WOITKO v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION COMMISSIONER
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OF DECISION. By MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN C. NIVISON. (MFS)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
VINNY W.,
Plaintiff
v.
MICHELLE KING, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant
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1:24-cv-00213-JCN
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Plaintiff applied for Supplemental Security Income Benefits, alleging a disability
beginning in April 2019. Defendant, the Social Security Administration Commissioner,
found that Plaintiff has severe impairments but could perform jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy. Defendant, therefore, denied Plaintiff’s request for
disability benefits. Plaintiff filed this action to obtain judicial review of Defendant’s final
administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Following a review of the record, and after consideration of the parties’ arguments,
the Court vacates the administrative decision and remands the matter for further
proceedings.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS
Defendant’s final decision is the August 30, 2023, decision of the Administrative
Law Judge. 1 (ALJ Decision, ECF No. 7-2.) The ALJ’s decision tracks the five-step
sequential evaluation process for analyzing social security disability claims, 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff has severe, but non-listing-level, impairments of
degenerative disc disease, fibromyalgia, bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety, attentiondeficit/hyperactivity disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. (R. 20.) The ALJ
determined Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work with
some limitations. (R. 23.) Based on the RFC finding, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff
could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. (R. 29.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court must affirm the administrative decision provided the decision is based on the
correct legal standards and is supported by substantial evidence, even if the record contains
evidence capable of supporting an alternative outcome. Manso-Pizarro v. Sec’y of HHS, 76
F.3d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Rodriguez Pagan v. Sec’y of HHS, 819 F.2d 1, 3 (1st
Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a finding. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Rodriguez v. Sec’y of
HHS, 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1981). “The ALJ’s findings of fact are conclusive when
supported by substantial evidence, but they are not conclusive when derived by ignoring
Because the Appeals Council found no reason to review the decision (R. 1), Defendant’s final decision is
the ALJ’s decision.
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evidence, misapplying the law, or judging matters entrusted to experts.” Nguyen v. Chater,
172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues the ALJ, in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC, exceeded his qualifications
as a lay person and impermissibly made the RFC determination without the benefit of a
medical opinion. Defendant argues the RFC was based on commonsense findings and,
therefore, supportable.
The ALJ wrote:
[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work . .
. except she must avoid hazards such as heights, vibration, and dangerous
machinery; she is limited to only occasional bending, balancing, twisting,
squatting, kneeling, crawling, and climbing, but she cannot climb ropes,
scaffolds, or ladders; she is capable of simple, routine repetitious work that
does not require teamwork or working closely with the public; and she can
occasionally interact with coworkers and supervisors, but she can have no
public interaction.
(R. 23.) The ALJ did not rely on an expert medical opinion in the assessment of Plaintiff’s
RFC resulting from Plaintiff’s mental health-related impairments. The ALJ found the
relevant expert mental health opinions to be unpersuasive. (See R. 27–28.)
An “ALJ must measure the claimant’s capabilities and ‘to make that measurement,
an expert’s RFC evaluation is ordinarily essential unless the extent of functional loss, and
its effect on the job performance, would be apparent even to a lay person.’” Manso-Pizzaro,
76 F.3d at 17 (quoting Santiago v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 944 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir.
1991)); see also Gordils v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 921 F.2d 327, 329 (1st Cir.
1990) (ALJ is not “precluded from rendering common-sense judgments about functional
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capacity based on medical findings, so long as [the ALJ] does not overstep the bounds of
a lay person’s competence and render a medical judgment.”). Furthermore, an ALJ is not
required to adopt one medical expert opinion when developing a claimant’s RFC. An ALJ
can permissibly “pick and choose among different expert opinions.” Ball v. Soc. Sec.
Admin. Comm’r, No. 2:14-cv-61-JDL, 2015 WL 893008, at *4 (D. Me. Mar. 2, 2015).
In support of the RFC findings, the ALJ cites medical records that he suggests reflect
normal or nearly normal functioning. For instance, the ALJ notes that Plaintiff’s mood and
affect have been appropriate, she has been cooperative and comfortable, she has intact
memory, and she has not been in acute distress. (R. 26.) The ALJ also cites Plaintiff’s
reports that she is “doing okay” and some of her activities, including that she is in a
relationship and cares for her grandchild. (Id.)
The ALJ, however, did not explain and it is not otherwise apparent how the medical
findings translate to a particular RFC. Given that the ALJ did not rely on an expert’s
opinion to support the RFC finding, the ALJ impermissibly developed an RFC based in
part on his interpretation of medical information. See, e.g., Staples v. Berryhill, No. 1:16cv-00091-GZS, 2017 WL 1011426, at *2 (D. Me. Mar. 15, 2017); Chantal E. v. Kijakazi,
No. 2:22-cv-00126-NT, 2023 WL 2806497, at *3 (D. Me. Apr. 6, 2023); Jonathan D. v.
O’Malley, No. 1:23-cv-00338-NT, 2024 WL 1880475, at *3 (D. Me. Apr. 30, 2024) (“The
ALJ rejected the expert opinions and ‘necessarily crafted an RFC assessment in part from
[his] own assessment of the raw medical evidence.”) (quoting Kaylor v. Astrue, No. 2:10cv-33-GZS, 2010 WL 5776375, at *4 (D. Me. Dec. 30, 2010)). Furthermore, as in Vallier
v. Berryhill, the ALJ did not adequately explain, “nor is it apparent, how the activities on
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which [he] relied translated as a matter of common sense into [the] limitations” included
in the RFC. Vallier v. Berryhill, No. 1:17-cv-00064-DBH, 2017 WL 5665539, at *3 (D.
Me. Nov. 26, 2017).
The ALJ’s lay interpretation of medical information to develop Plaintiff’s RFC is
not harmless error. At least some of the expert opinions rejected by the ALJ would support
greater restrictions than the ALJ included in his RFC determination. For instance, John S.
Hale. Jr., Ed.D., who conducted a psychological evaluation of Plaintiff, concluded:
[H]er anxiety and tendency to be overwhelmed by her environment likely
would limit her ability to follow through on work expectations, as well as,
expectations of authority. This would likely also limit her ability to be
dependable and reliable. Her coping skills seem to be somewhat limited as
she becomes very anxious and overwhelmed. She is more prone to avoid
situations than to cope with her environment. She likely would have
difficulty dealing with normal stressors and pressures, as well as, being able
to persist at a task and to interact effectively with others.
(R. 583.) David Harlan, LCSW, one of Plaintiff’s providers, opined that Plaintiff’s mood
and anxiety disorder “would cause inconsistent performance” and “would likely worsen at
times to the point of non-function despite meds & intervention.” (R. 696.) Mr. Harlan also
found that Plaintiff’s condition and treatment would cause her to miss work about three
days each month. (Id.)
Because the ALJ did not supportably explain how the medical findings in the
record translate to his RFC determination, because the ALJ impermissibly interpreted
medical information in the formation of Plaintiff’s RFC, and because expert opinion
evidence of record would support greater restrictions on Plaintiff’s work capacity, remand
is warranted.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court vacates the administrative decision and
remands the matter for further proceedings.
/s/ John C. Nivison
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Dated this 28th day of January, 2025.
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