
Defendant Plourd separately argues that Mr. Stile cannot recover money damages on any
claim because he did not suffer physical injury, citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Defs. Plourd’s and
Jacques’s Mot. for J. on the Pleadings and for Summ. J. at 12. Granted, it is not apparent from the
record how any harm associated with Mr. Stile’s experience in the SMU could be regarded as the
product of a flawed disciplinary hearing months later. By 2012, he was already in the SMU on
legitimate grounds, given that he assaulted another inmate. “The administrators of the prison must
be free, within appropriate limits, to sanction the prison’s pretrial detainees for infractions of
reasonable prison regulations that address concerns of safety and security within the detention
environment.” Collazo-Leon v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 51 F.3d 315, 318 (1st Cir. 1995). The forced
extraction and relocation of Mr. Stile to the camera cell based on his refusal to be handcuffed on
December 26, 2011, and the subsequent administrative response consisting of regular trips to the

48
49

44

2016 WL 4082625, *5 (D. Me. July 29, 2016) (citing Coombs v. Welch, No. 15-1776
(1st Cir. May 9, 2016) (citing Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 179 (3d Cir. 1997)
(monetary fine))); see also Kuperman v. Wrenn, 645 F.3d 69, 73 n.5 (1st Cir. 2011)
(claim for punitive damages survives § 1997e(e)).
Mr. Stile asserts he was assessed monetary fines as part of the disciplinary
sanction without personally being present, and therefore under First Circuit
precedent, Mr. Stile alleges a loss that implicates due process. Wolff provides that an
inmate should be permitted to appear to present his position on disciplinary charges.
418 U.S. at 565-66. Mr. Stile was not present at three disciplinary hearings. Of those
three hearings, he appealed both disciplinary hearings conducted by Defendant
Plourd, but not the January 12 hearing conducted by Defendant Garling. On the
record, the Court cannot conclude at what hearing Mr. Stile was fined in excess of
$500. If Mr. Stile was in fact present at the disciplinary hearing where he was fined,
his due process claims, which are premised on his absence, would fall of their own
medical department and denial of telephone access due to Mr. Stile’s maintenance of a hunger strike
and contention he could not walk were supplemental conditions of confinement subject to the grievance
process.
In other words, Mr. Stile has not demonstrated that there were conditions imposed through a
disciplinary proceeding that he exhausted by means of an appeal. Cf. Thomas, 787 F.3d at 848 (holding
remedies were not available when officer incorrectly told the plaintiff he could not file a grievance
because only a disciplinary appeal was appropriate, and observing that administrators should have
provided access to grievance procedures despite the prisoner’s filing of an appeal of the underlying
disciplinary sanction where the prisoner was “not contesting his discipline or the conduct that
generated the charges [but r]ather, [was] challenging the officers’ conduct that occurred after his
offenses”). Here, Mr. Stile complains of how he was handled in the SMU and how long he was kept
there; the record does not demonstrate that his placement in the SMU on disciplinary grounds was
inappropriate. Finally, assuming Mr. Stile alleges that he was denied due process before his placement
in the SMU, or that the handling he experienced was excessive in relation to the gravity of his
underlying infraction(s), and deprived him of constitutional rights before any process could be
completed, see, e.g., Almighty Supreme Born Allah v. Milling, 876 F.3d 48, 58 (2d Cir. 2017), Mr. Stile
had to exhaust the claim for denial of predeprivation process administratively, through the grievance
process, as discussed above. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.

45

weight. Also, if Mr. Stile were fined without being present but did not timely appeal
that hearing, his claim would be barred by the PLRA. 50 If, however, he was not
present at the hearing that resulted in the fine and if he did appeal the fine, he may
have a viable claim that his due process rights were violated.
Because of this uncertainty in the record, the Court dismisses without
prejudice the dispositive motions on Mr. Stile’s claims of due process violation
stemming from his monetary fine as to Defendants Plourd and Garling, as well as to
Defendant Allen, the jail administrator during both occasions and who would have
reviewed Mr. Stile’s appeal of the monetary fine if imposed by Defendant Plourd. If
the Defendants wish to file further dispositive motions to clarify this factual issue,
they must do so within thirty days of this order.
3.

James Stile’s State Law Assault Claim
a.

The Maine Tort Claims Act’s Notice Requirements

Mr. Stile asserted a state law claim of assault and battery based on the same
conditions that underlie his federal excessive force claim. When tort claims are
asserted against Maine governmental entities and employees, the MTCA requires
that the claimant substantially comply with certain “notice requirements” before
bringing a civil action in court. 14 M.R.S. §§ 8102, 8107(1), 8107(4).
1. Notice requirements for filing. Within 180 days after any claim
or cause of action permitted by this chapter accrues, or at a later time
within the limits of section 8110, when a claimant shows good cause why
If, as Defendant Garling asserts, Mr. Stile refused to exit his cell to attend his scheduled
hearing, Mr. Stile could have waived the right to be present at the hearing. Mr. Stile claims he was
physically unable to attend the hearings but does not specify which hearings. If the Defendants file a
subsequent dispositive motion to clarify at what hearing Mr. Stile was allegedly fined, they should
clarify this issue as well.
50

46

notice could not have reasonably been filed within the 180-day limit, a
claimant or a claimant’s personal representative or attorney shall file a
written notice containing:
A. The name and address of the claimant, and the name and address of
the claimant’s attorney or other representative, if any;
B. A concise statement of the basis of the claim, including the date, time,
place and circumstances of the act, omission or occurrence complained
of;
C. The name and address of any governmental employee involved, if
known;
D. A concise statement of the nature and extent of the injury claimed to
have been suffered; and
E. A statement of the amount of monetary damages claimed.
Id. § 8107(1). When the claim is against a political subdivision or one of its employees,
the Maine Tort Claims Act requires that the notice “shall be addressed to and filed
with one of the persons upon whom a summons and complaint could be served under
the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4, in a civil action against a political
subdivision.” Id. § 8107(3)(B).
Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because Mr. Stile
did not “serve” the required notice on Somerset County. In support, the Defendants
introduced the Affidavit of Defendant Delong, a former Sheriff of Somerset County,
who states that Mr. Stile did not serve a notice of claim alleging any state tort law
claims until this present action. Mr. Stile apparently attempted to serve notice upon
Somerset County through a court pleading signed on May 29, 2012, and received by
Somerset County Superior Court on June 8, 2012. Mr. Stile also apparently sent the
pleading or some other type of “notice” to a law firm who represented Somerset
47

County in some capacity, for which he received a response from counsel dated
December 14, 2012, who informed him that no “notice” was enclosed. 51 A review of
Mr. Stile’s allegations show that he primarily complains of conduct by the Defendants
from September 2011 to February 1, 2012, as well as during a few days in September
2012, May 2013, and from September 24, to September 30, 2013.
Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 4 provides that that service upon a county is
accomplished by delivering the pleadings in question “to one of the county
commissioners or their clerk or the county treasurer.” ME. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(4). The
purpose of the notice requirement is “to assure that the notice will be received by an
official having authority to deal with plaintiff’s claim or that the official receiving the
notice is one charged with the duty of transmitting the notice to the proper officials.”
Robinson v. Washington County, 529 A.2d 1357, 1360 (Me. 1987) (quoting Faucher v.
City of Auburn, 465 A.2d 1120 (Me. 1983)).

The MTCA allows for substantial

compliance in terms of notice insofar as “[a] claim filed . . . shall not be held invalid
or insufficient by reason of an inaccuracy in stating the time, place, nature or cause
of the claim, or otherwise, unless it is shown that the governmental entity was in fact
prejudiced thereby.” 14 M.R.S.A. § 8107(4). “The issue is whether the notice includes
mere ‘inaccuracies,’ or whether the failures are ‘fundamental.’” Palm v. Sisters of
Charity Health, Sys., 537 F. Supp. 2d 228, 231 (D. Me. 2008) (quoting Faucher, 465
A.2d at 1123); see also Deschenes v. City of Sanford, 2016 ME 56, ¶ 16, 137 A.3d 198
(“[O]ral notice can never constitute substantial compliance.”). In Robinson, the Law
Mr. Stile also filed in Superior Court an application to proceed without prepayment of fees,
dated June 6, 2012, however, it seems that application was denied. (ECF No. 566-3.)
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Court held that a plaintiff substantially complied with the notice requirement where
her notice was addressed to the Sheriff of Washington County at the Washington
County Courthouse, and “the written notice was delivered directly to one of the
litigants, namely, Sheriff Prescott, the chief law enforcement officer for Washington
County.” 529 at 1360-61.
i.

September 2011 to February 1, 2012 Claims

Mr. Stile was required to provide notice for these claims within 180 days of his
last claim arising, making July 30, 2012, the last day by which he had to provide
notice for these claims. In that window, the only possible “notice” Mr. Stile provided
was his May 29, 2012 letter. In contrast to Robinson, Mr. Stile’s May 29, 2012 letter
was not directly delivered to one of the litigants, only to the Somerset County
Superior Court. The record does not show that the Defendants were served notice
pursuant to this letter. This is a not a mere inaccuracy, but a fundamental failure of
notice given that one of “[t]he general purposes of [the] notice requirement [is] to save
needless expense and litigation by providing an opportunity for amicable resolution
of disputes, and to allow the defendant to fully investigate claims and defenses.”
Faucher, 465 A.2d at 1123 (citation omitted). Notice must be “addressed to the proper
person[s].” Id. at 1122. Additionally, Mr. Stile only states Defendant Allen as a
potential litigant, but refers to other potential litigants as John and Jane Does as
well as “all unnamed defendants yet to be identified.” The Court is not persuaded
that this filing constitutes substantial compliance given these significant flaws.

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Nor has Mr. Stile established good cause for his inability to file a notice of his
claim within the 180-day period for these claims. Diviney v. Univ. of Maine Sys., 2017
ME 56, ¶ 17, 158 A.3d 5 (quoting Peters v. City of Westbrook, 2001 ME 179, ¶ 6, 787
A.2d 141) (“The good cause exception is interpreted narrowly since the Maine Tort
Claims Act is a ‘limited relaxation’ of common-law sovereign immunity”)). Good cause
“require[s] a showing that the plaintiff was unable to file a claim or was meaningfully
prevented from learning of the information forming the basis for his or her
complaint.” Peters, 2001 ME 179, ¶ 6, 787 A.2d 141. As the Plaintiff, Mr. Stile has
the burden to show good cause. Id. ¶ 8. Even though Mr. Stile complains about
various jail policies, the record lacks sufficient genuine evidence showing that these
policies prevented Mr. Stile from filing his MTCA notice. Mr. Stile’s September 2011
to January 31, 2012, assault and battery claims are barred under the MTCA.
ii.

Remaining Tort-Related Claims
a. Compliance with the Maine Tort Claims Act
Notice Requirement

Mr. Stile also alleges he was subjected to various strip searches, visible cavity
searches and certain other violations while at Somerset County Jail during a few days
in September 2012, May 2013, and from September 24 to September 30, 2013. From
what the Court can discern, Mr. Stile presumably asserts these constitute assault
and battery as well. Mr. Stile evidently sent some type of “notice” to a law firm which,
at the time, represented Somerset County, for which he received the response from
counsel dated December 14, 2012, who informed Plaintiff that no “notice” was
enclosed. Given the date of the response, this “notice” would be within the 180-day
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time period for the September 2012 to September 2013 tort-related claims. Whether
this “notice” substantially complied with the MTCA’s notice provisions is a fact
intensive issue, however. Given the record before the Court, and given that the Court
must draw all reasonable inferences to the non-movant, the Court is unable to
conclude that this “notice” sent to this law firm is not substantially compliant given
that it also states it was “sent to Somerset County.”
b. Qualified Immunity
However, Somerset County is immune from these claims. The MTCA provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, all governmental
entities shall be immune from suit on any and all tort claims seeking
recovery of damages. When immunity is removed by this chapter, any
claim for damages shall be brought in accordance with the terms of this
chapter.
14 M.R.S. § 8103(1).

Section 8104-A also provides for some limited immunity

exceptions, none applicable to this case. As a result, because an exception does not
apply here, and because the record also establishes that the County did not maintain
liability insurance for any claim to which immunity would apply, which negates the
possible application of section 8116, 52 Somerset County is entitled to summary
judgment on Mr. Stile’s assault and battery claims.
The Maine Tort Claims Act also provides “discretionary function” and
“intentional act” immunity to individual officers. Id. § 8111(C), (E). Immunity does
not apply, however, if the officer’s conduct exceeds the scope of his or her authority,
Title 14 M.R.S. § 8116 provides that in the event an entity entitled to immunity under the
Maine Tort Claims Act procures liability insurance for any conduct for which it would otherwise be
immune, the entity waives immunity for any claim up to the amount of the insurance.
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such as where the conduct involves the excessive use of force and the circumstances
would not allow for qualified immunity under federal law.

Cote v. Town of

Millinocket, 901 F. Supp. 2d 200, 248 (D. Me. 2012); Blackstone v. Quirino, 309 F.
Supp. 2d 117, 130 (D. Me. 2004). The issue, therefore, is whether the individual
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
Government officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless they violate a
constitutional right that was “clearly established” when they engaged in the conduct
at issue. Hunt v. Massi, 773 F.3d 361, 367 (1st Cir. 2014). “Qualified immunity
shields an officer from suit when she makes a decision that, even if constitutionally
deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she
confronted.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (citing Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001)). “This strain of immunity aspires to ‘balance [the] desire to
compensate those whose rights are infringed by state actors with an equally
compelling desire to shield public servants from undue interference with the
performance of their duties and from threats of liability which, though unfounded,
may nevertheless be unbearably disruptive.’” Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir.
2004) (quoting Buenrostro v. Collazo, 973 F.2d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 1992)).
Defendants’ claim of qualified immunity requires the Court to assess: (1)
“whether the facts, taken most favorably to the party opposing summary judgment,
make out a constitutional violation” and (2) “whether the violated right was clearly
established at the time that the offending conduct occurred.” Ford, 768 F.3d at 23.
When the Court considers whether the constitutional right was clearly established at

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the time, the Court must determine (a) “whether the contours of the right, in general,
were sufficiently clear,” and (b) “whether, under the specific facts of the case, a
reasonable defendant would have understood that he was violating the right.” Id.
The constitutional prohibition against the use of excessive force has long been
clearly established. See, e.g., Morelli v. Webster, 552 F.3d 12, 23-24 (1st Cir. 2009).
The qualified immunity analysis, however, requires a consideration of the
particularized facts of the case, not broad general propositions. Hunt, 773 F.3d at
368.

The contours of this right must have been “sufficiently definite that any

reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was
violating it.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014). “In other words,
‘existing precedent must have placed the . . . constitutional question beyond debate.’”
Hunt, 773 F.3d at 368. Because Mr. Stile was a pretrial detainee during the relevant
period, Defendants’ conduct must be evaluated against the law that governs claims
of excessive force rather than claims of cruel and unusual punishment. See Kingsley
v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015). Excessive force claims are evaluated
under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard. Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force
must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than
with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396.
The Court concludes that the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity and are therefore, immune from the assault and battery claims arising
from Mr. Stile being subjected to strip and visible cavity searches during short periods

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at Somerset County Jail in September 2012, May 2013, and from September 24, until
September 30, 2013.

Final Compl. ¶¶ 12, 36-38.

Mr. Stile also asserts other

violations of his rights, such as not having access to medication, his eyeglasses, and
his legal papers. Id. ¶¶ 36-38.
Even viewed in the light most favorable to him, Mr. Stile’s allegations are
conclusory and insufficient. Id. As strip searches are a necessary and common safety
procedure in jails, his allegations that he was subjected to daily strip searches during
the brief periods he was present at the Somerset County Jail from September 2012
onward, without more, are insufficient to show the individual Defendants actions in
conducting these searches were objectively unreasonable given the jail’s penological
interests in such searches. See Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 237 (1st Cir.
2002) (citation omitted) (“[T]o withstand a properly supported motion for summary
judgment, the opposing party must present ‘enough competent evidence’ to enable a
factfinder to decide in its favor on the disputed claims.”). Similarly, as Mr. Stile was
placed in the Somerset County Jail only for brief periods from September 2012
through May 2013, there is no basis to conclude that the Somerset County Jail or its
employees were responsible for making certain that certain unnamed medications,
his eyeglasses, and his legal paperwork were transported with him to the Somerset
County Jail for these brief stays.
The individual Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Stile’s
assault and battery and other tort-based claims.

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VI.

CONCLUSION

The Court DENIES the following motions:
1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Video Exhibits, including his Motion for
a Ruling on the Motion to Strike (ECF No. 499), (ECF No. 583);
2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Court to Grant Order Pursuant to Rule 56(d) (ECF
No. 562).
The Court DISMISSES as moot the following motions for judgment on the pleadings:
1) Defendants Somerset County and Barry DeLong’s Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings (ECF No. 438);
2) Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 431);
3) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Defendants Keith Plourd and Jeffrey
Jacques (ECF No. 434).
The Court GRANTS the following motion for summary judgment:
1) Defendants Somerset County and Barry DeLong’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 438).
The Court GRANTS in part and DISMISSES in part the following motions for
summary judgment:
1) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 431);
2) Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendants Keith Plourd and
Jeffrey Jacques (ECF No. 434);
3) Defendant David Allen’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 440).
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The Court GRANTS each motion for summary judgment, and DISMISSES without
prejudice each motion as to Defendants Plourd, Garling, and Allen solely as regards
Mr. Stile’s due process claim stemming from his monetary fine. If the Defendants
wish to file dispositive motions to clarify this factual issue, they must do so within
thirty days of this Order.
SO ORDERED
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 28th day of September, 2018

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