PACKGEN v. BERRY PLASTICS CORPORATION et al

Filing 203

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' POST-JUDGMENT MOTION By JUDGE NANCY TORRESEN. (rmb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
PACKGEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
BERRY PLASTICS CORPORATION,
and COVALENCE SPECIALTY
COATINGS, LLC,
Defendants.

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ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ POST-JUDGMENT MOTION
This matter comes before me on the Defendants’ Post-Judgment Motion for
Judgment as a Matter of Law, for a New Trial, and/or for Altering or Amending the
Judgment (“Defs.’ Post-Judgment Motion”) (ECF No. 190). For the reasons stated
below, the Defendants’ motion is DENIED.
LEGAL STANDARD
“A party seeking to overturn a jury verdict faces an uphill battle.” Marcano
Rivera v. Turabo Med. Ctr. P’ship, 415 F.3d 162, 167 (1st Cir. 2005). In reviewing a
motion made under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), the court “must scrutinize
the evidence and the inferences reasonably extractable therefrom in the light most
hospitable to the nonmovant.” Martínez–Serrano v. Quality Health Servs. of P.R., Inc.,
568 F.3d 278, 284 (1st Cir. 2009). The court may “not pass upon the credibility of the
witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or engage in a comparative weighing of the
proof.” Id. at 285. The motion should only be granted “if the evidence . . . dictates a

result as to which reasonable minds cannot differ.” Downey v. Bob's Disc. Furniture
Holdings, Inc., 633 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2011).
When considering a motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a), “[a] district court
may set aside the jury's verdict and order a new trial only if the verdict is against the
law, against the weight of the credible evidence, or tantamount to a miscarriage of
justice.” Casillas-Díaz v. Palau, 463 F.3d 77, 81 (1st Cir. 2006). In deciding whether
to grant a new trial, the court may consider the credibility of witnesses and weigh the
evidence. Jennings v. Jones, 587 F.3d 430, 436 (1st Cir. 2009). But “a jury's verdict
on the facts should only be overturned in the most compelling circumstances.” Wells
Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850 F.2d 803, 811 (1st Cir. 1988).
The parties dispute whether the Defendants’ Rule 50(b) motion is properly
before me, given that I previously denied the Defendants’ renewed oral motion for
judgment as a matter of law. See ECF No. 181; Tr. of Proceedings on Nov. 12, 2015,
7:20-25; 8:1-7 (ECF No. 192). Even if I accepted the Plaintiff’s argument that I have
already denied the Defendants’ Rule 50(b) motion, I would still construe the current
motion as a motion for reconsideration of that order under Rule 59(e). See, e.g.,
Beautiful Home Textiles (USA), Inc. v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., No.
13-cv-1725-LGS, 2015 WL 2330066, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2015) (treating a postjudgment motion for judgment as a matter of law as a motion for reconsideration
because the court had already denied the plaintiff’s motion for judgment as a matter
of law after the verdict was announced). A motion for reconsideration is an
extraordinary remedy that may be granted in three situations: “1) where the court

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made manifest error of fact or law; 2) where there is newly discovered evidence; and,
3) where there has been a change in the law.” Lakshman v. Univ. of Maine Sys., 338
F. Supp. 2d 162, 164 (D. Me. 2004).
ANALYSIS
Under any of the above standards, the Defendants’ motion fails. When I denied
the Defendants’ Rule 50(a) motion at the close of the Plaintiff’s case, I explained that
there was a significant amount of evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to
conclude that the Defendants’ defective foil laminate caused the Plaintiff to lose the
business it expected from the 37 refineries. That conclusion has not changed.
Likewise, the Defendants’ argument regarding the unreliability of Mr. Filler’s
statistical model for the 37 refineries is not persuasive. This argument was previously
addressed and rejected by Judge Woodcock in his thorough order denying the
Defendants’ Daubert motion. See Order on Mot. to Exclude Expert Test. 39-45 (ECF
No. 71). I agree with Judge Woodcock’s conclusion concerning the admissibility of Mr.
Filler’s testimony and will not disturb the verdict simply because the jury did not
credit the Defendants’ expert witnesses.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES the Defendants’ PostJudgment Motion (ECF No. 190).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Nancy Torresen
United States Chief District Judge
Dated this 29th day of January, 2016.
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