JOYCE v. POSTMASTER GENERAL, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
Filing
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ORDER denying 90 Motion for New Trial. By JUDGE JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR. (MFS)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
KATHLEEN JOYCE,
Plaintiff,
v.
POSTMASTER GENERAL,
UNITED STATES POSTAL
SERVICE,
Defendant.
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2:10-cv-00310-JAW
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Following adverse decisions on her age and sex discrimination claims against
the Postal Service from both the Court and a federal jury respectively, Kathleen
Joyce moves pro se for a new trial. Concluding that Ms. Joyce failed to meet the
legal standard for a new trial, the Court denies her motion.
I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 26, 2010, Kathleen Joyce filed a complaint against the Postmaster
General of the United States Postal Service (Postal Service or USPS), claiming that
the Postal Service discriminated against her on the basis of her age, sex, and
disability when it did not hire her as a Mail Handler. Compl. for Damages and
Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 1). On February 28, 2012, the Court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Postal Service on the disability claim. Order on Mot. for
Summ. J. (ECF No. 35). On May 25, 2012, a federal civil jury issued a verdict
against Kathleen Joyce and in favor of the Postmaster General on the age and sex
discrimination claims. Jury Verdict Form (ECF No. 79). As the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA) does not provide the right to trial by jury in a claim
against the Postal Service, the jury verdict on the ADEA claim was advisory. FED.
R. CIV. P. 39(c); see Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 168 (1981); In re Young, 869
F.2d 158, 159 (2d Cir. 1989).
On January 25, 2013, the Court issued a
Memorandum Decision, setting forth its factual findings and legal conclusions, and
issuing a verdict against Ms. Joyce and in favor of the Postal Service on the ADEA
claim. Mem. Decision (ECF No. 88) (Mem. Decision); FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1). On
February 27, 2013, Ms. Joyce, acting pro se, moved for a new trial. Mot. for a New
Trial (ECF No. 90) (Pl.’s Mot.). The Postal Service opposed Ms. Joyce’s motion on
March 15, 2013. Def.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for a New Trial (ECF No. 91)
(Def.’s Opp’n). Ms. Joyce did not file a reply to the Postal Service’s opposition.
II.
THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
A.
Ms. Joyce’s Argument for New Trial
Ms. Joyce’s motion for new trial is based on her allegation that the “USPS did
not follow its own policy, allowed hearsay and defendants repeatedly lied and
perjured themselves when it fit their agenda.” Pl.’s Mot. at 1. To prove her point,
she attaches affidavits from two of the Postal Service’s trial witnesses, Ausilio
Lombardi and Arthur Lent, id. Attach. 1-4, and says those affidavits reveal that
these men lied during the trial.
Pl.’s Mot. at 1-2.
She maintains that Robert
Burton, another Postal Service witness, contradicted himself during his trial
testimony. Id. at 2. Furthermore, asserting that she has “new information,” she
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attaches the Postal Service’s Employee and Labor Relations Manual, saying that it
was “recently sent to me.” Id. at 2. She contends that the Manual demonstrates
that the Postal Service did not follow the terms of its own Manual during the hiring
process. Id. at 2-3. Finally, she attacks the proffered reasons for the Postal Service
decision, arguing that its justifications for its decisions were “totally fictitious and
against the law.” Id. at 3.
B.
The Postal Service’s Response
The Postal Service responds that the verdicts, both from the jury and the
Court, are supported by the evidence, that the evidence Ms. Joyce cited in her
motion is not new, would not be admissible, and would not change the result, and
that there was no false testimony. Def.’s Opp’n at 4-12.
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Legal Standard for New Trial
Ms. Joyce’s motion for new trial is made pursuant to Rule 59. FED. R. CIV. P.
59. Under Rule 59, a court may grant a new trial on some or all of the issues
submitted to the jury “for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been
granted in an action at law in federal court.” FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1)(A). Similarly,
after a nonjury trial, a court may grant a rehearing “for any reason for which a
rehearing has heretofore been granted in a suit in equity in federal court.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 59(a)(1)(B). When assessing a motion for a new trial following a jury verdict,
a trial judge has limited discretion:
A trial judge may not grant a motion for a new trial merely because he
or she might have reached a conclusion contrary to that of the jurors,
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rather, the trial judge may set aside a jury’s verdict only if he or she
believes that the outcome is against the clear weight of the evidence
such that upholding the verdict will result in a miscarriage of justice.
Conway v. Electro Switch Corp., 825 F.2d 593, 598-99 (1st Cir. 1987). In making
this ruling, a court is “free to independently weigh the evidence.” Jennings v. Jones,
587 F.3d 430, 436 (1st Cir. 2009). At the same time, as regards a jury verdict, a
“‘district judge cannot displace a jury’s verdict merely because he disagrees with it’
or because ‘a contrary verdict may have been equally . . . supportable.’” Id. (quoting
Ahern v. Scholz, 85 F.3d 774, 780 (1st Cir. 1996)). In other words, “trial judges do
not sit as thirteenth jurors, empowered to reject any verdict with which they
disagree.” Id. In short, to succeed Ms. Joyce must demonstrate that “the outcome is
against the clear weight of the evidence such that upholding the verdict will result
in a miscarriage of justice.” Webber v. Int’l Paper Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 160, 171 (D.
Me. 2004) (quoting Johnson v. Spencer Press of Me., Inc., 364 F.3d 368, 375 (1st Cir.
2004)).
B.
Analysis
First, none of the evidence that Ms. Joyce refers to in her motion is “new”
within the meaning of the law.
To constitute new evidence, Ms. Joyce must
establish “(1) the evidence was discovered after trial, (2) the exercise of due
diligence would not have resulted in the evidence being discovered at an earlier
stage, and (3) the newly discovered evidence is of such magnitude that production of
it earlier would likely have changed the outcome of the case.” Defenders of Wildlife
v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 929 (9th Cir. 1999). The four affidavits that Ms. Joyce
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attached to her motion for new trial were prepared in 2008, well prior to trial, and
Ms. Joyce has made no showing that she was unaware of the affidavits or that she
could not have procured them before the 2012 jury trial in this case. As the Postal
Service points out, another similar excerpt of the Employee and Labor Relations
Manual was marked as Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 3 during trial, and Ms. Joyce has
made no showing that the excerpt she has attached to her motion was unavailable
to her at trial. Thus, to the extent Ms. Joyce is claiming she is entitled to a new
trial because of new evidence, her claim must fail.
Second, no doubt, Ms. Joyce maintains a heartfelt conviction that the Postal
Service employees who testified at trial were lying. However, these witnesses were
placed under oath, subjected to cross-examination, and both the jury and the Court
had a full opportunity to evaluate their credibility.
Ms. Joyce was represented
extremely well by her attorney; he marshaled the facts in her favor, disputed
countervailing evidence, and presented the best possible case. Nevertheless, despite
his professional efforts and her own testimony in this case, both the jury and the
Court simply took a different view of the critical testimony. As the Court wrote,
even though Ms. Joyce demonstrated that the Postal Service’s “hiring process for
Mail Handler positions in 2008 was surprisingly irregular and ad hoc,” there was no
evidence that its decision not to hire her was related to her age. Mem. Decision at 1.
The jury verdict in favor of the Postal Service leads to a similar conclusion about
her sex discrimination claim.
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There has been no miscarriage of justice in this case. Ms. Joyce had her day
in court, made her arguments, presented evidence, cross-examined opposing
witnesses, and did not sustain her burden of proof on either her age or sex
discrimination claims. Had Ms. Joyce been required to prove only that the Postal
Service’s hiring process was imperfect, she likely would have succeeded. However,
she was required to prove that the Postal Service discriminated against her because
of her age or gender, and she produced no evidence that the imperfections in the
Postal Service’s hiring process had anything at all to do with either age or gender.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES Kathleen Joyce’s Motion for a New Trial (ECF No. 90).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 12th day of April, 2013
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