CAUDILL v. KENNEBEC COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICE et al
Filing
28
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 25 Bill of Costs (Costs Taxed in amount of $ 1261.89 against Plaintiff) By CLERK OF COURT, Christa K. Berry. (ems)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
District of Maine
CHERI CAUDILL
Plaintiff,
v.
KENNEBEC COUNTY,
et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 1:18-cv-00164-GZS
ORDER ON BILL OF COSTS
In accordance with the Court’s Order on Pending Motions, ECF No. 23, and
the Judgment, ECF No. 24, in this case, the prevailing party is Defendants. As
such, Defendants are entitled to an award of costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(d)(1), which reads in pertinent part that “[u]nless a federal statute,
these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs...should be allowed to the
prevailing party.” While the expenses that may be taxed are specified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920, taxable costs must also be “necessarily incurred in the case,” pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1924. Defendants seek costs in the total amount of $1,418.49 for
deposition transcript costs, service fees and fees for witnesses. Bill of Costs, ECF
No. 25. Plaintiff has objected to the Bill in her Response to Bill of Costs, ECF No.
27.
Having made an independent review of Defendants’ Bill of Costs and
Plaintiff’s Response, the Clerk of Court hereby taxes against Plaintiff the total
amount of one thousand two hundred sixty-one dollars and eighty-nine cents
($1,261.89). Certain claimed costs are excluded as explained herein.
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I.
Public Policy and Indigency
In her response to the claimed Bill of Costs, Plaintiff argues that the
Defendants’ Bill of Costs should be denied in its entirety for equitable reasons: that
the awarding of costs would “chill” similarly-situtated plaintiffs who might be
intimidated by the threat of costs; that she has limited resources to pay the costs
such that paying them would financially devastate her; and that Defendants have
vastly more resources. Response, ECF No. 27, pp. 2-3.
Opposing the Bill of Cost is challenging for Plaintiff as it is for any other nonprevailing party because the First Circuit has interpreted Rule 54(d) as creating a
presumption “favoring cost recovery for prevailing (parties).” B. Fernandez &
HNOS, Inc. v. Kellogg USA, Inc., 516 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2008) and Papas v. Hanlon,
849 F.2d 702, 704 (1st Cir. 1988) (“presumption inherent in Rule 54(d)”); see also
Am. Auto. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Comm’r, Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 31 F.3d 18, 28 (1st Cir.
1994) (“Prevailing parties are normally entitled to costs.”); and In re Two Appeals
Arising Out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 994 F.2d 956, 962 (1st
Cir. 1993) (“[T]his negative discretion...operates in the long shadow of a background
presumption favoring cost recovery for prevailing parties.”).
But, the Court may, in exercising its discretion, consider “the limited
financial resources of the plaintiff.” Papas v. Hanlon, at 704 (1st Cir. 1988). In
considering denial of costs based upon indigency, courts have generally weighed the
disparity of resources of the parties, the merit of the plaintiff’s claim and the impact
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of the award requested. See DeSaint v. Delta Air Lines, 2015 WL 4111428 (D. Mass.
2015); Anunciacao v. Caterpillar Japan, 283 F.R.D. 44, 45 (D.Mass.2012); Kuzman
v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 2005 WL 1981498, at *2 (D.Me. 2005); Mulvihill v.
Spalding Worldwide Sports, Inc., 239 F.Supp.2d 121, 122 (D.Mass.2002),
As in many civil rights and employment cases, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges
important statutory issues and rights of public significance, such as those in the
case of Mulvihill v. Spalding, which was cited by Plaintiff. This Court has
considered the Mulvihill proposition which states that “where the issues are fairly
disputed, it is important that the plaintiff not be ‘unduly intimidated’ by the threat
of imposition of costs in a case raising important issues such as these.” Kuzman v.
Hannaford, 2005 WL 1981498 at *2 (D.Me 2005), quoting Mulvihill. The Clerk
assumes the Plaintiff’s claims had merit or were “fairly disputed” even where the
case failed to survive summary judgment; but this Court has also said that “not
every Title VII plaintiff, due to the statutory invocation, is absolved from the
presumptive working of Rule 54(d).” Kuzman at *2. The losing party’s good faith in
pursuing an action is an insufficient basis to refuse the assessment of costs against
her, since “[t]o hold otherwise would frustrate the rule.” Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d
978, 996 (4th Cir. 1994).
Additionally, the presumption of Rule 54(d) cuts against Plaintiff’s equitable
policy argument where the proposed tax in this case is low. The Clerk believes that
similarly-situated plaintiffs would not be chilled or intimidated to bring a lawsuit
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that might vindicate important civil rights where the proposed imposition of costs
totals only $1,418.49.
Even though the First Circuit acknowledged the indigency exception in Papas
v. Hanlon and gave district courts discretion to “take into account the limited
financial resources of a plaintiff,” the inquiry requires more. Papas, 849 F.2d at 704.
“[T]he district court must make a threshold factual finding that the losing party is
incapable of paying the court-imposed costs at this time or in the future (emphasis
added). The burden is on the losing party to provide the district court with enough
documentation to support such a finding. The documentation should include
evidence in the form of an affidavit or other documentary evidence of both income
and assets, as well as a schedule of expenses.” Rivera v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d
631, 636 (7th Cir.2006).
Plaintiff has asserted that she is unable to pay the costs in this case, stating
that she provides financial support for two adult children. She has not, however,
provided full information that shows her income and cashflow or her sons’, only
some of their expenses including credit card bills. Affidavit, ECF No. 27-1, p 2.
With the limited information provided by the Plaintiff, the Clerk is unable to
determine the Plaintiff’s household cash flow beyond the bald assertion that she
would be “financially devastate(d)” if she had to pay costs. Without a complete
picture of the Plaintiff’s present financial situation or her future earning potential
and given the narrowness of the indigency exception, the Clerk finds that the
Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden to demonstrate her eligibility for Rule 54(d)’s
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narrow indigency exception even if Kennebec County, et al. have “vastly more
resources” than Plaintiff. Response, ECF No. 27, p. 3.
II.
Lack of Standing
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have no standing to seek reimbursement of
costs because they have not paid the expenses themselves but have been
indemnified by the Maine County Commissioner Association’s Self-Funded Risk
Management Pool. Id. at p 3. Plaintiff submitted a copy of the Member Coverage
document for the Self-Funded Risk Management Pool. Response, ECF No. 27-2.
Plaintiff’s assertion is countered by Defendants’ assertion that they incurred the
expenses claimed necessarily. Where there has been no evidence submitted that
someone other than the prevailing party has borne the expenses claimed herein, the
Clerk will not go against the presumption to tax in favor of the prevailing party and
will assume that the prevailing party has not claim these same expenses against
their insurance.
III.
Fees for Deposition Transcripts
Defendants have claimed a total of $1,306.99 for transcripts obtained in this
case. Transcript fees are taxable to the extent that they were “necessarily obtained
for use in the case.” 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2). In its supporting affidavit, Defendants
have explained that the depositions were necessary because they were either relied
upon by the Court in its order of March 19, 2019 (Order, ECF No. 23) or by both
parties. Bill of Cost, ECF No. 26, p. 2. The Clerk’s review of the Court’s Order and
of docket in this case indicates that each of the transcripts were necessarily
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obtained in that they were either used by the Court or were relied upon for the
parties’ motion work 1.
While each of the transcripts appear to have been necessarily obtained, some of
the associated costs for the transcripts will not be taxed. Plaintiff has pointed out
that each of the six transcripts includes an index. This Court has held that charges
for word indices are not ordered because such items are considered “items for the
convenience of counsel.” Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, Co., 395 F.Supp.2d 1065
at 1080 (D. Kan. 2005); Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. Rising, 2005 WL
3535124 at *2 (W.D. Mich. 2005); and Charles v. Sanchez, 2015 WL 11439074 at *12
(W.D. Tex. 2015). Rather than deny the transcript costs in total, the Clerk adopts
Plaintiff’s estimation that the indices portion of the transcripts amounts to a total of
approximately $156.60. See Response, ECF No 27, pp. 4-5. Therefore, the claim for
transcript costs will be reduced to a tax of $1,150.39.
IV.
Service of Process and Witness Fees
Plaintiff has averred that the Defendants’ claimed expenses for service of
subpoenas and witness fees should not be taxed because Defendants have failed to
provide sufficient proof that the payments were actually made.
The Clerk finds that the service of process fees claimed by Defendants are
sufficiently documented on the invoices submitted and attached to the Bill of Cost.
See ECF No. 25-3, pp. 1-4. The level of documentation and itemization submitted in
The Clerk finds that the Court’s referential use of some of the transcripts in its Order (ECF No. 23)
is sufficient to overcome Plaintiff’s allegations that certain depositions were not necessarily obtained
or not used. Response, ECF No. 27, pp. 6-7.
1
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this case has been sufficient for this Court in the past and proof of actual payment
has not been required. With regard to the multiple subpoenas needed to secure
Bobbi-Jo Dumas’ appearance, the Clerk can find no reason to deny such costs
against Rule 54(d)’s presumption and where Dumas’ deposition was necessarily
obtained for Defendant’s use and referred to by the Court in its Order. Order, ECF
No. 23, p. 8.
Witness fees are expressly authorized as taxable costs by statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1920(3); and the Defendant has made no claim in this case beyond the statutorily
authorized attendance fee and the statutorily determined mileage allowances
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) and (c)(2). Both of these costs can be determined on
the face of the witnesses’ attendance, so the Clerk finds they are recoverable
without additional documentation than that which was provided, which is
consistent with the Court’s past orders.
ORDER
The Clerk of Court hereby taxes costs in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of
one thousand two hundred sixty-one dollars and eighty-nine cents ($1,261.89).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Christa K. Berry
Clerk, U.S. District Court
Dated this 19th day of April, 2019
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