BEGIN v. DROUIN et al

Filing 80

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE granting in part and denying in part 58 Motion in Limine. By MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN C. NIVISON. (mtm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
JASON BEGIN,
Plaintiff
v.
LAURA DROUIN,
Defendant

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1:16-cv-00092-JCN

ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE
Defendant moves to exclude as evidence at trial the Augusta Police Department’s
Standard Operating Procedures regarding the use of force and the response to a person
experiencing a mental health crisis. (Motion, ECF No. 58.) After consideration of the
parties’ arguments, the Court grants in part and denies in part the motion.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the Department’s Situational Use of Force, SOP No. 13A, and
the Department’s Responses to Behavior of Person in Mental Health Crisis; Protective
Custody, SOP No. 41C, are not relevant to the jury’s assessment of whether Defendant’s
use of force was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Alternatively,
Defendant contends any probative value of the policies is outweighed by the risk of unfair
prejudice to Defendant and the potential to confuse and mislead the jury.
As both parties acknowledge, police enforcement practices are not determinative of
the reasonableness of an officer’s actions under the Fourth Amendment. See Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815-16 (1996). The policies, however, are not irrelevant to

the assessment of an officer’s conduct. Given that the policies are designed to govern and
guide an officer’s conduct in certain situations, policies regarding police enforcement
practices can be relevant to an assessment of the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct.
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that given the circumstances Defendant encountered on
January 12, 2015, Defendant’s decision to use deadly force violated the protections of the
Fourth Amendment. The Department’s use of force policy, on which Defendant was
trained, is relevant to the jury’s evaluation of Defendant’s conduct. In addition, because
Defendant was trained on the policy, the probative value outweighs any prejudice to
Defendant or potential for jury confusion.
Based on the Court’s understanding of the anticipated evidence at trial, however, the
Department’s policy regarding the response to an individual in a mental health crisis
appears to have little, if any, relevance to the situation Defendant encountered. The policy
is evidently designed to govern and guide an officer in the assessment of whether a person
might require protective custody, through either a voluntary or an involuntary process. On
January 12, 2015, Defendant was present to assist the Assertive Community Treatment
Team of the Riverview Psychiatric Center in the event Plaintiff became uncooperative
when he learned that he would be returning to Riverview. Given that the team included
medical professionals, including at least one mental health professional, who would
presumably assess and address Plaintiff’s mental health needs, and given that the team had
already determined that Plaintiff would be re-admitted to Riverview, the policy does not

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appear to have much relevance to the situation. To the extent the policy has any relevance,
its probative value is outweighed by the potential to confuse or mislead the jury.
CONCLUSION
Based on the following analysis, the Court grants in part and denies in part
Defendant’s Motion in Limine. The Court grants the motion as to and excludes from
evidence the Augusta Police Department’s Responses to Behavior of Person in Mental
Health Crisis; Protective Custody, SOP No. 41C. The Court denies the motion as to the
Augusta Police Department’s Situational Use of Force, SOP No. 13A.

/s/ John C. Nivison
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Dated this 17th day of May, 2019.

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