STEWART v. MAINE STATE POLICE et al
Filing
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DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS - granting 17 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. By JUDGE D. BROCK HORNBY. (mnw)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
MARY STEWART,
PLAINTIFF
v.
PATRICK J. FLEMING,
ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS
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NO. 1:11-CV-396-DBH
DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Mary Stewart originally filed a complaint in the Maine Superior Court
against the Maine State Police and Troopers Bureau and Mills.
In it, she
alleged that they violated her state and federal constitutional rights during a
June 2009 arrest and detention.
The defendants removed the case here.
Stewart then amended her complaint to assert that Patrick J. Fleming, chief of
the Maine State Police, also was liable for some of the 2009 violations of her
rights.1 Chief Fleming moved to dismiss the amended complaint against him
on the basis that Stewart failed to state a claim for supervisory liability. Def.
Fleming’s Mot. to Dismiss (Docket Item 17).
I GRANT Fleming’s motion to
dismiss because the amended complaint does not provide any legal basis or
factual claim for relief against him.
1 Stewart does not assert that he is liable for the excessive force claim under Count 2, but does
include him under the unlawful arrest claim (Count 1), the malicious prosecution claim (Count
3), the malicious abuse of process claim (Count 5), and the Maine Civil Rights Act claim (Count
6). She also adds a new Count 5 that is leveled against only Chief Fleming, namely, that he
refused or neglected to prevent the actions of Troopers Bureau and Mills. Am. Compl. (Docket
Item 10).
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), I accept the allegations of the complaint as
true, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Albright v.
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440,
443 (1st Cir. 1992).
But to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a
claim must contain more than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or
“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). That is, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not
suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Furthermore, a claim
upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570.
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
ANALYSIS
Stewart seeks to hold Chief Fleming liable solely in his capacity as a
supervisor.
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37(e), 51 (Fleming “is liable in a supervisory
capacity”). Her legal argument in its entirety is as follows:
SUPERVISORY LIABILITY:
Supervisory liability can be grounded on either the
supervisor's direct participation in the unconstitutional
conduct, or through conduct that amounts to condonation
or tacit authorization. See Maldonado-Denis v. CastilloRodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994). There must be
an affirmative link between the action or inaction of the
supervisor and the behavior of the subordinate. Maldonado,
et al v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d. 263, 274 (1st Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint adequately alleges
Fleming’s Supervisory liability, arising from condonation or
tacit authorization of specific acts of Bureau and Mills,
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which resulted in plaintiff’s injuries. Both notice and
grounds (as required by Twombly) are found in the
paragraphs below:
27. Defendant Fleming had knowledge or, had he
diligently exercised his duties to instruct, supervise,
control, and discipline on a continuing basis, should have
had knowledge that the wrongs conspired to be done, as
heretofore alleged, were about to be committed [by]
Defendants Bureau and Mills and had power to prevent or
aid in preventing the commission of said wrongs, and could
have done so by reasonable diligence, but knowingly,
recklessly, or with gross negligence failed or refused to do
so.
28. Defendant Fleming directly or indirectly, under
color of law, approved or ratified the conduct of Bureau and
Mills, which was unlawful, deliberate, malicious, reckless,
and wanton as heretofore described.
The specific factual context of Bureau and Mills’
activities are also provided in the Amended Complaint and
tightly circumscribed by time, manner, and place, over the
course of an approximate two week period with specific
allegations as to the acts and omissions of Bureau and
Mills and the resulting injury to Plaintiff. These allegations
are neither vague nor are they mere threadbare recitals of
the elements needed to state claims for relief. Moreover, the
causal connection between Fleming’s condonation or tacit
authorization of Bureau’s Mills’ acts, and plaintiff’s harm is
directly alleged, as is the appropriate level of intent. Plaintiff
may not yet have set forth facts sufficient to prevail on her
claims against Fleming, but because much of the evidence
supporting the claims (and factual the allegations therein)
was/is in Defendants’ possession to begin with, discovery,
which is ongoing, is necessary to determine how strong the
claims may be for trial purposes. Sufficiency of fact is
different than the standard for dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6). To survive the motion, plaintiff must merely is
cross the line from conceivable to plausible, as far as facts
alleged are concerned. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint does so.
Accordingly, this court should deny Defendant
Fleming’s Motion to Dismiss.
Pl.’s Opp’n to Def. Fleming’s Mot. to Dismiss at 2-3 (footnotes omitted) (Docket
Item 23). In a footnote Stewart adds: “Plaintiff agrees with Defendant that the
factual allegation in paragraph 27 does not support any claim against Fleming
for which Plaintiff can recover.” Id. at n.3. Stewart also does not rely upon her
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Amended Complaint ¶ 29 alleging negligent training of Troopers Bureau and
Mills by Chief Fleming.
Federal Constitutional Claims
“[S]upervisory liability cannot be predicated on a respondeat superior
theory. Supervisors may only be held liable under § 1983 on the basis of their
own acts or omissions.” Whitfield v. Melendez–Rivera, 431 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir.
2005) (internal citation omitted).
Accordingly, as the First Circuit has
explained:
[i]n the context of Section 1983 actions, supervisory liability
typically arises in one of two ways: either the supervisor
may be a “primary violator or direct participant in the
rights-violating incident,” or liability may attach “if a
responsible official supervises, trains, or hires a
subordinate with deliberate indifference toward the
possibility that deficient performance of the task eventually
may contribute to a civil rights deprivation.”
Sanchez v. Pereira–Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 49 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Camilo–
Robles v. Zapata, 175 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1999)). In either case, the plaintiff
in a Section 1983 action must show “‘an affirmative link, whether through
direct participation or through conduct that amounts to condonation or tacit
authorization,’ between the actor and the underlying violation.”
Id. (quoting
Camilo–Robles, 175 F.3d at 44).
It is obvious that paragraphs 27 and 28 provide absolutely no factual
specifics about Chief Fleming’s alleged unconstitutional conduct. The absence
of discovery is no excuse for that.
Twombley makes clear that factual
allegations are the prerequisite for discovery.
Twombley, 550 U.S. at 556.
Here, Stewart makes no allegations that Chief Fleming was a direct participant
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in the conduct that she alleges violated her constitutional rights. Instead, her
allegations against the Chief are simply that, as a supervisor, he “had
knowledge or, . . . , should have had knowledge” of the wrongful conduct of
Bureau and Mills and “approved or ratified the conduct of Bureau and Mills.”
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27, 28.
Although that assertion constitutes a factual claim
about the Chief’s state of mind, the Supreme Court has concluded that a bare
allegation of intent is inadequate to state a claim without more specific factual
assertions. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (rejecting the “bare assertion” that
defendants “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject
[plaintiff] to harsh conditions . . . solely on account of [his] religion, race,
and/or national origin” because of its conclusory nature).
Thus, because Stewart offers no factual allegations to show that Chief
Fleming’s action or inaction was affirmatively linked to the allegedly
constitutionally improper behavior of those he supervised, I will dismiss all the
federal claims.
Maine Civil Rights Act
Stewart provides no additional factual allegations for Chief Fleming’s
liability on her Maine Civil Rights Act claim. She says only that “Fleming is
liable in a supervisory capacity superior [sic] for the acts of Defendants Bureau
and Mills.” Am. Compl. ¶ 37(e). Because Chief Fleming is entitled to dismissal
of the federal constitutional claims, he is likewise not liable for the state
constitutional claims. Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548 F.3d 155, 178-79
(1st Cir. 2008) (because “protections provided by the Maine Civil Rights Act,
including immunities, are coextensive with those afforded by 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
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the dismissal of all of the Estate’s § 1983 claims mandates that this claim
receive similar treatment”).
Accordingly, I GRANT the defendant Fleming’s motion to dismiss in its
entirety.
SO ORDERED.
DATED THIS 13TH DAY OF MARCH, 2012
/S/D. BROCK HORNBY
D. BROCK HORNBY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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