INMAN v. PENOBSCOT COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY OFFICE DA CHRIS ALMY

Filing 5

REPORT AND RECOMMENDED DECISION re 1 PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by FRANK INMAN, 4 MOTION for Bail filed by FRANK INMAN. Objections to R&R due by 11/29/2017. By MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN C. NIVISON. (CWP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
FRANK INMAN,
Petitioner,
v.

PENOBSCOT COUNTY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY OFFICE,
et al.,
Respondents

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1:17-cv-00412-GZS

RECOMMENDED DECISION ON 28 U.S.C. § 2254 PETITION
In this action, Petitioner Frank Inman, a pretrial detainee, seeks relief pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254.1 (Petition, ECF No. 1.) He also filed a motion for bail. (Motion,
ECF No. 4.) Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance; he asserts a claim regarding the
conditions of his bail, including a claim of excessive bail, established by the state court;

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Although Petitioner filed the petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, courts have held that section 2254 is
limited to post-conviction detention, and that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is the relevant statute for a habeas challenge
to the constitutionality of pretrial detention. See, e.g., Hartfield v. Osborne, 808 F.3d 1066, 1071
(5th Cir. 2015); Klein v. Leis, 548 F.3d 425, 430 n.4 (6th Cir. 2008).
The proper respondent in a habeas action is the “immediate custodian,” i.e., “the warden of the
facility where the prisoner is being held, not the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory
official.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 & n.9 (2004) (noting exceptions “in the military context,”
i.e., exceptions not applicable to Petitioner’s allegations). Petitioner named the Penobscot County Jail as
the place where he was confined when he filed the petition, but he named the Penobscot County District
Attorney’s Office and the District Attorney as respondents. (Petition, ECF No. 1 at 1.) This recommended
decision assumes, without recommending a decision on the issue, that if necessary, the Court would permit
Petitioner to amend the petition to name the custodian as the respondent.

and he alleges a claim regarding the conditions of his confinement.

(Id. at 1-2;

Attachments, ECF Nos. 3-1, 4.)
Petitioner’s claims appear to be the same claims Petitioner raised recently in a
separate proceeding.

(Inman v. Penobscot County Jail, No. 1:17-cv-00358-GZS,

Petition, ECF No. 1; Recommended Decision, ECF No. 12; Order Affirming,
ECF No. 16.)2

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal in the separate proceeding.

(No. 1:17-cv-00358-GZS, Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 19.)3
Following a review of Plaintiff’s filings, I recommend the Court dismiss the petition
and deny the motion for bail.
DISCUSSION
“The filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance – it confers
jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those
aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.,
459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per curiam); United States v. Distasio, 820 F.2d 20, 23
(1st Cir. 1987). The First Circuit has noted that “the limited exceptions to the general rule
that an appeal terminates a district court’s jurisdiction all pertain ‘to district court orders
that concern matters unrelated to the “substance of the decision” being appealed.’”
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In this proceeding, Petitioner alleges he is a pretrial detainee on state court charges of operating after
revocation, failure to appear, and violating conditions of release, and he provides state court docket numbers
in the petition. (Petition at 1.) In the separate proceeding, Petitioner alleged he was a pretrial detainee on
a Class C charge of driving without a license, and he evidently did not provide a state court docket number.
(Inman v. Penobscot County Jail, No. 1:17-cv-00358-GZS, Petition, ECF No. 1.) The discrepancy in
Petitioner’s allegations regarding the charges appears to have been unintentional.
According to this Court’s docket record in Inman v. Penobscot County Jail, No. 1:17-cv-00358-GZS, the
First Circuit has assigned Docket Number No. 17-2094 to Petitioner’s appeal. (No. 1:17-cv-00358-GZS,
ECF No. 22.)

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United States v. George, 841 F.3d 55, 71 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting United States
v. Maldonado-Rios, 790 F.3d 62, 64 (1st Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting
16A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3949.1, at 59
(4th ed. 2008))).
In the separate proceeding, because Petitioner has appealed from the substance of
the decision, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the claims. Griggs, 459 U.S. at 58;
George, 841 F.3d at 71. Petitioner may not relitigate the claims by initiating another
proceeding. See Crosby v. Brook, 353 F. App’x 591, 593 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Petitioner cannot
show that the instant petition is anything more than an attempt to relitigate issues that have
been previously decided by other courts.”). Here, Petitioner is attempting through this
habeas action to assert the claims he asserted in Inman v. Penobscot County Jail,
No. 1:17-cv-00358-GZS, which matter is currently on appeal. Dismissal, pursuant to Rule
4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, therefore, is appropriate.4
To the extent Petitioner is asking the Court to review the bail decision in the state
court proceedings, Petitioner’s claim fails for the reasons discussed in the separate
proceeding. (Inman, No. 1:17-cv-00358-GZS, Recommended Decision, ECF No. 12
at 5-6.) See Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, --- U.S. ---, ---, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591
(2013) (noting that Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), “preclude[s] federal intrusion
into ongoing state criminal prosecutions”). “The considerations of federal-state comity

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The Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases apply to petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
See Rule 1(b); Bramson v. Winn, 136 F. App’x 380, 382 (1st Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (unpublished) (noting
that the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases apply to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petitions). Rule 4 provides in
relevant part: “If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition . . . .”
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that militate against federal court intervention, by way of habeas corpus, with respect to
state court convictions which have not received final state appellate consideration apply
with equal force in the context of state court bail processes in pending proceedings . . . .”
United States v. Kehl, 456 F.2d 863, 869 (2d Cir. 1972) (discussing the requirement under
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) that relief not be granted unless a petitioner has exhausted available
state court remedies).5 See Davila v. Davis, --- U.S. ---, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2064 (2017) (“[A]
state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies before presenting his claim to a federal
habeas court. § 2254(b)(1)(A). The exhaustion requirement is designed to avoid the
‘unseemly’ result of a federal court ‘upset[ting] a state court conviction without’ first

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Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c) address exhaustion and provide:
(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that—
(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or
(B) (i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or
(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the
applicant.
(2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding
the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.
(3) A State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement or be estopped
from reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through counsel, expressly waives the
requirement.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts
of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State
to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.

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according the state courts an ‘opportunity to . . . correct a constitutional violation.’”)
(quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982)).
The analysis set forth in the Court’s decision in the separate proceeding is not altered
simply because Petitioner asserts his claim in a section 2254 proceeding, or because
Petitioner contests the factual basis for an alleged bail revocation. (Petition at 10.)
Petitioner alleges no facts that would support the conclusion that he exhausted all available
state court remedies.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases, I recommend the Court dismiss the petition (ECF No. 1) and deny the
motion for bail (ECF No. 4). I further recommend that the Court deny a certificate of
appealability pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases because there
is no substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right within the meaning of
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
NOTICE
A party may file objections to those specified portions of a magistrate
judge's report or proposed findings or recommended decisions entered
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for which de novo review by the district
court is sought, together with a supporting memorandum, within fourteen
(14) days of being served with a copy thereof.
Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right
to de novo review by the district court and to appeal the district court's order.
/s/ John C. Nivison
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Dated this 15th day of November, 2017.
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