LEWIS v. KENNEBEC COUNTY et al

Filing 54

ORDER denying 41 Motion for Entry of Default Judgment for Failure to File Timely Answer; denying 41 Motion to Strike Untimely Answer of Defendant Kim Vigue; granting sua sponte Defendant Vigue's presumed motion to file late answer and cross-claim. By JUDGE JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR. (MFS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
BRANDEE A. LEWIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
KENNEBEC COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.

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1:16-cv-00559-JAW

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT AS AGAINST
DEFENDANT KIM VIGUE AND MOTION TO STRIKE UNTIMELY ANSWER
OF DEFENDANT KIM VIGUE
The Court denies a motion for entry of default against a defendant who had
already filed a late answer to the complaint, denies a motion to strike the late-filed
answer, declines to impose sanctions, and grants sua sponte a presumed motion to
file a late answer.
I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Relevant Procedural History

On November 7, 2016, Brandee A. Lewis filed a complaint against Kennebec
County, the Kennebec County Sheriff’s Office and its Corrections Division, the
Kennebec County Correctional Facility (KCCF), a number of Kennebec County
officials and employees, Crisis & Counseling Centers, Correctional Health Partners
(CHP), and Kimberly Arlene Vigue, alleging that while Ms. Lewis was housed in the
KCCF, she was “brutally sexually assaulted and physically assaulted by a nurse and
multiple staff members at the [KCCF].” Compl. ¶ 1 (ECF No. 1). The Complaint
alleges that Kimberly Arlene Vigue was a registered nurse, was employed by CHP,

and acted as a nurse for the KCCF. Id. ¶ 16. The Complaint further alleges that Ms.
Vigue is facing two counts of simple assault in a separate criminal matter related to
the civil allegations made in the Complaint. Id. ¶ 1.
Ms. Lewis served Ms. Vigue with the Complaint and a summons on February
26, 2017.1 Summons Returned Executed (ECF No. 34) (Executed Summons). Ms.
Vigue answered the Complaint through counsel on March 28, 2017 and filed a crossclaim. Def. Vigue’s Answer, Defenses and Cross-cl. (ECF No. 35) (Def.’s Answer). Ms.
Vigue’s cross-claim was against CHP, claiming that she was acting “at the direction
of her employer, for its benefit and within the scope of that employment” and she was
entitled to indemnification and a defense. Id. at 5. On April 4, 2017, CHP answered
Ms. Vigue’s cross-claim. Def./Cross-cl. Def. Correctional Health Partners’ Answer
and Affirmative Defenses (ECF No. 40).
On April 11, 2017, Ms. Lewis filed a motion for entry of default and a motion
to strike answer against Ms. Vigue, Mot. for Entry of Default for Failure to File Timely
Answer and Mot. to Strike Untimely Answer of Def. Kim Vigue (ECF No. 41) (Pl.’s
Mot.), and a memorandum in support of her motions. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pl.’s
Mot. for Entry of Default for Failure to File Timely Answer and Mot. to Strike
Untimely Answer of Def. Kim Vigue (ECF No. 43) (Pl.’s Mem.). Ms. Vigue responded
on April 25, 2017. Def. Vigue’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. [for] Entry of Default and Mot. to
Strike (ECF No. 50) (Def.’s Opp’n). Ms. Lewis replied on April 27, 2017. Reply to Def.

There is a dispute as to whether Ms. Vigue was served on February 24 or February 26, 2017.
As will be seen, the Court concludes that Ms. Vigue was served on February 26, 2017.
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Vigue’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Entry of Default and Mot. to Strike (ECF No. 51) (Pl.’s
Reply).
B.

Factual Background

After filing her Complaint on November 7, 2016, Ms. Lewis sent Ms. Vigue a
“complete package for waiver of service on November 14, 2016.” Pl.’s Mot. at 2. Ms.
Vigue failed to respond or return a duly executed waiver form, id., and on February
9, 2017, the Court issued an order to show cause because Ms. Lewis had named Ms.
Vigue as a defendant in the Complaint but had not served her. Order to Show Cause
(ECF No. 29). On February 10, 2017, Ms. Lewis moved to extend the time within
which to serve Ms. Vigue to an additional forty-five days, or until March 31, 2017,
explaining that her failure to serve Ms. Vigue was “excusable neglect.” Partially
Consented to Mot. to Extend Time to Effect Service Upon Def. Kim Vigue at 2 (ECF
No. 30). On February 23, 2017, the Magistrate Judge granted the motion to extend
time and terminated the Order to Show Cause. Order Granting Mot. to Extend Time
to Serve Def. Vigue (ECF No. 31); Order Terminating Order to Show Cause (ECF No.
32).
On February 23, 2017, the Clerk’s Office issued a summons for Ms. Vigue.
Summons in a Civil Action (ECF No. 33). A server from the Lincoln County Sheriff’s
Office served the summons on Ms. Vigue on February 26, 2017, and Ms. Lewis filed
the executed summons with the Court on March 5, 2017. Executed Summons. On
March 28, 2017, Ms. Vigue answered the Complaint and filed a cross-claim against
her employer. Def.’s Answer.

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II.

THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
A.

Brandee Lewis’ Motion

Stating that the Court set a deadline of March 20, 2017 for Ms. Vigue to file an
answer, Ms. Lewis observes that Ms. Vigue simply filed an answer on March 28, 2017
“[w]ithout requesting leave of court or an extension of time.” Pl.’s Mot. at 2. Ms.
Lewis asserts that Ms. Vigue’s answer would have been due on March 17, 2017 but
for the Court-imposed deadline. Id. Ms. Lewis also notes that on March 23, 2017,
after no timely answer was filed by Ms. Vigue, the Court set April 24, 2017 as the
deadline for Ms. Lewis to file a motion for default. Id. Noting that Ms. Vigue refused
to waive service, Ms. Lewis urges the Court to strike Ms. Vigue’s answer and to issue
a default against her since she “in all, had over 4 months to retain counsel and file an
Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint.” Pl.’s Mem. at 3–4.
B.

Kim Vigue’s Opposition

In her response, Ms. Vigue first argues that Ms. Lewis failed to comply with
Rule 55, which she claims requires a party moving for entry of default to show “by
affidavit” that the party against whom the default is sought has “failed to plead or
otherwise defend.” Def.’s Opp’n at 2 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a)). Ms. Vigue notes
that she submitted an answer on March 28, 2017, two weeks before Ms. Lewis filed
her motion for default, and she asserts that the reason Ms. Lewis did not file an
affidavit is that she could not have done so. Id. Ms. Vigue contends that even though
she was served on February 26, 2017, she was unaware until counsel entered his

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appearance on her behalf that she was required to file an answer by March 20, 2017.
Id.
Ms. Vigue also asserts that on March 14, 2017, her counsel contacted Ms.
Lewis’ counsel and requested an extension of time to file an answer until April 24,
2017 and that Ms. Lewis’ attorney responded that she would agree to the extension
if Ms. Vigue’s attorney agreed to a motion she stated she was preparing to amend the
complaint. Id. Ms. Vigue’s attorney responded on March 15, 2017 that he would
probably agree to the motion to amend but would like to see the amendments first.
Id. at 3. Ms. Lewis’ attorney failed to respond, and at no time informed Ms. Vigue’s
lawyer that her answer was due by March 20, 2017. Id. Ms. Vigue’s attorney
contends that Ms. Lewis should be estopped from the requested relief. Id. at 4.
C.

Brandee Lewis’ Reply

In her reply, Ms. Lewis reiterates that Ms. Vigue failed to timely file her
answer, and that no leave of court has been granted for the filing of a late pleading.
Pl.’s Reply at 2. Ms. Lewis’ attorney rejects Ms. Vigue’s argument that she had an
obligation to inform Ms. Vigue’s counsel about the impending filing deadline. Id. Ms.
Lewis states that “[t]he Court Order on March 6th was not actually an ‘Order’ but a
notice setting a deadline which was actually greater than the 21 days from service of
summons upon Defendant Vigue.” Id.
Ms. Lewis’ attorney also rejects the argument that her discussion with Ms.
Vigue’s counsel justified the filing of a late answer, noting that no agreement for
extension was reached and arguing that Ms. Vigue’s lawyer should have known to

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file a motion for extension of time, whether consented to by counsel or not. Id. at 3.
Finally, responding to the Rule 55 affidavit issue, Ms. Lewis observes that Rule 55
provides that the failure to plead may be shown by affidavit “or otherwise.” Id. at 4
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a)).
III.

DISCUSSION
It is unfortunate that a lawsuit involving such manifestly serious allegations

has begun with a squabble between attorneys.
First, the Court concludes that Rule 55 is not applicable to this situation. By
its terms, Rule 55 applies only “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” FED. R. CIV. P.
55(a). Ms. Vigue answered the Complaint on March 28, 2017, and Ms. Lewis filed
the instant motion for entry of default on April 11, 2017, after Ms. Vigue had filed
her answer. To state the obvious, Rule 55(a) does not authorize either the entry of
default or a default judgment against a party not in default.
Second, the Court concludes that Ms. Vigue was served on February 26, 2017,
not February 24, 2017. The server noted in his Proof of Service:
This summons for (name of individual and title, if any) Kimberly Vigue
was received by me on (date) 2-24-17.
Executed Summons at 2. February 24, 2017 is the date the server received the
summons, not the date he served it. The summons goes on to state:
I personally served the summons on the individual at (place) . . .
Jefferson on (date) 2-26-17.

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Id.

February 26, 2017 is the date the server actually served Ms. Vigue.

In

determining the date by which a defendant must file an answer, the date of service
itself is not counted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i) (“within 21 days after being served”)
(emphasis supplied). Thus, pursuant to Rule 12, Ms. Vigue was required to file her
answer within twenty-one days of February 27, 2017, or by March 20, 2017. The
clerk’s docket entry on March 5, 2017, which states that the answer was due by March
20, 2017, echoed the provisions of Rule 12.
Setting aside the motion for entry of default, Ms. Lewis’ claim for relief is really
found in her motion to strike Ms. Vigue’s answer. In Ms. Lewis’ view, Ms. Vigue’s
untimely answer justifies striking the answer, and in effect Ms. Lewis is demanding
an entry of default and default judgment as a sanction for the late answer. Ms. Lewis
argues first that the Court should consider Ms. Vigue’s refusal or failure to waive
service in deciding whether to sanction her for a late answer. The Court declines to
do so. Although Ms. Lewis might be justifiably annoyed that Ms. Vigue insisted on
actual in-hand service when others did not, and thereby (perhaps) delayed the
proceedings, Rule 4 contains the typical penalty for failing without good cause to sign
and return a waiver, and it is not default. Rule 4 provides that if a defendant located
within the United States fails, without good cause, to sign and return a waiver
requested by a plaintiff located within the United States, the court must impose on
the defendant: “(A) the expenses later incurred in making service; and (B) the
reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, of any motion required to collect those
service expenses.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(2)(A)-(B).

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The Court does not view the

imposition of a default judgment as a proper sanction for failing or refusing to waive
service.
Next, Ms. Lewis stands by her view that she is entitled to a default simply
because the answer was untimely. The Court disagrees. As the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit has written, “[d]efault is strong medicine and should be prescribed
only in egregious cases.” Hooper-Haas v. Ziegler Holdings, LLC, 690 F.3d 34, 37–38
(1st Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Indeed, the rule in the First Circuit is that “a
defaulting party ‘has appeared’ for Rule 55 purposes if it has ‘indicated to the moving
party a clear purpose to defend the suit.’” Key Bank of Maine v. Tablecloth Textile
Co., 74 F.3d 349, 353 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Muniz v. Vidal, 739 F.2d 699, 700 (1st
Cir. 1984)).

Attorney Spurling’s March 28, 2017 answer denying the essential

allegations of the complaint is a clear indication of Ms. Vigue’s “clear purpose to
defend the suit.” See id.
Furthermore, the circumstances in this case are hardly so egregious as to
justify default. The email exchange between counsel reveals that on March 14, 2017,
before Ms. Vigue’s answer was due, Ms. Vigue’s attorney wrote to Ms. Lewis’ attorney:
This office has been retained to represent Kimberly Vigue in the civil
action you have filed in the United States District Court. I am sure you
appreciate that it will take some time to investigate and prepare an
answer and defenses to your two hundred and twenty-three (223)
paragraphs of the complaint. I am requesting that I be given an
additional thirty (30) days to prepare an answer and any affirmative
defenses that may exist.
I understand that the answer is due by March 17, 2017. I propose that
you agree to allow me until April 24, 2017 or some other date agreed to
by counsel to file the answer.

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Def.’s Opp’n Attach. 1, Ex. A, Letter from Att’y C.H. Spurling to Att’y Jackie T.
DiGiacomo (Mar. 14, 2017) (delivered via email).
On March 14, 2017, Attorney DiGiacomo responded:
I have reviewed the request by Attorney Spurling. I will agree to the
extended deadline proposed if Attorney Spurling will consent to the
Motion I am preparing to Amend the Complaint. I would like to include
the parent company for Correctional Health Partners and there are a
couple of other changes I would like to make.
Please let me know if Attorney Spurling is amenable to the amended
complaint.2
Id. Attach. 2, Ex. B, Email from Att’y Jackie T. DiGiacomo to Legal Assistant (Mar.
14, 2017). The legal assistant responded to Attorney DiGiacomo on March 15, 2017
that she had passed her request along to Attorney Spurling. Id.
On March 15, 2017, Attorney Spurling replied:
I probably will agree to amending the complaint but would like to see
the amendments first. No problem with naming parent company.
Id. Attach. 3, Ex. C, Email from Att’y C.H. Spurling to Att’y Jackie DiGiacomo (Mar.
15, 2017). There is no indication in this record that Attorney DiGiacomo ever sent
Attorney Spurling the proposed amended complaint, and the court docket does not
reflect that she has yet filed an amended complaint in this case.
Based on this exchange, although the understanding between counsel could
have been clearer, the Court finds that Attorney Spurling reasonably concluded that
Attorney DiGiacomo was going to send him a proposed amended complaint and that
he could delay answering the original complaint until she had done so.

When

Attorney DiGiacomo wrote the email response in this fashion because Attorney Spurling’s legal
assistant was the person who actually sent Attorney Spurling’s March 14, 2017 letter to her.
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Attorney DiGiacomo did not send him the proposed amended complaint, Attorney
Spurling filed the answer on March 28, 2017, eight days late. This type of exchange
between attorneys is remarkably routine in the practice of law and the law would
grind to a standstill if attorneys were unable to rely on similar exchanges regarding
all manner of deadlines.
It is also true that any informal agreement about deadlines by the lawyers—
like the one here—is ultimately subject to judicial oversight and, when the proposed
amended complaint was not forthcoming by the time the answer was due, it would
have been prudent for Attorney Spurling to have filed a timely motion to extend the
time within which to file an answer. Although lawyers can usually count on judges
to use their discretionary authority wisely, it is wiser yet for lawyers to exercise their
professional discretion to eliminate even the possibility of an unexpected and
untoward judicial result. In the circumstances of this case, the Court would most
likely have looked favorably on granting a timely-filed reasonable extension of time
to file an answer. If Attorney Spurling had done so, it is unlikely that this entire
controversy would have taken place.3
Finally, the Court observes that it is making this ruling in the absence of any
plausible claim from Ms. Lewis that she has been prejudiced by the late filing of Ms.
Vigue’s answer. Indeed, Ms. Lewis pointed to no potential prejudice at all from the
eight-day delay. In addition, Ms. Lewis did not request and obtain an entry of default

In fact, Attorney Spurling has not yet filed a motion to file late answer, an omission the Court
is remedying in this Order.
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against Ms. Vigue in the interval between March 21, when Ms. Vigue was in potential
default, and March 28, when she answered the Complaint. The Court is therefore
not addressing a motion for relief from entry of default, which would require the
Court to analyze the motion under a slightly different standard.
The Court views all of this as an unfortunate diversion, especially given the
manifestly serious nature of the allegations in the Complaint.
IV.

CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES Motion for Entry of Default for Failure to File Timely

Answer and Motion to Strike Untimely Answer of Defendant Kim Vigue (ECF No.
41). The Court GRANTS sua sponte the Defendant Kimberly Vigue’s presumed
motion to file late answer and cross-claim.
SO ORDERED.

/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 24th day of May, 2017

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