TREFRY v. TRACY et al

Filing 19

OPINION AND ORDER denying 4 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; granting 11 Motion to Dismiss By JUDGE NANCY TORRESEN. (dfr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
C.J. TREFRY,
Plaintiff
v.
DIANA K. TRACY, et al,
Defendants.

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1:14-cv-00044-NT

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff C.J. Trefry filed suit against Defendants, predominantly employees of
the Maine Department of Health and Human Services, complaining of the loss of food
stamps and asking that this Court order the return of food stamps to Plaintiff and
her minor daughter, among other things. Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Preliminary
Injunction. Now pending before the Court are the Motion for Preliminary Injunction
and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. 1
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed suit, pro se, on February 4, 2014. With her Complaint (ECF No.
1), Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 4) asking the Court
to order that she continue to receive food stamps while the issue of her eligibility for
the stamps is litigated in this Court. The Court authorized her petition to proceed in
forma pauperis on February 6. Although the primary focus of Plaintiff’s action is to

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On April 29, 2014, the Court referred the motions for report and recommended decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 6(b)
to Judge Nivison, who entered an order of recusal on May 16, 2014, apparently at the suggestion of the Plaintiff. See
Mot. to Expedite J. (ECF No. 16).

challenge state administrative decisions and state court decisions on appeal from that
administrative action, it also appears that Plaintiff wishes to litigate in this Court
some manner of claim against the State of Michigan for “unlawful detainment,”
though neither Michigan nor any officer or other representative of the State of
Michigan is a named defendant in this action.
On March 11, 2014, Defendants agreed to accept service of the Complaint and
Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 10). On March 25, 2014, Defendants
filed their Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 11). On May 12, 2014, Plaintiff filed her
“second” Motion to Expedite Judgment. (ECF No. 16).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts set forth herein are derived from Plaintiff’s Complaint, which facts
are deemed true when evaluating the Motion to Dismiss.2 The facts may also be
informed by the exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint, which include the
Department’s January 22, 2014 “Decision after Hearing” (ECF No. 1-3), authored by
Defendant Tamra Longanecker, Administrative Hearing Officer; Plaintiff’s May 26,
2011 “Request to Appeal,” evidently filed by Plaintiff in the Maine Superior Court
(ECF No. 1-2); and various correspondence between Plaintiff and the Department and
between Plaintiff and the York County Superior Court. See Freeman v. Town of
Hudson, 714 F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 2013) (“On a motion to dismiss, a court ordinarily
may only consider facts alleged in the complaint and exhibits attached thereto[.]”).

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The reference to the facts as alleged should not be construed as a determination that the alleged facts are accurate.
The alleged facts are recited in the context of the standard of review for a motion to dismiss.
2

On April 26, 2011, James D. Bivins, Esq., Chief Administrative Hearing Officer
for the Department of Health and Human Services, wrote Plaintiff regarding “request
for hearing” and indicated that he denied her request for a hearing for reasons stated
in a letter of March 30, 2011, which is not made part of the record. (ECF No. 1-6).
On May 26, 2011, Plaintiff requested an appeal to “across the board cuts to food
stamps” in a letter/pleading directed to the Maine Superior Court. In that letter,
Plaintiff noted that she had not taken the opportunity to request an administrative
hearing in the matter because she could not fit it in with her parenting obligation and
then discussed in general terms the challenges that parenthood creates for the pro se
litigant. (ECF No. 1-2). On July 27, 2011, the Clerk of the York County Superior
Court wrote a letter to Plaintiff, possibly in response to the May 26, 2011 letter,
stating that the “document” was being returned “because it is unclear . . . how you
want to proceed or what your objective is.” (ECF No. 1-6).
Years later, the Department provided Plaintiff with an administrative hearing
on January 7, 2014, with Administrative Hearing Officer Longanecker presiding “by
special appointment from the Commissioner, Department of Health and Human
Services.”

Decision After Hr’g 1, ECF No. 1-3. In her Decision After Hearing,

Longanecker noted that the Department determined Plaintiff’s household to no
longer be eligible for federal food supplement benefits effective November 1, 2013.
(Id). In her findings of fact, Longanecker found that Plaintiff was receiving food
stamps prior to that date for the benefit of herself and her daughter, but that stamps
were discontinued upon an October 2013 eligibility review at which it was determined

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that Plaintiff’s son, age 20, was also living in the residence and was earning income
in excess of the limit for food stamp eligibility. (Id. 2, ¶¶ 1-6). Longanecker upheld
the eligibility determination and articulated her reasons. (Id. 3-4).
In her Complaint before this Court, Plaintiff explains that she remains
unemployed, but does not receive unemployment assistance or other benefits from
the State of Maine because she moved here from Michigan, though she acknowledges
that she has received food stamps. Plaintiff indicates that even with food stamps she
receives “way too small financial payment for [her] job-seeking efforts, and the
sharing of [her] intellectual property.” (Compl. 2). She believes her family is being
discriminated against for living an alternative lifestyle and wants the problem of
having adequate food and water solved, not just for her own benefit, but so that “we
are all in a better position to handle global warming.” (Id. 3). According to Plaintiff,
she does not know how broadly to fashion her complaint, but knows that the Food
Stamp Act is a federal program and “that there is an employment discrimination
issue.” (Id). She asks that food stamps be returned to her family, that the matter be
litigated in this Court in the meantime, and that the Court help her to sue Michigan
“for a lot of money, and/or obtain a very large check for [her] services to Michigan.”
(Id).
In a Good Cause Argument for Food Stamps, attached to the Complaint,
Plaintiff argues that it is unfair to base her household income on earnings made by
her son because, in her view, it hurts his ability to be independent and he should not
be responsible for supporting his mother and sister. Plaintiff also argues, among

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other things, that this litigation imposes an undue burden on her household and,
because she cannot afford or find a lawyer, requires her “continued consumption of
her intellectual property without appropriate payment to her.” (ECF No. 1-1).
In her Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Plaintiff repeats many of her
allegations and requests that food stamps be provided while this matter is being
reviewed in Court. (ECF No. 4).
DISCUSSION
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is premised on Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants argue that the Court should
abstain from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s action, pursuant to Burford v. Sun
Oil Company, 319 U.S. 315 (1943), because there is a statutory and regulatory scheme
that affords Plaintiff state administrative remedies and state court judicial review.
(Mot. to Dismiss 1-2 & n.1).
A.

Standard of Review
Pursuant to Rule 8(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, every

complaint must state the basis for the court’s exercise of jurisdiction. “ ‘Federal courts
are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only that power authorized by
Constitution and statute.’ ” Gunn v. Minton, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064 (2013)
(quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “It
is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden
of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen,
511 U.S. at 377 (citation omitted). But when it is evident that jurisdiction exists,

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“federal courts have a ‘virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction
given them.’ ” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992) (quoting Colorado
River Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)). Federal courts
“have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp
that which is not given.” Cohens v. State of Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may seek
dismissal of an action on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction to rule on the
subject matter of the action.

Additionally, courts have an independent duty to

evaluate the existence of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. Generally, dismissal
based on the absence of subject matter jurisdiction is without prejudice to the
plaintiff’s right to pursue the claim in state court. U.S. ex rel. Poteet v. Bahler Med.,
Inc., 619 F.3d 104, 115 (1st Cir. 2010).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may seek
dismissal if that party believes that the complaint fails “to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Judgment based on such a motion presumes the existence of
subject matter jurisdiction and the resulting dismissal is with prejudice absent a
contrary indication. U.S. ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220,
241 (1st Cir. 2004). In its assessment of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must
“assume the truth of all well-plead facts and give the plaintiff[ ] the benefit of all
reasonable inferences therefrom.” Blanco v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 802 F. Supp. 2d
215, 221 (D. Me. 2011) (quoting Genzyme Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 622 F.3d 62, 68 (1st
Cir. 2010)). To overcome such a motion, Plaintiff must establish that her allegations

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raise a plausible basis for a fact finder to conclude that Defendants are legally
responsible for Plaintiff’s claims. Id.
B.

The Parties’ Positions
Defendants assert that the Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction,

describing Plaintiff’s action as “an inappropriate attempt to obtain federal court
review of an adverse decision by a state agency.” (Mot. to Dismiss 2). They base their
argument on Burford v. Sun Oil Company, 319 U.S. 315 (1943), and analyze the case
according to the Burford jurisdictional standard. (Id. 6-13).
In response, Plaintiff maintains that her action is about more than getting
“federal court review,” and asserts that the issue “is whether there is a system in
place which adequately gathers AND reimburses systems feedback from the peons it
was designed to assist toward jobs and job conditions that will be more supportive of
government’s compelling interests.”

(Pl’s Resp. 1, ECF No. 12).

Among other

concerns voiced by Plaintiff, is her concern that the unavailability of free legal counsel
to represent her at the Department’s administrative hearings, coupled with the
unavailability of public monies to pay her directly for her own legal education or selfrepresentation amount to a denial of due process. (Id. 2). Plaintiff also addresses her
particular frustration with the food stamps eligibility determination—that as a
matter of public policy her son should not be automatically treated as part of her
household simply because he boards in her home. (Id. 2-3). She asserts that a need
for “a federal review of food stamp policy may be in order.” (Id. 3). Plaintiff wishes

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to reserve the right to amend her Complaint and suggests that a section 1983 action
“may be reasonable.” (Id).
In reply, Defendants note that any available free legal services must be sought
out by Plaintiff in the context of the food stamp program, i.e., that there is no federal
right to the appointment of counsel. (Reply 1-2, ECF No. 15). They also address the
merits of Plaintiff’s chief complaint about the underlying eligibility determination,
noting that federal regulations required the State to treat Plaintiff’s son as part of
her household for income computation purposes.

(Id. 2-3, citing 7 C.F.R. §

273.1(b)(ii)). As for Plaintiff’s reference to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Defendants observe that
the Plaintiff’s allegations are not sufficient to identify an actionable deprivation. (Id.
4).
C.

Discussion
The food stamp program is a federally-funded program run under the auspices

of the Department of Agriculture, but administered locally by the states pursuant to
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2020 et seq. (“SNAP”).
The SNAP Act places responsibility for “certifying applicant households and issuing
EBT cards” with each participating state, id. § 2020(a)(1), and establishes that each
state’s “plan of operation” provide certain statutorily mandated services and other
services as required by regulation, id. § 2020(e). Among the required services are “a
fair hearing and a prompt determination thereafter to any household aggrieved by
the action of the State agency under any provision of its plan of operation as it affects
the participation of such household in the supplemental nutrition assistance

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program.” Id. § 2020(e)(10). The Act also requires that the states comply with civil
rights law in the administration of their respective programs. Id. § 2020(c). Failure
to comply with these and other statutory requirements exposes a state to a suit by
the Attorney General in federal court, id. § 2020(g), but there is no similar provision
authorizing enforcement actions by private citizens. Consequently, the SNAP Act
does not authorize this Court to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s private action
seeking a change in federal and state food stamp policy.
Furthermore, as argued by Defendants and as thoroughly explained by Judge
Singal in Kilroy v. Mayhew, 841 F. Supp. 2d 414 (D. Me. 2012), in the specific context
of an action complaining of a state administrative determination related to food
stamp eligibility, it is appropriate under the Burford doctrine for the Court to abstain
from the exercise of jurisdiction to the extent that some theoretical basis may exist in
federal law for this Court to exercise jurisdiction over such a claim. See id. 419-424.
Plaintiff otherwise raises the idea that perhaps her claim arises under the Civil
Rights Act, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although section 1983 affords a cause of
action to private individuals and therefore could provide a jurisdictional basis for this
Court to act, it does not confer upon plaintiffs any substantive rights. County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 n. 5 (1998); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,
144 n.3 (1979). Consequently, to state a civil rights claim, Plaintiff must identify
another federal statute or a constitutional provision that affords her a right she might
vindicate through a section 1983 action. On this issue, Plaintiff mentions due process
and employment discrimination in her Complaint.

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With respect to due process, what Plaintiff proposes is that individuals
challenging food stamp eligibility determinations receive free legal counsel or that
such individuals be paid directly by the government for the time they spend
representing themselves. However, Plaintiff does not identify, nor is this Court
aware of, any federal law or federal court precedent that supports either of these
novel theories. As for employment discrimination, Plaintiff again fails to identify any
federal law or precedent that could support a plausible inference that she was an
employee of the Maine Department of Health and Human Services, let alone an act
of Congress that would authorize her to maintain an employment discrimination
claim in federal court on the facts she has alleged. Because Plaintiff is a pro se
litigant, this Court has reviewed her complaint subject to “less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). Nevertheless, in this instance Plaintiff simply fails to identify any legitimate
basis for a finding that Defendants subjected Plaintiff to an injury for which either
section 1983 or a federal anti-discrimination statute provides a remedy.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 4) is
DENIED; the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) is GRANTED; the
Plaintiffs’ food stamp claim and employment discrimination claim are DISMISSED,

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without prejudice, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and Plaintiff’s section 1983
due process claim is DISMISSED, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Nancy Torresen
United States District Judge

Dated this 22nd day of May, 2014.

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