TILTON v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION COMMISSIONER

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION re 8 Social Security Statement of Errors/Fact Sheet. By MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN C. NIVISON. (CWP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
TIMOTHY DAVID TILTON,
Plaintiff
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant

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No. 1:14-cv-00153-JCN

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION1
Plaintiff Timothy Tilton applied for disability insurance benefits under Title II and Title XVI
of the Social Security Act. Defendant, the Social Security Administration Acting Commissioner, found
that Plaintiff has severe impairments, but that he retains the functional capacity to perform substantial
gainful activity. Defendant, therefore, denied Plaintiff’s request for disability benefits.

As explained below, following a review of the record, and after consideration of the parties’
written and oral arguments, the Court vacates the administrative decision and remands the matter
for further proceedings.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS
The ALJ’s decision2 tracks the familiar five-step sequential evaluation process for
analyzing social security disability claims, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. (ALJ Hearing Decision, ECF
No. 6-2.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of Title II through
December 31, 2013. (Id. ¶ 1.) At step 1 of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ determined

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The parties have filed a consent authorizing the undersigned to conduct any and all proceedings and enter a final
order and judgment in this matter.
Because the Appeals Council “found no reason” to review that decision (PageID # 22), the Acting Commissioner’s
final decision is the October 19, 2012, decision of the Administrative Law Judge.
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that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity beginning September 25, 2009, the
date of alleged onset of disability. (Id. ¶ 2.) At step 2, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff suffers
degenerative disk disease of the lumbar spine, which is a severe impairment. (Id. ¶ 3.) At step 3,
the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairment does not meet or equal any listing in the
Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments, Appendix 1 to 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P. (Id. ¶ 4.)
Prior to further evaluation at steps 4 and 5, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s residual functional
capacity (RFC) and found that Plaintiff can perform light work, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), except
that he can stoop and crouch only on an occasional basis. (Id. ¶ 5.) In making this finding, the
ALJ gave “little weight” to each of the expert opinions that he considered, and did not cite an
expert opinion that corresponded with his assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC. (Id.)
At step 4, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s limitations do not prevent Plaintiff from
performing past relevant work in shoe manufacturing. (Id. ¶ 6.) Additionally, in a step 5
alternative finding, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is able to perform other substantial gainful
activity, including in the cleaning, price marker, and mail sorter occupations. (Id.) In support of
his alternative finding, the ALJ asserted that Plaintiff could perform the jobs of price marker and
mail sorter “even with the reduced capacity for light work expressed within Dr. Lorenzo’s treating
source opinion.” (Id.) Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been under a disability
from September 25, 2009, through the date of the ALJ’s decision. (Id. ¶ 7.)
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in his residual functional capacity assessment because
he rejected the opinions of an examining physician and a treating source, and did not expressly
rely on any medical opinion of record. (Statement of Errors at 2, 4.) Plaintiff notes that although
the record includes an “agency evaluation” (R. 74-75) that offers the same RFC as the RFC

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determined by the ALJ, the evaluation is immaterial because the ALJ did not cite the evaluation
and because the physician who made the evaluation did not consider subsequent evidence,
including an EMG that reflected that Plaintiff suffers from Axonal Neuropathy. (Id. at 2, n.1.) In
fact, Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ failed to acknowledge the diagnosis of Axonal Neuropathy,
and failed to mention the opinion of Plaintiff’s primary care provider, Mary Dunlap. (Id. at 3-5.)
Plaintiff also argues that the decision is deficient regarding its discussion of Plaintiff’s credibility
and the impact of Plaintiff’s obesity on his degenerative disk disease. (Id. at 6-7.)
A. Standard of Review
The Court must affirm the administrative decision provided that the decision is based on
the correct legal standards and is supported by substantial evidence, even if the record contains
evidence capable of supporting an alternative outcome. Manso-Pizarro v. Sec’y of HHS, 76 F.3d
15, 16 (1st Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Rodriguez Pagan v. Sec’y of HHS, 819 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
1987). Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a finding. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Rodriguez v. Sec’y of HHS, 647 F.2d
218, 222 (1st Cir. 1981). “The ALJ’s findings of fact are conclusive when supported by substantial
evidence, but they are not conclusive when derived by ignoring evidence, misapplying the law, or
judging matters entrusted to experts.” Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999).
B. Analysis
A review of the record reveals that the ALJ (1) rejected the opinions of two consulting
physicians (Drs. Axelman and Trumbull), (2) rejected the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician
(Dr. Lorenzo), (3) failed to cite any expert opinion as a basis for his RFC finding, and (4) failed to
address and thus failed to seek an expert consultation regarding Plaintiff’s Axonal Neuropathy.
Simply stated, given the lack of expert opinion evidence to support the ALJ’s RFC determination,

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and given the lack of medical evidence to support the ALJ’s disregard of Plaintiff’s Axonal
Neuropathy, to reach his conclusions, the ALJ must have inappropriately interpreted raw medical
data. See Manso-Pizarro v. Sec’y of HHS, 76 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1996) (“With a few exceptions
…, an ALJ, as a lay person, is not qualified to interpret raw data in a medical record.”).
Accordingly, remand is warranted.3
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court vacates the administrative decision and remands
the matter for further proceedings.
/s/ John C. Nivison
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Dated this 14th day of January, 2015.

The ALJ’s discussion of obesity also appears to be lacking, particularly as obesity appears to have been a factor
relevant to the RFC assessment offered by the treating pain specialist, Dr. Lorenzo. (Exs. 15F, 20F.) The ALJ limited
his consideration of obesity to a cursory step 2 assessment that the condition was not severe, without revisiting the
impact obesity has on Plaintiff’s RFC when considered alongside Plaintiff’s lumbar degenerative disk disease. See
Titles II & XVI: Evaluation of Obesity, SSR 02-1P (S.S.A. Sept. 12, 2002) (“When we identify obesity as a medically
determinable impairment …, we will consider any functional limitations resulting from the obesity in the RFC
assessment, in addition to any limitations resulting from any other physical or mental impairments that we identify.”).
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