MURTAGH, MD v. ST MARY'S REGIONAL HEALTH CENTER et al

Filing 64

ORDER ON MOTION TO BIFURCATE denying 55 Motion to Bifurcate By JUDGE NANCY TORRESEN. (dfr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
JAMES MURTAGH, M.D.,
Plaintiff,
v.
ST. MARY’S REGIONAL HEALTH
CENTER, ST. MARY’S HEALTH
SYSTEM, IRA SHAPIRO, M.D. and
JOHN DOE 1 through 10 and JANE
DOE 1 through 10,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
) Docket no. 2:12-cv-00160-NT
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER ON MOTION TO BIFURCATE
This case comes before the Court on St. Mary’s Regional Health Center, St.
Mary’s Heath System, and Ira Shapiro, M.D.’s (“Defendants”) motion under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) to bifurcate this case (ECF No. 55). For the
reasons discussed below, the Defendants’ motion to bifurcate is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Murtagh was employed as a locum tenens physician at Defendant St. Mary’s
Regional Health Center (the “Hospital”) from April 12, 2010 through May 12, 2010,
when his placement was prematurely terminated. Murtagh filed suit against the
Defendants on May 11, 2012. On September 23, 2013, the Court entered an order
dismissing the Plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract, tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage, false light, enforcement of rights of a third-party
beneficiary, and wrongful discharge and retaliation against a whistleblower, but
preserving the Plaintiff’s claims for defamation and violation of a Maine employee

notice statute, 26 M.R.S.A. § 630. This order was followed by the Plaintiff’s motion
to file a second amended complaint (ECF No. 57), and the Court’s order granting
that motion (ECF No. 62).
The Second Amended Complaint includes the Plaintiff’s surviving claims but
also resurrects the Plaintiff’s tortious interference and false light claims. The
Plaintiff’s tort claims all arise from the same essential facts: that Defendant
Shapiro made false and defamatory statements to hospitals and recruiting firms to
frustrate Murtagh’s attempts to keep or obtain any further employment. See Sec.
Am. Compl. ¶ 61. The Plaintiff’s statutory claim requires proof that Murtagh is an
“employee” of the Hospital, as that term is used in 26 M.R.S.A. § 630.
DISCUSSION
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b), the Court may order separate
trials of issues in a case “for convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and
economize . . . .” In considering bifurcation, the “major consideration . . . must be
which procedure is more likely to result in a just and expeditious final disposition of
the litigation.” 9A Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2388 (3d ed.). The party
requesting bifurcation has the burden to show it is warranted. Thorndike ex rel.
Thorndike v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 220 F.R.D. 6, 8 (D. Me. 2004). The decision to
grant a motion to bifurcate rests in the Court’s discretion. Id. (citing GonzalezMarin v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of U.S., 845 F.2d 1140, 1145 (1st Cir.
1988) and Warner v. Rossignol, 513 F.2d 678, 684 (1st. Cir. 1975)).

2

The Defendants request that the Court bifurcate this case into two phases,
the first dealing with whether the federal Healthcare Quality Improvement Act of
1986, 42 U.S.C. §§11101-11152 (the “HCQIA”) provides immunity from the
Plaintiff’s tort claims, and the second dealing with the Plaintiff’s statutory claim
and with the merits of the Plaintiff’s surviving tort claims, if any. The Plaintiff
opposes bifurcation on the ground that the HCQIA is inapplicable to this case. The
HCQIA’s provisions may apply to the Defendants’ alleged communications with
hospitals regarding the Plaintiff’s credentialing.1 But the same cannot be said for
the Defendants’ alleged communications with recruiters including Vista, Locum
Medical Group, and Alliance Recruiting. Because the recruiters are not “health care
entities,” and do not determine whether a physician may have clinical privileges,
communications with these groups do not appear to come within the scope of the
HCQIA. This prevents any clean bifurcation of this case into a first phase dealing
solely with HCQIA immunity and a second phase dealing solely with damages.
Accordingly, the Court denies the Defendants’ motion to bifurcate.

See 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(2) (protecting anyone “providing information to a professional
review body regarding the competence or professional conduct of a physician” from liability for
damages “unless such information is false and the person providing it knew that such information
was false.”); 42 U.S.C. § 11151(11) (defining a “professional review body” as: “a health care entity and
the governing body or any committee of a health care entity which conducts professional review
activity, and includes any committee of the medical staff of such an entity when assisting the
governing body in a professional review activity.”); 42 U.S.C. § 11151(10) (defining “professional
review activities” to include activities “of a health care entity with respect to an individual physician
. . . to determine whether the physician may have clinical privileges”—i.e. credentialing).
1

3

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Defendant’s motion to bifurcate is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Nancy Torresen
United States District Judge
Dated this 10th day of December, 2013.

4