ROBINSON v. MILLER et al

Filing 90

ORDER ON MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION denying 87 Motion to Strike, granting 87 Motion to Extend Time for response, and granting 87 Motion for Leave to File in excess of page limit By MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN H. RICH III. (nrg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE

DAVID J. ROBINSON,
Plaintiff
v.
JO MILLER,
Defendant

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No. 2:11-cv-56-JHR

ORDER ON MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
The plaintiff moves to strike the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff’s
Motion to Strike Defendants’1 Summary Judgment Motion in its Entirety or, in the Alternative,
for Sanctions and Other Relief (“Motion”) (Docket No. 87), on the grounds that the motion’s
accompanying statement of material facts violates Local Rule 56 and the order of Judge
Kravchuk of this court that the statement of material facts be “reasonable” and not contain
“every fact revealed through the extensive discovery process.” Docket No. 72. I deny the
motion and grant the parties the requested extensions of the deadlines for the filing of their
respective opposition and reply.
The statement of material facts that accompanies the defendant’s motion contains 213
paragraphs, in 36 pages. Docket No. 76. Some of the paragraphs are lengthy and contain several
distinct facts. Local Rule 56(b) requires the statement of material facts supporting a motion for
summary judgment to be “separate, short, and concise.”
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One of the original two defendants in this action, Herbert Miller, has died.

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The plaintiff contends that the

defendant’s statement constitutes a “flagrant” and “breathtaking” violation of Judge Kravchuk’s
order and imposes “undue burden and expense” on the plaintiff, who must respond to each
factual assertion. Motion at 1, 2.
The defendant responds that the plaintiff has filed a motion that is “procedurally
prohibited and borderline frivolous.” Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Response”) (Docket No. 89) at 1. The plaintiff’s
motion is neither, although it is hardly a model of restraint. In addition, even the section of the
opinion in Randall v. Potter, 366 F.Supp.2d 120, 121 n.1 (D. Me. 2005), cited by the defendant,
Response at 1-2, demonstrates that a motion to strike an entire statement of material facts is not
“procedurally prohibited.”
While the defendant’s statement of material facts could undoubtedly have been made
more “short and concise,” it is only the most egregious of transgressions that justify complete
rejection by this court, see, e.g., Learnard v. Inhabitants of the Town of Van Buren, 182
F.Supp.2d 115, 119-20 (D. Me. 2002), and the statement of material facts submitted by the
defendant in this case does not meet that standard. Counsel for the plaintiff and the court will
undoubtedly have to devote more time to the motion than might have been the case had counsel
for the defendant been more succinct, but that fact does not justify the imposition of sanctions.
The plaintiff’s request to extend the deadline for his response to the motion by two
weeks, to November 17, 2011, is granted, as is his request for a limit of 25 pages for his
opposing memorandum of law.
The defendant’s request for sanctions, Response at 2, is denied. Her request for an
extension by four days of the deadline for her reply, to December 5, 2011, is granted.

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Counsel for both parties are advised that the overheated rhetoric employed in the motion
at issue and the response is of no assistance to the court, and its use is best avoided as this case
moves forward.

Dated this 28th day of October, 2011.

/s/ John H. Rich III
John H. Rich III
United States Magistrate Judge

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