JAMES v. BUENO et al

Filing 26

REPORT AND RECOMMENDED DECISION re 20 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by MICHEAL J JAMES. Objections to R&R due by 10/11/2016. By MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN C. NIVISON. (CWP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
MICHAEL JAMES,
Plaintiff
v.
ERIC BUENO , et al.,
Defendants

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1:16-cv-00416-NT

RECOMMENDED DECISION ON
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
In this action, Plaintiff Michael James, an inmate at the Maine State Prison, alleges
Defendants deprived him of certain federal rights when they placed him in solitary confinement
based on false accusations. (Complaint at 3, ¶ IV.) He asserts the confinement has included the
application of excessive force, and that he has suffered severe mental pain and experienced medical
treatment issues. (Id.)
Plaintiff also filed a motion for injunctive relief. (Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order, ECF No. 20; Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 20-1.) Through his motion and
supporting declaration,1 Plaintiff asks the Court (1) to order Defendants to provide him with a
classification and prison assignment that is not punitive in nature, provide more liberty out of his
cell, and provide “proper medical care,” and (2) to prohibit Defendants from having any contact
with Plaintiff while his lawsuit is pending. (ECF No. 20 at 2 – 3.)
After review of Plaintiff’s filings, I recommend that the Court deny Plaintiff’s request for
immediate injunctive relief.

Plaintiff’s motion is in the form of a draft order to show cause, which order would require Defendants to show cause
why injunctive relief should not be provided.

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Background
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that he has been “maced” over 100 times,
which has greatly exacerbated his asthma; that he has been “taken off all [his] medication for [his]
mental health and emotional issue;” that in his distress, he has hit his head against the wall; and
that he has a long history of mental illness. (Complaint at 4, 6.) Plaintiff has on three occasions
supplemented his complaint, which filings have included grievance forms (ECF No. 13), responses
to some grievances (ECF No. 14), and a letter to the court (ECF No. 11) in which he asserts the
treatment he presently receives is influenced in part by his decision to file suit.
Plaintiff’s history of incarceration has been discussed at some length by the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court (the “Law Court”). In James v. State, the Law Court provided the following relevant
background information:
[¶ 2] On May 21, 2004, while serving a twelve-year sentence at the Maine State
Prison, Michael James was convicted of one count of witness tampering and eleven
counts of assault on an officer. The court (Brodrick, A.R.J.) sentenced James to
three years, to be served consecutively to his twelve-year sentence. Pursuant to 17–
A M.R.S.A. § 1256 (Supp. 2004)[ ] [subsequently amended], James’s twelve-year
sentence was interrupted so that he could serve this three-year sentence first.
[¶ 3] While serving this three-year prison sentence, James was charged with ten
more counts of assault on an officer. On June 27, 2006, a Knox County jury found
James not criminally responsible by reason of mental disease or defect on these
counts, and the Superior Court (Marden, J.) ordered him committed to DHHS
custody “to be placed in an appropriate institution for the mentally ill ... for care
and treatment” pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 103 (2007). The order did not state whether
James was to be committed to DHHS custody before or after serving the remainder
of his prison sentence.
[¶ 4] The Attorney General’s office reviewed the conflicting orders relating to
James’s custody and opined that James should remain in DOC custody until his
term of imprisonment is complete, after which he would be taken into DHHS
custody for placement in a psychiatric institution. The Attorney General’s office
shared this opinion with the court, noting that the prison would retain the option of
initiating an emergency involuntary admission should James’s illness or behavior
warrant treatment during his incarceration.

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[¶ 5] James, who was then still housed in the Maine State Prison, filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court, dated September 15, 2006, naming
the Commissioners of DOC and DHHS as respondents. James argued that deferral
of his placement in the custody of DHHS was not warranted pursuant to the court’s
order or the applicable statute, that the Maine State Prison was not an appropriate
institution to care for the mentally ill, and that DOC and DHHS were failing to
implement the court’s June 27, 2006, order. The respondents moved for dismissal
of the petition.
[¶ 6] On January 5, 2007, following a hearing, the court denied James’s petition for
a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the writ of habeas corpus has been replaced
by the statute providing for post-conviction review, 15 M.R.S. §§ 2122, 2124, and
that James could challenge the legality of his detention by DOC only by way of a
post-conviction proceeding. The court ordered that James’s petition be treated as a
petition for post-conviction review and gave James leave to amend the petition in
order to cause it to conform to the statutory requirements and M. R. Crim. P. 67.
[¶ 7] James amended his petition, naming the State as the respondent. In
preparation for the post-conviction hearing, the parties stipulated that the Maine
State Prison is not “an appropriate institution for the mentally ill ... for care and
treatment” under 15 M.R.S. § 103.
[¶ 8] The court entered a judgment on July 25, 2007, ordering James committed
immediately to DHHS custody for placement in a psychiatric hospital, and holding
that his pre-existing prison sentence will be tolled until James receives an order of
release or discharge from the custody of DHHS pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 104–A
(2007), at which time he is to be delivered back to DOC custody.[ ]
James v. State, 2008 ME 122, ¶¶ 2 – 8, 953 A.2d 1152, 1153–55 (footnotes omitted at bracketed
locations).
In the case, the Law Court held that it was appropriate for the Superior Court to order the
State to deliver Plaintiff to the custody of DHHS and to suspend Plaintiff’s sentence of
incarceration with the Department of Corrections while Plaintiff was “a member of the exceptional
class for whom a reasonable and humane response is commitment to a hospital for treatment.” Id.
¶ 21, 953 A.2d at 1158 (abrogated by statute, P.L. 2007, ch. 475, § 3 (currently codified at 15
M.R.S. § 103-A)). The Law Court reasoned that “[t]he court presiding over the trial that results in
a determination that the defendant is not criminally responsible is best able to judge whether

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hospital confinement is immediately necessary, or whether continued confinement by DOC until
the defendant’s sentence is discharged would serve the needs of the defendant and of the public.
Id. ¶ 22. The Law Court concluded:
Pursuant to the terms of 15 M.R.S. § 104–A, James may be returned to DOC
custody when it is determined that he does not present a danger to himself or others
because of a mental disease or defect. As soon as a staff psychiatrist believes that
James could be “released or discharged without likelihood that [he] will cause
injury to [himself] or to others due to mental disease or mental defect,” a report to
that effect must be sent to the Commissioner of DHHS, and the Commissioner is
required to forward that report to the Superior Court. 15 M.R.S. § 104–A(3). The
court must then hold a civil hearing to determine James’s readiness for discharge.
Id. § 104–A(1). James himself may also petition the court for release under this
section. Id. § 104–A(3). We emphasize that the decision to be made by the
psychiatrist and the court pursuant to section 104–A is whether James presents a
danger because of his mental illness or defect. Even without the complication of
mental illness, James may present a danger to others, but if any such continuing
dangerous behavior is not due to mental illness, or if his mental illness is not
amenable to treatment, then there may be no reason for James’s continuing
commitment.
Id. ¶ 24, 953 A.2d at 1159.
Plaintiff was still committed to the care and custody of DHHS as of the Law Court’s
January 17, 2008, oral argument. Id. ¶ 26. The record in this case does not reflect precisely when
Plaintiff returned to the Maine State Prison. Plaintiff, however, represents in his letter (ECF No.
11) that he spent “from 2007 to 2014 in Riverview Hospital,” that none of the time counted toward
his sentence, and that it was illegal not to count the time toward his sentence. (ECF No. 11 at 1.)2

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In James v. State, the Law Court explained that because Plaintiff was committed to DHHS custody pursuant to 15
M.R.S. § 103, his sentence was tolled because such a commitment “is not deemed to be a punishment.” 2008 ME
122, ¶ 25, 953 A.2d at 1159.

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Discussion3
To obtain emergency injunctive relief on his viable civil rights claims, Plaintiff must show
“(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a significant risk of irreparable harm if
the injunction is withheld, (3) a favorable balance of hardships,4 and (4) a fit (or lack of friction)
between the injunction and the public interest.”5 Nieves–Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108,
120 (1st Cir. 2003); Hoffman v. Sec’y of State of Me., 574 F. Supp. 2d 179, 186 (D. Me. 2008).
Through his submissions, Plaintiff evidently requests both a temporary restraining order
and a preliminary injunction. Generally, the distinction between the two forms of injunctive relief
is that the former can be awarded without notice to the other party and an opportunity to be heard.
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Verso Paper Corp., 80 F. Supp. 3d 247, 278 (D.
Me. 2015). A temporary restraining order, therefore, is an even more exceptional remedy than a
preliminary injunction, which is itself “an extraordinary and drastic remedy that is never awarded
as of right.” Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 32 (1st
Cir. 2011) (quoting Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689 – 90 (2008)). By rule, a temporary
restraining order requires a clear showing “that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage

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Plaintiff’s contention that his continued confinement is not lawful is not the proper subject of a civil rights claim
under § 1983 unless and until Plaintiff’s confinement is terminated on direct review, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by an authorized state tribunal, or called into question in a federal court’s writ of habeas corpus. Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 – 87 (1994); see also Edwards v. Balisok, 529 U.S. 641, 647 – 48 (1997). “[H]abeas
corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks
immediate or speedier release ....” Heck, 512 U.S. at 481 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488 – 90 (1973)).
Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff’s pleadings and motion can be interpreted to request release, such relief is not
available in this action and I will not address the issue further in the assessment of Plaintiff’s request for immediate
injunctive relief.

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Plaintiff must demonstrate that his claimed injury outweighs any harm that granting the injunctive relief would inflict
upon Defendants. Lancor v. Lebanon Hous. Auth., 760 F. 2d 361, 362 (1st Cir. 1985).
Plaintiff must prove that “the public interest will not be adversely affected by the granting of the injunction.” Planned
Parenthood League v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1009 (1st Cir. 1981).

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will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
65(b)(1).
Regardless of whether notice is provided, “[t]he dramatic and drastic power of injunctive
force may be unleashed only against conditions generating a presently existing actual threat; it
may not be used simply to eliminate a possibility of a remote future injury, or a future invasion of
rights, be those rights protected by statute or by the common law.” Holiday Inns of Am., Inc. v. B
& B Corp., 409 F.2d 614, 618 (3d Cir. 1969). Moreover, “judicial restraint is especially called for
in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.” Rogers v. Scurr,
676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (requiring that
prospective injunctive relief “extend no further than necessary” and afford only “the least intrusive
means necessary to correct the violation,” and that the court “give substantial weight to any adverse
impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief”).
For the Court to consider the merit of Plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order,
Plaintiff first must demonstrate that he would suffer an irreparable loss if Defendants were notified
of his request and provided the opportunity to respond to the motion. Plaintiff has failed to provide
any record evidence that would support such a conclusion.
In addition, Plaintiff has failed to establish through record evidence that he is likely to
prevail on the claim asserted in the complaint, which Plaintiff must do to obtain injunctive relief
at this stage of the proceedings. Verizon New England, Inc. v. Maine Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 403
F. Supp. 2d 96, 102 (D. Me. 2005). Plaintiff has not only failed to present credible evidence to
support his claim, but his history of assaultive behavior as outlined by the Maine Law Court raises
legitimate questions about Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the circumstances of his confinement.
Plaintiff’s history also suggests the balance between an injunction and the public interest militates

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against an injunction particularly given that “judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing
with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.” Rogers, 676 F.2d at 1214.
In short, on this record, Plaintiff is not entitled to the immediate injunctive relief he seeks.6
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing analysis, I recommend the Court deny Plaintiff’s Motion for a
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 20).
NOTICE
A party may file objections to those specified portions of a magistrate judge’s
report or proposed findings or recommended decisions entered pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for which de novo review by the district court is sought,
together with a supporting memorandum, within fourteen (14) days of being served
with a copy thereof. A responsive memorandum shall be filed within fourteen (14)
days after the filing of the objection.
Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right to de novo
review by the district court and to appeal the district court’s order.

/s/ John C. Nivison
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Dated this 23rd day of September, 2016.

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Because the elements that Plaintiff must satisfy to obtain a preliminary injunction are similar to the elements
necessary to secure a temporary restraining order, the analysis is equally applicable to both requests. Newton v.
LePage, 789 F. Supp. 2d 172, 178 (D. Me. 2011).

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