NUGENT v. STATE OF MAINE
Filing
11
REPORT AND RECOMMENDED DECISION re 1 Complaint filed by JOSEPH J NUGENT, III. Objections to R&R due by 11/14/2016. By MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN C. NIVISON. (CWP)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
JOSEPH J. NUGENT, III,
Plaintiff
v.
STATE OF MAINE,
Defendant
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
1:16-cv-522-NT
RECOMMENDED DECISION AFTER SCREENING COMPLAINT
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
In this action, Plaintiff Joseph J. Nugent, III, alleges that the Defendant State of Maine,
acting through a district attorney, state court judges, court-appointed counsel, and others violated
his civil rights in connection with a 2006 prosecution and conviction for assault, which conviction
is evidently the basis for current or recent proceedings involving a state court bail violation.
Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 3), which application
the Court granted (ECF No. 8). In accordance with the in forma pauperis statute, a preliminary
review of Plaintiff’s complaint is appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Following a review of the
pleadings, I recommend the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a party is proceeding in forma pauperis, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time
if the court determines,” inter alia, that the action is “frivolous or malicious” or “fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “Dismissals [under § 1915]
are often made sua sponte prior to the issuance of process, so as to spare prospective defendants
the inconvenience and expense of answering such complaints.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
324 (1989).
1
When considering whether a complaint states a claim for which relief may be granted,
courts must assume the truth of all well-plead facts and give the plaintiff the benefit of all
reasonable inferences therefrom. Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.
2011). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “The relevant question ... in assessing plausibility is not whether the
complaint makes any particular factual allegations but, rather, whether ‘the complaint warrant[s]
dismissal because it failed in toto to render plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief plausible.’” Rodríguez–
Reyes v. Molina–Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 n.
14). Although a pro se plaintiff’s complaint is subject to “less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the complaint may not
consist entirely of “conclusory allegations that merely parrot the relevant legal standard,” Young
v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 717 F.3d 224, 231 (1st Cir. 2013). See also Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d
888, 890 (1st Cir. 1980) (explaining that the liberal standard applied to the pleadings of pro se
plaintiffs “is not to say that pro se plaintiffs are not required to plead basic facts sufficient to state
a claim”).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
According to Plaintiff, through the combined actions or omissions of the district attorney,
state court judges, and multiple court-appointed attorneys, Defendant denied him of certain
constitutional rights, including his right to counsel, in connection with an assault charge for which
he was convicted. (Complaint at 1 – 3.) On Plaintiff’s appeal from the assault conviction, the
1
The facts set forth herein are derived from Plaintiff’s complaint.
2
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed the conviction, but vacated the sentence and remanded
the case for resentencing. State v. Nugent, 2007 ME 44, 917 A.2d 127, 128.
Plaintiff requests multiple forms of injunctive relief. In particular, Plaintiff asks the Court
to order the creation of a true record of his assault trial, direct the state courts to order the state
court to appoint new counsel, quash certain arrest warrants, overturn the assault conviction, and
conduct a grand jury investigation into the actions of all public officials identified in the complaint.
(Id. at 6 – 7.)
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff has named the State of Maine as the Defendant. Although Plaintiff requests
injunctive relief, the State of Maine has immunity under the Eleventh Amendment against suits
brought by citizens in federal court, regardless of the form of relief requested. Poirier v. Mass.
Dep’t of Corr., 558 F.3d 92, 97 n. 6 (1st Cir. 2009) (“A plaintiff may seek prospective injunctive
relief against a state official, but may not obtain such relief against a state or its agency because of
the sovereign immunity bar of the Eleventh Amendment.”). Plaintiff, therefore, cannot pursue a
claim in this Court against the State of Maine.
Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff also intends to pursue a claim against the individuals
named in his complaint, a federal district court would have jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1983, over claims against persons exercising state authority.2 The Court, however,
2
Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against
a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief
shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
…
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
3
does not have jurisdiction to review the final judgments and decisions of state courts. See Lance
v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (per curiam) (“The Rooker–Feldman doctrine prevents the
lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by ‘state-court losers’
challenging ‘state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.’”
(quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, (2005))); Silva v.
Massachusetts, 351 Fed. App’x 450, 454 (1st Cir. 2009) (“28 U.S.C. § 1257 vests the United States
Supreme Court with exclusive ‘jurisdiction over appeals from final state-court judgments.’”
(quoting Lance, 546 U.S. at 463)).
Here, Plaintiff clearly asks the Court to review the state court proceedings and to overrule
decisions of the state court. Simply stated, this Court thus lacks jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s
claim.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), I recommend the
Court dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint.
NOTICE
A party may file objections to those specified portions of a magistrate
judge’s report or proposed findings or recommended decisions entered pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for which de novo review by the district court is sought,
together with a supporting memorandum, within fourteen (14) days of being served
with a copy thereof. A responsive memorandum shall be filed within fourteen (14)
days after the filing of the objection.
Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right to de
novo review by the district court and to appeal the district court's order.
/s/ John C. Nivison
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Dated this 27th day of October, 2016.
4
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?