TUCK v. CITY OF GARDINER POLICE DEPARTMENT et al

Filing 24

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND KENNEBEC BEHAVIORAL HEALTH'S MOTION TO DISMISS granting 16 Motion for Leave to File; granting in part and denying in part 11 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim By JUDGE JON D. LEVY. (akr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
MICHAEL A. TUCK,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF GARDINER POLICE
DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants.

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ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND
KENNEBEC BEHAVIORAL HEALTH’S MOTION TO DISMISS
This suit arises from the alleged unlawful seizure and forced hospitalization of
the Plaintiff, Michael A. Tuck, in June 2015. The original complaint named multiple
defendants: the City of Gardiner Police Department and three of its officers, the City
of Gardiner Fire and Rescue Department, Central Maine Medical Center, and
Kennebec Behavioral Health (“KBH”). KBH, noting that the complaint contains no
substantive factual allegations against it, moved to dismiss all of the claims against
it—illegal search and seizure (Count One), false imprisonment (Count Three),
intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count Six), and negligent release of
information resulting in injury (unnumbered Count Seven)—for failure to state a
claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 11). Tuck, acknowledging that his
complaint is deficient, has moved for leave to file an amended complaint that adds
factual allegations against KBH (ECF No. 16). KBH argues that granting Tuck leave
to amend the complaint would be futile because the supplemented allegations still
fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. I conclude that Tuck’s proposed

amended complaint (ECF No. 16-1) states a claim against KBH for intentional
infliction of emotional distress and negligent release of information and, therefore,
grant Tuck’s motion to amend. The proposed amended complaint does not, however,
sufficiently state a claim against KBH for illegal search and seizure or false
imprisonment. I therefore dismiss those claims against KBH.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
After the time has passed during which a plaintiff may amend his complaint
as a matter of course, the plaintiff may do so only with leave of the court. Leave to
amend should be freely given “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
Accordingly, leave to amend is granted absent “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of
the amendment, [or] futility.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Even where
there is good cause to amend, a court can exercise its discretion to deny a motion to
amend if the amendment would be futile. See Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90
F.3d 617, 622-23 (1st Cir. 1996). “In assessing futility, the district court must apply
the standard which applies to motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).”
Adorno v. Crowley Towing and Transp. Co., 443 F.3d 122, 126 (1st Cir. 2006). Thus,
to avoid futility, an amended pleading “must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). Because Tuck is appearing pro se, I construe his complaint liberally and may

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dismiss the claims at issue “only if [he] cannot prove any set of facts entitling him or
her to relief.” Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997).
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In applying the above standard, I accept the following facts taken from Tuck’s
proposed amended complaint as true for the purpose of evaluating the pending
motion. McKee v. Cosby, 874 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2017).
On June 3, 2015, Tuck called the police about excessive traffic and suspicious
behavior in his neighborhood.

An officer from the Gardiner Police Department

responded to Tuck’s residence, made a report concerning Tuck’s complaint, and left.
During the next several hours, the Gardiner Police Department reviewed Tuck’s
medical records, which it received from KBH without a release or Tuck’s
authorization.

Later that day, three Gardiner police officers arrived at Tuck’s

residence, and Tuck invited them inside thinking they were there to follow up on his
earlier complaint. Instead, the officers informed Tuck that they had come to take him
for a mental health evaluation (to “get checked out”). ECF No. 16-1 ¶ 16. Tuck
refused, and for several minutes argued with the officers, during which the officers
ignored Tuck’s repeated requests that they leave his home. Eventually, one officer
used his taser several times on Tuck to subdue him, during which Tuck sustained a
self-inflicted injury to his neck and throat.1 Tuck was then transported to Central
Maine Medical Center for treatment of his injuries.

Although Tuck’s original complaint offers more detail concerning the nature of the self-inflicted injury, the
proposed amended complaint does not. The discrepancy does not alter the analysis that follows.
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Although medically cleared on June 10, Tuck was told that he had been “blue
papered” (involuntarily admitted to a psychiatric hospital) and could not leave the
hospital. In total, Tuck was kept against his will at Central Maine Medical Center
for 21 days, during which KBH disclosed information about Tuck’s health treatment
and counseling history to Central Maine Medical Center without Tuck’s knowledge
or consent. Tuck was then transferred to Riverview Psychiatric Hospital in Augusta
and held there involuntarily for another 21 days.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Tuck’s proposed amended complaint asserts four claims against KBH: illegal
search and seizure (Count One), false imprisonment (Count Three), intentional
infliction of emotional distress (Count Six), and negligent release of information
resulting in injury (Count Seven).
A.

Illegal Search and Seizure (Count One)
Tuck’s claim for an illegal search and seizure is properly analyzed as a claim

made pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2019). See Holmes v. Meleady, 738 F.
Supp. 2d 196, 201 (D. Mass. 2010). “To make out a viable section 1983 claim, a
plaintiff must show both that the conduct complained of transpired under color of
state law and that a deprivation of federally secured rights ensued.” Santiago v.
Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 2011). If the plaintiff fails to allege facts
sufficient to establish that the defendant acted under color of state law, the § 1983
claim is subject to dismissal.
There are no allegations in the proposed amended complaint that indicate that
KBH is a state actor and is not, as KBH asserts, a private, not-for-profit corporation.
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ECF No. 18 at 3. There are three tests to determine whether a private party can be
characterized as a state actor: (1) the state compulsion test, (2) the nexus/joint action
test, and (3) the public function test. Estades-Negroni v. CPC Hosp. San Juan
Capestrano, 412 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 claims
against private healthcare providers that participated in plaintiff’s involuntary
mental health commitment because the alleged facts did not establish that they were
state actors).
The allegations in the proposed amended complaint concerning KBH’s
involvement in Tuck’s hospitalization lack detail and do not support any of the three
tests. There are no facts suggesting (1) that the State “exercised coercive power” over
KBH, or that it “has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert,
that [KBH’s conduct] must in law be deemed to be that of the State,” Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982); (2) that the State “so far insinuated itself into a
position of interdependence with [KBH] that it [should be considered] a joint
participant in” KBH’s actions, Estades-Negroni, 412 F.3d at 6 (quoting Bass v.
Parkwood Hosp., 180 F.3d 234, 242 (5th Cir. 1999)); or (3) that KBH performed a
public function that was “traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.” Blum,
457 U.S. at 1005 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)).
The proposed amended complaint therefore fails to state a claim for illegal search and
seizure against KBH.
B.

False Imprisonment (Count Three)
“[T]he gist of the common law tort [of false imprisonment] is conduct by the

actor which is intended to, and does in fact, confine another within boundaries fixed
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by the actor where, in addition, the victim is either ‘conscious of the confinement or
is harmed by it.” McCann v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 210 F.3d 51, 53 (1st Cir. 2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that Maine caselaw lacks “comprehensive
definition” of false imprisonment). Construing the facts of the proposed amended
complaint in the light most favorable to Tuck, KBH allegedly disclosed Tuck’s medical
information to law enforcement personnel and other healthcare providers, which
contributed in part to Tuck being held against his will. However, there are no factual
allegations that KBH intended for Tuck to be held against his will. The proposed
amended complaint therefore fails to state a claim for false imprisonment against
KBH.
C.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count Six)
To plead a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Tuck must

allege that (1) KBH “intentionally or recklessly inflicted severe emotional distress or
was certain or substantially certain that such distress would result from [its]
conduct”; (2) the conduct was “extreme and outrageous”; (3) KBH’s actions caused
Tuck’s emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress Tuck allegedly suffered was
“so severe that no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it.” Curtis v.
Porter, 784 A.2d 18, 22-23 (Me. 2001).
Tuck’s allegations that KBH disclosed his medical information to law
enforcement personnel and other healthcare providers without his authorization can
“reasonably be construed as extreme or outrageous and as reckless.” See Stokes v.
Barnhart, 257 F. Supp. 2d 288, 293-94 (D. Me. 2003) (denying motion to dismiss claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from unauthorized disclosure
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that plaintiff had the human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”) by Social Security
Administration employee); see also Hudson v. Dr. Michael J. O’Connell’s Pain Care
Ctr., Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 84, 89-90, 98 (D.N.H. 2011) (denying motion to dismiss
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim where allegations were conclusory
but plausible when viewing complaint, which included alleged retaliation, a hostile
work environment, and disclosure of employee’s medical records, as a whole). The
allegations also allow the inference that Tuck’s alleged emotional distress arising
from his involuntary confinement was due, at least in part, to the release of Tuck’s
health history and counseling records, which KBH is alleged to have disclosed. Thus,
the proposed amended complaint states a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress against KBH.
D.

Negligent Release of Information Resulting in Injury (Count Seven)
“A cause of action for negligence has four elements: (1) a duty of care owed to

the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) an injury; and (4) causation, that is, a
finding that the breach of the duty of care was a cause of the injury.” Bell ex rel. Bell
v. Dawson, 82 A.3d 827, 831-32 (Me. 2013).
KBH does not dispute that a healthcare provider has a duty of care to ensure
the privacy and confidentiality of its patients’ medical information. See Bonney v.
Stephens Mem’l Hosp., 17 A.3d 123, 128 (Me. 2011) (noting that although Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) does not provide private cause
of action for unauthorized disclosure of medical information, HIPAA can establish the
standard of care associated with a state tort claim). The proposed amended complaint
alleges facts that would establish a breach of this duty and that Tuck was injured.
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KBH does not contest that it owed Tuck a duty, but instead argues that the proposed
amended complaint fails to plead facts establishing a breach because healthcare
providers are permitted under law to disclose patient information under certain
circumstances. ECF No. 18 at 6-8. Whether those circumstances existed in this case,
however, is a question of fact that cannot be decided at this early juncture.
KBH also argues that the proposed amended complaint fails to allege any facts
establishing a causal link between its disclosure of medical information and Tuck’s
alleged injuries. Id. at 8-10. “The question of causation is generally one of fact to be
determined by the fact-finder, and a judgment as a matter of law is improper if any
reasonable view of the evidence could sustain a finding of proximate cause.” Dyer v.
Me. Drilling & Blasting, Inc., 984 A.2d 210, 219 (Me. 2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

Here, construing the allegations liberally because Tuck is a self-

represented plaintiff, the proposed amended complaint permits the inference that the
Gardiner Police Department returned to Tuck’s house on June 3 to get him “checked
out” because of the healthcare information it had received from KBH. See ECF No.
16-1 ¶¶ 11-16. As noted earlier, the allegations also allow the inference that Tuck’s
confinement at Central Maine Medical Center and then Riverview Psychiatric
Hospital was due, at least in part, to Tuck’s health history and counseling records,
which KBH is alleged to have provided to Central Maine Medical Center. See id. ¶¶
28-30, 65-66. I therefore conclude that the proposed amended complaint states a
claim for negligence.

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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that Tuck’s proposed amended complaint
sufficiently pleads a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count Six)
and negligent release of information resulting in injury (Count Seven) and, therefore,
that the amendment is not futile. Tuck’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 16) is GRANTED. However, because I also conclude that the
amended complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) on Tuck’s remaining
claims against KBH for illegal search and seizure (Count One) and false
imprisonment (Count Three), I treat KBH’s motion to dismiss the original complaint
as having been made against Tuck’s amended complaint. Accordingly, the motion to
dismiss (ECF No. 11) is GRANTED IN PART:

Counts One and Three of the

amended complaint are DISMISSED as against Kennebec Behavioral Health, and
the motion to dismiss is otherwise DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated this 13th day of February, 2019.
/s/ JON D. LEVY
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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